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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the thesis is to analyse the function fulfilled 
by the Youth Opportunities Programme (1978-1983) in its wider 
political, economic and historical context. There are three main 
sections to the work. 
The first establishes the context from which the Youth Opportun-
ities Programme (YOP) emerged. This includes: an analysis of the 
origins and early development of the Manpower Services Commission 
(MSC); an historical account of government policy and special 
measures for the relief of unemployment; and a description of the 
circumstances and manner in which these elements came together in 
the development of the MSC's special measures policy, leading to 
the launch of YOP in April 1978. It is concluded that the initial 
role of the programme was essentially that of a palliative in the 
context of the Labour Government's social contract relationship 
with the trade union movement rather than being a positive element 
in the MSC's development of a comprehensive manpower policy. 
The second section is concerned with the actual development and 
performance of the programme in relation to its original object-
ives. This includes national level analyses in terms of both 
quantitative and qualitative objectives, and the conclusions of 
a case study conducted in the Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area. 
The third section examines the significance of the divergences 
revealed between objectives and results, both in the context of 
contemporary political and economic developments, and also in a 
wider historical context which includes the initial progress made 
by YOP's successor, the Youth Training Scheme (YTS). It is 
concluded that, although YOP continued to act as a palliative, 
it developed beyond this towards a new form of active manpower 
policy consistent with a monetarist macro-economic context. On 
the basis of this analysis, alternative scenarios for the future 
are briefly considered. 
1 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude 
to the following people: Dr Tessa Blackstone and Professor Mark Blaug 
for undertaking the supervision of this thesis; Steve Butters and 
Paul Richardson for the help and encouragement which they gave me 
in their capacity as Research Officers on the Education Training and 
the Youth Opportunities Programme Project to which my studentship 
2 
was officially linked; the many people, too numerous to name individually, 
who gave me interviews or supplied information by other means; Glynis 
Robinson and Mona Eldridge, my typists; and finally, my family and 
friends who have supported me throughout this endeavour. 
CONTENTS 
Abstract 1 
Acknowledgements ..................................... 2 
Contents 3 
Tables and Figures 5 
Introduction 7 
1. The Manpower Services Commission: Origins and Early 
Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
1. The Creation of the MSC 14 
2. The MSC and Active Manpower Policy.............. 18 
3. 
4. 
The MSC, Corporatism and 'Hiving Off' 
Towards a Comprehensive Manpower Policy 
2. Unemployment and government Policy: A History of 
34 
46 
Special Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
3. The Manpower Services Commission and Special Measures 88 
1. Pre-YOP Special Measures 
2. 
3. 
The Holland Report 
Special Measures in Historical Context 
4. The Development and Performance of the Youth 
88 
110 
136 
Opportunities Programme: Part I Quantity........... 149 
1. The Growth of Unemployment 
2. The Quantitative Development of YOP 
149 
154 
3. Criteria for the Measurement of YOP's Performance 168 
4. The Undertakings 170 
5. Employability................................... 191 
5. The Development and Performance of the Youth 
Opportunities Programme: Part II Quality........... 211 
1. Quality Improvement and Training Content ........ 211 
2. The Initial Approach to Quality Improvement and 
its Measurement 
3. Off-the-job Training 
4. The Training of Sponsors' Staff 
5. Monitoring 
6. Substitution and Displacement 
7. Research and Development 
8. Quality or Collapse 
9. The New Training Initiative 
10. Towards a Comprehensive Training Scheme 
213 
217 
222 
229 
238 
250 
259 
274 
280 
3 
6. The Conclusions of the Local Case Study 
Introduction 
1. Relevance 
2. Quality of Content 
294 
294 
299 
303 
3. Labour Market Interference ....................... 307 
4. Quality Improvement Initiatives 
5. Implications for YTS 
7. The Significance of the Youth Opportunities Programme 
313 
317 
in its Contemporary Political and Economic Environment 322 
1. Summary Assessment of YOP 322 
2. The Changed Political and Economic Environment ... 329 
3. Thatcherism and the MSC 336 
4. Thatcherism and the Role of YOP as a Palliative ... 340 
5. The Alternative Economic Role of YOP 345 
6. The Significance of the 1979 General Election .... 351 
7. The Question of Government Intent 
8. Trade Union Involvement and the Survival of 
Corporatism 
9. YTS as YOP's Redemption 
8. The Youth Opportunities Programme in its Wider 
357 
361 
375 
Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 
1. The First Year of YTS 381 
2. The Demise of the MSC's Original Interpretation 
of an Active Manpower Policy .................... 392 
3. The Development of a Monetarist Active Manpower 
Policy .......................................... 407 
4. The Impasse for the MSC 
5. Alternatives for the Future 
413 
415 
6. Implications for the Historical Judgement of YOP 430 
Concl~sion 438 
Appendix: YOP in the Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area .. 446 
I Introduction 
II The Local Programme 
Bibliography 
Cirriculum Vitae 
446 
480 
618 
629 
4 
Tables 
Table 1 
Table 2 
Table 3 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
The Original Plan of the Youth Opportunities 
Programme 
Expenditure on YOP 1978-79 to 1982-83 
YOP Entrants by Scheme Type 
122 
155 
160 
Table 4 Gross Unit Costs of Special Programmes ....... 165 
Table 5 
Table 6 
The Results of The School Leaver Undertaking. 172 
School Leaver Unemployment as a Percentage of 
Total Unemployment in Great Britian - Annual 
Averages 1971-1982 .......................... 176 
Table 7 The Results of the Undertaking to Long-Term 
Unemployed Young People .................... . 
Table 8a Young People under 19 Unemployed for over a 
Year 
8b As a Percentage of Total Unemployment in 
177 
Great Britain of over a Year's Duration ...... 182 
Table 9 The Results of the Undertaking to the 'Other' 
16 and 17 Year Olds ........................ . 
Table lOa Young People under 18 Unemployed for over 
Six Months 
lOb As a Percentage of Total Unemployment in 
187 
Great Britain of Over Six Months' Duration 189 
Table 11 Work Experience Trainees Receiving Off-the-job 
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 
Table 12 Industrial Analysis of Employees in Employment: 
Great Britian and Portsmouth TWA ............ 457 
Table 13 Destinations of those reaching the Minimum 
School Leaving Age in the Portsmouth Travel-to-
Work Area 1976-82 . ....•........ ............. 462 
Table 14 Industrial Analysis of Employment known to have 
been entered by School and College Leavers 
during Year ended 30th September, 1982 - South 
East Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465 
Table 15 Hampshire School and College Leavers, 1982 
Entrants to Employment as a Percentage of 
Table 16 
Table 17 
1977 Entrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466 
Composition of YOP/Special Measures Provision 
in Hampshire and South East Hampshire, 
1977-1982 . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . • . . 475 
Occupational Distribution of WEEP Places - Both 
Filled and Unfilled - in South East Hampshire: 
December 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482 
5 
Figures 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
Figure 5 
Total Unemployment in Great Britain 1977-1983. 152 
Unemployment among 16-18 Year Olds: 
Quarterly 1977-1982 .......................... 153 
Unemployment among School Leavers: 
Quarterly 1977-1982 .•........................ 153 
Entrants to YOP 155 
National Follow-ups of Work Experience Trainees 
Entering Schemes, September 1978 - December 1981 193 
Figure 6 National 1 in 6 Follow-ups of TSD Trainees 
Leaving Schemes, January 1980 - September 1982 195 
Figure 7 Young People as a Proportion of Total Unemploy-
ment 1978-1983 .....•......................... 200 
Figure 8 Annual Rates of Unemployment, Great Britain and 
Portsmouth TWA ...... . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450 
Figure 9 The Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area 453 
Figure 10 Monthly Totals of Young People Registered at 
Careers Offices in South East Hampshire, 1974-83 468 
Figure 11 Young People Participating in Special Measures 
in Hampshire and South East Hampshire, 1976-83 469 
Figure 12 Young People Registered as Unemployed or 
Participating in Special Measures, Portsmouth 
TWA, 1976-1983 ............................... 470 
Figure 13 Analysis of the Destinations of Young People 
Completing YOP in South East Hampshire, 
January 1980-September 1982 .................. 479 
6 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1950s and 1960s the process of transition from school 
to work was relatively unproblematical for most young people. 
There may have been a lack of training available, but there were 
plenty of jobs to choose from. For those young people without many 
qualifications, and who were not undertaking an apprenticeship, 
it was common practice to tryout a number of jobs in rapid 
succession before settling down into what would be a more long term 
career. This was made possible by the conditions of effective full 
employment which had prevailed since the end of the Second World 
War. 
In the 1970s unemployment went out of control Young people were 
disproportionately affected, and the transition from school to 
work became an issue of major public concern. The need was seen 
for increased state intervention and the main responsibility for 
this was given to a newly-created governmental agency, the Manpower 
Services Commission(M.S.C.). 
In October 1976 the MSC published a review document entitled 
Towards a Comprehensive Manpower Policy. This constituted the 
first attempt on the part of the Commission since its formation in 
1974 to produce a strategic overview of its policy, role, and 
structure, in relation to a projection into the future of current 
economic and labour market trends. The policy recommendation that 
derived from the analysis of current youth unemployment trends was 
as follows: 
"it should become an objective of the Commission to 
ensure that all young people of 16 to 18 years of age 
who have no job or who are not engaged in further or 
higher full-time education should have the opportunity 
of training, of participation in a job creation programme 
or of work experience". (1) 
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The outcome of this statement was that a working party was set 
up with a brief to study all the existing measures to help 
unemployed young people, and to report on the feasibility of 
securing the above-stated objectives. In May 1977 the working party 
published its report under the title of Young People and Work 
(usually referred to as the Holland Report). It consisted of 
detailed proposals for the establishment ofa new Youth Opportunities 
Programme (Y.O.P), packaged in the optimistic rhetoric of anew deal 
for young people: 
"The time has now come to turn a major problem and cost 
into an opportunity and a benefit. 
********************* 
We hope that the programme we propose can provide as 
many opportunities as are likely to be needed. It offers 
each young person an effective bridge to permanent employment 
and encourages and helps him or her to cross at the 
earliest available moment. Moreover, the programme is 
designed to bring young people the kind of help they most 
need in the form they want it. It thus aims to demonstrate 
by deeds rather than words that society cares about them, 
and, through them, about its own future". (2) 
YOP was launched on 1st April 1978. Five years later, when the 
programme was closed to new entrants, it had catered for over 
1.8 million young people. Yet, despite this massive quantitative 
achievement which was far beyond anything originally anticipated 
by the authors of the Holland Report, the credibility of the 
programme had to a large extent been exhausted by this stage. Under 
extremely difficult circumstances, it had succeeded in providing as 
many opportunities as were needed, at least as defined in terms of 
its principal undertaking to unemployed school leavers. Yet, 
increasingly, it had failed to provide an effective bridge into. 
permanent employment. Moreover, it had not lived up to original 
expectations in terms of training content and the general quality 
of provision. Doubts had emerged about its overall impact on the 
youth labour market, and widespread complaints had been made of 
'cheap labour' and other such abuses leading to the destruction of 
permanent jobs. At the end of the five years, despite YOP taking 
up to 300,000 young people off the labour market at anyone time, 
youth unemployment remained as much a problem, if not more, than 
it was at the start. 
YOP began to lose credibility from its second year onwards, and by 
mid-way through the third year a point of crisis had been reached. 
The only way in which the programme was able to continue, and to 
complete its five year lifespan, was on the basis of the promise 
that it was leading to something very different and much better. 
This was to be the Youth Training Scheme (Y.T.S.). 
The equivalent of the Holland Report for YTS was a document called 
the Youth Task Group Report which was published in April 1982. 
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This made clear from the beginning that the new scheme being proposed 
was not to be just another temporary special programme for the 
young unemployed. Thus the opening paragraph stated: 
"This report is about providing a permanent bridge between 
school and work. It is not about youth unemployment. 
What we propose will improve the prospects of young people 
to get and keep jobs but we have not been concerned with 
temporary measures". (3 ) 
The permanent bridge was to be based upon the comprehensive 
provision of an integrated and high quality programme of training, 
education and.work experience for all young people leaving school, 
whether employed or unemployed. Yet, whatever the intended 
differences in terms of content, the style of presentation involved 
the same rhetoric of the historic new deal for young people which 
had originally been applied to YOP. The report concluded: 
'The government has created a major opportunity for 
itself, for the country, and above all, for young people. 
The opportunity is there for the taking'. (4) 
Since its replacement by YTS in April 1983, YOP's reputation has 
not improved in hindsight. If anything, it has deteriorated 
still further. Those who were previously responsible for the 
programme, and who fought hard to sustain its credibility, no 
longer have any reason to defend YOP. Their interest now lies 
in emphasising the extent of the difference between YOP and YTS, 
and drawing attention to the failings of the former is one way 
of attempting to boost the reputation of the latter. What were 
previously regarded as momentous achievements of YOP have largely 
been forgotten, and after one year of YTS almost everybody seems 
10 
to refer back to the 'now discredited youth Opportunities Programme'. 
Yet, the two entities cannot be completely separated in this way. 
In many important respects YOP led directly to YTS, and in certain 
ways YTS appears to have reproduced the fundamental characteristics 
of YOP. Ultimately, any historical judgement of the meaning and 
achievements of the youth Opportunities Programme must include 
some assessment of the establishment of the youth Training Scheme 
and its eventual outcome. 
The object of this thesis is both to detail the events which have 
just been sketched and to analyse them in a wider historical, 
political, and economic context. The description of the development 
and performance of the youth Opportunities Programme includes not 
only an account from a national level perspective, but also a 
detailed case study of a particular local labour market, the Portsmouth 
Travel-to-Work Area. An important characteristic of YOP was its 
diversified mode of administration which was intended to enhance 
the programme's capacity to adapt to the individual needs of 
different local labour markets. As a result, there were certain 
aspects of its performance that could only be adequately assessed 
at a local level. Yet, obviously, there are certain limitations to 
the extent that generalisations can be drawn from a single case 
study. For this reason, the main account of the local research 
has been reproduced in the form of an extended appendix. Nevertheless, 
it has been possible to set this account in the context of the 
national level analysis and therefore to integrate its conclusions 
into the main text. Besides this, the local case study has 
provided much illustrative material which not only stands on its 
own in the context of the appendix, but which has informed and 
enriched the main analysis in many ways that are nttexplicitly 
stated. 
The main purpose of the detailed accounts which are given of the 
development and performance of YOP is to compare the actual 
achievements of the programme with what it was originally intended 
to do. This includes a concern with certain effects which might be 
regarded as unintended consequences. The analysis of the differ-
ences which emerged between stated objectives and actual 
results takes place within a wider context which includes both 
the history of manpower policies and special measures for the 
unemployed, as well as the immediate and changing political and 
economic conditions under which YOP developed. 
The starting point of the thesis is with the establishment of the 
historical aspect of this wider context. Thus, Chapter 1 is 
concerned with the origins and early development of the Manpower 
Services Commission, and Chapter 2 with the history of special 
measures for the unemployed. These two themes 'are then brought 
together in Chapter 3 with an account of the growing involvement 
of the Manpower Services Commission with special measures for the 
unemployed leading up to its launch of the Youth Opportunities 
Programme. The same chapter also introduces the immediate political 
and economic context within which these events took place, and 
provides a systematic analysis of the original objectives set 
out by the Holland Report. The next two chapters detail the 
development and performance of YOP at a national level in relation 
to these objectives, Chapter 4 being concerned with quantity and 
Chapter 5 with quality. Chapter 6 then adds in the conclusions 
of the local case study. The material covered in these three 
previous chapters is summarised at the beginning of Chapter 7, 
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before being analysed in the context of the political and economic 
changes which took place over the five year lifespan of the programme. 
Chapter 8 reintroduces the wider historical perspective, starting 
with an account of the progress made in its first year by the 
Youth Training Scheme. The significance of this for the 
historical judgement of YOP is then analysed in terms of the themes 
of manpower policy and special measures for the unemployed. 
Finally in this chapter, there is a brief consideration of alter-
natives for the future. The thesis ends with a formal summary 
of conclusions. The account of the local case study forms a 
separate appendix. 
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Clearly, a wide range of ground is covered: from the 19th Century 
Poor Law to the introduction of the Youth Training Scheme, from the 
broad principles of economic policy to the experience of an 
individual 16 year old serving behind the counter of a small fishing 
tackle shop in Portsmouth. This indicates the extent of the 
implications of a programme such as YOP; yet by no means all 
angles have been covered. In particular, the educational implications 
of the programme have only been briefly touched upon. Generally, 
in attempting to cover such a wide area, it has been necessary 
to be very selective. A number of narrow lines have been drawn 
across from one boundary to another in an attempt to show the links 
between aspects of particular interest. The course of these lines 
has been determined by the central objective of answering two 
relatively straight forward questions; what were the actual effects 
of the Youth Opportunities Programme, both intended and unintended, 
and what was their wider historical, political and economic 
significance? 
Footnotes 
1. MSC, Towards a Comprehensive Manpower Policy, 
October 1976 para.4.21. 
2. MSC, Young People and Work May 1977, p.7. 
3. MSC, Youth Task Group Report. April 1982, 
para.l.l. 
4. Ibid., para. 7.26. 
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CHAPTER 1 THE MANPOWER SERVICES COMMISSION 
ORIGINS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
1. The Creation of the MSC 
The Manpower Services Commission began its operations in 
January 1974, its statutory basis having been established in the 
1973 Employment and Training Act. At the time of its formation, 
the Commission was considered to be an important innovation: (1) 
at a specific level, in the organisation and management of British 
manpower services; at a more general level, in the conventional 
pattern of operation and responsibility of British government 
and public administration. First, it brought together under the 
same co-ordinating structure both employment and training services 
which had previously existed separately within the Department of 
Employment and had since been in the process of being 'hived off' 
as independent agencies. Secondly, it gave to those who use these 
services - employers and employees - a direct collective respons-
ibility for their management, thus combining representative and 
operational functions in the same organisation. (2) 
The representative aspect of the new body was constituted in its 
'tripartite' composition. The actual Commission, in its most 
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limited sense, was to consist of ten people selected on the following 
basis: three members nominated by organisations representing 
employers (i.e. the CBI); three members nominated by organisations 
representing employees (i.e. the TUC); two members nominated 
by the local authority associations; one member nominated by 
educational interests; and a chairman, in the matter of whose 
appointment the Secretary of State for Employment was given full 
discretion, there being no requirement for consultation. This 
body, supported by a small number of staff, was to take over the 
running of the Employment Services Agency (E.S.A.) and the Training 
Services Agency (T.S.A.), its role being like that of the board of 
directors of a holding company with the two agencies being in effect 
its operational subsidiaries. 
The responsibility of the Commission for the management of 
manpower services was defined as follows by Section 2 of the 
1973 Act: 
"it shall be the duty of the Commission to make such 
arrangements as it considers appropriate for the purpose 
of assisting persons to select, train for, obtain and 
15 
retain employment .... and to obtain suitable emp loyees ... "(3) 
This responsibility had previously been directly in the hands of 
the Secretary of State. Under the new legislation, the Secretary 
of State still retained an overall responsibility and was still 
expected to answer to Parliament for the execution of this 
responsibility, but the day-to-day management of the services 
involved was to be left to the Commission and its two agencies. 
Thus the relationship of the Commission to central government 
was to be that of a semi-autonomous body, or what might loosely 
be referred to as a 'quango' '(4) As such, it was also to act as 
a form of clearing house for labour market information and to have 
a major role in the formulation of manpower policy. Thus, provision 
was made for an annual programme and budget, plus a medium term 
five year rolling programme, to be presented by the Commission each 
year. These would be subject to the approval of the Secretary 
of State, who was also empowered to issue directions of his own. 
Furthermore, the Treasury was to retain control over the funding 
of the Commission, which was to be by means of a 'grant-in-aid' 
through the Department of Employment. 
Thus, the MSC came into existence as a semi-autonomous tripartite 
body, combining representative and operational functions in its 
role of supervising and co-ordinating the management of employ-
ment and training services. As such, it constituted a radically. 
new kind of organisation. Yet, despite the significance of 
the innovation involved, the MSC's creation was the result of what 
was in a certain sense a last minute decision, and consequently 
it was only superimposed over the two agencies when in effect 
they were already independent bodies'(5) A brief examination 
of the immediate context in which the decision to set up the 
MSC was made will demonstrate how this came about. 
Originally, it had been intended by the Conservative Government 
then in power that the two Agencies being hived off from the 
Department of Employment should remain separate. In 1971 
People and Jobs, the consultative document that presented the 
Government's plans for the modernisation and hiving off of the 
employment services, had suggested that some form of general 
council on manpower services should be set up on a tripartite 
basis, in order to facilitate the co-ordination of employment 
services with the other manpower services. However, this was 
only to be an advisory council, and it was not considered 
practical at the time to invest such a body with executive powers 
as well. The idea of such a general advisory council on manpower 
services was repeated in Training For The Future, the consultative 
document concerned with the reorganisation and hiving off of 
training services that was released in 1972. This general 
council, it was proposed, would replace the existing Central 
Training Council, a tripartite advisory body whose role was 
restricted to manpower issues concerned with training. 
During the process of consultation that followed the publication 
of these two documents, a consensus was built up around the 
opinion that a mere advisory council would be inadequate for the 
important task of co-ordinating employment and training policies. 
What was needed instead was some kind of labour board based 
on the Swedish model, capable of exercising executive powers on 
its own behalf in the pursuit of an active and coherent manpower 
policy. This had been along held view of the TUC, (6) and the 
CBI was likewise prepared to give the idea its support. But the 
Conservative Government was initially reluctant to give up its 
opinion that the granting of executive powers to such a body 
would be impractical, (7) and thus it continued with its plans to 
develop the employment and training services as wholly separate 
agencies. Nevertheless, in response to a joint statement from 
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the TUCand the CBI pressing for the establishment of a National 
Manpower Board, the Secretary of State agreed to extend the process 
of consultation; eventually the Government relented, and then 
swiftly came up with proposals of its own for the creation of the 
The consensus that existed between both sides of industry on this 
matter ensured that when these proposals were announced in Parl-
iament by the Tory Secretary of State, Maurice Macmillan, no 
major obstacles were placed in their way. Indeed, the main area 
of dispute between the political parties was over who had thought 
of the idea first. Both Government and Opposition claimed that 
they had been discussing the creation of such a body for a number 
of years; the Secretary of State sought credit for being the 
first person to have acted upon these discussions. (9) Likewise, 
when these proposals were translated into the legislative form 
of the Employment and Training Bill, although there was disagr-
eement over the measures included to curtail the levying powers 
of the Industrial Training Boards, there was broad cross-party 
agreement on the sections concerned with the establishment of the 
MSC. What argument there was concerned the extension and further 
detailing of the powers and responsibilities that were being 
granted. For example, in the course of debate Labour MPs called 
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for the Commission to be given a special and explicit responsibility 
for the unemployed in the 16 to 19 age group. (10) Also the 
TUC would have liked there to have been a more strongly intervent-
ionist role defined for the Commission in the legislation and, 
in particular, for there to have been some explicit allocation 
of responsibility for job creation to the new bodY.(ll) However, 
Government spokesmen argued that the broad and general definition 
of duties under Section 2 of the Bill gave sufficient scope 
to the Commission. (12) 
Thus th~ creation of the MSC came out of a process of consultation 
in which it had not originally been on the agenda. Little over 
a year elapsed between the Government's first announcement of 
its acceptance of the idea (November 1972), and the MSC's coming 
into operation at the beginning of 1974. Yet, such speed was only 
possible because of the strength of the consensus that emerged 
around the idea of creating such a body during the process of 
consultation; and this, in iteslf, was indicative of the fact 
that the idea represented the confluence of a number of powerful 
and longstanding trends. These can be identified both specifically 
within manpower policy, and more generally within the political and 
administrative systero. 
2. The MSC and Active Manpower Policy 
The major trend that needs to be explained within manpower 
policy is the development of what is generally referred to as 
an 'active manpower policy'. This, in its turn, can best be 
understood within the context of a brief history of the develop-
ment of manpower services in this country. 
The history of the two services that were brought together under 
the umbrella of the MSC can be traced back to the first quarter of 
the twentieth century. (13) The origins of the Public Employment 
Service can be found in the 1909 Labour Exchanges Act which 
resulted in the establishment of a National Exchange system under 
the Board of Trade. It was originally envisaged by those 
such a$ Beveridge , who had been responsible for pressing for this 
legislation, that a national system of labour exchanges would be 
able to make an important contribution to the efficiency of the 
operation of the labour market. However, soon after the system 
was established, the exchanges were made responsible for the 
administration of the new national social insurance, and as a 
result, their role in employment placement was rapidly relegated 
to one of secondary importance. (14) 
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The subordination of the original purpose of the employment 
services was to continue for the next half century, despite the 
great extensions of government direction of manpower that took 
place temporarily during each of thetwo world wars. In particular, 
the mass unemployment of the 1920s and 1930s forced further 
emphasis to be put upon the insurance work of the exchanges, at 
the expense of the~r employment and placement functions. (15) This 
situation has often been described within the literature on 
manpower policy in terms of social objectives being given priority 
over economic objectives; social objectives being understood to 
be primarily concerned with the welfare of individuals, economic 
objectives to be primarily concerned with the efficient use of 
labour resources, and the growth and welfare of the economy. (16) 
This same order of priorities has generally been considered to 
have applied to the development of government training services, 
at least up until the early 1960s. The prevalent view was that 
.it was primarily industry's responsibility to meet its own 
training needs, and consequently government provisions were 
reserved for exceptional circumstances, notably those arising 
during or immediately after war, and for special categories, 
such as the disabled. (17) Thus it was during the first World 
War that the Government first undertook the provision of 
vocational training, when instructional factories were established 
to provide skill training for the war disabled. After the war, 
the provision of these facilities was extended to those of the 
able-bodied who had missed their normal induction into industry 
because of their military service, but this was only ever seen 
as a short-term measure to assist resettlement. However, the 
19 
1920s did see the use, at least on a small-scale, of government 
training provisions as a measure for the relief of mass unemployment. 
In 1925, for example, the first Government Training Centre was 
established for the benefit of young unemployed men between the 
ages of 18 and 25 who had not previously had the opportunity 
to learn a skilled trade. But such measures were never of a 
significant scale in comparison with the problem of mass unemploy-
ment that was being faced,and once again, in accordance with the 
distinction made above, their purpose was primarily social -
the bringing of some form of relief to certain unemployed individ-
uals·(18) 
The meaning of an active manpower policy can now be explained by 
way of contrast with the predominant pre-Second World War pattern 
of provision that has been described above. An active manpower 
policy implies that, beyond and in addition to any social purposes 
they may serve, manpower services are to be used to make an 
'active' and significant contribution to wider economic policy 
objectives. It was not until the early 1960s that such an active 
manpower policy began to be explicitly developed in Great Britain, 
but its origins are to be understood within the context of the 
economic policy objectives that were adopted at the end of the 
Second World War, in particular, the commitment that was made 
to a policy for full employment. 
In 1944 the war-time Coalition Government issued the famous 
White Paper on Employment Policy that opened with the words: 
"The Government accept as one of their primary aims 
and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and 
stable level of employment after the war." (19) 
This formal acknowledgement of the Government's responsibility 
to maintain a high level of employment was of great significance: 
it marked the public commitment of members of both major political 
parties never to return to the mass unemployment that had been 
tolerated or thought inevitable during the inter-war period. 
The rest of the document proceeded to detail the main features 
of the economic policy that would be necessary for the pursuit 
of this commitment, within the more general aim of national 
economic efficiency and growth. 
The primary long-term policy for the achievement of a high and 
stable level of employment was to be that of demand management. 
This was to involve the use of monetary and fiscal policy on the 
part of the Government to ensure the maintenance of a high level 
of aggregate demand for goods and services. Thus, whenever the 
danger of a slump in demand appeared, the Government was to take 
various forms of prompt action to stimulate public and private 
expenditure in both capital investment and consumption. (20) 
20 
However, Government adherence to such a policy of demand management 
was not regarded as a sufficient condition for the maintenance 
of high levels of employment. A number of other conditions 
were referred to by the White Paper. First, it was pointed out 
that it would not be enough to maintain domestic demand at a 
high level: the demand for exports would also have to be expanded, 
and the foreign balance of trade kept in equilibrium. The 
Governement's role in this respect would be to collaborate with 
other national governments in order to secure conditions favourable 
for the expansion of international trade. It would then be 
industry's responsibility to take advantage of these conditions 
by competing efficiently. (21) 
A second condition for the success of demand management policy, 
emphasised as necessary by the White Paper, was the maintenance 
of a reasonably stable level of prices and wages. This, it was 
said, would require co-operation and moderation from both workers 
and employers to hold down wages and profits in line with 
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productivity and thereby avoid the disruptive effects of inflation. (22) 
The third condition mentioned by the White Paper was "a sufficient 
mobility of workers between occupations and localities". (23) Even 
if the general level of demand were kept high, patches of 
unemployment, localised within particular industries and areas, 
might develop as a result of elements of mismatch within the 
labour market. These could not be remedied directly by means 
of demand management; and, indeed, if a solution was sought 
in a further raising of the level of demand, it would only create 
severe labour shortages elsewhere, and thus give rise to inflat-
ionary pressures. Thus, beyond the need for workers to be ready 
to adapt to changing circumstances, the White Paper envisaged 
as necessary certain Government measures designed "to bring men 
to the work and the work to men". (24) It is here that the potential 
for an active manpower policy role can be identified within the 
more general strategy that was articulated. However, little was 
said in the White Paper to encourage the development of such a 
policy. 
The primary means of overcoming problems of regional mismatch was 
to be a regional policy of encouraging the development and 
diversification of industry within those areas which were known 
to be particularly vulnerable to unemployment. (25) These were 
to be designated 'development areas'. While the main thrust 
of Government policy was thus to be directed towards the movement 
of industry to the areas in which concentrations of surplus labour 
existed, measures were also to be taken to remove some of the 
obstacles to the geographical mobility of labour. (26) These were 
to include the provision of cheap rented accommodation and the 
payment of resettlement allowances for those moving to new areas 
under approved schemes. The employment services were to have some 
involvement in this latter aspect of regional policy, but in general 
the White Paper made no attempt to reappraise their role within 
the context of the new employment policy, and no new emphasis was 
given to the development of their placement function as a means 
of reducing friction in the operation of the labour market. 
With regard to the role fo the training services, (27) it was 
proposed that the Government should provide training facilities 
in order to help tackle the problem of occupational mismatch, 
but the main responsibility for training employees was to remain 
with their employers. All that was undertaken, was that the 
Government would continue to provide training schemes after the 
immediate postwar need for resettlement had passed, if this were 
deemed necessary in order to retrain workers being laid off by 
declining industries so as to fit them for jobs in expanding 
industries. As it happened, from 1946 onwards the training 
facilities used for resettlement were rapidly rundown, and the 
training services returned to their traditionally limited social 
policy objectives, largely concerned with providing for the 
disabled. (28) 
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In the transitional period of reconstruction immediately following 
the end of the war, it was not envisaged by the White Paper that 
it would be necessary to employ a macro-economic policy of demand 
management in order to secure a high level of employment. (29) 
During this period, large numbersof men and women were to be 
demobilised from the armed forces or released from military 
production, -but the demand for labour created by the huge task of 
reconst~uction would be at least as great. Also, in the short-
term, the Government was to retain many of its war-time powers 
of direct intervention in the labour market in order to ensure that 
the vast supply of labour becoming available was directed to where 
it was most needed. In fact, the main fear was that during the 
hectic initial phase of reconstruction labour shortages would 
appear: however, it was also envisaged that patches of localised 
unemployment might develop simultaneously. Consequently, the 
measures listed above that were designed to overcome mismatch 
within the labour market, were initially to be introduced during 
this transitional period immediately following the end of the war; 
they were then to continue after the more short-term measures of 
direct Government intervention had been removed, and were 
subsequently to become an adjunct of the longer term policy of 
demand management. (30) 
In the first twenty years that followed the war, both major 
political parties when in Government by and large upheld the 
commitment undertaken in the White Paper, and gave priority 
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to the maintenance of a high level of employment in their economic 
policies. Furthermore, in the years that followed the initial 
period of upheaval at the end of the war, the technique of demand 
management appeared to work remarkably well, at least if judged 
by the levels of employment achieved. Thus between 1948 and 1966 
unemployment averaged only 1.7% and almost never exceeded 3%.(31) 
However, by the middle of the 1950s, concern was beginning to be 
felt about the rate of inflation that appeared to be associated 
with the success of full employment policy. Between 1946 and 
1955 price levels rose by about 50%'(32)a modest increase by modern 
standards, but at the time it was considered to be a sufficiently 
serious problem to demand a Government response. Thus in 1956 
the Conservative Government published a White Paper entitled 
The Economic Implications of Full Employment. In the 1944 White 
Paper, the importance of price stability had been noted as a 
condition for the success of a policy of sustained economic growth 
and full employment. What this new document did was to bring the 
issue of inflation into a position of central importance alongside, 
and in opposition to, economic growth and full employment. Thus 
it was argued that, if inflation was allowed to continue, it would 
affect the competi~iveness of British exports, discourage invest-
ment, cause social instability and injustice, and thereby undermine 
the conditions necessary for economic growth, sustained prosperity 
and full employment. (33)The main element causing inflation was 
identified as being rising incomes, whether in the form of wages 
or dividends. (34) Excessive income rises were, in their turn, 
said to be the result of trade unions and businessmen exploiting 
the prosperous conditions necessary to maintain full employment. (35) 
If this continued to happen, price stability and full employment 
would become incompatible, and whichever were chosen, full employment 
would be lost in the long run; but this was not inevitable. 
The solution sought by the White Paper lay in mutual self-
restraint and co-operation between management and labour: self-
restraint "in making wage claims and fixing profit margins and 
prices, so that total money income rises no faster than total 
output"; (36)and co-operation in maintaining good industrial 
relations and increasing productivity, so as to raise the total 
level of output. 
The tendency of opposition between stable prices and full employ-
ment drawn attention to by the 1956 White Paper was subsequently 
given a more precise academic formulation in what became known 
as the 'Phillips curve'. In an influential article published in 
November 1958, (37)A.W. Phillips claimed to be able to prove from 
available statistical evidence that the rate of change of money 
wage rates in the United Kingdom between 1861 and 1957 could be 
explained by the level of unemployment and the rate of change of 
unemployment, except in or immediately after those years in which 
there was a rapid rise in import prices. Furthermore, he gave 
the relationship between the rate of change of money wage rates 
and the level of unemployment a precise quantitative value, in 
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the form of of an equation representing the curve that he had 
derived from plotting the two relevant sets of statistics on a 
graph.(38) The implication was that for any given level of 
unemployment there was a corresponding 'natural' rate of wage 
inflation. Thus, in theory, it was possible to specify a level of 
unemployment at which inflation would be eliminated, so long as 
there was not the disturbance of a rapid rise of import prices. 
Phillips in fact suggested that a 5~% rate of unemployment would 
be associated with the level of aggregate demand necessary to 
keep wage levels stable, and that a 2~% rate of unemployment would 
be sufficient for product prices to be stabilised, assuming a 
2% per annum increase in productivity. (39) 
The theory behind the Phillips curve was a simple neo-classical 
extrapolation of the law of supply and demand, applied to the 
operation of the labour market. (40) If demand for labour exceeded 
supply, as would have to be the case for the maintenance of full 
employment, then the price of labour would be bound to rise. As 
we have seen, the tactic of the 1956 White Paper to escape the 
inevitable incompatibility between full employment and stable 
prices that is implied here, was to appeal to both trade unions 
and businessmen for self-restraint in forgoing any bargaining 
or price-setting advantages that the Government's maintenance of 
high levels of demand might give them. 
Over the years that followed the publication of the White Paper, 
Governments tried to apply various forms of prices and incomes 
restraint, both voluntary and statutory. All proved to be unpop-
ular and difficult to administer, and the problem of inflation 
remained unsolved. The development of an active manpower policy 
that started in the 1960s can be understood as an attempt to find 
an alternative or additional means of altering the terms of the 
relationship that was thought to hold good in the form of the 
Phillips curve. (41) 
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The case for developing the role of the manpower services as an 
active adjunct of economic policy was put explicitly in these terms 
by the Organisation For Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E. 
C.D.), which, during the 1960s, was lobbying internationally for 
the adoption of an active manpower policy as a new instrument 
of economic management. (42) The argument took the following form. 
The difficulties being encountered in the administration of an 
incomes policy did not mean that the relationship between unempl-
oyment and inflation implied by the Phillips curve was unavoidable. 
Much of the inflation taken account of by Phillips in plotting his 
curve was in fact 'unnecessary'. It was not the inevitable 
result of the level of demand required to sustain a given level 
of employment, but rather the product of the inflationary pressures 
allowed to build up around particular labour shortages and 
'bottlenecks' in the labour market. If these could be eliminated, 
or at least ameliorated, then the Phillips curve could in effect 
be moved downwards, so that a lower rate of wage inflation would 
correspond with a given rate of unemployment; and this would be 
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achieved independently of the application of an incomes policy. 
What was required then was that supply and demand should be matched 
more evenly across every area of the labour market: the instruments 
of an active manpower policy were seen as capable of providing 
the mechanism by which this could be done. 
First, the employment services could add to the general fluidity 
and efficiency of the operation of the labour market. This could 
be achieved through the further development of the placement 
function, which had originally been considered their primary 
function, but had since been pushed into the background by their 
responsibility for the administration of unemployment benefit. 
Secondly, the training services could be developed to playa more 
active role in overcoming the various problems of occupational 
mismatch in the labour market. And thirdly, working in 
conjunction with the two primary manpower services on matters 
affecting the location of jobs and labour, regional policy could 
be used more directly to counter mismatch of a geographical 
nature. 
If these three elements of an active manpower policy could be 
applied successfully in conjunction with each other, it was believed 
that it would be possible to run the economy at a lower level of 
aggregate demand without thereby creating more unemployment. 
However, it was not only the level of demand that was a matter of 
concern, the degree of fluctuation was also perceived as an 
important aspect of the problem. Since the early 1950s, the 
attempts to apply demand management through monetary and fiscal 
means had given rise to an increasingly erratic pattern of growth 
in the economy, commonly referred to as 'stop-go'. Each time the 
Government attempted to stimulate growth in the economy, the 
economy would rapidly 'overheat', inflation going out of control 
and foreign trade out of balance. The Government would then be 
compelled to introduce deflationary measures in order to regain 
control and balance, thereby cancelling out much of what had been 
achieved during the period of rapid growth. But deflation could 
not be maintained for long if the commitment to full employment 
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was to be honoured, and so the cycle would soon have to be started 
up again with some new form of reflation. In the short term, 
the rapid repetition of this cyclical pattern might enable the 
avoidance of the unacceptable extremes of unemployment and 
inflation, but in the long run, it was a wasteful and inadequate 
way of maintaining the kind of sustained economic growth on which 
all the postwar economic policy objectives were ultimately 
premissed. 
Once again a solution appeared to be offered by the elements of 
an active manpower policy that were listed above, since again 
the underlying problem was identified as being the inefficiency 
and imbalancffiof the labour market. (43) Thus it was thought that 
cyclical 'overheating' was another result of labour shortages 
and bottlenecks which acted as the foci of inflationary pressures 
and, at the same time, blocked the growth of domestic output 
that was necessary to maintain the balance of foreign trade 
during a period of demand reflation. Consequently, an active 
manpower policy aimed at. removing elements of both structural 
mismatch and frictional drag from the labour market could be 
expected, not only to mitigate the underlying inflationary tendency 
of the economy, but also to smooth its cyclical pattern of growth. 
Furthermore, the timing of the implementation of this policy, in 
particular its training element, could be directly integrated 
into a counter-cyclical strategy of demand management. Thus, the 
time to step up investment in training programmes would be on the 
downswing of the cycle, when demand was low. At this point, such 
spending would contribute as an element of the reflationary 
policy necessary to lift the economy out of its slump and, at the 
same time, bring direct relief to some of those finding themselves 
unemployed during the lull in demand. Then, when the economy 
moved back into a phase of growth, there would be a supply of 
newly trained labour available to cover the areas where labour 
shortages were likely to occur, thus removing one of the major 
obstacles to sustained and non-inflationary economic growth. 
In short, the active manpower policy that was being developed in 
Britain from the 1960s onwards can be understood as an attempt 
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to 'fine-tune' the policy of demand management that had been adopted 
by the 1944 White Paper in pursuit of its commitment to full 
employment. Since the beginning of the 1950s, demand management, 
implemented primarily by means of monetary and fiscal controls, 
had proved an unwieldy and insensitive mechanism for steering 
the economy: it had given rise to unnecessary tension between 
the twin objectives of full employment and stable prices, and had 
encouraged the erratic cycle of 'stop-go'. The development of 
an active economic role for manpower policy, it was hoped, would 
make it possible to run the economy at a lower level of aggregate 
demand without thereby creating more unemployment, and thus help 
to achieve sustained economic growth without the wasteful 
fluctuations of 'stop-go'. 
The extent to which these ideas were new should not be exaggerated. 
It will be remembered that the potential role for an active 
manpower policy had been adumbrated in the 1944 White Paper. Now, 
in the 1960s, what had been outlined in 1944 was in effect being 
reactivated in a new and more explicit form. This was necessary 
because, in the intervening years, the potential contribution of 
the manpower services to broader economic policy had in practice 
been neglected. 
Following the intense activity of the postwar demobilisation period, 
both the employment and training services were rapidly rundown, 
and continued to decline until the early 1960s'(44) A strongly 
interventionist role was necessary for the employment service 
during demobilisation, but thereafter controls were relaxed and 
eventually removed when the Control of Engagements Order was 
revoked in 1950. For a brief period in the early 50s some 
attempt was made to ensure that all vacancies were notified 
officially, but thm, in the decade following, the volume of adult 
placings was allowed to fall back by over 40%. Some reference 
has already been made to the neglect of the training services 
that followed their rapid expansion immediately postwar. A few 
figures may help to emphasise the point. The number of places 
at Government training centres reached apeak of over 23,000 in 
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1946. By 1948 this number had been reduced by 75%, and thereafter 
it continued to decline, so that by 1962 there only existed 10% 
,of the places there had been in 1946. Finally, some effort was 
put into regional policy during this period, but the measures 
taken to encourage capital'investment in development areas had 
little success in reducing the regional disparities between levels 
of employment. (45) 
The early 1960s saw a new interest being taken in the role of 
planning in the promotion of economic growth. This was marked by 
the setting-up of the National Economic Development Council in 
1962, and its publication, a year later, of a report entitled 
Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth. (46) This document placed 
a new emphasis on various aspects of manpower policy, in particular 
training and regional development. It is from this period and 
context that it is possible to trace the development - all be it 
unsystematic - of the different elements of an active manpower 
policy. 
1962/3 proved to be the turning point for the Government provision 
of training, the expansion that took place thereafter being 
indicative of the adoption of a new role beyond the limited 
'social' objectives that had been characteristic of the programmes 
of the 1950s. (47) Thus, between 1962 and 1971 the numbers being 
catered for in Government Training Centres increased fourfold. 
Also an important step forward with regard to the regulation of 
training carried out in industry was made by the 1964 Industrial 
Training Act. This involved the establishment of the Industrial 
Training Boards (I.T.Bs),tripartite regulatory bodies, each with 
responsibility for maintaining and improving the quality and 
quantity of training provided within a particular sector of 
industry, and each empowered to administer a grant lev~ system to 
ensure the equitable distribution of training costs between 
individual concerns. 
No major reforms were made to the employment services during the 
1960s; however, it is possible to trace a significant change of 
attitude reflecting the growing influence of the idea of an 
active manpower policy. Indicative of this attitudinal change was 
an article, entitled 'Changing role for the Employment Service' , 
that was published in the Labour Gazette in 1966.(48) Here it was 
argued that the main emphasis of the work of the service should 
be moved away from the administration of unemployment benefit, 
and put back onto the employment placement function. Some minor 
reforms in line with this change of emphasis were announced at 
the time, but the main importance of this restatement of what 
was the original objective of the employment service was to be 
in preparing the ground for the more radical reforms that were 
to follow in theearly 1970s. 
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The impact of the development of the concept of an active manpower 
policy can also be detected in the new emphasis that was given to 
regional policy during the 1960s. This not only involved a 
sizeable increase in the amount spent by Government on regional 
development, but also the introduction of new mechanisms to ensure 
that more of this spending was directly linked to the creation 
of jobs. Previously ~egional policy had been predominantly 
concerned with the encouragement of capital intensive investment 
in the development areas. The Regional Employment Premium, 
which was introduced in 1967, sought to stimulate the creation 
of employment by the more direct means of subsidising the wage 
costs of employers in the specified areas. (49) 
Three other measures that illustrate the development of manpower 
planning during the 1960s should be mentioned: redundancy payments, 
earnings-related unemployment benefit, and the Selective Employment 
Tax, all of which were introduced between 1965 and 1966 in 
connection with the Labour Government's ill-fated National Plan. 
It was a commonly held view at the time that the prospects for 
economic growth would be enhanced, if some of the skilled labour 
currently being employed in the less productive areas of the 
economy could be 'shaken out' and redeployed more productively 
elsewhere. All three of the measures listed above were designed 
to assist and encourage this process. Redundancy payments and 
earnings-related benefits, it was hoped, would make workers 
more willing to accept losing their jobs and having to look for 
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new forms of employment. The Selective Employment Tax was designed 
to encourage employment in the manufacturing industries in pref-
erence to the service industries, working on the questionable 
assumption that the former would make a greater contribution 
to economic growth. In so far as these measures had any notice-
able effects, research carried out at the time showed that they 
were more successful in the negative function of shaking out labour, 
than in the positive function of redeploying it more productively 
elsewhere'(50) Thus, while in a certain sense they represented an 
advance in manpower planning techniques, at the same time, they 
highlighted the need for a greater degree of co-ordination of policy. 
The consultative documents previously referred to, People and Jobs 
(1971) and Training for the Future (1972), can now be understood 
in terms of the requirements of the further development of an 
active manpower policy, as can the criticisms that were made of them 
which led up to the MSC being superimposed over the two separate 
agencies. People and Jobs, as well as proposing that the Employment 
Services Agency should be hived off from the Department of Employ-
ment, recommended that the administration of the employment and 
benefit services should be separated at the local level. This, 
it was hoped, would allow the employment service to develop and 
expand its active placement function, unencumbered by the image 
and responsibility associated with the dole office. Further to 
this end, the new employment service was to be relocated in modern-
style self-service Job Centres which were to be separate and 
distinct from the old benefit offices. 
Training for the Future contained two other main proposals besides 
that for the establishment of a separate Training Services Agency. 
The first of these was for the expansion and diversification of 
Government provided training through the introduction of the 
Training Opportunities Scheme(T.O.P.S.).The second was for the phasing 
out of the levy system operated by the ITBs. While the introduction 
of TOPS clearly represented a positive step forward in the 
development of the instruments of an active manpower policy, 
the abolition of the ITBs'power to raise a training levy was 
viewed by some, particularly those associated with the labour 
movement, as a retrograde step .(51) Under the pressure of their 
criticisms, the Government did eventually compromise, and only 
curtailed the ITBs' use of the levy rather than eliminating it 
altogether. However, this does still illustrate an important 
point about the concept of an active manpower policy. The object 
of such a policy was never to supplant the normal workings of the 
labour market, but rather, with the minimal amount of intervention 
necessary, to remove any irregularities or blockages that might 
interfere with the efficiency of its normal operation. It was 
then always a doctrine of limited intervention, and this will be 
seen later to be a feature of the philosophy of. the MSe, the 
organisation that was given responsibility for the development 
of a comprehensive manpower policy. 
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Apart from the criticisms that were made of the proposal to abolish 
the ITB training levy, the main criticism of the two documents 
was that, while they made an important contribution to the separate 
development of two of the primary instruments necessary for the 
implementation of an active manpower policy, they failed to 
establish an adequate institutional structure for the co-ordination 
of their usage in such a policy. (52) The idea of some form of 
national manpower commission had emerged from the debate about 
active manpower policy that took place during the 1960s. Probably 
the fir?t reference to the need for such a body in this country 
was made in a report called 'Perspectives in Manpower Planning' 
which was published in 1967 by the Edinburgh Group of the Institute 
of Personnel Management. (53) There it was proposed that an 
independent statutory body should be set up to co-ordinate manpower 
statistics and forecasting. Subsequently the TUe played a leading 
role in developing the idea that such a body should also be given 
planning and administrative responsibilities. Then, at the time 
of the debate concerning the separate hiving off of the employment 
and training service agencies, the argument for setting over them 
a co-ordinating commisson was put powerfully by the influential 
labour market expert, Santosh Mukherjee. (54) 
In a Political and Economic Planning (P.EP.)broadsheet entitled 
Making Labour Markets Work, Mukherjee compared the Swedish and 
British systems of manpower policy administration. One of the 
main conclusions of his analysis was that the comparative success 
of the Swedish system relied on the co-ordinating role played by 
an autonomous agency called the Labour Market Board. If Britain 
was serious about implementing an active manpower policy, it 
would be necessary to create some equivalent institutional 
framework. Reforming the employment and training services was 
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not enough, the co-ordination of an active manpower policy required 
that they should be given an organisational unity. 
This argument gained wide support and,as we have seen, eventually 
prevailed. The establishment of the MSC thus represented a further 
point of advance in the development of the institutional machinery 
required for the implementation of an active manpower policy. 
It should be noted, however, that the Commission was not endowed 
with as broad a range of competence as its Swedish equivalent. (55) 
In particular, it was not given control over the allocation of 
regional development assistance which it should by now be apparent 
is integrally related to the implementation of an active manpower 
policy. Nevertheless, it was hoped that the new organisation 
would be able to develop the capacity to plan and implement a 
comprehensive manpower policy, combining both economic and social 
objectives, the interests of industry and the interests of individual 
people. 
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3. The MSC, Corporatism and 'Hiving Off' 
Beyond the specific trend of the development of an active 
manpower policy, it is possible to identify two broader trends 
within the institutional organisation of politics and administration 
that were influential in determining the form that the MSC 
eventually took. The first of these was a trend in the development 
of functional representation within political structures that 
is generally labelled as 'corporatism'. The second was a trend 
of administrative reform associated with the process of 'hiving 
off'. As will become apparent, there was some connection between 
these two trends, in so far as the latter could be viewed as a 
means of enabling the furtherance of the former. 
Within modern political analysis corporatism is a contested and 
ambiguous term. (56) It is not my intention in this context to 
get caught up in the complex wrangle that has been carried on 
between various schools of political thought over the precise 
meaning and correct usage of the concept. Nevertheless, given the 
confusion that presently exists, it will be necessary at least 
to explain how I intend the term to be understood in the account 
that follows. 
The term corporatism was originally used to describe a certain body 
of political and social thought that emerged in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. (57)In contrast to both liberalism and 
socialism it laid emphasis on the organic unity and class harmony 
of society, and it attempted to define a system of political and 
social organisation in accordance with these principles. Influenced 
by the hierachical and functional organisation of the mediaeval 
estates, the proponents of corporatism sought to reproduce the 
organic unity that was assumed to have been characteristic of 
such pre-capitalist societies, by means of a new hierachical 
and functional form of organisation based on the socio-economic 
divisions of contemporary capitalist society. Under such a system, 
the relationship between the state and invididual would be 
hierachically mediated through functionally based sectoral 
organisations fulfilling both representative and administrative 
functions. 
These ideas subsequently became associated with fascist ideology, 
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and in this context were put into practice as a means by which it 
was attempted to enforce totalitarian state control over society. 
Understandably, this association with fascism left corporatism 
discredited as a political doctrine in the postwar era. Nevertheless, 
since the Second World War, there have been certain characteristic 
developments in the political structures of 'liberal democracies' 
that, although not explicitly put forward in corporatist terms 
by their adherents, have borne a sufficient resemblance to the 
original ideas of corporatism for various political commentators 
to have revived the term as a means of description and analysis. 
Broadly speaking, the characteristic feature of these develop-
ments to which the label corporatism has been applied has been 
the incorporation of representatives of management and labour 
within the institutional framework of the state as a strategy 
associated with the extension of the scope of state intervention 
in the economy. Unlike in the context of fascism, this has taken 
place voluntarily, typically through the establishment of various 
forms of tripartite body, operating at first mainly in an advisory 
capacity, but subsequently becoming directly involved in the 
policy-making process. (58) Thus, in most so-called liberal democ-
racies, a political process based on the establishment of consensus 
between the state and representatives of the major functional 
sectional interests within society has grown up alongside the 
more traditional liberal democratic institutions based on geog-
raphical parliamentary representation. 
These developments constitute the generally accepted core of the 
descriptive reference of most modern theoretical formulations of 
corporatism: the major areas of disagreement are with regard to 
the extent and significance of such developments. Do they 
constitute a comprehensive new system, or are they only partial 
and dependent developments? If they do constitute a new system, 
on what plane of analysis is it to be classified - a new system 
of interest mediation, a new state form, or new mode of economic 
production ( a post-capitalist society?) ? And if not a new 
system, how do such developments fit in with, and how do they 
moderate, the nature of existing systems atthese different 
levels? (59) 
As already indicated, these are not questions that I intend to 
attempt to answer in this context. My object is rather merely 
to place the origins of the Manpower Services Commission within 
the trend of developments that has formed the descriptive core 
of the modern analysis of corporatism in Britain. My use of the 
term corporatism will therefore be restricted to the minimal 
descriptive reference outlined above, leaving open for the moment 
any questions of wider analytical significance. 
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The origins of corporatist tendencies in British political life 
have been traced back as far as the extension of state intervention 
in the economy that was necessitated by the First World War. (60) 
Throughout the economic depression, mass unemployment and industrial 
conflict of the twenties and thirties various forms of tripartite 
consultation continued to operate, and were indeed further consol-
idated. Examples of particular relevance to this account were 
the National Advisory Councils for Juvenile Employment which were 
~established in November 1927 by the Minister of Labour, and on 
which were represented trade unions and employers, as well as 
educational interests and the Ministry of Labour. (61) The Second 
World War gave a further stimulus to the growth of corporatist 
political structures in this country. Leading trade union and 
business figures were co-opted into the Government, and a number 
of important tripartite consultative bodies, such as the National 
Joint Advisory Council and the National Production Advisory Council 
on Industry, were established to assist in the wartime mobilisation 
of the economy. (62) In the years immediately following the end 
of the war, when it was necessary to maintain a high degree of 
direct government intervention in the economy, these various 
tripartite advisory bodies were kept intact, and new ones such 
as the National Investment Council and the Economic Planning 
Board were formed by the Labour Government. (63) Between 1948 
and 1950 a wages policy was maintained on the basis of voluntary 
restraint on the part of the unions. (64) However, in general 
from 1947 onwards, with the adoption of Keynesian macro-economic 
policies of demand management, the mechanisms for more detailed 
state intervention in the running of the economy were largely 
abandoned'(65)and consequently plans made for the extension of 
tripartite development councils into each sector of industry were 
passed over largely unimplemented.(66) Thus, the withdrawal of 
the state from active intervention in the labour market that has 
been described as dating from this same period was one aspect 
of a more general retreat from detailed state intervention, with 
W1ichwas associated a temporary halt in the growth of corporatist 
political structures. 
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The significance of the 1956 White Paper in calling attention to 
certain inherent problems, notably the stimulation of inflationary 
pressures, associated with the unmediated implementation of a 
macro-economic policy of demand management has already been 
referred to in the account of the d~elopment of an active manpower 
policy. It will be remembered that a solution was sought to these 
problems in co-operation between management and labour, both in 
the restraint of incomes, and in the improvement of industrial 
relations and productivity. In this exhortation for co-operation 
can be understood the stimulus for the new growth of corporatist 
institutions that took place during the 1960s in the areas of 
incomes policy, industrial relations and economic planning, 
including manpower policy. (67) 
The details of these developments need not concern us, except in 
so far as they relate directly to manpower policy. When previously 
examining the development of active manpower policy during this 
period, it was explained as a possible supplement or alternative 
to incomes policy in the fight against inflation. Now, looking 
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from the angle of the development of corporatism, what needs to 
be understood is that both these approaches, incomes policy and 
active manpower policy, involved an extension of state intervention 
at the micro-economic level in an attempt to supplement and rectify 
the operation of Keynesian demand management at the macro-economic 
level. Keynesian policy, although itself constituting an exten-
sion of state intervention, was essentially a means of indirect 
manipulation rather than of direct control. The various correct-
ives being considered from the late fifties onwards all required 
a more direct and detailed form of state intervention. However, 
the simple unilateral imposition of the necessary micro-economic 
controls by the state was not generally considered to be an 
acceptable means of procedure in peace-time (and in so far as it 
was subsequently attempted, in statutory incomes policy for 
example, it was to prove more trouble than it was worth to enforce). 
Hence, there was a need to develop new political structures through 
which the requisite degree of intervention and control could 
be achieved on the basis of co-operation and consensus rather 
than coercion. 
Thus,it is possible to understand the development of corporatism 
during this period in terms of the same search for a way out of 
the apparent contradiction between full employment and stable 
prices that provided the motive force for the development of 
active manpower policy: (68) in this sense they can be thought of 
as parallel developments. Yet, in another sense they were 
developments on different planes, active manpower policy being 
concerned with a particular area of policy, corporatism being 
a more generalised form of policy-making, and thus they were 
capable of coming together as form and content in the same instit-
utions. 
In 1958 the National JointAdvisory Council published under the 
title of Training for Skill a report made by the Carr Committee 
on industrial training. (69) While reaffirming the conventional 
wisdom that 'industry knows best', it proposed that a tripartite 
Industrial Training Council should be established to act in an 
advisory capacity, encouraging the qualitative and quantitative 
development of training. This body was duly set up and operated 
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with modest success. However, in the context of the early 
development of active manpower policy that has already been described, 
the need was soon recognised for a further extension of state 
intervention in industrial training, and this was to take the form 
of the tripartite Industrial Training Boards. 
Some reference has already been made to the revival of interest 
in economic planning that took place in the early 1960s and the 
stimulus that it gave to the development of active manpower policy. 
This revival of economic planning was accompanied by a rapid 
growth of new institutional forms built on the tripartite principle. 
Foremost was the National Economic Development Council (N.E.D.C.) 
which was established by the Conservatives in 1962 to provide a 
central tripartite forum for the discussion of economic planning. (70) 
Subsequently Harold Wilson's Labour Government was to demonstrate 
its enthusiasm for this form of corporatist planning mechanism 
by setting up similar tripartite bodies at both sectoral and 
regional levels - the Economic Development Committeffiand the 
Regional Economic Planning Councils respectively. Within the 
sphere of manpower policy the establishment 'of the Central Training 
Council and the Industrial Training Boards under the 1964 Industrial 
Training Act may be viewed as equivalent corporatist developments. 
The Central Training Council, as another tripartitie advisory body, 
did not mark a particularly important advance in relation 
to the Industrial Training Council that it replaced. However, the 
Industrial Training Boards, with their statutory power to administer 
grant levy schemes in their respective sectors, may be regarded 
as representing a significant development of tripartism in the 
administration and regulation of manpower policy. 
The extension of state intervention within the economy during the 
1960s provided the stimulus not only for the proliferation of 
such tripartite institutions, but also for a complementary phase 
of institutional review and reform within the administrative 
apparatus of the central state. (71) One product of this was the 
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emergence of the policy of 'hiving off' during the early seventies. 
In 1966 a committee was appointed under the chairmanship of Lord 
Fulton to examine the structure, recruitment and management of the 
Civil Service. One of the committee's main recommendations was 
that, "in the interest of efficiency, the principles of accountable 
management should be applied to the organisation of the work of 
departments. "(72) This, it was explained, meant "the clear 
allocation of responsibility and authority to accountable units 
with defined ob j ectives."(73) However, it was also recognised 
that the application of such principles to the Civil Service 
might be impeded by the requirements of ministerial responsibility 
and the existence of problems overlapping between different depart-
ments. Accordingly, the Committee took note of the opinion 
expressed by certain well-informed observers that some large-scale 
operationscould be run more effectively if they were 'hived off' 
from the direct control of government departments and entrusted 
to independent boards or corporations. (74) 
Significantly, the Report made reference to the Swedish system 
of administration in this context. (75) The main feature identified 
was the separation of functions between ministeries and agencies. 
Ministeries were not directly responsible for the execution of 
policies, but acted principally as secretariats to ministers, and 
consequently required comparatively small numbers of staff. The 
main responsibility for the management and operation of policies 
was invested in independent statutory agencies (one of which was the 
Labour Market Board), and it was in these organisations that the 
bulk of civil servants were employed. Thus, 'hiving off' was 
in a sense the central organisational principle of the Swedish 
system, and the Fulton Report expressed its admiration of the 
way in which the system worked. (76) 
However, such issues concerning the reorganisation of government 
machinery went beyond the terms of reference of the committee, 
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and therefore it had to be content with making a recommendation 
that a further review should be made of the feasibility of 
extending the application of 'hiving off' within the organisation 
of British government and administration. (77)In fact no such 
review was ever carried out. Nevertheless, the Fulton Report 
provided the stimulus for a piecemeal extension of the application 
of the principle during the early seventies. 
Before explaining the circumstances in which the related trends 
of corporatism and 'hiving off' came together in the formation of 
the MSC, it is necessary to sound a note of caution about the 
former of these two trends. In attempting to summarise, and direct 
towards a particular purpose, the description of a complex trend 
such as that of the development of corporatism, there is always 
the danger that the impression is given that the process of events 
was more straightforward and simple than was actually the case. 
It therefore needs to be emphasised that the development of 
corporatist political processes through the sixties and seventies 
was not a simple linear progression. Rather it was one strategy 
amongst others resorted to by Governments during this period. (78) 
It may have turned out to be the prevalent strategy, but it was 
still possible for Governments, at least periodically, to impose 
deflationary policies at the expense of rising unemployment, or 
to accept rising levels of inflation, or to attempt the unilateral 
imposition of statutory controls. Matters are further complicated 
by the fact that it cannot be assumed that there was always a 
parallel development of corporatism in different areas of policy-
making: indeed, a reversal in one area of policy could provide 
the stimulus for development in another. Thus at various points 
it is possible to identify definite withdrawals of Government 
interest and involvement in corporatist processes, sometimes just 
in specific areas of policy, at other times on a more generalised 
level. 
The revival of economic planning in the 1960s came to its climax 
in the National Plan that was launched by the Labour Government in 
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September 1965. The plan also represented a highpoint in the 
development of tripartism in a number of areas of policy. Broad 
tripartite agreement to the plans for economic growth was achieved 
through the NEDC, and the associated network of regional and 
sectoral tripartite planning bodies was established. Furthermore, 
by holding out the prospect of rapid economic growth and promising 
measures to achieve social justice in the distribution of the new 
wealth created, the Government was able to secure a joint tripartite 
declaration of intent (December 1964) in which, as their side of 
the bargain, the employers and unions committed themselves to 
voluntary prices and incomes restraint, and to efforts to improve 
their levels of productivity. Machinery to monitor this prices 
and incomes policy was subsequently established in the form of 
the National Board for Prices and Incomes (N.B.P.I., 1965), which 
originally was intended to function merely on the basis of moral 
pressure and persuasion. (79) 
The consensus achieved during this period relied on the prospect 
of repaid economic growth that was held out by the Government as 
the reward for co-operation from which all would benefit. 'Restraint' 
was not so much a matter of holding incomes down as planning their 
sustained growth. Thus the National Plan set an ambitious target 
of a 25% increase in national output between 1964 and 1970.(80) 
However, such growth proved impossible to sustain and within a 
year, under the pressure of a balance of payments and sterling 
crisis, the Government forced to abandon the plan and to impose 
severe deflationary measures (July 1966).(81) 
Even before this dramatic turnabout, the voluntary aspect of the 
incomes policy accompanying the plan had been under severe 
pressure, and the Government had found it necessary to introduce 
a statutory element into the powers of the NBPI.(82) Inevitably, 
once the plan was abandoned, the wider corporatist consensus that 
had been constructed around its promise of rapid and sustained 
economic growth could no longer be maintained. Consequently a full 
statutory incomes policy had to be imposed, with an initial six 
months standstill on all income increases, to be followed by a 
further six months of severe restraint. (83) At the same time, the 
rapid rise in unemployment triggered off by the deflationary 
policies of July 1966 can be seen as bringing to bear market 
forces on the control of incomes. Thus, with the promise of 
economic growth on which tripartite consensus had been founded 
proving unrealistic, the Government was forced, on the one hand, 
to resort to unprecedented - in peace-time - statist intervention 
in the details of income distribution, and on the other, to take 
a substantial step away from the postwar commitment to full 
employment. Meanwhile, the tripartite planning bodies such as 
the NEDC and its regional and sectoral equivalents continued to 
exist, but only a peripheral forums for dialogue and consultation 
in the process of economic policy-making. (84) 
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The Labour Government was to continue with some form of statutory 
incomes policy for the rest of its term. Furthermore, it was to 
attempt to launch what was a new statist, as opposed to corporatist, 
initiative in the field of industrial relations - the 1969 
Industrial Relations Billo(85) However, both these forms of direct 
state intervention caused popular resentment, particularly amongst 
the trade unions, and, after the Government had been forced to back 
down on the Industrial Relations Bill, there were also signs of 
a move back towards a voluntary bargained form of incomes control 
more in line with a corporatist approach. (86) 
The idea of 'hiving off' was taken up by the incoming Conservative 
Government in 1970 which was pledged in its manifesto to reducing 
the size of central government and the civil service. (87) The DE 
was a prime target for this form of reorganisation, a number of its 
services being considered suitable for 'hiving off' '(88) Thus between 
1974 and 1975 (the Labour Government taking over from where the 
Conservatives left off), both the Health and Safety Commission and 
the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service, as well as the 
MSC, were set up to take-over functions which had previously 
been carried out within the Department of Employment. 
As has already been explained, the employment and training 
services were originally to be hived off as separate agencies. 
The tripartite advisory council which was to co-ordinate them did 
not mark a significant advance of the corporatist principle in 
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the administration of manpower policy over the Central Training 
Council that it was to replace. In fact, given the proposals to 
abolish the levying powers of the ITBs, the original plans for the 
reorganisation of manpower services as expressed in People and Jobs 
and Training for the Future may be considered to have constituted 
a reversal of corporatist development in this field of policy. 
This can perhaps be understood more fully in the wider context of 
the prevailing climate of industrial relations at the time when 
these plans were being drawn up. 
The Conservatives came back into office in 1970 with a commitment 
to remove all forms of incomes policy and to draw back from more 
detailed state intervention in the economy in general. (89) Instead 
they were to rely on market sanctions to regulate the economy, 
while at the same time introducing new industrial relations 
legislation to restrict the bargaining power of the unions. (90) 
The first aspect of this policy marked a new stage in the slide 
away from the commitment to full employment which had started 
with the deflationary measures carried out by the previous Labour 
Government in July 1966. By January 1972 the symbolic figure of 
one million unemployed had been exceeded. The second aspect of 
the policy, which took form as the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, 
can be understood in corporatist terms, but only as an attempt to 
impose a highly statist form of corporatism that failed. (91) 
The purpose of the legislation was to make the legitimacy of 
trade union organisation and activity subject to the sanctioning 
of a detailed legal framework imposed by the state. However there 
was no consensus behind this policy. (92) The trade unions were 
bitterly opposed to it as an incursion on their traditional autonomy, 
and the struggle against the Act gave rise to the most serious period 
of industrial confrontation since the 1926 General Strike. The 
Government was able to force the legislation through Parliament, 
but the trade unions were able to render the Act inoperable within 
three months of its full implementation in February 1972. They 
simply refused to co-operate with the terms of the new legis-
lation and the Government, lacking the will to attempt to enforce 
the sanctions that it had provided itself with, was left with no 
alternative but to back down. The legislation remained on the 
statute book for a further two years, but it was in effect 'put 
on ice'. (93) 
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What can now be seen is that the original plans for the reorg-
anisation of the manpower services, at least those expressed in 
Training for the Future, were formulated in the following context: 
first, of a Government corumi;tted to rolling back the extent of 
state intervention in the economy and letting market forces operate 
even at the expense of rising unemployment; and secondly, of a 
breakdown of relations between the Government and the trade union 
movement unprecedented in the postwar period. 
The Governments retreat from its stand on the Industrial Relations 
Act was one aspect of a more generalised 'U-turn' in its policies, 
which interestingly enough coincided with its change of heart over 
the idea of setting up a body such as the MSC. In the face of the 
(then) alarming level of unemployment, the unprecedented wave 
of industrial militancy, and the considerable pressure being placed 
on sterling, the Heath Government was forced to abandon its 
strategy of laissez faire economics and legally regulated 
industrial relations in favour of the pattern of incomes policy and 
tripartite talks which it had originally spurned. (94) Between 
July and November 1972 the Government organised a series of 
meetings with delegates from the TUC and CBI at which bargaining 
took place over a wide range of policies in an attempt to secure 
an agreement on which a voluntary incomes policy could be based.' 
It would seem that during this process, the establishment of the 
Manpower Services Commission was put forward as a comparatively 
uncontroversial concession which could be granted to the TUC.(95) 
The talks on pay eventually broke down, but the commitment to 
set up the Commission survived as one of their permanent legacies. 
4. Towards a Comprehensive Manpower Policy 
In his introduction to the first Annual Report of the 
MSC, the new Chairman, Dennis Barnes, referred to three main areas 
of work on which the Commission had been concentrating its efforts 
over the previous year. (96) First there was the process of taking 
over and approving the programmes of the two agencies. Secondly 
contingency plans had been made against a further rise in the 
level of unemployment. Thirdly the task of developing a comprehensive 
manpower policy had been embarked upon. 
The manner in which the MSC had been superimposed over the employ-
ment and training agencies almost as an afterthought was reflected 
in the comparative independence that they enjoyed during this early 
period of the Commission's life'(97) The main features of the 
programmes of the two agencies had already been settled upon, and 
at this stage the Commission's role was largely that of giving its 
formal approval. Thus, the ESA was to continue with its programme 
of modernisation, the most important feature of which was the 
introduction of specialised Jobcentres which had already begun in 
1973'(98) Meanwhile, the TSA was to supervise the ITBs' introduction 
of the new form of levy exemption scheme covering private industrial 
training, and to continue the expansion and diversification of 
government training under TOPS'(99) 
The capacity of the MSC in the future to take on an effective and 
positive co-ordinating role in relation to the two agencies depended 
• largely upon the third area of its work referred to above, 
the development of a comprehensive manpower policy. At the time of 
its creation, the criticism was levelled at the new Commission by 
some of those who had been actively lobbying for such a body that it 
had not been endowed with the powers and resources necessary for the 
collection, co-ordination and processing of manpower intelligence 
on a scale adequate for the planning of such a comprehensive manpower 
policY'(lOO) In response to this kind of criticism the first Annual 
Report acknowledges the need for the Commission to become, 
"an authoritative centre for manpower intelligence ... in a 
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position to express constructive views on any policies 
affecting the labour market and to propose practical 
solutions to problems which may range from the short-term 
to long-term fundamental questions concerning the effective 
use of the country's manpower resources, whether or not 
the Commission is itself in a position to take action 
on them." (101) 
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A fresh impetus was given to these developments by the new Labour 
Government which, reflecting the labour movement's general desire 
for the Commission to take a more active and interventionist role, 
had pledged in its October 1974 Manifesto, "to transform the 
MSC into a powerful body responsible for the development and 
execution of a comprehensive manpower policY."(102)The new 
Secretary of State, Michael Foot, duly set up a working group 
to report on how this could be achieved, the eventual outcome 
of which was the publication of Towards a Compr,ehensive Manpower 
Policy in October 1976. 
Towards a Comprehensive Manpower Policy represented the MSC's 
first attempt to review publicly its philosophy and strategies. 
It was also, it will be remembered, the document that announced 
the formation and the terms of reference of the Holland Working 
Party. Thus, it naturally presents itself as a link between the 
account of the origins and philosophy of the MSC that has been 
presented in this chapter, and the account of the development of 
the special measures response to unemployment that is to be 
presented in the next two chapters. In particular, it provides 
a basis for' a summary of the philosophy of the newly created Comm-
ission ,- the philosophy in terms of which it will subsequently be 
attempted to analyse the objectives of the Youth Opportunities 
Programme. 
Three major themes arise from the account which is presented of 
the aim of comprehensive manpower policy. Two of these can be 
understood in terms of active manpower policy; the third relatre 
to corporatism. The first theme is that of the dual function of 
a comprehensive manpower policy. This is described as follows: 
"to enable the country's manpower resources to be developed 
and to contribute fully to economic well-being; and to 
ensure that there is available to each worker the opport-
unities and services he or she needs in order to lead a 
satisfactory working life. 
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In consequence, most manpower measures do not have only 
an economic object (to help industry) or a social one 
(to help people), but both."(103) 
This combination of economic and social objectives, it will be 
remembered, is the core notion of an active manpower policy. 
The second theme is concerned with the role of the MSC in the 
fulfillment of this dual function, and it involves the definition 
of a limited conception of state intervention. It is explained 
that a comprehensive manpower policy does not imply any attempt 
to take over control of the labour market as a whole. Such is 
thought to be impossible and unnecessary. What it does imply is 
a strategic approach that considers policy in relation to an 
understanding of the total system of the labour market, and goes 
beyond the limits of a 'fire-fighting' operation to deal with 
specific short-term problems. Thus, the MSC's role is explained 
in terms of assisting the workings of the existing market system: 
"The Commission's role is to understand the system and 
its own position in it, and to establish a framework for 
action in the shape of a network of advice, assistance 
and encouragement to individuals and emp loyers."(104) 
This limited conception of state intervention can be understood 
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as another integral element of active manpower policy. It was 
never the object of an active manpower policy to substitute itself 
for the normal operations of the labour market, but rather to 
supplement, and at times manipulate, these operatiomin accordance 
with the dual economic and social objectives mentioned above. 
The third theme which arises is that of consensus policy-making. 
The limitations placed on the MSC's direct interventionary role 
imply the need for it to work in co-operation with others to secure 
its objectives. Consequently, its success is seen to depend 
upon its ability to involve the major relevant interest groups 
in the policy-making process, and thereby, establish amongst them 
a consensus: 
"The Commission can be successful in its endeavours only 
by taking people along with it. In a free society, much 
the most effective way of securing the commitment of 
organisations and people to a course of action is to 
involve them in decisions, and we therefore consider it 
essential for there to be participation of the major 
interests concerned, and particularly employers' 
organisations and trade unions, in the work of the central 
manpower authority and at many other levels."(105) 
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This, of course, is merely a restatement of the corporatist principle 
which we have already seen expressed in the tripartite composition 
of the Commission. 
Summing up, the MSC's conception of itself, as expressed in 
Towards a Comprehensive Manpower Policy, may be defined by: 
a) the duality of its function in relation to economic and social 
interests: b) the acceptance of a limited though strategic role 
of direct intervention in relation to the labour market: and 
c) the adherence to a consensus model of policy making. This 
philosophy might be labelled as a form of social democratic 
corporatism: social democratic in that it expresses the belief that 
the pursuit of growth and efficiency in a capitalist economy can be 
rendered compatible with the promotion of the social needs 
of individuals by means of a limited form of state intervention in 
the operations of the market mechanism; and corporatist in that 
it expresses the belief that this limited form of intervention is 
best carried out with the active involvement of the representatives 
of the major interest groups concerned, and in particular those of 
capital and labour, rather than it being imposed by unilateral 
state activity. 
The exact degree of direct intervention entailed by the pursuit of 
a comprehensive manpower policy is left open in Towards a Comprehensive 
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Manpower Policy, depending upon certain conditions, notably the 
persistence of high levels of unemployment. (106) It will be 
remembered that the first Annual ~port (1974-75) mentioned the 
preparation of contingency plans for higher unemployment. Already, 
by the time that Towards a Comprehensive Manpower Policy was 
published in 1976, these had resulted in the implementation of a 
number of special measures which subsequently were to be reorganised 
by the Holland Report around the structure of Special Programmes. 
The major concern of Chapter 4 will be the consideration of how 
special measures, and YOP in particular, emerged from the context 
of the philosophy and organisation of the newly established MSC 
which has just been described. But, before this account can be 
presented, it will be necessary to introduce another historical 
thread, that of the history of government responses to unemployment, 
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CHAPTER 2 UNEMPLOYMENT AND GOVERNMENT POLICY: 
A HISTORY OF SPECIAL MEASURES 
In the account that follows I intend to focus upon various past 
examples of job creation, training and instruction schemes which 
have been implemented in response to unemployment. Where it is 
applicable, I will emphasise those schemes which have been aimed 
specifically at the relief of youth unemployment. My object is 
not to attempt a comprehensive history of government policy in 
relation to unemployment, but rather to present a selective 
history which concentrates on certain specific kinds of measures. 
However, other measures, such as those which are primarily 
concerned with the provision of maintenance for the unemployed, 
must also be referred to. Schemes for the provision of work 
(and equally those providing training and instruction) have 
often been integrally connected with schemes for the provision 
of maintenance; consequently, it is sometimes necessary to 
consider both together as aspects of the same general policy towards 
the relief of unemployment. Furthermore, it is important that 
some attempt should be made to understand both the specific measures 
and the more general policies directed at unemployment in the 
wider context of government economic policies as a whole. These 
in their turn need to be explained in the context of the dominant 
economic theories in terms of which they were formulated. Thus, 
although this chapter is intended primarily to give an account 
of the history of certain specific kinds of approach to the relief 
of unemployment which can be thought of as precedents for the special 
measures approach recently adopted by the MSC, it necessarily 
tends at times towards being a more general history of government 
policy in response to unemployment, and at certain key points it 
needs grounding in the broader histories of economic policy 
and economic theory. 
Before the 1880s 'unemployment' did not appear as a concept in 
political economy, and was not regarded as a responsibility of 
Government poliCY.(l) Within the dominant 19th century classical 
school of political economy, the view was held that a full 
employment equilibrium was part of the 'natural order' of the 
economic system. This was simply deduced from Say's Law which 
states that 'supply creates its own demand', and was upheld 
regardless of any empirical inconsistencies that might appear. 
There might be periodic crises in the process of adjustment around 
the equilibrium, but within the assumptions of classical economy 
'general over-production was an impossibility' .(2) 
This understanding, or rather neglect, of the problem of unemploy-
ment was given expression in the 19th century social policy, and 
in particular in the New Poor Law of 1834. The implication of the 
doctrine that a full employment equilibrium was the natural order 
of the labour market was that anyone who sought work ought to be 
able to find it, and anyone who was out of work must either be 
unable or unwilling to work. These views were institutionally 
embodied in the 1834 Poor Law which, with its harsh regulations 
based on the principles of 'deterrence' and 'less eligibility', 
sought to drive the able-bodied back into the labour market and 
to make them self-reliant at any cost rather than face the 
humiliations of the workhouse or the labour test.(3) 
Yet, while the philosophy of the 1834 Act was dominant, its hold 
was never absolute, and compromises were in fact often necessary 
to sustain the system that it sanctioned. Thus pragmatic and 
humanitarian adjustments in the administration of the Poor Law 
were sometimes made in response to particular individual or 
localised circumstances, and outside the Poor Law system, there 
were alternative sources of relief. Notably the charities, while 
for the most part being enthusiastic supporters of the Poor Law 
philosophy, were prepared to compromise the logic of this phil-
osophy by giving relief to those they adjudged to be unfortunate, 
but deserving, cases. Likewise, in particularly grave crises, 
the Government was prepared to make practical exceptions to its 
own philosophy, as for example, in the cases of the relief 
works authorised in Ireland in the 1840s and in Lancashire between 
1863 and 1866. Also, there were various thrift institutions, 
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often associated with trade unions, which operated insurance 
schemes designed to maintain the self-reliance of workers through 
occasional periods of unemployment. (4) 
Although in one sense these were exceptions to the philosophy 
and system of the 1834 Poor Law, in another sense, it is arguable 
that such exceptions, by preventing the philosophy being taken 
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to its logical conclusion, sustained the system as a practical 
policy. Thus, from a broader perspective, the apparent compromises 
to the system might be considered an integral element of the system, 
the system not being exclusively defined by the regulations of 
the Poor Law, but rather being what Jose Harris has described 
as "the uneasy synthesis of Poor Law, thrift, and charity". (5) 
The inadequacy of this 'uneasy synthesis' was exposed by its 
failure to cope with the prolonged mass unemployment of the 
'Great Depression' of the 1880s. The serious riots and demon-
strations that ensued helped to put unemployment on the 
political agenda for the first time. (6;he period that followed, 
from 1886 onwards, can be understood as a period of experim-
entation, during which various policies were tested, either at 
the local level or amongst the charities, before the need 
for a national policy was accepted, and the form that it should 
take was determined jointly by the Labour Exchanges Act of 1909 
and the National Insurance Act of 1911. 
One of the significant, yet ultimately unsuccessful, lines of 
experimen~ation during this 25 year period was that concerned 
with the artificial creation of work as a means of relieving 
unemployment. Under the punitive regulations of the Poor Law, 
the performance of a 'labour test' was made a condition of the 
receipt of outdoor relief by the able-bodied. The labour test 
consisted of gruelling work, such as stone breaking or oakum 
picking, which was selected both for its deterrent effect and 
because it offered little competition to other labour. (7) 
61 
The prolonged severity of the Great Depression exhausted the 
resources of self-help and charity that had generally in the past 
kept skilled workers clear of the Poor Law system. In this 
situation, the Government of the day became concerned that the labour 
test, rather than acting as a deterrent, was destroying the 
proficiency of skilled men and prejudicing their return to employ-
ment within their previous trade. The response of Joseph 
Chamberlain the President of the Local Government Board, when 
prompted by riots of the London unemployed in February 1886, 
was to issue a circular to local authorities, urging them "to 
co-operate with Poor Law guardians in providing temporary non-
pauperising employment for the deserving unemployed. "(8) 
The so-called 'Chamberlain circular' was to be issued five times 
between 1886 and 1893, and in the years following, as the Poor 
Laws became increasingly irrelevant to the relief of unemployment 
and the labour test fell into disuse, various local authorities 
and charities experimented with further schemes of relief work 
and with the establishment of labour colonies. (9) The culmination 
of this process of development was the Unemployed Workmen Act of 
1905, which attempted to transform the practise of the previously 
localised experiments into a more ambitious national programme 
administered by Distress Committees in all major centres of 
population. (10) 
However, it is generally considered that the 1905 Act's main 
achievement was to give final proof of the impracticality of 
remedies, such as relief works and labour colonies, that were 
"external to the normal commercial and industrial system". (11) 
In the case of relie.f works this only confirmed the experience 
of the previous twenty years. Those authorised by the Chamberlain 
circular had been almost a complete failure in practical terms, 
and the subsequent experiments of local authorities and charities 
for the most part fared little better. (12) One of the main 
problems was that, although the Government was prepared under 
certain circumstances to encourage local initiatives, it gave little 
practical support and was not prepared to finance a national 
policy. Thus, the financial burden of these schemes fell largely 
on the local authorities, and it was generally those with the most 
serious unemployment problems who were least able to bear such 
costs. (13) But, beyond these external financial difficulties, 
there were inherent problems involved with the provision of 
relief work as some form of intermediary between normal employ-
ment and the punitive labour test of the Poor Law. As with the 
work that was required by the labour test, relief work was not 
supposed to compete with or replace work that would be carried out 
otherwise. Yet, as a result, the work that was created artifically 
was expensive, inefficient, and often just as 'demoralising' as 
that which was carried out under the labour test. (14) For example, 
the types of work suggested by the Chamberlain circular included 
shovelling on sewage farms, paving streets and laying out 
cemeteries. (15) Another seemingly intractable problem was 
presented by the question of what was the proper level of remun-
eration for those employed on relief schemes. Those administering 
the schemes were anxious to maintain some financial differential 
as an incentive to those seeking normal employment, as well as 
being concerned to minimise their running costs. However, the 
trade unions were worried that the schemes would act to undermine 
wage levels if those employed on them were paid anything less than 
the standard rate.(16) 
The failure of relief works encouraged the development of rural 
labour colonies as an alternative means of taking the urban 
unemployed off the labour market. Such colonies were established 
both by private charitable organisations, such as the Salvation 
Army, and by local poor law guardians. The motives behind their 
establishment were various. For some they were primarily 
institutions of penal segregation, for others they were an ideal-
istic 'back to the land' experiment in communal living. Often 
they were regarded as a training stage in preparation for eventual 
emigration. As one of the alternative policies authorised by the 
Unemployed Workmen Act, it seemed likely at one time that they 
would have an important role to play in any new national policy. 
However, for the most part, these experiments turned out to be just 
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as inefficient, expensive and demoralising as relief works, and 
thus likewise were eventually discredited. (17) 
Despite their lack of practical success, the various forms of 
relief works and labour colonies tried out during this twenty-year 
period have been seen as representing an important breach in the 
laissez-faire philosophy that was embodied in the 1834 Poor Law: 
a move away from deterrence and less eligibility, and towards the 
recognition of the right to work or maintenance. However, this 
view can be questioned. The purposa of the Chamberlain circular's 
endorsement of public works was never to supersede the Poor Law, 
but rather to reinforce it, by separating out the deserving unemp-
loyed so that the severe regulations could be enforced all the more 
strictly upon those considered undeserving. (18) Likewise, the 
Unemployed Workmen Act of 1905 can be seen as merely a means 
of improving the administration of traditional forms of charit-
able relief(199us, what might be said to have happened over this 
twenty year period was that various attempts were made to reinforce, 
rather than replace, the 'uneasy synthesis' that had already been 
proved inadequate during the Great Depression of the 1880s. 
These measures did not, by and large, depart from the fundamental 
principles that had supported the previous synthesis, and they 
were not, by and large, any more successful. 
In the early years of the twentieth century the need for a 
national policy to cope with unemployment was thus more pressing 
than ever. (20) The failure of alternatives or supplements to the 
Poor Law brought the focus of reform back onto the Poor Law 
itself, the administration of which was in a state of mounting 
crisis at this time.(21) Although not originally intended to 
be a temporary measure, the Unemployed Workmen Act was event-
ually given only a three year life-span pending the results of 
the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws that was set up in 1905.(22) 
When the Majority and Minority Reports were published in 1909, 
despite their many differences, both recommended the dismantling 
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of the Poor Law administrative structure. (23) However, daunted 
by the immense financial and technical complications involved 
in such a reform, the Liberal Government had in the meantime 
decided to bypass the Poor Law altogether in its attempt to 
produce a new national policy to deal with unemployment. (24) 
The main elements of this policy, as mentioned before, were the 
provision of a national system of labour exchanges and a national 
insurance scheme. Yet, there was to have been a third element, 
the establishment of a national Development Commission for the 
financing and administration of counter-cyclical public works; 
but, despite receiving legislative approval, this never got off 
the ground as a practical policy. (25) Labour exchanges and 
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national insurance, although significant reforms, also had their 
limitations as practical policies. The labour exchanges, as has 
been pointed out already in the context of the history of manpower 
policy, were rendered largely ineffective in their primary function 
of organising the labour market as soon as they were given the 
additional responsibility of administering the new insurance scheme. 
The insurance scheme, although described as national, covered less 
than a quarter of the total male labour force, being concentrated 
mainly on skilled men and excluding women virtually altogether. 
It was also extremely cautious and conservative in the scale and 
duration of the benefits that it promised to contributors. Thus, 
in general, it was a narrow and tentative experiment rather than a 
full-scale national programme of insurance. 
(26) 
Leading Liberal politicians, such as Churchill and Lloyd George, 
introduced these reforms as a scientific policy to deal with 
unemployment and spoke of them as heralding a more comprehensive 
programme of social reform. (27) However, this never came about; 
and as they stood, the measures can only be described as limited and 
pragmatic adjustments to the existing scheme of social policy, 
rather than the embodiment of a radical new philosophy. (28) 
The main architect of the Liberal reforms of this period was in 
fact William Beveridge. A brief examination of his thought 
at the time can help to place the new policies within the broader 
context of economic theory. In Unemployment: A Problem of Industry, 
published in 1908, Beveridge acknowledged that unemployment 
was nctnecessarily the fault of individuals unemployed. However, 
he still held to the basic proposition of Say's Law and believed 
that, while there might be a pattern of cyclical fluctuation 
around the point of equilibrium, general overproduction was an 
impossibility. His main explanation for unemployment, if it 
was not voluntary, was that it was 'frictional', being the result 
of imperfections in the functioning of the labour market which 
were particularly associated with the widespread system of casual 
labour. The solution, he thought, was to improve the organisation 
of the labour market; and the government policy that this required 
was the provision of a national network of labour exchanges. 
The basic philosophy, then, was one of limited state intervention 
to ensure the smoother operation of the labour market mechanism, 
the essentially efficient and benevolent nature of which remained 
guaranteed by the fundamental premises of classical political 
economy. (29) 
Similarly, the national insurance scheme, of which Beveridge 
was also an advocate, can be understood as an 'organisationist' 
development of a predominantly nineteenth century approach to 
social policy and the relief of unemployment. Thus, the 
provision of insurance was a means of intervening to extend and 
organise more efficiently the workers' own resources of thrift 
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and self-help, and thereby, to ensure that they should remain 
self-sufficient through any brief periods of unemployment they might 
face. It was by no means an acknowledgement of the state's 
responsibility to support the unemployed. The scheme was to be 
run on a strict actuarial basis, with the contributors' right 
to benefit being limited to 15 weeks per year. (30) This was 
consistent with the view explained above that non-voluntary 
unemployment was of a limited cyclical and frictional nature. 
The assumption was, that with the complementary provision of 
labour exchanges, no-one genuinely seeking work should remain 
unemployed for more than the limited period of time for which 
they were covered by insurance benefits. 
Thus, in effect, these 'organisationist' improvements of the 
mechanisms of the market and of individual self-help produced 
a new and more 'scientific' means of distinguishing the deserving 
from the undeserving. Those who were able-bodied, and still could 
not look after themselves after the reforms, could only have 
themselves to blame; and for them, the deterrent of the Poor Law 
and the workhouse was to remain as fierce as ever'(31) There 
was virtually no understanding that unemployment might have other 
causes, located deeper within the essential mechanism of the labour 
market itself, and thus, no allowance was made for prolonged mass 
unemployment. That the inadequacy of the Liberals so-called 
scientific policy was not exposed before the outbreak of the First 
World War, was largely due to the favourable economic conditions 
that prevailed during this comparatively brief period, rather 
than to any inherent merits in the policy. (32) However, the 
interwar years were to be less kind. 
It is difficult to make reliable comparisons between the rates 
of unemployment before and after the First World War because 
there were different sources for the statistics covering each 
of the two periods. However, it has been estimated that the 
average rate of unemployment for the twenty years between the two 
world wars was between two and three times higher than that for 
the thirty years preceding the First World War'(33) It is not 
surprising, then, t~at the tentative prewar measures devised 
to control and cope with unemployment were rapidly overwhelmed 
by the magnitude of the disaster that took place after the war. 
The prolonged mass unemployment of the interwar period, during 
which the cyclical pattern of variation was between unemployment 
rates of 10 and 20%, was an impossibility according to the 
conventional assumption of classical political economy that a 
full employment equilibrium was the norm. Yet, the social policy 
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that had been based on that assumption, and was designed to 
cope with the limited range of possibilities that it encompassed, 
was faced with such an impossible situation as a pressing and 
unavoidable social reality. 
The very fact that unemployment reached the levels already 
mentioned demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the prewar measures 
taken to control unemployment through the organisation of the 
labour market. (34) The higher the level of unemployment rose, 
the less relevant became the placement work of the exchanges 
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and the more over-burdened they became with insurance administration. (35) 
The other side of this inability to control unemployment was 
the inadequacy of the means of relief provided for the millions 
who were unemployed as a result. The two major instruments of 
relief that were the legacy of the prewar era, the experimental 
unemployment insurance scheme and the antiquated Poor Law system, 
were both reduced to states of crisis and disintegration by the 
end of the 1920s.(36) Financial and administrative order was 
then only restored at the beginning of the 1930s through harsh 
cuts in the levels of benefits and the use of the hated means 
test, at the expense of rioting and hunger amongst the unemployed. (37) 
Although the situation gradually improved in the latter half of 
the thirties, it was only the rearmament in preparation for the 
Second World War, and the war itself, that 'solved' the problem. (38) 
Given that the policies that had found favour in the Edwardian 
era proved so inadequate at dealing with the mass unemployment of 
the interwar period, it needs to be asked to what extent attempts 
were made to revive some of the policies that had been rejected 
before the First World War, and to what extent the attempt was made 
to devise new policies. The answer, in brief, must be that 
although a variety of alternative policies were tried none 
was ever of more than a marginal significance. Nevertheless, it 
is worthwhile taking a look at some of these alternatives, in 
particular those that were applied specifically to the problem 
of youth unemployment. 
One of the main demands of the labour movement and the organised 
unemployed during the 1920s was for government work schemes to 
be provided for the unemployed at trade union rates of paYO(39) 
However, the demand met with little response, even from the 
Labour Government, and in general it can be said that little 
attention was given to the policy of public works during the 
interwar periodo(40) The prejudice against such schemes persisted 
from the prewar era, and the predominant view was that any money 
spent by g8vernment on the creation of jobs in public works 
would be at the direct expense of capital available for the 
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creation of jobs in the private sector of the economy. (41) 
Consequently, the amount spent on public works was insignificant.(42) 
The body most concerned with the organisation and funding of 
relief work schemes was the Unemployment Grants Committee. This 
was established in 1920 in order to make grants available to local 
authorities providing approved schemes in areas of high unemp-
loyment. The work provided was, for the most part, of the 
conventional type for such schemes - sewage disposal, road building, 
laying out and maintaining parks, etc. The amount given out by 
the Committee varied from year to year depending on the policy 
of the government.(43) In the peak year of 1931, £30 million was 
spent on direct relief work, and the largest number of men 
employed at anyone time was 59,000.(44) However, in 1932, the 
Committee was abruptly wound up, falling a victim to the National 
Government's policy of savage public spending cuts. 
The introduction of Government Training Centres for the unemployed 
in 1925 has already been referred to in the account that was given 
above of the development of manpower policy. (45) These were also 
on a very limited scale compared to the immensity of the problem. 
Indeed, the policy was to restrict their intake in accordance 
with future employment prospects, so that those who were trained 
would be almost certain of finding employment at the end of their 
six-month course. (46) As a result, placement rates were excep-
tionally high, but it was only when the peak of unemployment had 
passed that the numbers being admitted to the Training Centres rose 
to a significant level. (47) 
An alternative to Training Centres was provided by Instructional 
Centres, which were less specifically vocational, and aimed more 
generally "at restoring unemployed men to a condition fitting 
them to obtain and hold employment if and when it becomes 
available". (48) When they were first set up in 1929, attendance 
on their twelve week 'reconditioning courses' was purely 
voluntary. However, within a year, insurance officers were given 
the power to compel attendance as a condition for the receipt of 
unemployment benefit. (49) At their peak, Instructional Centres 
registered over 20,000 admissions in a year, but again this 
came after the worst peak of unemployment at the beginning of the 
thirties. (50) 
Other sp~ial measures directed at unemployed men included: 
training in basic agricultural techniques on farm camps in prep-
aration for emigration to the colonies; an industrial transference 
scheme to relocate unemployed labour out of the depressed areas; 
the provision of physical training centres and the establishment 
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of occupational and recreational centres under the aegis of the 
National Council of Social Services. In addition, special provision 
was made for what were considered to be the special needs of 
unemployed women and girls by the Central Committee on Women's 
Training and Employment: this consisted largely of preparation 
for domestic service. (51) 
Before describing the provision that was made for the young 
unemployed, it is necessary to say something about the specific 
nature and dynamics of youth unemployment during the twenties 
and thirties. The official literature at this time used the 
term 'juvenile' rather than 'youth', and applied it to the age 
group between 14 and 18.(52) Until 1934 the information about the 
employment and unemployment of a substantial portion of this age 
group was very incomplete. The minimum school-leaving age was 
set at the fourteenth birthday, but it was not until the age of 
16 that juveniles entered into the national Unemployment Insurance 
scheme. Thus, between 14 and 16, there was a gap in the readily 
available sources of statistical information. Consequently, the 
only reliable figures for juvenile unemployment rates during 
this period apply just to the 16 to 18 age group, though it is 
generally assumed that the rates amongst the younger age group 
were broadly comparable. (53) 
The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that, in 
direct contrast to the modern situation, the rate of unemployment 
for juveniles during the mass unemployment of the interwar 
years was considerably less than that for the population as a whole. 
Thus in 1925, for example, only 4.1% of insured juveniles were 
unemployed, as compared to 11.6% of insured adults: (54)and in 
the peak year of 1932, the ratio was even more favourable to 
youth, the figures being 7.6% for juveniles and 23.3% for 
adults. (55) 
The explanation of this situation lay in the particular and 
exclusive nature of the juvenile labour market at this time. 
A whole range of unskilled jobs existed - such as messengers, 
van boys, office boys, machine-minders, etc - for which juveniles 
were exclusively hired, during which no form of training was 
given, and at the end of which dismissal was inevitable as soon 
as the young person reached an age when they could command an 
adult wage. A large proportion of the apparently buoyant 
juvenile labour market consisted of these 'dead-end' jobs.(56) 
Their effect was, temporarily, to insulate juveniles from the full 
impact of mass unemployment, but in the long run, to exacerbate 
the situation of young adults over the age of eighteen. (57) 
This was not a new problem. The role of such 'blind-alley 
occupations' in the creation of future generations of casual 
labour and adult unemployment had been clearly recognised at 
the time of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws. (58) How~ver, 
no serious attempt was made to remedy the problem then'(59)and 
nor was it during the interwar years. The view expressed by 
the Malcolm Committee on Education and Industry in 1926 was 
that there were only a limited number of skilled jobs available 
in the adult labour market, and therefore, there was little point 
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in intervening to increase the number of apprenticeships and training 
opportunities available for juveniles. (60) 
Thus, rather than attempting to find a remedy for the long-term 
structural problem of juvenile employment in dead-end jobs, 
government efforts were concentrated on providing what were 
admitted to be only palliatives for the apparently less serious 
problem of juvenile unemployment. (61) Despite the comparatively 
low percentage involved, juvenile unemployment was considered 
to be a serious problem at the time. The 14 to 18 age group was 
associated with adolescence and perceived as a particularly 
difficult and dangerous period of life, during which an unemployed 
young person could easily become 'demoralised' and thereby 
rendered permanently unemployable. In the words of the Malcolm 
Committee: 
"The disintegrating effect, moral and physical, of 
juvenile unemployment is incalculable ... In such districts, 
where employment is a comparative luxury, to allow boys and 
girls of 14 to 18 to roam the streets should be unthinkable. 
That the unemployed boy of today is the unemployable man 
of tomorrow is a saying we are satisfied is often only 
too true". (62) 
The main means used to keep the unemployed boys and girls off 
the streets were the Juvenile Unemployment Centres, subsequently 
renamed the Junior Instruction Centres. These were first set-up 
in connection with the Out-of-Work Donation Scheme which was 
introduced as an emergency measure immediately after the end 
of the First World War'(63) Unemployed juveniles between the 
ages of 15 and 18 had to attend approved courses at Juvenile 
Employment Centres as a condition for the receipt of the 
donation. When the Out-of-Work Donation Scheme came to an end, 
the centres were briefly closed, but they were then reopened 
under the 1920 Unemployment Insurance Act which made attendance 
a condition for juveniles receiving benefit. Between 1918 and 
1934 there were mounted seven different schemes involving 
Juvenile Unemployment Centres and, from 1929 onwards, Junior 
Instruction Centres; and over the period, more than a million 
young people passed through the centres and their associated 
classes. Each scheme was set up on a temporary basis, but then 
had to be replaced by a similar scheme as the problem of juvenile 
unemployment persisted. The facilities were provided by the local 
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education authorities supported by varying percentages of 
government aid'(64) 
The basic aim of all the schemes was to maintain the employability 
of the young people concerned. (65) The centres attempted to 
create the atmosphere of a 'club' rather than a school, but 
discipline was still considered to be an essential feature'(66) 
and at some centres a prefect system was introduced. (67) The 
main emphasis of the curriculum was placed onphysical fitness and 
practical activities, with an industrial bias for boys and 
a domestic bias for girls. Although it was attempted to relate 
the activities to the requirements of the local labour market, 
there was no training of a specifically vocational nature provided. 
In addition tothe physical and practical activities, efforts were 
made to improve the general education of the young people, to 
broaden their interests, and to develop their social awareness. (68) 
Reviewing the work being done by the Juvenile Unemployment Centres 
in 1926, the Malcolm Report concluded that they were performing 
a valuable role in preventing the deterioration of unemployed 
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young people, and recommended that a permanent scheme should be 
brought into operation. (69) The main problem identified with existing 
arrangements was that only half the age group could be compelled 
to attend the centres. What has already been referred to as a 
gap in sources of information, between the minimum school-leaving 
age of 14 and the minimum age of entry to the Unemployment 
Insurance scheme of 16, was also a gap in state supervision. 
Unemployed juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18 could be forced 
to attend the centres as a condition for the receipt of benefit, 
but the younger age group were difficult to maintain contact 
with and could only be urged to attend on a voluntary basis. (70) 
This was perceived as a particularly unfortunate situation by the 
members of the Malcolm Committee who considered these earlier 
years as the most dangerous and impressionable. (71) Consequently, 
the Report gave considerable attention to a review of methods 
suggested for bridging the gap. (72) 
Following the Malcolm Report, two National Advisory Councils 
for Juvenile Employment (one for England and Wales, and one for 
Scotland) were set up and given the task of considering a 
permanent scheme of Juvenile Unemployment Centres. (73) As has 
been referred to before, (74)their composition was of a 
typically corporatist format, representatives of both employers 
and unions being included, as well as representatives of Local 
Education Authorities, teachers, Advisory Councils and the 
Ministry of Labour. Their first reports reasserted the object-
ives of the centres and recommended their continuation in the 
following terms: 
"provision should continue to be made for dealing with 
unemployment among boys and girls by the establish-
ment of Centres or Classes, under the administration 
of the Education Authority of the area concerned, 
with the object of preventing deterioration, and 
of facilitating the reabsorption of the boys and girls 
into industry by maintaining or re-establishing, through 
further education or training, habits of discipline and 
self-respect". (75) 
Subsequently, a more permanent scheme was established under 
the 1930 Unemployment Insurance Act, but it was not until the 
1934 Unemployment Act that the problem of the gap was finally 
tackled. This latter piece of legislation brought the 14 to 16 
age group into the Unemployment Insurance scheme, and, although 
they .would still not be eligible for benefit until 16, the power 
was created to compel their attendance at suitable courses should 
they become unemployed. At the same time, the provision of 
suitable facilities was made a statutory duty of the Local 
Education Authorities. (76) 
Following the 1934 Act, there was a substantial increase in 
the numbers attending Junior Instruction Centres, though not 
perhaps as great as might have been expected, since by this 
time the employment situation was beginning to improve. 
Aggregate attendances for a.year reached their highest level in 
1936, when they were just over 190,000, compared with a figure 
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of 110,000 in 1933. Thereafter the numbers declined steadily, 
and with the outbreak of the Second World War, the centres 
rapidly disappeared. (77) 
Other special provisions for the juvenile unemployed included 
a juvenile transference scheme and a camp to prepare juveniles 
for emigration. Also a large proportion of girls were taken by 
the Domestic Training Centres for Women which were run by 
the Central Committee on Women's Training and Employment. (78) 
What can be said about all these special measures, whether 
aimed at the juvenile or the adult unemployed, was that they 
were essentially palliatives, not attempting to tackle the 
causes of unemployment, but instead seeking to mitigate some 
of the worst effects. The various marginal schemes of training, 
instruction and job creation thus played much the same role as 
the local and charitable schemes of the nineteenth century. 
Then, the inhumane system of the Poor Law had had to be compromised 
and supplemented in order to survive in the face of a social 
reality that was inconsistent with the abstract economic theory 
in terms of which it had originally been formulated. In the 
interwar period, the organisationist policy that had been form-
ulated at the beginning of the twentieth century as a scientific 
alternative to the Poor Law, but which shared the same basic 
economic premises, had likewise to be compromised and supplemented 
in the face of a theoretically impossible social reality. Each 
time, the various special schemes were theoretically breaches in 
the philosophy of the main system of policies, but in reality 
they functioned as the saving grace of that system. 
Despite the massive denial of Say's Law that was constituted by 
the reality of unemployment in the interwar years, throughout this 
period government policy continued to be framed within the macro-
economic assumptions of classical economy. However, the 
disjunction between theory and reality did provide the stimulus 
for a major revision at the level of economic theory which was 
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to have important policy implications after the Second World War. 
This revision was, of course, that which is associated with John 
Maynard Keynes and his major work, The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money. (79) 
Keynes accepted the existence of frictional and voluntary unemp-
loyment, the two main forms of unemployment recognised by classical 
economics, but argued that there was also a third category, 
which he defined as 'involuntary' unemployment. The explanation 
of this third category of unemployment involved a major chall-
enge to the assumption of Say's Law that supply always tends to 
create its own demand. Involuntary unemployment, Keynes 
argued, was the result of a prolonged deficiency in aggregate 
demand. The explanation of how this was possible, as expounded 
by the 'General Theory', was both complex and technical. However, 
essentially, it depended upon understanding the d~ermination of 
the level of employment in the wider context of the maintenance 
of equilibrium between other key economic variables. Thus, 
Keynes argued that there was no reason why the point of 
equilibrium reached (between consumption, investment, saving 
and national income) should coincide with the overall level of 
demand necessary to secure full employment. This being the case, 
the level of employment could no longer be regarded, as it was 
in classical economics, simply as a function of the level of 
wages acting as the price mechanism regulating supply and demand 
within the labour market. 
This revolution at the level of economic theory had important 
implications in terms of contemporary economic policies. 
Classical economics explained persistent unemployment in terms 
of the insufficient downward flexibility of the level of wages. 
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In accordance with this theory, the main policy objective of 
interwar governments in trying to reduce the level of unemploy-
ment was the forcing down of wage rates. Keynesian theory, however, 
indicated that such a policy was not only doomed to be ineffective, 
but likely to be counterproductive. Thus, in the absence of any 
other action being taken to ensure a sufficient overall level of 
demand within the economy, the main impact of any reduction of 
real wage levels was likely to be upon the level of consumption, 
leading to further falls in the levels of demand and employment. 
Keynes' alternative was to recommend positive state intervention 
directed at what he regarded to be the source of the problem, 
the regulation and maintenance of the level of effective demand. 
This could take a number of different forms. Either investment 
could be stimulated by a reduction of interest rates, or 
consumption could be encouraged by taxation policy. However, 
both these measures were indirect and still relied on manipulating 
the decisions of private individuals. Keynes did not think that 
such manipulation would always be sufficient to pull the economy 
out of a slump. Hence, the policy that he most strongly 
recommended to restore and maintain full employment was one of 
large-scale direct government investment in public works. This, 
he argued, must if necessary be financed out of a budget deficit. 
Keynes had been pressing for such policies since the early 
twenties, though without being able to justify them at the 
level of macro-economic theory. His 'General Theory', published 
in 1936, was intended to provide such a theoretical justification, 
so that an extensive policy of public works could be incorpor-
ated as an important and integral element of government macro-
economic policy rather than remaining as one of the small-scale 
exceptional measures that were tolerated only as tokens of 
humanitarian concern. 
Keynes' ideas had little impact on government policy before the 
outbreak of the Second World War. The treasury orthodoxies of 
sound money and a balanced budget precluded the kinds of inter-
vention that he was.recommending. The reaction to the depression 
and steeply rising unemployment of the early thirties was, as we 
have seen, to cut back on public spending, including relief works 
and unemployment benefits, in a vain attempt to balance the budget 
in the face of shrinking revenues and escalating relief expend-
itures.(SO) It was only the over-riding national interest of the 
war that made possible reversal of this policy and the adoption 
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of what was in effect an inadvertent Keynesian policy of unbal-
anced budgets, heavy public investment and low interest rates'(81) 
At the same time unemployment ceased to be a problem, 
The experience of the Second World War seemed to provide a 
decisive confirmation of the role that state expenditure could 
play in the maintenance of full employment, and thereby prepared 
the way for the translation of Keynes' doctrine into a consciously 
adopted peace-time poliCY'(82) The official adoption of a 
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Keynesian policy of de.mand management in the 1944 White Paper on 
Employment Policy, and its subsequent apparent success in controlling 
unemployment during the postwar era, have already been described 
in the context of the history of the development of active manpower 
policy, Perhaps at this stage certain qualifications should be 
made with regard to this description, First, it can be questioned 
exactly how fully the White Paper endorsed Keynesian policies, 
and whether in fact the full conversion to Keynesianism was ever 
achieved'(83) Certainly Beveridge, who by this time had been 
fully converted to Keynesianism, thought that the White Paper 
was still trying to cling onto conservative orthodoxies and that 
therefore it did not provide the basis for an adequate full 
employment policY'(84) Secondly, it can be questioned to what 
extent the high level of employment achieved in the postwar era 
was the direct result of the government policies adopted'(85) 
But, whatever the case may be with regard to these questions, 
it is certain that postwar governments did accept a greater degree 
of responsibility for maintaining the level of activity in the 
economy than had ever been contemplated in the prewar era'(86) 
and that for roughiy two decades they appeared to be able to 
guarantee a situation that was in practise very close to the goal 
of full employment, 
In this situation, particular micro-economic policies to deal 
with unemployment, at first, seemed largely unnecessary; and then, 
when they were required, they took on, or at least were presented 
in, a new form, This new form, as has already been explained, 
was that of active manpower policy. However, looking back in 
historical terms, it can now be understood that active manpower 
policy was in many ways similar to the organisationist policies 
espoused by Beveridge and implemented by the Liberals at the 
beginning of the century. (87) The continuity between the two 
sets of policies is indicated by the importance that each of them 
ascribed to the placement role of labour exchanges. Both sets of 
policies assumed a certain form of full employment equilibrium 
as the norm and were concerned to remove frictional factors in 
the labour market which were perceived as interfering with the 
achievement of this norm, or as making its achievement give rise 
to undesirable side effects. But there was an important differ-
ence, and this lay in the macro-economic context assumed by each 
of the two policies. Beveridge's organisational policy was set 
within the assumptions of classical economy, according to which 
the norm of a full employment equilibrium was guaranteed by the 
unfettered operation of a free labour market. In contrast, active 
manpower policy was set within the macro-economic assumptions 
of Keynesianism, according to which the labour market's regulation 
of a full employment equilibrium was to be guaranteed by a 
government policy of demand management. 
Before embarking upon an analysis of the way in which special 
measures to deal with unemployment emerged from the newly-created 
Manpower Services Commission, it may be helpful to give a 
schematic summary of the historical account that has just been 
presented. First, at the level of economic theory, the account 
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can be divided fairly straightforwardly into two parts. From the 
beginning of the nineteenth century until the outbreak of the Second 
World War, the dominant economic theory underlying all government 
policies in relation to employment and unemployment was classical 
political economy. According to this theory, a full employment 
equilibrium was guaranteed by the unhindered operation of the 
market mechanism. From the Second World War at least until the 
period of the setting up of the MSC in the early seventies, 
Keynesian economics apparently enjoyed a similar position 
of dominance. According to Keynes, a full employment equil-
ibrium could only be guaranteed by various forms of state 
intervention to ensure the steady growth of aggregate demand. 
At the level of policies, the process of periodisation is far 
more complicated. Nevertheless, at the cost of considerable 
simplification, it is possible to mark out six distinct periods. 
The first four of these fall within the theoretical domain of 
classical economics; the latter two are subsequent to the 
Keynesian revolution. 
The limits of the first period can conveniently be defined by the 
passing of the New Poor Law in 1834, and the onset of the Great 
Depression in the mid-1880s. During this period unemployment 
was not recognised as a concern of policy-making. The Poor Law 
sought to drive the able-bodied back into the labour market, where, 
in accordance with the doctrines of classical economy, everybody 
ought to be able to find work. In general, the only provision 
of work was as a deterrent in the form of the labour test. Yet 
there were exceptions to this harsh regime, involving the provision 
of both work and maintenance. These ran contrary to the strict 
logic of classical economic theory, but still had a positive 
role to play inthe wider policy system - the role of palliatives. 
Thus, the strict official policy of the Poor Law, and the 
exceptions that existed to it, combined together in what has been 
described as an 'uneasy synthesis' . 
The second period opened with the first issue of the Chamberlain 
circular in 1886, and closed with the rapid demise of the 1905 
Unemployment Workmen Act. The Great Depression exposed the 
inadequacy of the uneasy synthesis of the Poor Law and its 
exceptions, and raised unemployment as a policy issue for the 
first time. The period that followed was one of experimentation, 
during which various attempts were made to develop the 
exceptions within the synthesis into a positive alternative policy. 
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In particular, various schemes were set up for the artificial 
provision of work which was neither part of the normal commercial 
and industrial system, nor directly part of the Poor Law's system 
of deterrence. However, all that was established was that such 
schemes were impractical. None developed beyond the status of 
the exceptional or the experimental. In the last analysis, they 
functioned either as deterrents or as palliatives, reinforcing, 
not replacing, the previous synthesis. 
The third period can be defined, at its outer limits, by the 
setting up of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws in 1905 and 
the outbreak of the FirstWorldWar in 1914. This was the period 
of the emergence of an 'organisationist' national policy to deal 
with unemployment. It was essentially a policy of micro-
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economic adjustment, working from within the macro-economic 
assumptions of classical economy. The two main provisions made 
were a national system of labour exchanges and a limited form of 
national insurance scheme. Their purpose was to organise more 
efficiently the 'natural' mechanisms of market competition and 
provident self-help, so as to exclude the need for special measures 
intervening between the open system of the market and the penal 
system of the Poor Law. An improved market system would no longer 
require the uneasy synthesis of deterrents and palliatives; 
deterrents alone would be sufficient. This was presented as a 
'scientific policy'. 
The fourth period is that of the interwar years. During 
this peri0d, the reality of prolonged mass unemployment 
overwhelmed both the assumptions of classical economy, and 
the 'scientific policy' that had been constructed on their 
basis. There emerged a new synthesis of exceptional palliat-
ives and Poor Law/Unemployment Assistance deterrents. 
policy can be explained quite simply by pointing out that 
there was no problem of unemployment and therefore no need for 
palliatives. However, there is another way in which the 
relationship between Keynesian economic policy and special 
measures for the relief of unemployment can be viewed. Keynes-
ian ism can be understood as a development of what were previously 
special measures for the relief of unemployment into an economic 
policy for the maintenance of full employment. In this way, 
special measures are rendered no longer special; rather they appear 
as integral elements of macro and micro-economic policy. 
Thus, instead of special measures for the creation of artificial 
j"Jbs, 'normal' jobs are created through the macro-economic policy 
of demand management, if necessary by direct public expenditure. 
And instead of training being a special measure, it appears within 
the framework of active manpower policy as an aspect of the micro-
economic fine-tuning of Keynesian demand management. Thus, within 
the framework of classical economy, special measures were 
'special' because they ran counter to the logic of economic 
policies and could only be justified in social terms; conversely, 
within the framework of Keynesianism, special measures were non-
existent because they had been fully integrated into the logic 
of economic policies and therefore could be justified in both 
economic and social terms. 
As we have seen, the Manpower Services Commission was planned as 
a development of active manpower policy and therefore assumed 
in its philosophy a Keynesian macro-economic framework. Yet, from 
its very first meeting, the Commission has been directly associated 
with the development of special measures for the relief of 
unemployment. It is to the problematical question of how these 
special measures have been understood and justified in terms of the 
philosophy of the newly-created MSC that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE MANPOWER SERVICES COMMISSION 
AND SPECIAL MEASURES 
1. Pre-yop Special Measures 
When considering the MSC's initial response to the rising 
levels of unemployment in the mid-seventies, it is important 
to keep in mind how the Keynesian macro-economic setting of the 
philosophy of active manpower policy influenced the perception 
of unemployment as a problem. The postwar period, in which the 
problem of unemployment by and large appeared to have been solved, 
gave rise to considerable confidence in the efficacy of Keynesian 
macro-economic policy. All that seemed to be necessary was 
the fine-tuning of this macro-economic policy in order to avoid 
the build-up of inflationary pressures around labour bottlenecks 
and mismatches. Within the analysis of active manpower policy, 
beyond a certain residual regional problem, unemployment was 
viewed as essentially a short-term frictional and cyclical 
phenomenon, arising from the imperfect organisation of the labour 
market and the insensitivity of the deflationary mechanism used 
to put the brake on inflation. There might then be periodic 
rises of unemployment, but the real underlying problem was the 
shortages and mismatches that were blocking sustained inflation-
free economic growth. 
Despite the fact that unemployment had been rising as an underlying 
trend since 1966, and despite the fact that it had exceeded the 
million mark in January 1972, it was predominantly in terms of 
the above analysis that the future role of the MSC in relation to 
unemployment was originally envisaged. A Labour MP drew attention 
to the apparent contradiction involved during the debate that 
followed the Conservative Government's first announcement, in 
November 1972, of its plans to set up the MSC. The MP, Mr.Molloy, 
took issue with the Secretary of State in the following terms: 
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"Does the right hon, Gentleman agree that there is a 
distinct relationship between the statement he made 
apropos the establishment of this Commission and the 
subject of unemployment which we were discussing 
a few minutes ago? It seems absurd that we should be 
regarding a manpower problem in one statement as though 
we have not enough work people in this country, whereas 
a few minutes ago we were talking about the problem 
of recording the number of unemployed"'(l) 
The understanding of unemployment as a transient and secondary 
problem was further encouraged and reinforced by the peculiarly 
unrealistic economic circumstances that prevailed immediately 
prior to the MSC's establishment, The 'u-turn' in Conservative 
policy previously alluded to involved a substantial reflation 
of the economy, Major tax cuts and other complementary measures 
announced by the Chancellor, Anthony Barber, in the April 1972 
budget initiated a period of rapid economic expansion that 
became known as the 'Barber Boom' '(2) At first rapid growth was 
achieved; but by the latter half of 1973 momentum was being 
lost and a number of serious problems were emerging, including 
the appearance of bottlenecks and shortages in the labour market, 
The employment exchanges had more vacancies on their books 
than at any time since 1951, and employers affected by bottlenecks 
and shortages were crying out for more skilled labour, An 
article published in the Economist in November 1973 conveys 
something of the atmosphere at the time'(3) Having illustrated 
the problem, it stated that the "first job (of the newly created 
Commission) should be to produce a policy for dealing with 
labour shortage", (4) It went on to express anxiety about the 
effects of the raising of the school-leaving age, and to suggest 
ways in which more women and pensioners might be encouraged to 
participate in the labour market, and even contemplated the 
possibility of more immigration, Looking back with hindsight, 
it seems extraordinary that informed observers could have made 
such statements less than a decade before unemployment exceeded 
the three million mark and equally well informed observers 
began predicting that this could be the permanent level for the 
rest of the eighties, (5) Yet, when considering how the MSC has 
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reacted to the growing problem of unemployment, it must always 
be borne in mind how rapidly circumstances and opinions have changed 
over the comparatively brief period of its existence. 
Indeed, even in the short period of time between the publication 
of the article I have referred to in the Economist and the 
official launching of the MSC in January 1974, there was a 
dramatic change in labour market prospects. The Barber Boom 
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had carried the seeds of its own destruction from the beginning, (6) 
and its inevitable collapse was hastened by the onset of the oil 
supply crisis in October 1973 and the miner's strike a month later(7) 
In December the Conservative Government was forced to take 
drastic action to deflate aggregate demand, and this was soon to 
be followed by the imposition of the three day week'(8) Thus, 
even as the MSC was being set up the balance of prospects in the 
labour market was being tilted strongly in the direction of higher 
unemployment. 
Hence, at the first meeting of the new Commission in January, 
it was decided that it was necessary to make contingency plans for 
the introduction of special measures should there be a substantial 
rise in the level of unemployment. (9) These plans took two forms. 
First, the TSA was asked to examine what training initiatives it 
could launch in response to a deteriorating unemployment situation 
over the coming year. Secondly, Santosh Mukherjee was commissioned 
to make "a wide-ranging review of the likely effects of various 
future levels of unemployment on different groups in the labour 
market and of manpower policies which might ease them"'(lO) 
Mukherjee's findings were published in a booklet entitled 
There's work to be done. The views expressed in this publication 
were his own and not those of the Commission. Nevertheless, the 
document was significant: first, because it set out clearly, and 
for the first time in this country, the rationale within the wider 
framework of active manpower policy for the adoption of special 
measures in response to unemployment; secondly, because much of 
what it recommended was eventually to be adopted and implemented 
as official MSC policy. It will be remembered from the account of 
the origins of the MSC that Mukherjee was a leading exponent 
of active manpower policy, in particular as practised in Sweden. 
In his comparative study of Swedish and British manpower policies, 
he had been particularly impressed by the response of Swedish 
manpower policy during periods of deflation and comparatively 
high unemployment. (11) This response took a dual form: the 
expansion of training programmes and the implementation of various 
schemes of job creation. By these two means the Swedes were able 
to cater for two thirds of those who would otherwise be unemployed. 
In There's work to be done, Mukherjee made the case for a similar 
extension of the scope of active manpower policy in Britain, to 
include special measures to counteract unemployment. (12) 
His analysis started from a consideration of the prospects for 
the labour market in the coming year. As we have seen, following 
the peak of over a million reached at the beginning of 1972, 
unemployment fell rapidly over the next two years in response to 
a reflationary macro-economic policy. Consequently, the average 
level during 1973 dropped back down to 0.6 million. However, by 
the standards of previous postwar history this was still a high 
level, and Mukherjee drew attention to the underlying upward trend 
that was distinguishable from such short-term fluctuations. Thus, 
for the period 1955-66 the average unemployment rate was 1.5%, 
between 1967 and 1969 it was 2.4%, and by 1971-73 it had reached 
3.3%. Furthermore, reinforcing this upward trend was the fact 
that sine 1967 a normal rate of economic growth (2~-3%) had 
proved insufficient to take up the slack resulting from the 
average rise of productivity. At the beginning of 1974 prospects 
for the growth of output were poor. The rise in oil prices was 
adding to what was already considered to be a serious deficit in 
the balance of payments, and the rate of inflation was continuing 
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to cause alarm. In these circumstances, there was negligible hope 
of the Government reintroducing a reflationary macro-economic policy. 
already enhanced. For those in the outer labour market, as 
defined in structural terms according to age, he believed 
that some form of direct job creation programme was more suitable, 
albeit supplemented by further training provision. (15) 
The idea that the MSC should be given a job creation role in 
response to rising unemployment had previously been advanced 
by the TUC, but it had been by no means universally accepted and 
had not been explicitly included in the legislative definition of 
the Commission's responsibilities. (16) Thus, when Mukherjee 
advocated that the MSC should take on such a role, he was aware 
of the need to argue for what was in many respects a new approach. 
There were of course historical precedents of public works 
programmes and contemporary examples, in North America and 
elsewhere, of the kind of direct community-orientated job 
creation programme that he was proposing. (17) Also in Britain 
there was already a small-scale example of such a scheme. This 
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was Community Industry, which had been set up in 1972 by the 
National Association of Youth Clubs and was funded by the Department 
of Employment. It catered for unemployed young people facing 
particular difficulties in finding employment, and involved 
temporary work in supervised teams on socially useful projects. 
However, the scale of provision was only small, and in the context 
of modern British manpower policy, the case had still to be made 
for a larger scale intervention of this kind'(18) 
Mukherjee's advocacy of a programme of direct job creation was 
presented explicitly in the terms of active manpower policy. 
Whilst its primary justification was in terms of the social welfare 
of those who would otherwise be left to suffer the enforced 
idleness of the 'dole', he argued that job creation could also be 
supported for its economic benefits, both short-term and long-term. (19) 
The immediate return would be in the productive output of the 
jobs created; in the longer term there would be the contribution 
made by the work to the development of 'social capital' which, 
according to Mukherjee, could also be valued in economic terms. (20) 
But the question must now be asked, what implication did this 
extension of the scope of active manpower policy have for the 
relationship which has been assumed to exist between active 
manpower policy and the framework of Keynesian demand management? 
Within the philosophy of active manpower policy, it was assumed 
that·overall levels of employment would be guaranteed in the long-
term by Keynesian-style intervention at the macro-economic level, 
and that active manpower policy itself, was merely a mechanism 
of adjustment operating within the framework thus provided. As 
they were implemented in Sweden, special measures of job creation 
and training could be considered as an extension of this mechanism 
of adjustment. However, Mukherjee presented his proposals for 
special measures in response to rising unemployment more as an 
alternative than as an adjustment, given that a generalised policy 
of reflation was unlikely in the existing economic situation. 
Clearly, this is difficult to reconcile with the philosophy of 
active manpower policy as it has thus far been explained. Yet, 
it did not necessarily amount to a complete contradiction. 
Mukherjee was very aware of, and stated explicitly, the limitations 
of his selective measures as an alternative to macro-economic 
demand management: 
lilt is just as well to face the fact squarely that if the 
amount of unemployment was something like 1.2 million, 
which is about 5.4%, the only effective antidote would 
be expansion of demand by the Government through 
less taxes, more public expenditure and easier access 
to cheaper credit. More specifically, at that level 
of unemployment any action which the MSC might itself take 
(and urge upon other public or private organisations) 
though of some help, could not be of any great significance. 
Paradoxically, selective measures for gaining something 
positive from the existence of unemployment are best 
employed when there is not a huge number of jobless 
peop le ll '(2l) 
Thus, while he may have been attempting to extend the scope of 
active manpower policy to include selectively directed special 
measures as a temporary alternative response to unemployment, 
Mukherjee was still working on the assumption that there was to be 
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some permanent wider framework of control at the macro-economic 
level. If this control was allowed to slip beyond a certain point, 
then the case for special measures, as argued in There's work to 
be done, would be lost. 
Consistent with his conception of job creation as an extension 
of the legitimate functions of an active manpower policy, 
Mukherjee argued that the Manpower Services Commission was 
uniquely well-suited by its composition both to administer 
and to legitimise the job creation programme that he was proposing(22) 
Although the 1973 Employment and Training Act did not 
explicitly assign a job creation role to the Commission, Section 
5 of the Act did authorise the Secretary of State for Employment 
to make arrangements for the purpose of providing temporary 
employment for the unemployed; furthermore, there was nothing 
in the Act's broad definition of the MSC's general functions to 
prevent the Secretary of State from using the Commission as his 
agent in this purpose. 
However, the Labour Secretary of State, Michael Foot, appears 
to have been reluctant to invoke this statutory power. (23) The 
MSC passed on Mukherjee's proposals to the Department of 
Employment in the summer of 1974, but it was not until more than 
a year later that action was taken upon his recommendation for a 
job creation programme. (24) During this intervening period, 
unemployment continued to rise, rapidly approaching the level at 
which Mukherjee had warned that special measures would fail to 
have a significant impact. Ironically, it was the repassing of the 
million mark in July 1975 that was one of the factors that event-
ually spurred the Labour Government into action. (25) 
The allocation of £30m for the launching of the Job Creation Prog-
ramme (J.C.P.) was announced in September 1975, as part of a 
'job creation package' which also included an extension of the 
Temporary Employment Subsidy, the launching of the Recruitment 
Subsidy for School leavers and an extra £20m for industrial 
training. (26) As envisaged by Mukherjee, JCP aimed to 
provide temporary (up to a year) worthwhile jobs for those who 
would otherwise be unemployed. Furthermore, it gave priority to 
those age groups constituting the outer labour market, that is 
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to say, young people aged 16-24 years and the Qver-50s. The mode of 
operation of the programme was to be through the provision of 
grants by the MSC to reimburse the approved costs of various labour-
intensive projects which were put forward and run by sponsors 
from the community. Approved costs covered wages, which were 
to be paid at the appropriate local rate for the job, plus the 
employers' national insurance contributions. In addition up to 
10% of the labour costs could be paid to help off-set the running 
costs of projects. The administration was to be carried out 
through a network of ten area offices, and the decisions on 
sponsors' applications for finance were to be made by Area Action 
Committees consisting of representatives of local employers' 
organisations, trade unions, local authority officials and 
voluntary organisations under an independent chairman. This plan 
appeared to embody the approach that Mukherjee had recommended 
for those in the outer labour market. However, the programme was 
to be operated under the very circumstances in which he had 
doubted whether such a special measure could make any significant 
impact. 
When Mukherjee proposed that the MSC should take on a .job creation 
role, he made clear his opinion that if unemployment reached 
"something like 1.2 million, no action taken by the MSC could be 
of any great significance."(27) By the time that JCP was launched 
in October 1975, unemployment had reached 1.1 million. Two months 
later, the 1.2 million mark was crossed, and since then unemployment 
has not been below that level again. When the programme ended 
in December 1978, the monthly average for the level of unemploy-
ment over its lifetime was 1.4 million. (28) 
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Clearly, under these cirumstances, the case that Mukherjee had 
made for job creation as an extension of active manpower policy 
was no longer applicable, (29) And when perhaps it had been 
applicable, in the year between the completion of Mukherjee's 
Report and unemployment crossing the million mark, the Government 
had been unwilling to implement such a measure, This all points 
to the conclusion that the Job Creation Programme fulfilled a 
different function in the context of wider Government policy from 
that which had originally been intended for it by its leading 
advocate, This alternative function, and its distinction from the 
original intentions held for the programme, were plainly stated 
in a critical article that appeared in the Times Educational 
Supplement in April 1976: 
"JCP is a palliative, It was designed from the highest 
of motives, but has been adopted for public relations 
purposes by a Government legitimitely concerned with 
the political consequences of the highest levels of 
youth unemployment since the 1930s"'(30) 
In order to understand more fully how JCP came to be cast in the 
role of palliative, it is necessary now to fill in some of 
the wider context of the Labour Government's policies during this 
period, In particular, something must be said about the 
'social contract', 
The social contract first took form in 1973 when the Labour Party 
was still in opposition, (31) At this stage it consisted of a 
vague agreement to the effect that the TUC wouldm-operate with 
a future Labour Governmentin the fight against inflation, in return 
for that Government enacting certain measures to re-organise the 
control of industry and the distribution of wealth in favour of 
working people, This agreement was then made the centrepiece of 
the February 1974 election manifesto, Labour's ability to work 
with the unions being presented in direct contrast to the Tories' 
policy of confrontation'(32) 
Labour won the election on this basis, but only secured enough 
seats to form a minority Government, In the comparatively short 
period before the next election in October, a start was made on 
carrying out the commitments that had been made to the trade unions 
in the February manifesto, The Industrial Relations Act was 
repealed and the apparatus of statutory incomes policy was 
gradually dismantled, (33) Price controls were extended, and many 
of the redistributional measures that had been promised were 
implemented in the March budget, By these means, the minority 
Labour Government was able to dissipate the tense atmosphere of 
industrial confrontation that had built up through the Heath 
administration, and to ensure its own political security, 
At the September Trades Union Congress a new social contract docu-
ment laying down voluntary guidelines for collective bargaining 
was unanimously endorsed, (34)and a month later Labour won a small 
overall majority in the October 1974 election, (35) 
However, the cost of these achievements was to be measured in terms 
of a continuing decline of economic performance, There was a 
soaring rate of inflation and a huge balance of payments deficit, 
and this situation was exacerbated by the steep rise in oil prices 
and the onset of an international trade recession'(36) It was 
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clear that once the Labour Government had secured its political 
position in the October election, action would have to be taken to 
restore control over the economy, This action amounted to a reversal 
of the economic strategy that had been embarked upon over the 
previous eight months, (37) The policies aimed at altering the 
nature of control within industry were abandoned as a luxury 
that could not be afforded in such a difficult economic situation, 
and as a result, it ~as inevitable that the policies aimed at 
redistributing wealth had to be turned back in order to encourage the 
private investment of capital, In addition, moves were made to 
restrict the growth of public expenditure, and these were bound 
to lead to a further rise in unemployment, But it was inflation, 
not unemployment, that was perceived by the Government as the most 
serious problem, Despite the voluntary guidelines that had been 
adopted by the trade unions, the rate of wage increases continued to 
accelerate, Thus, between July 1974 and July 1975, there was an 
average wage rise of 31%'(38) 
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Clearly the social contract was not working as had been intended 
by either of its partners, The Government began to threaten that 
it would have to intervene directly in order to restrain wage 
increases, and it seemed that the social contract might disintegrate 
completely, leading to a resumption of hostilities between 
Government and unions, (39) The situation was brought to a head by 
the sterling crisis of June 1975, which was a reflection of the 
international lack of confidence in the British Government's ability 
to handle its inflation and balance of payments problems'(40) 
The Labour Government's response was to set itself the target of 
reducing inflation to 10% by the end of the next pay round. This 
was to be achieved by means of a 10% limit on wage increases, for 
which 'voluntary' trade unillncooperation was to be sought'(4l) 
However, if such co-operation was not forthcoming, the policy would 
be enforced by statute, 
Less than a year earlier the trade union movement had been rallied 
behind the social contract as an affirmation of free collective 
bargaining and a rejection of all forms of incomes policy, When 
moving support for the policy document on Collective Bargaining 
and the Social Contract at the 1974 Congress, General Secretary 
Len Murray had stated adamantly: 
"We reject statutory incomes policy, or attempts by any 
institution - including the TUC - to impose a rigid 
centralised framework on collective bargaining"'(42) 
Yet, even before the onset of the sterling crisis in June, the 
TUC General Council had agreed upon the principle of a pay 
policy for the coming year based on a universal flat-rate increase 
to all wages, (43) The sterling crisis and the pressure applied 
by the Government then ensured the rapid adoption of the figure 
of £6 as the standard level for this flat-rate increase - a 
figure which was well below what would have been necessary to 
compensate an average wage for the level of price inflation over 
the previous year, Thus, not only was the TUC agreeing to impose 
the kind of rigid incomes policy that it had rejected so adamantly 
only a year previously, but also it was setting the policy at a 
level that would almost certainly result in a reduction of 
real incomes for the majority of its members. (44) 
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Clearly there was some explaining to be done by the TUC leadership 
when the new policy document, The Development of the Social Contract, 
was presented to the 1975 Congress. The defence started from an 
emphasis of the depth and seriousness of the economic crisis facing 
the country. (45) In this difficult situation, it was argued, the 
Government needed the assistance of a pay policy in order to be 
able to continue its pursuit of the wider objectives of the contract, 
especially the restoration of higher levels of employment. Since 
January the Labour Chancellor, Denis Healey, had been threatening 
that deflation and increased unemployment would be unavoidable 
unless there was wage restraint'(46)and already in the April budget 
he had introduced some deflationary measures in a vain attempt 
to avert the imminent exchange crisis. (47) The TUC leadership, 
which had previously rejected any such equation between wage 
increases and unemployment, now accepted this argument, and managed 
to persuade Congress of its validity. The new policy document 
was approved by a convincing ma j oritY(48)but at the same time a 
warning was given to the Government: 
"Unless the Government is seen to be tackling the 
problem of unemployment, the confidence of trade 
unionists in this policy will erode. Unemployment is 
not an optional extra on top of wage restraint". (49) 
The package of special job creation and training measures that was 
introduced in September 1975 can now be understood as the Labour 
Government's response to this warning. The TUC wanted the Govern~ 
ment to adopt a policy of mild reflation accompanied by import 
controls, (50)but at the same time they called for the introduc-
tion of temporary special measures to cut the peak of unemployment 
while the upturn was awaited. The Government, already committed 
to a programme of spending cuts designed to bring down 
the public sector borrowing requirement, (51)ruled out any policy 
of reflation. Howevef, with unemployment over the million mark 
and still rising, some token was required to demonstrate that they 
were still keeping faith with the social contract. The temporary 
special measures being advocated by the TUe naturally presented 
themselves for this role. 
The social contract, and the fundamental change that it underwent 
in the Labour Government's second year of office, thus provide 
the immediate political context in which the modern emergence of 
a special measures approach to unemployment can be understood. 
The particular events leading up to the announcement of the 
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package of job creation and training measures in September 1975 have 
been described in some detail because they can be considered as 
the start of a recurring pattern of events which was to provide 
the context for further developments of the special measures 
approach, including eventually both WEP and Yap. Between July 
1975 and July 1978, the social contract relationship between the 
TUe and the Labour Government, which had originally been constru-
cted on the basis of a comparatively radical policy framework, 
became primarily a means of securing voluntary trade union 
adherence to annual pay policies formulated in line with the Govern-
ment's economic policy priority - the so-called 'attack on infla-
tion"(52) At the same time increasingly severe restrictions 
were placed on the growth of public expenditure. Repeatedly, 
it was promised that an economic upturn and an accompanying 
reduction of unemployment were just around the corner, if only 
these policies were given time to bring inflation under control. 
But meanwhile, unemployment continued to rise rapidly from one 
'intolerable' level to another, (53) and by the time that inflation 
was brought down to the single figure (annual percentage) target 
set by the Government, (54)the number of those out of work had 
stabilised in a pattern of annual variation around the figure 
of 1.5 million. 
In this situation, the TUe continued to advocate its alternative 
strategy of reflation and selective import controls, and the 
Government continued to ignore it. Instead, while the promised 
economic upturn was awaited, there were frequent packages of temporary 
special measures. Whenever continued trade union cooperation 
seemed to be in jeopardy, such packages were produced as evidence 
that the Government was attempting to keep to its side of the social 
contract bargain. Thus, in the year covered by the £6 flat rate 
pay policy, there were no less than three such packages, in addition 
to the September set of measures that has already been mentioned(55) 
The fact that JCP and other special measures were playing such a role 
in relation to the social contract was widely recognised amongst 
informed commentators at the time. In the context of a general 
policy of public expenditure restraint, the extra money spent on 
special measures could only be explained as a form of palliative, 
aimed in particular to buy off the trade unions on whose continued 
support the whole Government strategy relied. The amounts involved 
were not sufficient to make a significant impact on the general level 
of unemployment and, if they had have been, they would have cancelled 
out the policy of public spending cuts'(56) 
In a highly critical article published in The Times Educational 
Supplement at the beginning of 1976(57)the Labour MP for Berwick, 
John Mackintosh juxtaposed the cutbacks taking place in the general 
level of public expenditure, and in particular within education, 
with the increasing amounts being spent on special measures of job 
creation. The Government's reason for spending on programmes such 
as JCP, he explained as follows: 
"The orig"in of this is 
seriously worried that 
which underpins the £6 
breakdown when the time 
of their incomes policy 
simply that the Government are 
their concordat with the unions -
flat rate incomes policy - will 
comes to produce the next phase 
after July". (58) 
This political reasoning, he argued, had to be kept carefully apart 
from the economic reasoning behind education cuts: 
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"Job creation is to impress certain groups with political 
power; education cuts are part of a major attempt to 
get the public borrowing requirement under control". (59) 
The inconsistency between the policy of public expenditure 
restraint and the extra expenditure devoted to temporary special 
measures was further highlighted by particular features of the 
way in which the Job Creation Programme operated. The work 
provided was supposed to be of benefit both to those being 
employed and to the community as a whole. Yet, it also had to 
be work which: (a) would not have otherwise been done; (b) could 
be easily started up and stopped on a temporary basis; and (c) 
would not lead to the making of any profit. The latter regulation 
effectively excluded private exployers from taking part in the 
programme. Consequently, the vast majority of sponsors were 
local authorities. Encouraged by the offer of funds from the 
MSC, these bodies provided temporary work on projects tha~ in 
effect , were not of sufficient importance to have been mounted 
otherwise. Thus, at the same time as local authorities were having 
to cut back on their priority programmes, they were being asked, 
through JCP, to devise new projects that by definition were of 
only marginal importance.(60) 
The inherent problems of this situation were compounded by the 
manner in which the programme was launched. Although the Government 
had originally been slow to take up the idea of job creation, once 
the decision was made to go ahead, they expected the programme 
to be implemented at great speed.(61) Nobody in the MSC had direct 
experience of administering such a programme, and none of the pot-
ential sponsors had prior knowledge of how to propose and set up 
suitable schemes,and yet, between them they were required to come 
up with £30 million worth of schemes almost instantly. 
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that many of the 
schemes set up during the early days of JCP lacked imagination 
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ployed under the Poor Law and with 19th century experiments in 
job creation. A notorious example was a beach cleaning exericse 
mounted in Sunderland. (62) Although subsequently more imaginative 
and worthwhile schemes were devised, the image of a forlorn 
group of youngsters picking up debris along a vast windswept 
tract of shoreline was to be associated with the programme for 
the rest of its duration. 
Another serious problem encountered by JCP was that of financial 
mismanagement. The speed at which the programme grew, and the 
MSC's concern to keep bureaucracy to a minimum, meant that 
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financial control was often lax'(63) As part of the attempt to 
provide more interesting schemes, voluntary and community assoc-
iations were increasingly encouraged to participate in the programme. 
But often these non-local authority sponsors lacked the necessary 
financial experience to handle the large sums of money involved 
without close supervision. A number of financial scandals 
resulted as a consequence, and these attracted further adverse 
publicity to the programme. 
In defence of JCP it can be said that it did succeed in creating 
a lot of jobs in a remarkably short time, most of which were 
filled by young people. Thus, during the three year period of 
its existence, the programme created approximately 140,000 
temporary job opportunities at a total cost of £192m; and of the 
estimated 200,000 people who took part, 72% were aged under 25'(64) 
Also it is true to say that it included a number of interesting 
and innovative schemes(65) But it was the bad examples of 
futility and financial mismanagement that were predominant in 
the public image of the programme, and these gave further emphasis 
to the paradoxical position of special job creation measures 
within the context of a general policy of public expenditure 
restraint. 
The criticism encounteredb JCP did not lead either the Government 
special measure with which to respond to the rapidly increasing 
level of youth unemployment. During the year covered by the 
£6 pay policy, the general level of unemployment rose from just 
over one million in August 1975, to l~ million by August 1976'(66) 
Over the same period, unemployment amongst the under-20s rose 
from 80,000 to nearly 200,000'(67) As has already been pointed out, 
these large increases took the level of unemployment well beyond 
the maximum at which Mukherjee's argument for special measures as 
an extension of active manpower policy could be sustained. But 
the political argument for special measures, in terms of doing 
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what was necessary to maintain trade union cooperation within the 
social contract became stronger than ever under these circumstances. 
In particular, it was important that there should be some new 
response to the sensitive problem of youth unemployment. 
The Work Experience Programme (W.E.P.) was announced in September 
1976, as part of yet another package of special measur~which 
also included the replacement of the Recruitment Subsidy for 
School Leavers by the Youth Employment Subsidy. This was, exactly 
a year after the announcement of JCP, and the two events can be 
understood as occupying the same position within the annual cycle 
of negotiations concerned with the agreement of an incomes policy. 
In the same way as the announcement of JCP had followed the TUC's 
agreement to the £6 flat rate pay policy in the summer of 1975, 
the announcement of WEP followed the TUC's agreement to a further 
year of pay policy in the summer of 1976. This time the norm for 
wage increases was set at 5%'(68) 
During the previous year of pay policy, the process of scaling 
down planned public expenditure had been80ntinued by the February, 
1976 White Paper on Public Ex~,enditure and intensified by the 
subsequent imposition of a system of cash limits'(69) Although 
certain tax concessions were given in the April budget as part of 
the bargaining process with the trade unions, the Government had 
no intention of initiating a more generalised policy of reflation. 
Yet, in order to secure the renewal of the social contract, it 
was still prepared to commit itself to the restoration of 
full employment through the creation of a million new jobs over 
the next three years. Given that this commitment underlay the 
TUC's agreement to another year of pay restraint, it can be 
understood that some token of the Government's resolve to tackle 
unemployment was at least as important as it had been the year 
before. (70) 
In this situation it is not surprising that little attempt was 
made to justify the new special measures introduced within a 
wider philosophy of manpower policy. The niceties of Mukherjee's 
argument had long been overwhelmed by political expediency. 
Consequently the case for the adoption of WEP was made principally 
in terms of the need to correct specific shortcomings of JCP. 
As had been the case with job creation, the emergence of the idea 
of work experience as a response to youth unemployment was 
closely associated with the trade union movement. Some form 
of work experience programme was first suggested by the Welsh 
TUC at the beginning of 1976.(71) The idea was then rapidly taken 
up, and canvassed for, by the trade union movement as a whole 
and by certain voluntary organisations. By July the MSC was 
examining the possibility of introducing such a programme in the 
Autumn. (72) 
JCP had run into many of the problems traditionally associated 
with attempts to generate jobs artificially without interfering 
with the normal workings of the labour market. The effective 
exclusion of private employers from participation as sponsors 
was widely regarded as a major drawback(73)and the content of the 
work, as well as sometimes being futile, was often regarded by 
both employers and unions as not relevant to the 'real world 
of work' (74) In contrast, WEP was specifically designed to 
attract private employers as sponsors, and gave particular 
emphasis to the realism of the work experience that was orovided. 
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four elements: induction, planned work experience over a range 
of jobs, an opportunity for training or further education, and 
personal counselling. The target of the programme was exclusively 
young people, entry being restricted to those unemployed between 
the ages of 16 aro18 years. Payment took the form of an allowance, 
originally £16 per week - a level considered high enough to act 
as an incentive for young people to join the programme rather than 
relying on unemployment or supplementary benefit, and yet not so 
high as to deter anyone from entering training or permanent employ-
ment. A separate organisational structure based on 8 area units 
was established in order to carry out the administration of the 
programme. 
The stated objectives of WEP were to enable young unemployed 
people: 
"(1) to learn about the disciplines, demands and 
satisfactions of working life; 
(2) to find out something of their aptitudes, likes and 
dislikes; 
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(3) to help them to learn to work and communicate with adults 
in order to assist in the transition from the world of 
school to that of work; 
(4) to enable them to learn a few simple basic skills 
and thus to gain confidence and motivation in looking 
for a job". (75) 
The main criterion for assessing the programme's achievement of 
these objectives was to be the success or otherwise of its 
'graduates' in finding permanent employment. (76) A major criticism 
of JCP was that having provided people with up to a year's temporary 
employment it then simply dumped them back into the dole queues. (77) 
Within WEP far more emphasis was to be given to placement rates 
as a gauge of success. 
One important point that should be noted is that, although WEP 
did not claim to create proper jobs, neither was it presented as 
a proper training programme. Another of the criticisms aimed at 
JCP was that it did not provide sufficient training: only 10% of 
opportunity for training or further education; (79)but, as the 
director of the programme himself acknowledged, those taking 
part "do not ....... receive training as the word is commonly 
understood". (SO) Yet the young people concerned were to be 
referred to as 'trainees' and, as such, they received an allowance 
rather than a wage at the rate for the job as was the case with 
JCP. No serious attempt was made by the MSC to justify the 
apparent inconsistency involved in this situation. Referring to 
the young people as 'trainees' was said to be merely a matter of 
convenience;(Sl) Paying them only as trainees, when they were 
working and not being given proper training, was a paradox that 
went by unmentioned, though presumably it was convenient too. 
Considering the prominent part that the Work Experience on 
Employers Premises element was to come to play within the Youth 
Opportunities Programme, this was a significant gap in the MSC's 
rationale. 
Although WEP, like JCP, was set up at a great s peed'(S2)it managed 
to avoid gaining such a bad reputation and was generally adjudged 
to be a success in its own terms. (S3) Despite a slow start, (S4) 
the programme eventually attracted more sponsors than it needed 
to generate the 30,000 places originally planned. Thus, by the 
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end of March 1975 when WEP was incorporated into the new Youth 
Opportunities Programme, 17,463 schemes had been approved, offering 
more than 54,000 places, at an estimated cost of 14.7m'(S5) 
Approximately SO% of these were sponsored by private employers. (S6) 
Some criticism was made to the effect that this quantitative 
achievement was only achieved at the expense of quality, (S7)and 
certainly it is true that in terms of providing opportunities 
for training and f~rther education, WEP did little better than JCP.(SS) 
But in terms of its principle criterion of success, the placement 
rate of those leaving the programme, WEP undoubtedly performed well. 
A follow-up survey revealed that 72% of WEP trainees were in full-
time employment three months after they had left the programme. (S9) 
The equivalent figure for JCP was 53%'(90) and this was at a time 
when employment prospects, in general, were more favourable. 
Both JCP and WEP were originally conceived of only as temporary 
measures, but there was a different reason for why each was 
assumed to be such. JCP was assumed to be temporary because, at 
the time of its launch, both the problem of unemployment in 
general, and the problem of youth unemployment in particular, 
were assumed to be of a short-term nature. (91) However, by the 
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time that WEP was being launched (and despite the fact that the 
promise of a return to full employment was still being held out to 
the unions), it was beginning to be recognised that these problems 
were of a more long-term nature, and that the problem of youth 
unemployment in particular would require a more permanent response (92 ) 
Thus WEP was not considered to be a temporary measure because it 
was thought that the problem of youth unemployment was temporary, 
but rather because by then it was recognised that such a programme 
could only be a stop-gap measure until a more comprehensive and 
permanent response could be developed. Thus it was that only a 
month after the launch of WEP, the MSC announced in Towards A 
Comprehensive Manpower Policy the setting up of a working party 
to examine the feasibility of a new and more comprehensive 
programme for the young unemployed. The outcome of this, as we 
have already seen, was the Holland Report. 
2. The Holland Report 
The Holland Report provided the blueprint for the Youth 
Opportunities Programme. As such, it must be regarded as the key 
document in this account. On the one hand, it marked the culmin-
ation of the development of the special measures approach to the 
relief of youth unemployment that has been described above. On 
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the other hand, it marked the starting point of the history of YOP, 
and of a process of development that was to lead beyond the special 
measures approach. Subsequent analyses will be concerned with this 
history, and in particular, will consider the extent to which 
the development and implementation of the programme fulfilled 
the aims and objectives that were originally set out for it in 
the Holland Report. With this purpose in mind, it is necessary 
now to provide a clear and accurate account of what the Report 
actually said. This will be presented first in a straightforward 
and uncritical manner. Then, it will be analysed more critically 
in the context both of the development of MSC policy, and of the 
wider political and economic environment. 
The Working Party which was responsible for the Holland Report 
included representatives of the CBI, the TUC, the Careers Service 
and Government Departments, as well as the Commission and its 
Agencies. It was chaired by Geoffrey Holland, the MSC official 
whose name was subsequently attached to the unanimous Report that 
was produced. (93) In assessing the feasibility of a new programme 
of opportunities for unemployed young people, the Working Party 
was asked to take into account the following factors: (a) long-term 
trends in the employment and unemployment of young people in 
Great Britain; (b) experience of all the measures so far taken 
to help unemployed young people; (c) relevant long-term develop-
ments in the training and further education field; (d) costs; 
(e) organisational implications; (f) directly relevant experience 
in other countries. As part of the study, certain pieces of 
research were undertaken. Two surveys were commissiond on the views 
of young people towards various aspects of employment and unemp-
loyment, and one on the attitudes of employers towards the recruit-
ment and employment of young people. Also, specific studies 
were made of the foreign experience of unemployment among young 
people, and of the scope for opportunities for unemployed 
young people in community service. 
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The style of the Holland Report was set by the terms in which it was 
introduced and it is worth noting once again some of the exact 
language used. During 1976, over 800,000 16-18 year olds had 
registered as unemployed - the highest figure since the end of 
the Second World War. The time had now come, it was stated, 
"to turn a major problem and cost into an opportunity and a 
benefit". The special measures taken so far by the Government had 
been "piecemeal and temporary". What was needed was" a new prog-
ramme of opportunities for young people", offering "an effective 
bridge to permanent employment". The programme to be presented 
in the Report was designed "to bring young people the kind of help 
they most need in the form they want it". It thus aimed" to 
demonstrate by deeds rather than words that society cares about 
them, and through them, about its own future". (94) 
The first part of the Report was concerned with an analysis of 
past trends and future prospects for the employment and unemploy-
ment of young people. The evidence available for the past confirmed 
the continuation of the trends that Mukherjee had identified in 
1974. While the industrial and occupational distribution of 
young people's employment had remained comparatively stable, there 
had been a fall in the number of young people entering employment 
and a large rise in the number of unemployed young people. The 
level of ~outh unemployment rose and fell sharply in an annual 
cycle based around the school Eaving dates, and there was also 
considerable local variation. However, the underlying national 
trend was consistently upwards, rising at a rate three times' as 
fast as that for unemployment amongst all ages. Thus, between 
January 1972 and 1977, there had been a 120% increase in the 
numbers of young people (16-17 year olds) unemployed, compared 
with a 45% rise for the working population as a whole. When the 
demand side was taken into account, the comparative deterioration 
of young people's prospects was revealed even more starkly: between 
January 1974 and 1977 the ratio of the numbers unemployed to the 
numbers of vacancies registered at Careers Offices rose twentyfold 
compared with a fivefold increase in the ratio of total unempl-
oyment to all vacancies. 
In addition to such statistics the Report referred in this context 
to the results of the research that had been commissioned. In 
particular, it noted the widespread belief amongst employers 
that the calibre of young people had deteriorated over recent years, 
both in terms of motivation and basic education. These factors 
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were cited as reasons for not recruiting young people. Nevertheless, 
most employers expected to continue to employ the same proportion 
of young people as before. Amongst young people, it was noted that 
the impact of unemployment was most severe on those who had few or 
no qualifications. The study of foreign experience revealed that 
rising youth unemployment was an international problem, and that 
there had been a disproportionate increase in the numbers of young 
people unemployed compared with the general level of unemployment 
in each of the major EEC countries. Although the Working Party 
considered the question of whether youth unemployment was structural 
or cyclical, it did not provide an answer. It simply concluded 
that the problem was serious and worsening, and that young people 
with low qualifications were the most vulnerable. 
Looking to the future, the Report drew attention to the fact that 
the existing problems were likely to be exacerbated by the increased 
number of young people expected to come onto the labour market 
each year until 1981, when it was estimated that there would be 
50,000 more young people entering the labour market than in 1976. 
Over the same period., the total labour supply was predicted to have 
increased from 25.75 million to 26.5 million. Considering the 
implications of such an increase, the Report referred to an estimate 
that it would require a 3% p.a. growth of output simply to keep 
unemployment at a steady level, and a 5% p.a. growth for full 
employment to be restored in five years. The conclusion was drawn 
that it would be prudent to plan on the assumption that there 
might not be a rapid return to low levels of unemployment. 
In an attempt to produce more exact estimates of the levels of 
youth unemployment that would have to be planned for over the 
next five years, the Report made three projections of the future 
time-path of total unemployment. The most pessimistic of these 
projections assumed that total unemployment would reach a level of 
1.60 million during 1978, before a moderate cyclical recovery 
brought the numbers back down to 1.35 million by August 1981. 
The implications of such a projection for youth unemployment were 
that the numbers might rise to almost 450,000 in the third quarter 
of 1978 and to more than 350,000 in the third quarter of 1981. 
All the projections agreed that the levels of unemployment would 
be coming down between 1978 and 1980, their differences were only 
with regard to how high a level would be reached in the meantime 
113 
and how quickly it would fall back down again. The general conclusion 
was that plans would have to take into account the fact that the 
return to lower levels of unemployment might be slow; nevertheless, 
such a return was always still assumed. 
The next stage of the analysis made by the Holland Report was 
a review of the services and programmes that were currently 
available for unemployed 16-18 year olds. In addition to the on-
going services of education, training and job placement, it was 
noted that since the early 1970s there had been a rapid expansion 
of special Government programmes designed to provide various 
kinds of opportunities for the young unemployed. These fell into 
five main categories: temporary employment, work experience, 
incentive training grants, direct training and rehabilitation, 
and employment subsidies. 
The details of the temporary employment and work experience 
opportunities offered through JCP and WEP, and to a lesser extent 
through Community Industry, have already been described above. 
Thus, it is only necessary to note here the scale on which these 
programmes were operating at the time when they were being exam-
ined by the Working Party. For the year 1976-77, Community 
Industry and JC~ were offering 4,000 and 17,000 places respectively, 
and WEP, which was expanding rapidly, had a throughput of 8,000 
trainees. The other kinds of programme, although some of them 
have been mentioned above, have not yet been fully explained. 
Hence, they require a more detailed description. 
Incentive training grants were designed to offset the effects of 
the recession on the levels of young people being trained in 
industry, and to help avoid shortfalls of skilled personnel. They 
were funded by the Training Services Agency (T.S.A.) of the MSC 
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and administered mainly through Industrial Training Boards. There 
were two main kinds: 'premium grants' which secured training within 
employment, and 'training awards' which provided training directly 
under the auspices of Industrial Training Boards. In 1976-77, 
nearly 43,000 such opportunities had been offered, though only 
some 37,000 had been taken up. 
Direct training was run by the TSA and included a variety of 
courses of work preparation for young people with differing 
vocational needs. The two major schemes wereOccupational Selection Courses 
and Short Industrial Courses; in addition, there were Preparatory 
Courses and Wider Opportunities Courses of a more specialised 
remedial nature. Rehabilitation training for disabled people was 
provided by the Employment Services Agency (E.S.A.) of the MSC 
through its network of Employment Rehabilitation Centres. This 
included the provision of a number of Work Preparation Courses for 
young people who had just left school and were finding it difficult 
to enter employment because of severe physical or mental handicaps. 
Between them, these direct training and rehabilitation courses 
had a throughput of 15,500 young people in 1976-77. 
Employment subsidies aimed specifically at young people were first' 
introduced in October 1975, as part of the package of special 
measures to alleviate youth unemployment that had also included 
the introduction of JCP. The Recruitment Subsidy for School Leavers, 
as it was known, offered £5 per week for 26 weeks to employers 
taking on school and college leavers. The problem was that the 
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majority (76% it was estimated on the basis of surveys) of the young 
people taken on under the scheme would have been employed anyway. 
Consequently, it was replaced a year later by the Yount Employment 
Subsidy which was aimed more specifically at young people having 
difficulty in obtaining employment, and consisted of a subsidy 
of £10 a week for 26 weeks offered to employers taking on young 
people who had been unemployed for six months or more. In addition, 
there were certain other schemes and subsidies, like the Job 
Release Scheme and the Temporary Employment Subsidy, which although 
not directly aimed at young people included them amongst their 
beneficiaries. In total, it was estimated that 30,300 young people 
benefitted from these various kinds of employment subsidy in the 
year 1976-77. 
The combined throughput of all the above-mentioned programmes in 
1976-77 was 117,000, and the gross cost of this provision was put 
at £106.2 million. The provisional estimate made prior to the 
Working Party for the combined throughput in 1977-78 was 156,900. 
Concluding its review of existing provisiorn, the Holland Report 
noted as a considerable achievement the speed at which this number 
of opportunities had been created, most of them having been 
brought into existence over the two previous years. However, it 
also drew attention to a number of limitations and shortcomings 
that were to be borne in mind when considering plans for a replace-
ment programme. 
First there was the fact that, despite the large numbers of opport-
unities created, the scale of provision was still inadequate and 
many young people were experiencing spells of unemployment without 
there being an opportunity available to them. Secondly, the tempor-
ary nature of the existing schemes had often inhibited employers 
and educational institutions from making provisions on a large scale. 
Thirdly, the piecemeal way in which schemes had been introduced 
had led to a number of problems. Different agencies were operating 
different schemes using separate organisational structures. This 
made the co-ordination of provisions in relation to the particular 
needs of localities extremely difficult, and there was often the 
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danger of different programmes competing against each other. 
This lack of co-orJination was also reflected in the wide dispar-
ities between different schemes as regards the level and form of 
remuneration paid to trainees, and the methods of calculating these. 
Thus some would receive wages, other allowances; some wages were 
'the rate for the job' ,others were according to age; some allowances 
were simply flat-rate, others included additional allowances for 
meals and transport costs. Such inconsistencies made the situation 
highly confusing, both for those providing the opportunities, and 
for the individual young person trying to select the scheme best 
suited to their needs. They also obstructed attempts that were 
being made to provide for movement and progression between different 
schemes. 
The conclusions drawn from this analysis of existing provision were 
as follows: 
"a. that the existing schemes fer young people need to be 
developed and in some cases supplemented by new types 
of opportunity; and 
b. that all these schemes need to be brought together in 
a single, coherent programme, comprehensive in its 
coverage and responsive to the differing needs of 
unemployed young people in different parts of the 
countrY·"(95) 
The Working Party based its plan for such a programme on the two 
following principles: 
"a. that the new programme must be designed to meet the 
personal needs of individual unemployed young people 
as they seek to secure permanent employment; and 
b. that individual elements in the programme and the 
programme as a whole must not be more financially 
attractive than being in full-time work or damage 
the incentive to young people in full-time education 
to continue their courses''''(96) 
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Elaborating fruther upon its aims for the future programme, the 
Report made it clear that it was not attempting to provide a 
comprehensive approach to work preparation for all young people, 
but only to ensure that all young unemployed people were offered 
the opportunity of some constructive alternative to a job. However, 
at the same time, it was acknowledged that in the long-term the 
programme proposed might become a part of a more general provision 
for all young people, and that in principle programmes catering for 
the needs of unemployed young people should not be considered as 
standing apart from policies directed at young people in general. 
In addition, it was emphasised that in order to meet the needs 
of young unemployed people as individuals, the programme would 
have to be sufficiently flexibly organised to provide a variety 
of vocationally relevant opportunities, and to allow for links 
and progressions to be made between its various elements. Yet, as 
well as meeting the needs of individual young people, it would have 
to be responsible to local labour market conditions and to fit in 
as a component part of wider manpower policies. 
The Report next detailed the content of the programme that had been 
designed to meet such specifications. The individual elements 
were for the most part merely continuations and extensions of 
previously existing schemes; what was important was that they 
had been organised within the framework of a single coherent 
programme. The opportunities to be provided were divided into 
two major groupings, work preparation courses and work experience. 
Work preparation courses included three categories: Assessment 
or Employment Induction Courses (E.I.C.s), Short Industrial Courses 
(S.I.C.s), and Remedial or Preparatory Courses. The main element 
of the first category was to be two week EICs designed to help 
young people improve their employability and social skills, and 
to give them an opportunity to assess what kind of employment 
they might find suitable. The model for these came from the 
first module of the existing TSA Occupational Selection Courses. 
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The second category of work preparation course consisted of a 
further development and extension of existing TSA Short Industrial 
Courses. These were 13 week vocational courses designed to 
introduce young people to the skills required for a fairly specific, 
though broad, occupational area, and to help equip them to deal 
with the demands of adult working life in general. It was emphas-
ised that the scale and nature of this provision should be 
closely related to the actual and potential employment opportunities 
in the locality. 
The third category was to be a continuation of the remedial courses 
already provided by the ESA and to a smaller extent by the TSA. 
But it was emphasised that the primary statutory responsibility 
for such remedial educational work with young people remained with 
the Local Education Authorities. 
The work experience side of the programme was divided into four 
different categories within the Report: Work Experience on 
Employers' Premises (W.E.E.P.), Project-Based Work Experience 
(P.B.W.E.), Training Workshops (T.W.s), and Community Service (C .. S.). 
It was specified that each of these different k.inds of work 
experience would provide the four features included in the existing 
Work Experience Programme - induction, planned work experience, 
an opportunity for training or further education, and counselling -
but each in a distinctive form, so as to be able to cater for the 
differing needs and interests of individuals. 
WEEP was envisaged as an extension of the existing WEP, with more 
emphasis being placed on the provision of associated training and 
further education, and the quality of induction and counselling. 
It was suggested that the average length of such courses should 
be 6 months. It was also noted that, if provided on a large scale, 
this kind of work experience might come to be regarded by employers 
as a useful vehicle for assessment and a normal avenue for recruit-
ment. Were this to happen, it was said that it might be necessary 
to review the basis of funding such opportunities. 
The second category, Project-Based Work Experience, involved the 
establishment of non-profit making projects supervised by small 
numbers of adult employees, and designed to give young people 
up to a year's experience of carrying out useful work. This form 
of work experience was seen as largely taking the place of the 
provision for 16-18 year olds existing under JCP, which was to be 
succeeded by a programme confined to adults. 
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Training Workshops were regarded by the Report as being particularly 
suitable for young people at lower levels of ability and motivation 
who were not attracted by, or able to profit from, formal courses. 
Their objective was said to be "the provision of training and work 
experience for a group of young people working together on a number 
of different tasks under supervision."(97) The group was to produce 
goods and services, but the main purpose was to give the young 
people experience in a variety of skill areas doing a variety 
of different kinds of work. They were to spend up to 12 months 
at the scheme. A number of such workshops had already been set 
up under JCPj the Report envisaged a considerable expansion. 
The fourth category, Community Service, was described by the 
Report as providing young people with the opportunity to experience 
a variety of forms of work, to take on responsibility, and to 
acquire a range of basic skills, in particular those associated 
with relating to people. Once again 12 months was specified as 
the maximum normal duration of this experience. A doubling of the 
number of such opportunities already being provided by existing 
schemes was suggested by the Report. 
Two other existing schemes were referred to by the Report, 
Incentive Training Grants and Community Industry. Both were being 
reviewed separately at the timej nevertheless the Report appears 
to have assumed that they would have a role to play within the 
new programme. No further mention was made of employment sub-
sidies. 
The Report emphasised that the programme outlined above should be 
available to all unemployed young people, but should not be 
compulsory. It noted also that some concern had been expressed 
that young people might be drawn into the programme before they 
had had a chance to look for a job. However, the majority view 
of the Working Party was that there should be no mandatory 
waiting period for eligibility and no closed season for school 
leavers. 
The organisational unity between the elements of the new programme 
was given expression in the proposal that all young people in the 
programme should receive the same level of remuneration. This, 
it was explained, would ensure that financial considerations did 
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not affect the young person's choice of opportunity, and in addition 
would facilitate linkage and progression between the different 
elements of the programme. Nevertheless, it was still the primary 
aim of each opportunity to help and encourage the young person 
to move as quickly as possible into normal employment, and the 
level of remuneration had to be consistent with this aim. The 
Report, taking as its basis the existing WEP allowance, proposed 
a level of £18 including a standard £2 allowance for travel 
expenses. It was assumed as a matter of course that the level of 
the allowance would be reviewed periodically to take account of 
changes in the cost of living. (98) 
The Report next addressed the question of the scale on which the 
programme should be mounted. It was stated that it would be 
pointless to attempt to provide opportunities for every unemployed 
young person. A programme on such a scale would seriously inter-
fere with the normal workings of the labour market. For example, 
young people might be attracted into the programme, when other-
wise they would have successfully found employment. Also substit-
ution and displacement might arise. Substitution was defined 
as the situation in which "the employer who takes a young person 
on through one of the opportunities in the programme substitutes 
him or her for another person whom he would otherwise have recruited'(99) 
The danger was noted, in particular, that WEEP might provide 
employers with an expensive induction programme at public cost. 
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Displacement was said to occur "if young people recruited into the 
new programme displace workers somewhere else."(lOO) This, however, 
was not regarded as such a serious threat as substitution. Finally, 
it was recognised that the very success of the programme, in its 
major aim of making young people more competitive, was likely to 
affect adversely the job prospects of other age groups, unless 
there was a net increase in employment. Thus, it was accepted 
that some interference with the normal workings of the labour market 
was unavoidable. However, in order to minimise such interference, 
the scale of the programme needed to be tailored to the likely 
level of demand from those who would remain unemployed if there 
were no such programme. Estimating this level was of course 
problematic, but the Report suggested as a rule of thumb "that the 
size of the programme should be related to the stock of young 
people who have been unemployed for six weeks ove~ the months 
when the annual cycle of youth unemployment reaches its lowest 
level."(lOl) Applying this rule to the intermediate of the three 
projections of future youth unemployment, figures of 130,000 in 
1977/78 and 124,000 in 1978/79 were arrived at. 
The question of scale was next examined from the angle of supply. 
The major factors considered were: money, time, the need for a 
long-term commitment by the Government and the Commission, the 
availability and training of suitable staff, and the provision 
of physical facilities. It was concluded that by September 1978 
the programme could provide a maximum number of places at anyone 
time of 129,700 and a possible throughput of 234,200 young 
people ea~h year - figures conveniently consonant with the rule 
of thumb estimate of likely demand. Table 1 sets out the 
distribution of these opportunities between the various types of 
scheme. (102) It will be noted that the gross annual cost of the 
total programme was calculated at £168.31m (at 1976 prices), 
compared to the existing commitment of approximately £105m for 
programmes in the financial year 1977-78.(103) The net cost of 
the new programme, taking into account savings on supplementary 
benefit, unemployment benefit and other costs of unemployment was 
put at £95m, and it was pointed out that the figure could be 
lowered further by aid provided from the European Social Fund. 
122 
TABLE 1 THE ORIGINAL PLAN OF THE YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES PROGRAMME 
Assumed Places Throughput' Cost 
Average £m 
Duration 
1 . Work Preparation Courses 
a. Assessment or Employment 
Induction Courses 2 weeks 3.000 60.000 8·32 
b. Short Industrial Courses 3 months 8.000 , 25.000 22·57 
c. Remedial or preparatory courses 26 weeks 1.700 2.200 2·32 (max) (approx. ) 
2. Work Experience 
a. Work experience on employers 
premises 6 months 30.000 60.000 28·08 
b. Project-based work experience 1 year 15.000 15.000 14·04 
c. Training workshops 1 year 10.000 10.000 9·36 
d. Community service 1 year 15.000 15.000 14·04 
e. Capital contribution to (b)-(d) above - - - 8·42 
3. Additional Staff for Local Areas, etc. -
-
- 2·63 
TOTAL 82.700 187.200 109·78 
L 
4. Other Programmes 
a. Incentive training grants 1 year 41.500 41.500 46·00 
b. Community Industry 1 year 5.500 5.500 12·53 
OVERALL TOTAL 129.700 234.200 168·31 
1 These figures take account of some under-occupancy since experience has shown that it is not possible for all 
courses to be full at all times. 
The Report did not attempt to set outin detail the organisation 
that was to deliver such a programme, but it did specify some 
general requirements necessary for the success of the programme. 
The main administrative principles invoked were co-ordination 
and delegation. There needed to be co-ordination atboth national 
and local levels, but with the maximum possible delegation of 
authority to the local levels that was consistent with clear 
lines of accountability for funds and staff. It was recommended 
that the programme should be planned annually as a totality, 
and once the size of the total budget had been decided upon, that 
funds should be distributed to each local area in proportion to 
the numbers of young unemployed people in that area. The need 
for close co-ordination with the Careers and Further Education 
Services made it desirable that these local areas should be 
related to Local Education Authority(L.E.A.) areas, though 
not necessarily on a one-to-one basis. An MSC officer would 
have to be in charge of each area for reasons of public account-
ability. In general the programme was likely to require extra 
staff, both within the MSC and the Careers Service, but it was 
recommended that this should not involve the creation of anew 
network of offices or an additional layer of bureaucracy. Success 
was thought rather to depend upon the capacity of the programme 
to stimulate local initiatives. Hence, it was suggested that area 
boards comprising of local representatives of employers, trade 
unions, local authorities and other interested parties should 
be given the role of overseeing the planning of provisions for 
an area. A national board constituted along similar lines was 
to have a parallel role at the national level. It was also said 
to be desirable that young people should be able to participate 
in some way in the running of the programme. This it was thought 
would help to open up effective channels of communication with 
the trainees and avert the danger "that the programme could result 
simply in opportunities that older generations think young 
people need or ought to have, presented in a way which seems 
sensible to older people, instead of relevant opportunities which 
engage the active interest of unemployed young people."(104) 
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However, it was acknowledged that it was easier to make such a 
recommendation than to suggest how it might be achieved, though 
some practical suggestions were put forward. Finally, it was 
envisaged that the new organisational framework would supercede 
the networks that had been created to administer JCP and WEP, 
and go beyond the terms of reference of either of the two existing 
MSC agencies. But how exactly it might fit into the organisation 
of the MSC as a whole was not specified. 
The final section of the Holland Report considered what were the 
next steps required for the implementation of the programme. 
A target date of September 1978 was set for full implementation. 
It was stressed that the organisation for the expansion required 
had to be set up as soon as possible, and in particular that 
the training of staff and supervisors must be got under way. 
A ministerial decision was asked for by June. 
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This then was the text of the Holland Report. Now its significance 
can be interpreted in the wider context of MSC and Government 
policies. The setting up of the Holland Working Party provided 
an opportunity for the MSC to reassess the role of special measures 
in response to unemployment, and youth unemployment in particular, 
in the context of the philosophy of manpower policy that had been 
set out in Towards A Comprehensive Manpower Policy. Such a reass-
essment was clearly overdue. Mukherjee's argument for temporary 
job creation measures as an extension of active manpower policy 
had long ago been overwhelmed by the rising tide of unemployment, 
and, as we have seen, no new argument was put forward to justify 
such special measures when WEP was launched. Now that the need 
to establish special measures on a more permanent basis had been 
recognised, the requirement for a new rationale was more pressing 
than ever. However, the Working Party was not explicitly asked 
to provide such a rationale and did not really attempt to do so. 
As had been the case with WEP, the argument for the introduction 
of YOP was made primarily in terms of the shortcomings of 
existing provision - lack of numbers, lack of permanence, and lack 
of coherence. The more fundamental questions of why such special 
measures should continue to be employed in response to rising youth 
unemployment, and what might be the implications of continuing 
to increase their scale and duration, were never seriously 
considered. Between the elevated 'New Deal' rhetoric of the 
introduction, and the detailed proposals for the structure of the 
new programme which followed, this level of analysis was largely 
omitted. Indeed, the main contribution of the Holland Report was 
simply to bring together within a single coherent framework a 
number of schemes that had previously existed in a separate and 
haphazard fashion. There was little innovation with regard to the 
content of these schemes, and few explicit statements were made 
concerning the fundamental aims and objectives of the new programme 
in which they were to be located. 
It will be remembered that the design of YOP started from the 
two following principles: 
"(a) that the new programme must be designed to meet 
the personal needs of individual unemployed young 
people as they seek to secure permanent employment; and 
(b) that the individual elements in the programme and 
the programme as a whole must not be more 
financially attractive than being in full-time work 
or damage the incentive to young people in full-time 
education to continue their courses". (105) 
Of these two principles, the first is rather bland and general, 
and the second is highly specific. Both require a certain amount 
of interpretation before they can be understood in relation 
to the MSC philosophy of manpower policy that was set out in 
Towards a Comprehensive Manpower Policy. 
The first principle can be interpreted as embracing the dual social 
and economic function of a comprehensive manpower policy. The 
social function of the programme as a response to the needs of 
individual unemployed young people was explicitly emphasised by 
this principle, and was reiterated elsewhere as the Report went 
into further detail. The economic side of the dual function was 
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less obviously present, but may be considered as implicit within 
the reference to the securing of permanent employment. As was the 
case with WEP, the objective of improving the 'employability' 
of unemployed young people was central to the purpose of the 
programme, (106) and this objective implied not only a response 
to the needs of young people, but also a response to the needs 
of employers and the economy as a whole. Indicative of this was 
the fact that the Working Party commissioned a survey of employers' 
requirements, as well as one of young people's needs. (107) 
The second of the two founding principles was more specifically 
an organisational principle. Nevertheless, it can be interpreted 
in accordance with the general MSC principle of limited direct 
intervention as, in part, an attempt to minimise the effects of 
the programme on the labour market. It was stressed throughout 
the Report that the programme was only designed to operate where 
the normal mechanisms of the labour market were failing. This, 
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it was assumed on the basis of the predictions that were made, would 
only be necessary for a limited period of time, and would only 
apply to the least qualified and most disadvantaged minority of 
young people. In both these senses, what was proposed was a 
special programme, and not a permanent or comprehensive programme 
of work preparation for all young people, although the option was 
left open for YOP to constitute an element of such a programme 
in the future. (lOS) 
Neither of the two founding principles set out in the Holland Report 
can be in~erpreted directly in relation to the corporatist element 
of MSC philosophy that was identified in Towards a Comprehensive 
Manpower Policy. However, the corporatist approach to decision-
making was expressed practically both in the composition of the 
Working Party itself, and in the composition of the area and national 
boards that it proposed should oversee the programme. Closely 
linked to this consensus-based approach was the MSC's adherence 
to the principle of voluntarism in its administration of manpower 
policy. As we have seen, the Commission generally understood 
its role as being to enable, rather than to control or compel. 
With regard to YOP, it should be noted neither the trainees nor 
the sponsors were to be compelled to take part; rather they 
were to be offered 'opportunities' to do so. 
Thus it is possible to interpret the Holland Report's presentation 
of YOP in terms of the general principles of manpower policy that 
were set out by the MSC in Towards a Comprehensive Manpower Policy, 
but there still remains a certain ambiguity as to the exact status 
and position of the programme within the wider framework of 
manpower policy. The different elements of work preparation and 
work experience were described; but no assessment was made of 
their collective status in relation to the concept of training. 
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As we have seen, the dual social and economic function of manpower 
policy was expressed primarily through the concept of employability. 
Yet the young people entering the programme were still to be 
described as 'trainees' and paid an allowance in accordance with 
this status. Thus, the inconsistency between the status of provision, 
and the implied status of those being provided for, was imported 
from the Work Experience Programme and generalised throughout the 
range of schemes covered by the new YOP structure. It is arguable 
that there was more justification for considering those on work 
preparation courses as trainees, but as events turned out the 
majority of the programme was to consist of work experience, with 
little or no associated training. Furthermore, the work experience 
side of the programme was to include, in addition to the schemes 
of the type that had previously been part of WEP, some that had, 
come from within the framework of JCP. It will be remembered that 
under JCP it had been seen fit to pay the rate for the job, and 
that Mukherjee, when 'proposing such a job creation scheme, had 
clearly distinguished it from the training function of the MSC. 
As was the case with the presentation of WEP, the Holland Report 
swept over these underlying problems when explaining the form of 
remuneration that was to be adopted. All the emphasis was put on 
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why the system should be simple and uniform, and when it came to 
saying why this uniform system should take the form of an allowance, 
the question was left begging by this unhelpful non-sequitor: 
"Since the opportunities under the programme are either 
in courses to prepare young people for work or in different 
forms of work experience an allowance is appropriate',-( 109) 
Some attempt can now be made to bring together into a composite 
picture the main outlines of the MSC philosophy of YOP as it can 
be interpreted from the Holland Report. The main purpose of the 
programme was to provide a minority of young people experiencing 
serious difficulties in finding employment with a constructive 
alternative to unemployment that would make them more competitive 
in the adult labour market. In terms of organisation, it was to 
involve the collecting together of previous programmes into a more 
coherent and permanent structure; but it was still to be a 'special' 
programme, designed to operate only where the normal mechanisms 
of the labour market were failing and not attempting to take 
over permanently as a comprehensive programme of preparing and 
introducing young people to employment. Its style of operation 
was to be through the involvement of interesteQ parties in a 
corporatist mode of policy-making, and its participants were to 
be volunteers. Finally, its status as a training programme 
remained ambiguous: the MSC never claimed that it was a proper 
training programme, only that it contained elements of training, 
yet those taking part were to be considered wholly as trainees, 
and paid accordingly. 
The political context of the commissioning of the Holland Report 
was provided in the first place by the same uneasy Labour Government/ 
TUC relationship that had been responsible for initiating the special 
measures approach to youth unemployment in JCP, WEP, and the various 
other programmes. Before it was stated as an objective in Towards 
a Comprehensive Manpower Policy, the aim of ensuring that every 
unemployed school leaver should be given the opportunity of 
receiving some form of training or further education provision 
had already been recognised in the TUC-Labour Party Liaison 
Committee statement entitled The Next Three Years and the Problem 
of Priorities. (110) This statement, which was formally approved 
by the TUC General Council and the National Executive Committee 
of the Labour Party in July 1976, was regarded as a renewed version 
of the social contract and played an important part in the securing 
of a second year's pay policY'(lll) 
However, separate from the social contract, there was another 
important source of political pressure which needs to be mentioned 
in relation to the Holland Report. This was the so-called 
'Great Debate' on education, which was officially inaugurated by 
the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, in a speech delivered at 
Ruskin College in October 1976'(112) The origins of this debate 
went back to the previous decade. In the 1960s increased spending 
on education had been argued for in terms of its being an 
investment which ultimately would contribute to economic growth 
and prosperity. With the onset of the economic crises of the mid-
seventies, this argument was in effect turned back on itself. 
Not only had the increased spending on education failed to produce 
the promised economic benefits, but, it was argued, there had in 
fact been a decline in educational standards which had contributed 
to the trend of national economc decline. Thus the perception 
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of crisis was translated from the economy to the educational system. 
The debate over declining standards in education was originally 
orchestrated by the Black Paper movement which was highly critical 
of progressive teaching methods and comprehensive schooling. 
Supported by certain sections of the media, the authors of the 
Black Papers were able to elevate the debate into an issue of major 
public concern. When he became Prime Minister in January 1976, 
James Callaghan took an immediate interest which led to his personal 
sponsorship of the offical 'Great Debate'. This took the form 
of a series of eight regional conferences, whose deliberations 
on a prepared agenda were summarised and published in the July 
1977 Green Paper Education in Schools. 
In relation to the Holland Report, the first point that needs to 
be noted is that the inauguration of the Great Debate and the 
setting up of the Holland Working Party were concurrent events, 
both taking place in October 1976. Given that they took place 
alongside each other, it should not be surprising to find that 
certain themes of the Great Debate had an influence upon the study 
carried out by the Working Party. The most influential voice in 
the Great Debate was that of the employers, and the central theme 
was the need to improve the links between education and industry. 
Employers generally confirmed the view that educational standards 
were declining, and complained in particular that schools were 
not providing young people with the necessary skills and attitudes 
to function successfully in the world of work. Such opinions 
made tangible the link between educational and economic decline, 
and focussed it upon the particular problem of youth unemployment. 
Thus, the inadequacy of the schools' preparation of young people 
for the world of work was commonly identified as a major factor 
responsible for the disproportionately high levels of youth 
unemployment. These themes of educational decline and inadequate 
preparation for work were explicitly introduced into the Holland 
Report by means of the survey of employers. Although no formal 
conclusions were drawn as to the causes of youth unemployment, 
implicit within the proposals for the new programme was the view 
that schools were failing a significant proportion of young 
people, and that short periods of work preparation and work exper-
ience could rectify this deficiency and make these young people 
competitive within the labour market. Thus, while it was the 
Government's close but uneasy relationship with the trade unions 
within the social contract which made it necessary for some new 
special response to be made to rising youth unemployment, the 
nature of this response was significantly influenced by the 
opinions of employers which were expressed in the Great Debate on 
education. 
The publication of the Holland Report in May 1977 was in time for 
its recommendations to playa role in the annual set of negot-
iations to secure another year of pay restraint. However, in 
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the period of nearly a year that had elapsed between commissioning 
and publication, the social contract had begun to collapse. 
A number of factors contributed to this deterioration of relations 
between the Labour Government and the trade union movement. 
Frustration inevitably built up amongst the trade union rank and 
file as the policy of pay restraint entered its second year, and 
this was intensified by the fact that now the policy was beginning 
to have a serious impact on the level of real incomes.(113) But 
also there was a widespread collapse of confidence in the 
Government's capacity to honour its side of the social contract 
bargain, in particular in relation to the control and reduction 
of unemployment. It has already been seen how in the first year 
of pay policy, despite all Government promises, unemployment had 
risen from just over a million to near l~ million; and how, in 
order to secure the renewal of the social contract at the end of 
that year, the Government had promised that it would take action 
to restore full employment over the next three years. The TUC 
had accepted this new reassurance and endorsed the continuation 
of the social contract at its 1976 Congress. But even as it was 
doing so, a sequence of events was starting that was to mark the 
beginning of the end of the social contract. 
In September 1976 there was another serious sterling crisis, 
and this time the Labour Government's response was to apply to 
the International Monetary Fund for a loan. The IMF agreed to 
grant the British Government the loan that it required, but 
imposed a set'of conditions. In order to make itself eligible 
the Government had to agree to implement certain economic policies, 
including further cuts in public expenditure and other deflat-
ionary measures. (114) 
The agreement that the Labour Government made in order to secure 
the IMF loan effectively eliminated its chances of securing 
another year's formal agreement with the unions on pay. Already 
at the September 1976 Congress there had been an overwhelming vote 
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in favour of an orderly return to free collective bargaining 
at the end of the current stage of pay policy. However, the word 
'orderly' had conveyed sufficient ambiguity to give rise to the 
hope in Government circles that it might be possible to win over 
trade union leaders to another year of formal restraint. Cl15 ) 
But this depended on some evidence that the Government was serious 
about adopting policies capable of reducing unemployment. The 
agreement with the IMF made it obvious that it was impossible for 
the Government to adopt the qlternative policies required, and 
that it could do no more in the face of lYz million unemployed than 
offer continued special measures and wait for an economic upturn. 
Thus when TUC leaders came to the Government in December 1976, 
prepared to talk about another year of pay restraint, the 
Government had nothing left to bargain with. Cl16 ) 
Nevertheless negotiations continued during the spring and early 
summer of 1977(117)and despite the fact that they were largely 
unsuccessful, the proposals for YOP and Special Programmes can 
be seen as playing the same role as the proposals for JCP and WEP 
had done in previous years. Eventually the Government was forced 
to go ahead unilaterally with Stage 3 of its pay policy, attempting 
to enforce it by applying sanctions to companies that exceeded 
the 10% level set for pay settlements. But, despite not agreeing 
to a formal policy, the TUC released a statement advising union 
negotiators that the rule enforcing a twelve month gap between 
wage settlements should still be respected, and that settlements 
due before July 31st should not be deferred in order to escape 
the limits of Stage 2. Cl18 )This statement, which was subsequently 
reproduced as an annex to the Government's White Paper The Attack 
on Inflation After 3°1st July 1977 CCmnd 6882), was first 
published by the TUC on June 22. A week later Albert Booth, the 
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new Secretary of State for Employment, announced that the Government 
had instructed the MSC to go ahead with its plans for the Youth 
Opportunities programme.Cl19) 
As well as endorsing the programme proposed by the Holland Report, 
the Secretary of State gave an undertaking that no summer or 
Easter school leavers who remained unemployed the following 
Easter would remain without the offer of a place under the prog-
ramme. Contrary to the majority recommendation of the Report, he 
stated that a six week waiting period wouldas a rule be applied. 
The announcement also disclosed a complementary programme for the 
adult unemployed, the Special Temporary Employment Programme 
(S.T.E.P.). This was modelled on, and designed to replace, 
JCP - the main difference being that it was aimed exclusively 
at the adult unemployed. Its provisions were to be concentrated 
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in areas of above average unemployment and priority was to be given 
to the long-term unemployed - those aged 19 to 24 who had been 
continuously unemployed for more than 6 months and those aged 25 
and over who had been continuously unemployed for more than 12 
months. The target was to provide places for up to 25,000 people 
in a full year, in addition to the 8,000 unemployed adults who 
would be taken on as ~upervisors on YOP. Finally, the announcement 
sealed the fate of the Youth Employment Subsidy, which was to be 
extended to March 1978, but then discontinued. As with its predec-
essor, the Recruitment Subsidy for School Leavers, there was 
doubt about the extent to which it was effective in encouraging 
employers to take on youngsters other than those they would have 
employed anyway. 
Following the ministerial announcement, a discussion document 
entitled 'The Next Steps' was published in August 1977. It restated 
the Government's decisions on the two programmes and called upon 
interested parties to express their views on the organisational 
and planning framework required for the implementation of such 
programmes. The decisions on these matters were to be made by 
the end of December so that the local units of organisation could 
be made ready for the launch of the programme in April. 
When the final details of YOP were unveiled by the MSC in February 
1978, a special emphasis was put upon its permanence, and it was 
stressed that the funding was guaranteed for five years. (120) The 
programme to be implemented was in general closely based on the 
proposals of the Holland Report. The main change with regard to 
content was that the two schemes, Community Industry and Incentive 
Training Grants, which were being reviewed separately from the 
Holland Report but were assumed to be included in YOP, were in 
fact left out. The organisational framework fitted closely most 
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of the recommendations made. A national Special Programmes Board 
and 28 Area Boards were set up to oversee the planning and 
operation of the two programmes, and a Special Programmes Division 
(S.P.D.) with 31 Area Offices was established within the MSC to 
carry out the necessary administration. (121) SPD link officers were 
to be responsible for liaising with potential sponsors in the 
setting up and monitoring of the various forms of work experience 
schemes. The parallel responsibility for the work preparation 
side of the programme was to remain with the TSD, acting on 
behalf of the SPD. The recruitment of young people into the 
programme was to be primarily the responsibility of the local 
Careers Service. Finally, the level of the allowance was set at a flat-
rate of £19.50 per week. 
These developments and alterations of the original plans for YOP, 
which took place prior to the programme's launch in April 1978, 
need also to be interpreted in the wider context of MSC and Govern-
ment policies. The school leaver undertaking was asked for by the 
Labour administration, and it was willingly agreed to by the 
Commission. The reason given by the Minister responsible, John 
Golding, was that it would ensure that the programme did not 
neglect those 'rough and tumble' youngsters who were most awkward 
to cater for.( 122)While this was certainly a real and valid 
consideration, it should also be recognised that the school leaver 
undertaking fulfilled an important political function. At a time 
when relations with the trade union movement were under great 
strain and the next General Election was beginning to loom up 
on the horizon, the undertaking provided a graphic means of publicising 
the Government's continued commitment to the unemployed, or at 
least to the most politically sensitive of their number. In 
terms of the MSC's philosophy of manpower policy, the undertaking 
can be regarded as giving an additional emphasis to the social 
side of what had been described as the dual social and economic 
function of active manpower policy. Thus it ensured that ultim-
ately the development of the programme was governed by social need 
registered in terms of the supply of unemployed school leavers, 
rather than economic demand as calculated by the placement rate 
of trainees in the labour market. This gave the programme the 
potential to develop beyond any rationale that might be constructed 
for it in terms of active manpower policy. 
Although contrary to the majority recommendation of the Holland 
Report, the decision to enforce a 6 week waiting period can be 
understood in terms of the general principles of MSC policy as a 
means of limiting the degree of direct intervention in the labour 
market. Thus it was hoped that this restriction would help to 
minimise the programme's interference with the normal flow of 
young people into employment. 
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Finally ,with regard to organisation, the creation of the national 
Special Programme Board and the local Area Boards confirmed the 
extension of the MSC's corporatist style of policy-making into the 
management of the new programmes. Moreover, the decision to establish 
a separate Special Programmes Division was indicative of the way 
in which these programmes were to be regarded. On the one hand, 
it marked a recognition of the fact that special measures had 
taken on a semi-permanent status; on the other hand, it confirmed 
that these measures were still 'special' and to be ke~ separate 
from the proper training and employment functions of the MSC, as 
originally conceived. The fact that, within the overall framework 
administered by the Special Programmes Division, the Training Services 
Division was still to be responsible for the setting up of the 
work preparation courses was another expression of the ambiguity 
concerning the status of YOP as a training programme. (123) 
3. Special Measures in Historical Context 
It has already been noted that the Holland Report and the 
launching of YOP marked the culmination of the MSC's special 
measures approach to the relief of youth unemployment. The new 
programme was to develop in such a way that it rapidly outgrew 
its original definition as a 'special programme'. The description 
of this development, and the analysis of its impact upon 
the original philosophy of YOP, is to be the subject of the next 
two chapters. However, before moving on, it is necessary briefly 
to look back, and to consider the account just given of the modern 
development of special measures in relation to the history of 
unemployment and government policy that was presented in Chapter 2. 
It will be remembered from that account that the predominant 
historical role of special measures for the relief of unemployment 
has been as palliatives, acting against the strict economic 
logic of macro and micro-economic policies that have failed to 
secure a full employment equilibrium. In the post-war era prior 
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to the establishment of the MSC in 1974, special measures were said 
to have been necessary because Keynesian macro-economic policy, 
latterly supplemented by active manpower policy at the micro level, 
had by and large succeeded in maintaining full employment. But 
clearly, at some stage, the commitment of the 1944 White Paper to 
the maintenance of full employment through a Keynesian macro-economic 
policy of demand management was abandoned. Exactly when this was, 
is more difficult to say. 
One approach would be to consider the first adoption of special 
measures as prima facie evidence of the abandonment of an economic 
policy of full employment. We have seen how originally it was 
attempted to present the new special measures as an extension of 
active manpower policy, and thus as an aspect of the micro-economic 
adjustment of Keynesian macro-economic policy. We have also seen 
how the rapid rise of unemployment in the mid-seventies destroyed 
the case that had been put for regarding modern special measures 
in this way, and how they became widely recognised as playing 
the traditional historical role of palliatives only in the 
specific contemporary political context of the social contract. 
As the Keynesian economist Lord Vaizey put it, when giving his 
opinion of measures such as the Job Creation Programme to the 
House of Commons Expenditure Committee: 
"The sum total of these sorts of scheme seems to me to be 
cosmetic rather than genuine in its economic consequence. 
What they do in effect is to push employment around a little 
bit without much net effect. They are in no sense a subst-
itute for the substantial regeneration of British Industry 
which alone in the long run can give the country thereturn 
to full employment" .... (124) 
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It could then be suggested, that once the Government started spending 
money on special measures to remedy the 'intolerable' level of 
unemployment, this was in fact a signal that it had decided to 
tolerate this 'intolerable' level and was trying to make the best 
of it. There was of course no overt admission from the Labour 
Government that full employment had been abandoned; as we have 
seen, the myth of the return to full employment was a necessary 
element for the maintenance of the social contract. 
The above analysis would suggest that the abandonment of the post-
war commitment to full employment could be associated with 
establishment of the MSC, when for the first time since the war 
plans were formulated for the adoption of special measures as 
a response to rising unemployment. However, it must also be 
considered that the trend of rising unemployment can be traced 
back at least as far as 1966, (125)and that already, before the 
MSC had come into existence, the million mark had been exceeded 
on one occasion. This would suggest that, in fact, the commitment 
to full employment had been gradually slipping over the decade 
preceding the formal adoption of a special measures approach by 
the MSC. 
This latter analysis points to another possible association which 
could be significant. The period during which unemployment first 
began to rise, the mid-sixties, is also the period which has been 
identified with the first emergence of active manpower policy 
in this country. I have previously described this policy in its 
own theoretical terms, as a means of micro-economic adjustment 
operating within the framework of a Keynesian macro-economic policy 
of full employment. However, the evidence of the trend of rising 
unemployment since its adoption in the mid-sixties would suggest 
that it may have been applied more as a substitute than as a 
means of adjustment. 
It will be remembered that the original formulation of active 
manpower policy emerged from the perceived conflict between the 
fundamental economic objectives of full employment and stable 
prices, that was raised by the 1956 White Paper and subsequently 
given exact mathematical expression in the Phillips Curve. It 
was thought then that a relatively small reduction in the overall 
level of demand would stabilise prices and that, with the assist-
ance of an active manpower policy, this reduction in demand 
could be brought about without a corresponding decline in the 
level of employment. As it happened, the simple predictable 
relationship between unemployment and inflation postulated by the 
Phillip's Curve did not exist, and the choice between the two 
fundamental objectives could not be avoided merely by the adoption 
of an active manpower policy. Already, in the 1956 White Paper, 
the commitment to full employment had been compromised by the equal 
importance accorded to the fight against inflation. It seems now 
from the evidence of the rising unemployment figures that, from 
the mid-sixties onwards, Governments were increasingly prepared 
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to sacrifice the objective of full employment to that of controlling 
inflation. 
In this situation, it is arguable that active manpower policy, 
rather than functioning as a support to a macro-economic policy 
of full employment, did in fact, by presenting itself as a partial 
substitute, assist in the gradual withdrawal from the commitment 
of Governments to the maintenance of full employment through the 
management of the overall level of demand in the economy. If this 
analysis is accepted, then the role of JCP and other special 
measures as palliatives does not represent such a major break 
from the previous role of active manpower policy as might otherwise 
have been thought. It seems, in fact, that the history of the 
development of active manpower policy has always been closely 
associated with the history of the withdrawal from the commitment 
to full employment and, although it may have played a genuine and 
positive economic role in relation to employment, at the same 
time it has always to a certain extent been fulfilling the role 
of palliative in relation to rising unemployment. In this case, 
the adoption of a special measures approach by the MSC can be 
considered as the explicit development of a theme that had 
already been implicit in the previous history of active manpower 
policy. 
I want now, for the momen~ to leave this question of the origins 
of the withdrawal from the commitment to full employment and its 
relation to the development of manpower policy. Whenever the 
withdrawal originally began, and whatever the relation of active 
manpower policy originally was, I think that it is safe to say 
that by the time that the Youth Opportunities Programme was 
launched in 1978 the commitment to full employment was dead. 
Unemployment had been hovering around thel.5 million mark for the 
previous two years, and still the Labour Government had not resp-
onded with any significant measures of reflation. Indeed, in its 
agreement with the IMF, it had made obvious its commitment to 
further policies of deflation. 
In this sense, it could be said that the role of YOP, as a 
palliative in the absence of a serious Government commitment to the 
restoration of full employment, was clearer than ever; but for 
other reasons it was probably not as widely recognised in this 
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role as JCP had been. To begin with, in the objective of enhancing 
employability, it had inherited from WEP a more plausible real 
economic function than had existed for JCP; and to this it had added 
its own particular claims about training content. But also the 
political situation must be considered. 
In the cases of both JCP and WEP, their role as palliatives was 
clearly connected to the Government's need to maintain the social 
contract. As we have seen the origins of YOP can be understood 
in this same context. However, by then, the political situation 
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was less clear. The very fact that it was now obvious that the 
Government was not prepared to take serious action against unempl-
oyment at a macro-economic level was contributing to the destruction 
of the social contract. The early period of YOP's development was 
to see both the final collapse of the social contract and the 
consequent fall of the Labour Government. This was followed by 
the election of a Conservative Government that was prepared openly 
to deny any commitment to the maintenance of full employment in 
its economic policy and that presented itself as totally hostile 
to the consensus politics that had characterised the previous 
administration, particularly with regard to its relations with 
the trade union movement. Thus, the immediate political context 
in which the role of special measures as palliatives has been 
understood was already toppling as YOP was being created and, 
apparently, had completely collapsed within a year of the 
programme's launch. Yet, YOP not only survived, but outgrew its 
original plans and transcended its status as a special programme. 
The next task is to describe exactly what happened with regard 
to both the quantitative and qualitative development of YOP 
throughout its five year history. This will involve: first, a 
comprehensive national level analysis of the whole of this history; 
and secondly, a presentation of the conclusions of the local case 
study which was conducted in the Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area. 
Once it has been established exactly how YOP developed and what it 
achieved, it will be possible to return to the consideration 
of its significance wi thin the wider political and economic 
framework. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF 
THE YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES PROGRAMME: 
PART 1 QUANTITY 
1. The Growth of Unemployment 
In order to understand the development of the Youth 
Opportunities Programme over its five year history, it is 
necessary first to describe what happened to unemployment 
during this period. When YOP was launched in April 1978, the 
headline figure for the total number unemployed was 1,387,500, 
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which represented 5.9% of the working population. Five years later, 
when YOP was closed to new entrants, the total stood at 3,053,300 
and the unemployment rate was 13.1%. Thus, what in 1978 had 
already been regarded as an intolerably high level of unemployment, 
more than doubled during the lifetime of the programme. Moreover, 
because of changes made in the way that unemployment was counted, 
these figures understate the rise which actually took place. If 
the 1983 total had been compiled in the same way as that for 
1978, then it would have registered at a level well above 
3 million'(l) 
It will be remembered that the planning process within the 
Holland Report included a series of predictions of future unem-
ployment levels. These were necessary to gauge the likely level 
of demand for places on the new programme. Figures 1, 2 and 3 
set out these predictions in relation to what actually happened. 
Although, of course, the principle concern was with youth and 
school leaver unemployment, the starting point was to predict 
the future of unemployment amongst the population as a whole. 
Three separate series of predictions (A, B and C) were made 
of total unemploymentin August of each year between 1977 and 1981. 
On the basis of these, and using certain stated assumptions, three 
more series of predictions (again A, B and C) were produced for 
the quarterly levels of both youth unemployment (16-18 year olds) 
and school leaver unemployment over the same years'(2) 
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Figure 1 shows the Holland Report predictions for total unemployment. 
It will be noted that each of the predictions assumed that the 
level of unemployment would reach a peak in the near future, 
either in 1977 or 1978, and that then there would be some form of 
recovery which would bring the level down in 1979 and 1980. What 
in fact happened was that unemployment started in August 1977 
at a level of 1.57 million, slightly above any of the three 
predictions. (3) Then over the next two years it fell back down, 
so that by August 1979, at a level of 1.38 million, it was closely 
in line with the intermediate of the three predictions. However, 
contrary to all of the predictions, this recovery did not continue 
into 1980. Instead, there was a dramatic rise in unemployment 
between August 1979 and August 1980, which then continued into 
1981. By August of that year the level had risen to 2.83 million, 
compared to the predicted totals of (A) 1.20m., (B) 1.35m., 
and (C) 0.90m. Thus, by the fourth summer of the programme, the 
total figure for unemployment was almost double the most pessimistic 
of the three forecasts in the Holland Report. These predictions 
ended in 1981, but in reality the unemployment total continued 
to rise to levels still further beyond anything that could have 
been expected. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the predictions and the reality for youth 
and school leaver unemployment(4) The quarterly figures reveal 
the annual pattern of fluctuation around the summer school leaving 
date. However, if the same point on each cycle is compared, it 
will be seen that the trends from year to year reflect closely 
those of total unemployment. All three predictions assumed that 
the summer peaks of both youth unemployment and school leaver 
unemployment would be coming down between 1978 and 1980. Once 
again, after starting off roughly in line with these predictions, 
the point at which reality began to diverge was the summer of 
1980. A year later, youth unemployment stood at 34% above the 
most pessimistic prediction, and school leaver unemployment at 19% 
above. These figures, at first sight, might not appear to be as 
dramatic as those for total unemployment. However, it must be 
pointed out that the predictions did not take any account of future 
provision for young people. They were predictions of what youth 
and school leaver unemployment would be like without YOP.(5) 
Thus the reality was that, even with the school leaver undertaking 
and with YOP then taking on school leavers at a rate of 2 - 300,000 
per annum, the figures for school leavers unemployed in the summer 
of 1981 exceeded by almost 20% the most pessimistic prediction of 
what would happen without YOP. In short, the growth of youth 
and school leaver unemployment from 1980 onwards was quite beyond 
anything imagined when YOP was planned in the Holland Report. 
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2. The Quantitative Development of YOP 
Given the dramatic and unpredicted rise in the levels of 
unemployment between 1978 and 1983, it is not surprising that the 
most obvious feature of the development of the Youth Opportunities 
Programme over this five year period should have been the sheer 
speed and scale of its quantitative growth. Committed by the 
school leaver undertaking and other undertakings made subsequently, 
YOP was forced to provide more and more places each year for the 
ever-increasing clientele of young unemployed. Figure 4 records 
the number of entrants to the programme each year in comparison 
with the original Holland Report plan'(6) The total given for 
the latter is 187,200, rather than 234,200 as in Table 1 of Chapter 
3, because as we have seen Incentive Training Grants and Community 
Industry were eventually omitted from the framework of YOP. 
It might appear from the fact that the total for 1978/79 is 
approximately 13% below the Holland Report target that the 
programme got off to a slow start: however, this was not the 
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case. The Holland Report did not envisage that the programme would 
become fully operational until September 1978. Thus, although it 
was launched in April 1978, the first fully ope'rational year of 
YOP was from September 1978 to September 1979. During this period 
there were over 200,000 entrants to the new programme, nearly 
9% in excess of the Holland Report target. 
The first major expansion of the programme came in its third year 
(1980-81), in response to the take-off of unemployment levels 
in the summer of 1980. At the beginning of the financial year, 
the plan was for another gradual rise in the number of entrants 
to between 250 and 260,000 p.a. As it turned out, a rapid 
expansion was necessary to meet the undertakings that had been given, 
and by March 1981 some 360,000 young people had entered the 
programme. This pattern was repeated in the following year. 
In November 1980, the target for 1981/82 was set at 440,000 
entrants - a 22% increase on the previous year. However, by July 
1981, this figure had to be revised sharply upwards again in order 
to cater for the new flood of unemployed school leavers. By the 
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Table2: 
Expenditure on YOP 1978-79 to 1982-83 (£ million) 
1978179 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982183 
YOP grants to 
sponsors. and 56.9 113.5 
allowances 198.9 
374.5 519.9 
SPD SalarIes 4.0 6.3 9.2 16.2 20.9 
Research. premIses, 
staff travel and other 3.6 3.9 5.1 7.1 8.4 
overheads 
1. ~p:s'cial Programmes Division salaries and other administration costs include resources 
devoted to the adult programme (now the Community Programme). operated by SPD staff 
until June 1982 when it was transferred to MSCs Employment Division. 
2. 1982-83 saw the merger ofSPD and TSD into Training Division, thus administration costs and 
staffing numbers for 1982-83 are not strictly comparable co previous years. 
• There is a lag between the growth of YOP and subsequent expendicurt' hy the MSC which pre· 
vents direct comparison of the two, by financial year. 
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end of this fourth year of the programme, there had been 553,000 
entrants. 
Although in the fifth year of the programme there was a 
slight drop in the number of entrants, the overall scale of 
provision continued to increase, with a peak of 308,000 filled 
places being reached in November 1982 and the average level of 
filled places throughout the year being significantly higher 
than in any previous year. This was explained by the fact that 
the young people were staying for longer periods in the programme 
an average of 27 weeks in 1982-83, compared with 23 weeks in 1981-
82 and 17 weeks in the first year. The average duration assumed 
by the Holland Report had been 22 weeks. Thus, by its final year, 
not only did YOP have almost 3 times as many entrants as originally 
planned, but these young people were staying the programme on 
average nearly 25% longer than had originally been assumed. 
Finally, another way of indicating the phenomenal growth of YOP 
is in terms of the proportion of each year's school leavers 
which entered the programme. In the first year it was 1 in 8, 
in the second year it was 1 in 6, in the third year it was 1 
in 3, and in the final two years it was 1 in 2. 
The massive expansion of YOP naturally resulted in rising 
expenditure. Table 2 sets out the costs for each of the five 
years of the programme. (7) The original estimate in the Holland 
Report for the gross costs of the first full year of the 
programme was £168.31m.(at 1976 prices). However, with the 
exclusion of Incentive Training Grants and Community Industry, 
this figure was reduced to £109.78m. Nevertheless, it can be 
seen that the actual cost for the first financial year of the 
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programme turned out to be much lower, and this despite an increase 
in the flat-rate weekly allowance from £19.50 to £20.55 in line 
with increases in social security benefits made in November 1978. 
The discrepancy can be accounted for partially by the fact that 
the programme was not fully operational from the beginning of 
this first financial year, but still 87% of the estimated throughput 
for a full year had been provided at less than 60% of the estimated 
cost. The main reason for this low level of spending was in fact 
the much higher proportion of WEEP opportunities than had been 
planned, these being by far the cheapest form of opportunity, 
as well as the easiest to set up. In the second year, the more 
expensive schemes, which had proved slow to get off the ground in 
the previous year, began to build up larger numbers of places. 
As a result, costs increased at a considerably faster rate than 
the number a entrants. Nevertheless, WEEP still remained the 
predominant element, and despite another November increase in the 
level of the allowance to £23.50 per week, at the end of the year 
the programme was once again substantially underspent'(8) 
The original MSC projections for expenditure on YOP envisaged 
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a levelling off of the annual costs of the programme once it had 
been established over the first two years. (9) However, as we have 
seen, MSC projections failed to foresee the take-off of unemployment 
levels in the summer of 1980 and therefore made no allowance for 
the massive expansion of YOP which was to be necessary over the 
next two years. Consequently, the first two years of endemic 
underspending were followed by two years in which budgets were 
continually exceeded and in need of upward revision. Thus in 
1980/81, neither the continued high proportion of WEEP places, 
nor the freezing of the weekly allowance at £23.50, could stop 
the costs from rising some 15% above what had originally been 
budgetted for the year'(lO) Likewise in 1981/82, the final figure 
for spending during the year represented a 17% increase on the 
original b~dget, which itself had been more than 50% up on the 
final figure for the previous year'(ll) Once again, this huge 
rise in costs took place despite the cheaper WEEP schemes maint-
aining their predominant share of the programme, and despite the 
level of trainees' allowance remaining unchanged at £23.50 for 
most of the year. Thus it was only in January 1982 that the 
allowance was raised to £25.00 per week, the level at which it was 
to be held for the remaining duration of the programme. 
Despite the slight decline in the number of entrants, the final 
year of the programme saw another substantial rise in expenditure. 
Apart from the increased level of the weekly allowance, this was 
accounted for first by the general tendency of trainees to stay 
for longer periods within the programme, and secondly by the 
introduction of over 80,000 high quality 12 month New Training 
Places, in preparation for the transition to the Youth Training 
Scheme. The resultant level of expenditure of £549.2m.represented 
a five-fold increase on the original Holland Report estimate for 
a full year of the programme, and more than an eight-fold increase 
on the actual level of spending in the first financial year'(12) 
Finally, two points of qualification need to be made with regard 
to these expenditure figures. First, it should be noted that the 
figures given in Table 2 for SPD salaries and other administration 
costs include resources which were devoted to adult special 
programmes as well as to YOP. Thus, the actual totals for YOP 
expenditure were slightly less than the figures quoted, and the 
proportions attributable to overheads somewhat lower than these 
figures would indicate. Yet, even without the YOP element 
distinguished, it can be seen from the figures available that 
overheads constituted only a small and diminishing proportion of 
the total expenditure on the programme. 
The second qualification which needs to be noted is that all 
the figures given so far have been for gross costs. They take 
no account of the savings on the supplementary and unemployment 
benefits which otherwise would have been paid to the trainees 
and their supervisors, or of the additional income from taxes 
(both direct and indirect) and national insurance contributions 
resulting from the wages and allowances. Taking all these factors 
into account, it was reckoned that the net costs of the programme 
to the Exchequer amounted to only about 60% of the figure for 
gross expenditure in any particular year. (13) Furthermore, YOP 
qualified for a sUbstantial contribution from the European Social 
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Fund. For example, the sum granted in 1981/1982 was £59m. which 
represented approximately a quarter of the net costs of the programme 
for that financial year. (14 ) Finally, of course, a comprehensive 
balance sheet would have to take account of the unquantifiable 
value of the work done, both to the participants and to the 
community as a whole. 
A third aspect of the development of YOP which needs to be 
considered is the balance between the various typ~ of scheme that 
were included within the overarching framework of the programme. 
Not only did YOP grow in scale and cost far beyond what had 
originally been anticipated, but also it developed a balance 
between different kinds of provision which was in many respects 
unlike that laid out in the Holland Report. Table 3 sets out how 
the entrants were distributed between scheme types in each of the 
five years of the programme, and compares these figures with the 
Holland Report plan. (15 ) 
The Holland Report divided the opportunities to be offered under 
the Youth Opportunities Programme into two major categories, 
work experience and work preparation. These were presented 
as being on a par, and it was planned that the entrants should be 
distributed roughly half-and-half between the two categories. 
What in fact happened was that in the first year of YOP the various 
types of work experience scheme accounted for almost 80% of the 
total number of entrants to the programme. In each of the foll-
owing three years the figure rose above 80%, and it was only in 
the final year that it fell back down to 72%. This was the result 
of the introduction of the major new category of New Training 
Places, which at the same time caused a reduction in the proportion 
accounted for by Work Preparation Courses to a meagre 12%. In 
order to understand better this imbalance between the work 
experience and work preparation 'halves' of the programme, it 
is necessary to analyse the development of the individual scheme 
types on each side. 
The outstanding feature on the work experience side, which has 
already been referred to in relation to the costs of the programme, 
was the unanticipated scale of the Work Experience on Employer's 
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TABLE 3 YOP ENTRANTS BY SCHE~ TYPE 
HOLLAND 1978/79 1979/80 
No. % No. ~ No. ~ 
100,000 5~ 128,200 7gfo 182,100 84% 
60,000 J2$> 108,400 67'), 1)8 ,900 64% 
1 S 000 8% 8.400 ~. tS-,-200 7% 
1 s.ooo 8% 7.600 ~ 20,700 10% 
10,000 ~ ),800 Zlb 7,)00 ~ 
87,200 47% )4,000 21% )4,)00 16% 
60,000 J2$> 2,400 1.5~ ),000 1% 
25,000 1~ )0,900 19% 29,)00 14% 
2,200 1% 700 O.~ 2,000 1% 
- - - - - -
187,200 10(Yfo 162,200 87% 216,400 116% 
1980/81 1981/82 1982/81 
No. % No. 
" 
No. % 
)04,500 85,% 461, .500 8;% )9),400 7'ZJ, 
242,200 6710 )71,200 67% )09,400 57% 
20 100 6j 74,100 13% 68,)00 13% 10 200 8. C)~ 
12,000 ).~ 16,200 Jfo 15,700 Jfo 
55,500 1.5% 91,500 17% 67,800 1~ 
4,100 ~ ),700 0.59' 
49,)00 1).~ 85,800 16% 
2,100 O.~ 2,000 O.~ 
- - - -
81,900 1.5% 
)60,000 192% 55),000 295% 54),100 290% 
Premises element. The Holland Report had planned for WEEP schemes 
to cater for 32% of entrants. As it turned out, two out of every 
three young people in the first year of the programme entered 
WEEP schemes. Originally, this was thought to be a temporary 
aberration, resulting from the large carry-over of ready-formed 
places from the Work Experience Programme and the comparatively 
longer time that it took to set up places in the other elements 
of YOP.(16) However, despite efforts to build up these other 
elements in the second year of the programme, WEEP still retained 
a 64% share of the total throughput. In the following two years, 
the pressure to create greatly increased numbersof opportunities 
at a rapid pace and with minimum additional expenditure ensured 
that the proportion of WEEP entrants went back up to 67%. It 
was only in the final year, with the introduction of the New 
Training Places, that the figure came down to 57%. 
The Holland Report envisaged that the three other types of 
work experience scheme - Project Based Work Experience, Community 
Service and Training Workshops - would between them constitute 
21% of the new programme. As it happened, they accounted for only 
12% of the entrants in the first year. After this slow start, 
more places began to come 'on stream' in the second year, and 
the percentage envisaged in the Holland Report was nearly achieved. 
However in the following two years, as the capacity of the 
programme expanded rapidly, the proportions dropped back to around 
16% and then remained stable at that level with the introduction 
of the New Training Places in the final year. One other minor 
point to be noted is that at the beginning of the fourth year 
of the programme the two separate scheme types, Project Based 
Work Experience and Community Service, were merged together under 
the collective title of Community Projects. They had already been 
running closely in tandem on the ground, so this change merely 
formalised what was already taking place.(17) 
On the work preparation side, the shortfall in comparison with 
the Holland Report plan was accounted for wholly by the almost 
complete failure of one particular kind of opportunity, Employment 
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Induction Courses. The Holland Report envisaged that these two 
week courses would account for almost a third of the total number of 
entrants to the programme. Yet, in the first year they catered for 
only l~% of the intake, and thereafter the figure remained at 
roughly 1% for the rest of the programme. Little was said publicly 
about the failure of Employment Induction Courses, but there appears 
to have been little enthusiasm for them amongst either sponsors or 
trainees. A small number of similar courses already existed 
before YOP at Skillcentres and colleges, and the hope was expressed 
in the Holland Report that a substantial expansion could be brought 
about through the involvement of private industrY.(lS) However, the 
rapid turnover of these courses meant that they were troublesome 
to organise, and there was little motivation for private employers 
to do the hard work of induction without them necessarily being 
able to reap the benefits of the trainees' labour. (19) On the part 
of the trainees, most wanted to get started in a particular area of 
work as soon as possible and therefore were reluctant to go through 
this preliminary stage. However, it is true to say that some might 
have benefitted from the opportunity to pause and assess more 
carefully the kind of work that they wanted to do. 
The effect which the failure of Employment Induction Courses had 
on the overall balance of YOP should not be over-estimated. Although 
it was intended that they should constitute a third of the 
annual throughput of the programme, because the courses were 
only two weeks long, this required only 3,000 places at anyone 
time, which was less than 4% of the total number planned for the 
programme as a whole. Moreover, the role which the courses were 
to have. played (often as a preliminary to entry into work 
experience schemes) could in most respects be fulfilled by the 
induction processes which were included as an integral element of 
all work experience schemes. The main effect of failure of EICs 
was upon the appearance of the programme. The large annual through-
put which was intended for these courses made it possible for the 
Holland Report plan to be presented as an equal combination of 
both work experience and work preparation opportunities. This was 
an important factor when it came to securing support for the plan 
from the wide range of interests that were to be involved in its 
implementation. (20) However, once the length of the individual 
schemes and courses is taken into account, it can be seen that the 
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work preparation side was always intended to be subsidiary. Indeed, 
in terms of places rather than throughput, it represented only 15% 
of the programme content within the Holland Reportp lan. Thus, the 
failure of EICs, which with 3,000 places were to have accounted 
for the majority of the throughput on the work preparation side, 
in a sense merely drew attention to the reality of the situation. 
The other two kinds of work preparation course, Short Industrial 
Courses and Remedial or Preparatory Courses, both constituted 
approximately the proportion of the total programme which had 
originally been intended. Short Industrial Courses, which were 
subsequently renamed as Short Training Courses, already existed 
in quite large numbers before YOP. Thus, in the first year, when 
other schemes were still building up their numbers, these courses 
constituted 19% of the total throughput compared with the Holland 
target of 13%. Thereafter, they maintained a proportion of the 
total throughput which was marginally above this target figure 
until the introduction of the New Training Places in the final 
year. Remedial or Preparatory Courses were only intended to 
constitute roughly 1% of total throughput. After a slow start, 
they reached this level in the second year of the programme. 
Despite the rapid expansion of total throughput, their numbers 
remained static in the following year, and consequently their 
proportion was reduced to less than ~%. However, it should be 
taken into account that as the programme expanded to cater for 
more of each year's school leaver population, the proportion 
that were in need of remedial help was reduced. One further 
point which should be noted about this area of provision is the 
introduction of a new form of remedial course which was not 
mentioned in the Holland Report. This was the Work Introduction 
Course (W.I.C.), which consisted of 13 weeks training in basic 
work skills and wider skills needed in working life. These 
courses took place in further education colleges, and were aimed 
at young people with no educational qualifications, including those 
classified at school as mentally handicapped. Introduced in the 
first year of YOP, WICs came to make a substantial contribution 
to the MSC's provisions in the remedial field, alongside the Young 
Person's Work Preparation Courses that were provided by the 
Employment Rehabilitation Centres. 
Looking now at the development of the overall balance of the 
programme over its first four years, what can be seen is that it 
was the schemes which were easiest and cheapest to provide which 
came to predominate. Work Experience on Employers' Premises 
was favoured on both counts. During the first two years, when the 
programme underspent its budget, the crucial factor was ease rather 
than cheapness. Thus, in the first year it was the schemes 
which pre-dated YOP, or which could be got off the ground quickly, 
that tended to come to the fore. The comparative respite of the 
second year allowed for some redress of the balance in favour of 
the schemes which took more time and effort to set up. Then 
in the third and fourth years, as the programme expanded rapidly 
and exceeded its budgets, expense became a crucial factor. Table 
4 sets out the comparative gross unit costs of the different types 
of schemes during the second half of the fourth year of the 
programme. (21) If these figures are put against those for 
throughput in the same year, and then the two together compared 
with the original Holland Report targets, it will be seen how 
important a factor expense was in shaping the development of the 
balance of the programme. WEEP, of course, stands out as being far 
less expensive than any other type of scheme. The only cost, 
apart from SPD overheads which were generalised across the whole 
programme, was the trainees' allowance. If WEEP had constituted 
only a third of total throughput as planned in the Holland Report, 
and the distribution between the other schemes had remained the 
same, then the overall cost of the fourth year of the programme 
would have been raised by nearly 40%. 
The final year of YOP saw a decisive change in the development 
of the balance of the programme. An increase in expenditure of 
almost 40%, combined with a slight decline in throughput, lifted 
the major constraints which had shaped the programme during the 
two previous years. Some of this extra finance was accounted 
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for by the general tendancy of trainees to stay for longer periods 
on the programme, but the most important factor was the introduction 
of the New Training Places. They marked a move away from the 
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TABLE 4 GROSS UNIT COSTS OF SPECIAL PROGRAMMES 
Cost per Average Average 
week* cost per duration 
entrant 
(£) (£) (weeks) 
Youth Opportunities Programme 40.50 931 23 
Work Experience on 
Employers' Premises 23.50·· 520 22 
Community Projects 59.50 1,902 32 
Training Workshops 67.00 2,216 33 
Employment Induction 
Courses 74.00 148 2 
Courses organised by 
Training Services Division 83.00 1,080 13 
Courses at Employment 
Rehabilitation Centres 123.00 1,232 10 
Community Enterprise 
Programme 91.00 2,730 30 
• These figures exclude MSC overhead costs and relate to the second hEllf of 
1981/82. 
**£25.()() from January 1982. 
Source: SPD 
determining factors of ease and cheapness, towards the pursuit 
of quality in preparation for the new Youth Training Scheme. 
New Training Places (N.T.P.s) were designed to provide trainees 
with 12 months of integrated, high quality training and work 
experience. They could take a number of different forms, each 
being based on a development of existing yap schemes. The four 
basic categories were: (1) Work Skills Courses; (2) Information 
Technology Centres; (3) High Quality Community Projects and 
Training Workshops; and (4) Linked Schemes. Work Skills Courses 
(W.S.C.s) consisted of an integrated combination of a 6 month 
training course and a 6 month work experience placement. They 
could be based either with an employer or with a college/training 
establishment. Information Technology Centres (I.T.E.C.s) were 
the result of a joint initiative undertaken by the MSC and the 
Department of Industry. Developed originally on the basis of 
a Training Workshop, they provided an integrated programme of 
work experience and training specifically in the area of new 
technology. High Quality Community Projects and Training 
Workshops were simply existing yap schemes in these categories 
which had been extended and upgraded to contain all the key 
elements demanded of New Training Places. Finally, Linked Schemes 
were existing or new work preparation courses and work experience 
schemes, which remained under the separate control of different 
sponsors, but which were linked up to provide the extra scope 
required of New Training Places. 
All of these different forms of New Training Places had to be 
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able to offer trainees the following seven key elements of content: 
(1) induction; (2) assessment; (3) basic skills (e.g. numeracy, 
literacy, communication, coping and managing, practical skills, 
social and caring skills, and technical skills); (4) occupationally 
relevant education and training; (5) guidance and support; 
(6) a record and review of progress; and (7) certification. 
It will be noted that some of these elements of content were 
already required for existing YOP schemes. Others were the 
product of good practice which had gradually developed over the 
previous four years. However, in the case of New Training Places, 
all of these key elements were required, and the specifications 
were made more demanding and more detailed than they had been 
before. (22) 
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The target set for the final year of YOP was 100,000 NTPs. Although 
in fact only just over 80,000 entrants were recorded during the 
financial year , the target figure for places was reached by 
1983'(23) Thus, while in terms of entrants NTPs represented only 
15% of the total annual throughput, by the end of this final year 
they constituted roughly a third of the total number of places 
available. Apparently, an important change had taken place in the 
overall balance of the programme. 
3. Criteria for the Measurement of YOP's Performance 
We have now seen how, under the pressure of unemployment 
levels far beyond anything foreseen in the Holland Report, the 
development of the Youth Opportunities Programme overran its 
original plans in terms of scale, costs, and the balance of 
provision. But how did this development relate to the 
programme's fulfilment of its original objectives? The next 
stage is to make a systematic examination of the performance of 
YOP over its five year history in relation to the following 
three criteria: (1) the undertakings; (2) the employability 
of the trainees; and (3) th~ quality of content. The choice 
of each of these criteria requires a brief explanation. 
The Holland Report, it will be remembered, made no reference 
to any undertakings. Nevertheless, when Geoffrey Holland as 
Director of the MSC subsequently reviewed the history of YOP, 
he referred to the school leaver undertaking as "the key feature 
of the programme". (24) Alongside the other undertakings, it 
provided a touchstone against which the public were invited to 
judge the annual performance of YOP. Furthermore, it ensured 
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that the development of the programme was tied to the rising levels 
of unemployment. However, the success of the programme could not 
be judged purely in terms of its ability to accommodate ever-
increasing numbers of unemployed young people. Success also 
depended upon what happened to these young people when they came 
back out onto the labour market at the end of their schemes and 
courses. The main rationale for the programme, as expounded in 
the Holland Report, was to improve the trainees' chances of securing 
permanent employment. Thus, a second important criterion for the 
assessment of the performance of YOP was the employment placement 
rate of the trainees when they left the programme. Yet, this 
placement rate was heavily dependent upon factors which were beyond 
the control of those who were directly responsible for the programme; 
in particular, it was subject to the general deterioration of 
labour market prospects under the influence of a deflationary 
macro-economic policy. Consequently, the performance of the 
p~ogramme cannot be assessed purely in terms of either the quantity 
of entrants or the percentage of employment placements. It is 
necessary also to attempt to make an assessment of the intrinsic 
quality of the provision. 
The assessment of the qualitative performance of YOP is not as 
straightforward as the assessment of the undertakings or the 
employability of the trainees. Quality could only be directly 
apprehended at the level of the individual scheme or course, where 
it could be described and analysed in detail. In order to 
be measured at a national level of analysis, it needed first to 
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be interpreted in terms of a small number of simple quantitative 
gauges. The Holland Report established certain minimum requirements 
of content which, during the first year of the programme, were 
elaborated upon in order to produce a series of principles and 
guidelines for quality improvement. Amongst these, it is possible 
to identify three crucial aspects of quality improvement which 
can be used as quantitative gauges of the programme's qualitative 
performance. In addition, a fourth gauge is provided by what can 
be regarded as the reverse side of quality improvement, the 
measurement of the various abuses to which the programme was 
subject. However, the qualitative performance of YOP cannot be 
assessed simply in terms of these four gauges. The understanding 
of quality and quality improvement did not remain static, but 
developed throughout the duration of the programme in response 
to research and practical experience. This development affected 
not only specific qualitative objectives, but, in combination 
with the quantitative development which has been described above, 
it affected the quole qualitative status of the programme. Given 
the complexity of this subject and the importance of its implic-
ations, a separate chapter will be required for the analysis of 
YOP's qualitative performance and development. But first it is 
necessary to make the assessments of the programme's performance 
in relation to the more straightforward quantitative criteria 
provided by the inputs and outputs of trainees. 
4. The Undertakings 
In each of the five years of the existence of the Youth 
Opportunities Programme, undertakings were given to the effect 
that certain groups of unemployed young people would receive the 
offer of a place on the programme by a certain date. Successive 
Labour and Conservative Secretaries of State invited the public 
to judge the performance of the programme in terms of the targets 
set by these annual promises. The purpose of this section is to 
take up this invitation and provide a systematic analysis of 
YOP's performance in relation to the undertakings that were made 
on its behalf. 
On the question of the availability of places on YOP,the 
Holland Report simply stated that, "the opportunties provided 
by the new programme ... should be available to all unemployed 
young people."(25) As has been noted, the idea that a specific 
guarantee should be made to a particular group of unemployed 
young people only emerged when the plans for the programme were 
announced by Albert Booth in the House of Commons. He introduced 
the idea in the following terms : 
"We shall want to ensure that places go to those who 
most need them. Summer school leavers will be 
considered for places from September, and it is our 
firm intention that no summer or Easter school 
leavers who remain unemployed the following Easter 
should remain without the offer of a place under 
the programme. The Government will ensure that the 
necessary resources are available for this purpose, and 
the MSC will arrange the programme accordingly, 
making such special provision as is necessarY."(26) 
This 'firm intention' subsequently became established as the 
annual school leavers undertaking, and was repeated in each 
year of the programme's existence. During the first three years, 
it was an Easter undertaking; in the latter two years, the date 
by which an offer of a place was to be made was brought forward to 
Christmas. 
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In the first year of YOP, the school leavers undertaking was the 
only undertaking given, and throughout the existence of the 
pr?gramme, it remained the most prominent of the undertakings. 
In each of the four other years, a second undertaking was given to 
another specific group of unemployed young people. In the second 
and third years of the programme, the target group was the long-
term young unemployed. The promise originally made was that any 
young person under the age of nineteen becoming unemployed for 
12 months would be ensured the offer of a suitable place on the 
programme within 3 months. (27) This undertaking started in January 
1980, and continued to run on an on-going basis until the end of 
the third year of the programme. It was then replaced by a new 
undertaking: that all other 16 and 17 year olds (i.e. those not 
already covered by the school leavers undertaking) who had been 
unemployed for 3 months would be offered a suitable place within 
another 3 months. (28) This commitment applied on an on-going 
basis throughout the latter two years of the programme. 
Table 5 sets out the national results of the school leaver 
undertaking in each of the five years of the programme. (29) 
Column 3 records the numbers of unemployed school leavers to whom 
the MSC failed to deliver its promise of an offer of a place by 
the specified date. The worst result it will be noted was in 
Year 4, the first year of the Christmas undertaking. Over 
15,000 school leavers were left without the offer of a place 
which they had been promised. (30) However, such figures need 
to be understood in the context of the rapdily increasing number 
of young people being covered by the undertaking. Column 1 
records the annual number of school leavers successfully placed 
on the programme by the undertaking date. If these figures are 
added to those in Column 3, then the totals represent the overall 
number of young people covered by the undertaking each year. 
The failures in Column 3 can then be rendered as a percentage of 
the total numbers covered by each year's undertaking. This annual 
'failure rate' is recorded in Column 3a. Year 4 still emerges 
as the worst result, but, even with 15,000 young people left 
without the offer of a place,the failure rate was less than 5%. 
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TABLE 5 THE RESULTS OF THE SCHOOL LEAV~R UNDERTAKING 
1 2 2A 3 3A. 4 ') SA 
No. of No. of 2 No. in J No. in No. in 5 
school s/ls. as 2 who as 2 who 2 who as 
leaver left on % refused % were were % 
entries regis- of of inappr- still of 
by ter at 1 1 opriate to be 1 
given given + + made an + 
date date 2 2 offer 5 
EASTER ****** ****** ** ****** ** ****** ****** ** 
YEAR 1 78/79 114,000 6,201 5.2 ),)00 2.7 900 1,632 1.4 
YEAR 2 79/80 1)1,000 5,42) 4.0 ),)00 2.4 1.032 46c; 0.4 
YEAR ) 80/81 2)4,000 22,004 8.6 (3+4= 11.133) 8.141 3.4 
CHRISTMAS ****** ****** ** ****** ** ****** ****** ** 
YEAR 4 81/82 295,000 15.010 4.8 
YEAR 5 82/8) 55,991 29,905 12.154 10. ')6r; 
This supports the MSC's claim that in each year of the programme 
the school leaver undertaking was 'substantially fulfilled' '(31) 
However, this conclusion must be qualified by reference to the 
figures in Column 2 of Table 5. Column 2 records the annual 
number of unemployed school leavers who did not take up a place 
on the programme by the date of the undertaking. These figures 
include the numbers of young people who had not been made an offer 
of a place, as recorded in Column 3, but they are considerably 
larger because they also include a number of other categories 
which have not yet been referred to. The two most important 
categories are thoseto whom the offer of a place was deemed inapp-
ropriate, and those who refused an offer of a place. There were 
a number of reasons why it might have been considered inappropriate 
to offera.young person a place on the programme: for example, 
they might have been waiting to take up an offer of full-time 
employment or to enter college, they might have been pregnant, 
they might have been ill, or they might have been pursuing a 
course of part-time study. Neither was the classification of a 
refusal a straightforward matter. Widely differing definitions 
of what constituted a refusal prevailed amongst the different 
Careers Services. However, what is clear from the figures given 
in Column 2 is that over the five years of the programme there 
was a steady rise in both the numbers and percentages of young 
people covered by the undertaking who, for whatever reason, did 
not take up a place by the specified date. Underlying this trend, 
perhaps the most significant factor was the increase in the rate 
of refusals. In the second year of the programme, 3,300 young 
people covered by the undertaking were classified as refusers, 
representing 2.4% of the total. By the final year of the 
programme the number had risen to almost 30,000, representing 8.0% 
of those covered by the undertaking. Thus, the number of young 
people refusing to take up an offer of a place on the programme 
became far more significant than the number to whom the MSC failed 
to make such an offer. 
Another way of considering the impact of this undertaking is to 
attempt to assess its impact upon the school leaver unemployment 
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statistics. These have already been set out in Figure 3, above. 
It will be remembered that, despite the existence of the school 
leaver undertaking, by the summer of 1980 the level of unemployment 
amongst school leavers under 18 had risen higher than the most 
pessimistic prediction in the Holland Report of what the level 
would be without the intervention of the Youth Opportunities 
Programme. Given that the school leaver undertaking was 'substant-
ially fulfilled' each year, this situation may appear somewhat 
paradoxical. However, it needs to be taken into account that the 
undertaking only applied to school leavers of the current year; 
whereas, in the unemployment statistics, all young people who had 
not been employed since leaving school or college were classified 
as 'school leavers'. Thus, for example, a young person might 
leave school with no job to go to, be taken off the~nemployment 
register and onto YOP in accordance with the school leaver under-
taking, spend 6 months on a scheme, and then go back onto the 
unemployment register, still classified as a school leaver. 
Yet, taking this factor into account, it must still be considered 
remarkable that the totals of school leavers under 18 unemployed 
continued to rise despite the growing proportion of current year 
school leavers being taken off the register for 6 months or more. 
In effect, there were more school leavers unemployed in the 18 
months between leaving YOP and reaching the age of 18, than 
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previously there had been in the 2 years between the minimum school 
leaving age and the 18th birthday. Moreover, the 6 months on YOP 
was supposed to be enhancing the employability of school leavers 
- more will be said about this later. Of course, it must be 
taken i~o 'account that this continued rise in school leaver 
unemployment took place against the background of a massive rise 
in the total level of unemployment, which exceeded the Holland 
Report predictions by a considerably larger percentage than was 
the case with the school leaver figures. Perhaps then a more 
significant set of statistics for gauging the impact of the under-
taking would be those showing the growth of school leaver unemployment 
in relation to total unemployment. Table 6 sets out the annual 
averages for school leaver unemployment as a percentage of total 
unemployment between 1971 and 1982'(32) From this it can be seen 
that, although the school leaver undertaking failed to halt the 
absolute rise of school leaver unemployment, it did halt the rise 
as a proportion of the total unemployment. Whereas school leaver 
unemployment had grown steadily as a proportion of total 
unemployment from 1971 to 1977 (with the exception of 1973 which 
was accounted for by the raising of the school leaving age), over 
the next five years it fell from 7.0% in 1977 to 6.1% in 1982, 
though the 7.0% high point was reached again in 1980. Thus, it can 
be stated as an achievement of the school leaver undertaking that 
it succeeded in halting the tendency which went back at least 
to the beginning of the 1970s for school leaver unemployment 
to increase at a more rapid rate than total unemployment. However, 
it only did so by in effect delaying the school leaving date by 
roughly 6 months for as many as half of each year's minimum age 
school leavers. 
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Turning now to the second undertaking given under the Youth Opport-
unities Programme, that to the long-term young unemployed, it 
will be noted that the results presented in Table 7 are far ·from 
complete. Whereas the MSC was always keen to publicise its 
achievements in relation to the annual school leavers under-
taking, it tended to be more reticent about the results of its 
other undertakings. Thus, with the undertaking to the long-term 
unemployed it has only been possible to obtain results for 
two of the five quarters during which it was in operation. 
The first set of results available for the long-term young 
unemployed undertaking are those for the first quarter in which 
it applied, January to April 1980. These were published, alongside 
the results of the school leaver undertaking, in the Review of the 
Second Year of Special Programmes. (33) The Review claimed that 
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fABLb.i 6 SCHOOL L.I!A V.l:!;.H UNcl1,PLOnW;NT AS A ./?.t,!;hCENrAu.c; OF rurAL UN.c.:NPLOY!1.J:W."l"T 
IN utiliAf BHITAIN - ANNUAL AV.c.:rlAu.c.:S 1971-1982 
Year Total School % Leavsrs 
1971 7.58 ,400 14,800 2.0 
1972 844,100 19,100 2.3 
1973 597,900 7,000 1.2 
1974 599,700 13,700 2·3 
1975 935,600 45,300 4.8 
1976 1,304,600 81,600 6.3 
1977 1,422,700 99,800 7.0 
1978 1,409,700 93,700 6.6 
1979 1,)25,500 78,000 5.9 
1980 1,715,900 120,100 7.0 
1981 2,628,400 159,600 6.1 
1982 3,036,600 184,700 6.1 
TABLE 7 
JAN-APR '80 
APR-JUL '80 
JUL-OCT '80 
OCT80~AN81 
JAN-APR '81 
THE RESULTS OF THE UNDERTAKING TO LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED 
YOUNG PEOPLE 
1 2 2A 3 JA 4 5 ;It. 
Under No. 2 No. in 3 No. in No. in 5 
196 from 1 as 2 who as 2 who 2 who a.s 
unem- left on % refused ~ were were ~ 
ployed regis- of of inappr- still of 
52 wks+ ter 3 1 1 opriate to be 1 
at 1st months made an 
dat~ ~a.ter offer 
5,614 2,635 47 1,365 24 607 663 12 
6~648 3,885 58 1,715 26 185 1,285 30 
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undertakings were 'very largely met'. Of the 5,614 in the long-
term undertaking group at the specified date in January, 663 
remained unemployed and without an offer of a place on the 
programme three months later. This was not much larger than 
the number left without the offer of a place under the school 
leaver undertaking, but as a percentage of the original target 
group it represented approximately a 12% failure rate, compared 
with the 0.4% failure rate of the school leaver undertaking. 
Furthermore, as Column 2 reveals, nearly half of those covered 
by the undertaking remained on the unemployment register at the 
end of the specified period. What in particular should be noted 
is the high rate of refusals: almost a quarter of those in the 
original target group refused the offer of a place on YOP. 
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In addition to these, some must have reached their 19th birthday. 
Unfortunately, no figure was given for the number in the undertaking 
group who were actually provided with a place on YOP during 
the three month period. (34) Without this figure, it is difficult 
to gauge the achievement of the undertaking, since the failure 
rate is understated in comparison to that of the school leaver 
undertaking. However, it can be said with certainty that the first 
three months of the undertaking to the long-term young unemployed 
had a failure rate of more than double the worst year of the school 
leaver undertaking. 
The other set of results given for the long-term young 
unemployed undertaking by Table 7 are those for the quarter 
July to October 1980. These were obtained from an internal paper 
presented to the Special Programmes Board. They reveal a 30% 
failure rate in terms of those left without an offer of a place 
on the programme. The refusal rate remained at about 25%, and 
almost 60% of those covered by the undertaking were still on the 
unemployment register at the end of the three months. Once again 
it was impossible to tell the exact number that YOP was responsible 
for taking off the register. (35) However, even if it took all those 
who left the register during this period, its performance in 
relation to the undertaking must still be regarded as very 
unsatisfactory. Perhaps this is why these results were never 
published. 
By the time that the Review of the Third Year of Special Programmes 
was published in December 1981, there should have been available 
four such sets of results covering the period April 1980 to April 
1981. However unlike in the previous year's Review, no clear 
statement was given of the results of the undertaking to the 
long-term young unemployed. All that was said is as follows: 
"Long term unemployment as a proportion of overall 
unemployment among 16 to 18 year olds fell from 
5.3% in January 1979 (9,300 young people) to 3.3% 
in January 1980 (5,700) and 3.1% in January 1981 
(9,400). This was due to efforts to ensure 
young people - including school leavers under the 
Easter undertaking - entered YOP well before they 
had spent a year on the unemployment register. In 
addition, the safety net of the separate undertaking 
to young people unemployed for 12 months meant that 
8,000 long term unemployed young people had a place 
on the Programme."(36) 
As a statement of the results of a publicly given undertaking, 
this is not only inadequate, it is misleading. The reduction of 
long-term unemployment as a proportion of overall unemployment 
among 16 to 18 year olds was not due to the impact of YOP under 
either of the undertakings, but was the result of the sharp rise 
in the overall total of youth unemployment that took place during 
1980, from 170,000 in January 1980 to 305,000 in January 1981. 
Moreover, the primary effect of the school leavers undertaking 
upon this proportion would be to increase it, by reducing the 
numbers of those unemployed for less than a year. The signif-
icant figures are those in brackets, and the proportions given in 
the main text are merely a contrived way of distracting attention 
from the fact that, despite both undertakings, the number of 
young people unemployed for a year or more rose from 5,700 in 
January 1980 to 9,400 in January 1981. 
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At this point it is worth taking a look at how the equivalent 
statistics gauging the impact of the long-term unemployed undertaking 
were reported in the previous year's Review. The progress made 
over the year was described as follows: 
"The number of young people under 19 unemployed for 
over 12 months fell significantly during the 
latter part of 1979 and the early part of 1980 -
from 9,000 in July to 5,600 in January 1980 and 
2,600 in April 1980. This is very largely due 
to the impact of the long-term unemployed undertaking 
" . . . . . .. (37) 
If these figures are linked up with those given in the Review of 
the Third Year, it becomes apparent that in 1980/81 there was a 
rapid reversal of all the progress made in the previous year. 
The Review of the Second Year claims that by April 1980 the 
number of young people unemployed for over 12 months had been 
reduced to 2,600. The Review of the Third Year admits at least 
in brackets), that by January 1981 the number of young people in 
this category had reached 9,400. However, the full period covered 
by this Review was from April 1980 to April 1981. No figure 
is provided for April 1981, but according to the Employment Gazette 
the figure was 11,300. Thus it would appear that in the third 
year of the Youth Opportunities Programme, the only year throughout 
which the undertaking to the long-term young unemployed applied, 
the number of young unemployed for more than a year increased 
from 2,600 to 11,300. This, however, is not correct. The figure 
of 2,600 given by the Review of the Second Year of Special Programmes 
is the total of those in the January 1980 undertaking group still 
left on the unemployment register in April 1980. It makes no 
allowance for those newly joining the ranks of the long-term 
unemployed during this three month period. This figure should 
have been given as 5,000. This mistake means that the deterioration 
during the second year of the undertaking was not so dramatic as 
suggested above; but, by the same token, the improvement made 
during the first year was not as impressive as originally claimed 
by the MSC. 
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The unravelling of a trail of misleading and erroneous statistics 
is inevitably a tortutuous process. In order to help clarify 
matters Table 8 (a) sets out a complete quarterly series of figures 
for the number of young people under the age of 19 registered as 
unemployed for more than a year, between July 1978 and October 1983(38) 
Judged in terms of its impact on these statistics, the undertaking 
to the long-term unemployed must be considered a failure. Despite 
a slight improvement during the first three months, over the 
complete 15 month period during which the undertaking was in force 
the number of long-term unemployed young people doubled from 5,700 
in January 1980 to 11,300 in April 1981. Of course total unemploy-
ment was rising rapidly during this period, but even if these 
figures are rendered as a proportion of long-term unemployment 
amongst the working population as a whole, it can be seen from 
Table 8 (b) that there was a rise from 1.7% to 2.3% over the 15 
months covered by the undertaking. Ironically, it was during 
the period before the undertaking came into force that YOP 
appears to have made a positive impact on both the numbers and the 
proportion of the long-term young unemployed. Thereafter, the most 
that can be said for the undertaking is that is application may 
have helped to control the growth of this category of youth 
unemployment. Thus it should be noted that, .in the three months 
following the removal of the undertaking, the number of long-term 
unemployed young people doubled again, representing another 
substantial rise as a proportion of total long-term unemployment. 
Looking over the whole period covered by the Youth Opportunites 
Programme, it can be seen that although long-term unemployment 
amongst the under 19s more than trebled, it ended up representing 
the same proportion of total long-term unemployment in April 1983 
as it had in July 1978. Thus, as in the case of the school leaver 
unemployment, it could be argued that YOP managed to stabilise the 
growth of this category of youth unemployment in relation to the 
equivalent category of unemployment amongst all ages. However, 
unlike the school leaver undertaking, this undertaking does not 
appear to have substantially fulfilled the specific promises that 
it made. 
TABL8 8 21 YOUNG l'l!;OPL,l!; UND1:.:,H 19 UNi.!.Hl'LOYlill £i'OR O'l,e;,H A Y,l!;AH 
Ql AS A P.l!;RL.!KNTAG~ O.t<' TOTAL UNu!PLOYI-lliNT IN G.HE.AT 
BHITAIN OF OVER A YEAR'S DURATION 
JAN APR JUL OCT 
1978 a) 13,000 11.400 b 4.0% 3.4% 
1979 a 9.300 9.000 9.600 7 • .500 b 1.17~ 2.6% 2.8% 2.2% 
1980 a 5,700 5,000 7,000 8,000 b 1.710 1. s% 2.0~ 2.1% 
1981 a 9,400 11, JOO 22,JOO 27,900 b 2.~ 2. )'ft? 3.8% 3.7% 
1982 a JO,JOO Jl,200 J7.100 45.500 b 1. '5% 3.3/0 3.6% 4.1% 
198J a 43,800 44,100 47,500 58.900 bJ 4.1/0 4.0/0 4. 'i% S.4% 
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It should now be apparent that the misleading and inadequate 
way in which the results of the undertaking to the long-term 
unemployed were reported in the Review of the Third Year of 
Special Programmes was a means of avoiding the admission that the 
undertaking had not been met. It has already been seen, from 
the unpublished figures obtained, that the undertaking had a 30% 
failure rate for the quarter of July to October 1980. One can 
only speculate about the two quarters that followed; but, 
given the continued growth of the long-term youth unemployment 
over this period, it seems unlikely that the failure rate would 
have been any lower. One final point about the reporting of the 
undertaking to the long-term unemployed in the Review of the Third 
Year: the undertaking was supposed to have been continued from 
the previous year, however, there was a significant change in its 
wording. The original undertaking, as reported in the Review of 
the Second Year, was as follows : 
"from January 1980 to ensure that any young person 
becoming unemployed for 12 months should be offered 
a suitable place on the Programme within 3 months."(39) 
The version given in the Review of the Third Year was this: 
"to continue to seek to make places available also 
for young people under 19 who had been unemployed 
for 12 months or more."(40) 
The difference between an undertaking 'to ensure' that something 
will be done and an undertaking 'to seek to' do something is an 
important difference. 'Seeking to' is not the same as 'ensuring', 
and an undertaking to seek to do something can be met whether one 
succeeds or fails to do that thing, so long as one tries. Thus, 
rather than admit that they had been unable to meet their publicly 
given undertaking to the long-term young unemployed, it appears 
that the MSC chose, retrospectively, to change the wording of 
the undertaking so that it would be met whether they had succeeded 
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or failed. This made the publishing of detailed results of 
the original undertaking unnecessary. All that was necessary 
was evidence that they had tried - i.e., the 8000 long-term 
unemployed young people found a place on the programme. Those 
left without a place, or those refusing to take a place,could 
be forgotten about. Thus, the undertaking to long-term unemployed 
young people was rendered meaningless. 
In the final two years of the programme, a new undertaking was 
applied, that to the 'other' 16 and 17 year olds who had been 
unemployed for three months or more. Compared with the undertaking 
to the long-term unemployed that it replaced, the period of 
unemployment necessary to qualify was substantially reduced, but 
at the same time the age group covered was narrowed by a year. 
From the very outset YOP had experienced difficulties in attrac-
ting 18 year olds. In the first year of the programme, only 10% 
of its entrants were aged 18, despite the fact that this age group 
constituted a third of the young unemployed. (41) Initially, this 
was a matter of concern, and a working group was set up to examine 
what could be done to attract more 18 year olds into the programme. 
A case was made out for paying a higher level of allowance to 18 
year olds in line with customary wage and benefit differentials. 
However, this policy was never adopted and the age group continued 
to be under-represented on the programme. (42) Moreover, 18 year 
olds had a high rate of refusal, (43)and they constituted over 50% 
of those covered by the unsuccessful undertaking to the long-term 
unemployed. The replacement of that undertaking by the new under-
taking to.16 and 17 year old non-school leavers marked the end of 
any specific obligation to 18 year olds. Although still formally 
eligible to join the programme, they were pushed to the back in the 
order of priorities, and only under certain specific circumstances 
were they actively encouraged to take up a place. YOP in effect 
redefined itself as a programme focussed on 16 and 17 year olds, 
with 18 year olds being allowed to take up any spare places. (44) 
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The new undertaking to 16 and 17 year old non-school leavers was 
monitored by taking a twice yearly stock count of the young people 
in this category who were registered unemployed, and then following 
their progress over the subsequent six month period. In order to 
meet the undertaking, those unable to find a job and remaining under 
the age of 18 had to be offered a suitable place on YOP by the 
end of the six months. As was the case with the undertaking 
to the long-term unemployed, the results of this undertaking were 
not fully reported in the Annual Reviews of Special Programmes. 
In the Review of the Fourth Year, the report was as follows: 
"Long term unemployment 'among under 18 year-olds 
increased during the period, but was mitigated 
by the operation of the two undertakings. The 
proportion of the total unemployed under 18 who 
had been unemployed for 12 months or more 
increased from 1.9% in April 1980 (2,100) to 
3.5% in April 1981 (5,200) and 5.4% in April 
1982 (10,000). The comparable proportion for adults 
in April 1982 was 32%." (45) 
Although the increase of long-term unemployment amongst 16 
and 17 year olds is admitted, nothing is said specifically 
about the results of the undertaking. Moreover, the comparison 
made with the proportion of long-term unemployment amongst adults 
is highly misleading. It takes no account of the fact that it is 
far less likely that someone should remain unemployed for 12 months 
or more within a two year period than it is within a span of 40 
years or more. For a true comparison one would have to look at 
the proportion of adults remaining unemployed for 12 months 
or m.ore within a similar two year age span. Yet, at least the 
Review of the Fourth Year referred to this undertaking. The very 
brief account of the final year of YOP which was published by the 
MSC in Youth Training News made no mention of it at all. 
Thus, as with the undertaking to the long-term unemployed, the 
reporting of the results of the undertaking to the 'other' 16 and 
17 year olds in the Annual Reviews of Special Programmes was not 
very satisfactory. However, upon request, the MSC were able to 
provide some more detailed results. These are set out in Table 9. 
Unfortunately, they only give an analysis of those left on the 
register at the end of each six month period. No figures were 
provided for the numbers successfully placed on the programme. 
Without such figures it is difficult to get a clear idea of the 
relative success or failure of the undertaking. Col~mn 5 gives 
the numbers still waiting for an offer of a place on the programme 
at the end of each six months, but these cannot be rendered 
directly as a failure rate in the same way as with the other two 
undertakings. The only way to calculate such a failure rate 
is to use the analysis of annual entrants provided by the Reviews 
of the last two years of the programme. Using these figures, and 
combining the results of the undertaking into pairs, it is possible 
to calculate a failure rate in each of these two years which 
should be comparable with those calculated for the school leaver 
undertaking. The figures arrived at are 9.9% for 1981/82 and 8.0% 
for 1982/83. Both are considerably higher than the failure rate 
in any year of the school leaver undertaking, but less than any 
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of the figures available for the undertaking to the long-term 
unemployed (which it will be remembered were understated by 
comparison). Similarly, refusal rates can be calculated in a manner 
which is comparable to that used for the school leaver undertaking. 
The figures arrived at are 10.9% for 1981/82 and 24.4% for 1982/83; 
once again, considerably higher than those for the school leaver 
undertaking, yet less than those for the undertaking to the 
long~term unemployed. Taking both the failure rate and the 
refusal rate of this undertaking into account, it can be seen 
why the MSC was perhaps reluctant to provide the results in full 
or to give them much publicity. 
Finally, as with the other two undertakings, the performance of the 
undertaking to the 'other' 16 and 17 year olds can also be gauged in 
terms of its impact upon the relevant unemployment statistics. 
l' 
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TABLE 9 THE RESULTS OF THE UNDERTAKING TO '!HE 'OTHER' 16 AND 17 YEAR OLDS 
1 2 ) 4 5 
No. of No. includ- No. includ- "No. includ- No. includ-
young ed in 1 who ed in 1 who ed in 1 who ed in 1 who 
people registered refused a were wait- were yet t'o 
covered by after place on ing to take receive an 
undertaking taking part YOP or CI up a place offer of a 
in YOP or on YOP YOP place 
CI 
APRIL 1981 - OCTOB~R 1981 i.- . 52,025 )0,614 10,9)7 2,679 7,777 
OCTOBER 1981 - APRIL 1982 )6,)16 16,126 9,841 946 9,40) 
APHIL 1982 - OCTOB~R 1982 50,441 19,225 2),812 1,56) 5,841 
OCTOBER 1982 - APRIL 198) 42,277 19,849 14,)26 2-,)16 5,799 
Table 10 (a) sets out the quarterly figures between January 1980 
and October 1983 for those under 18 unemployed for six months or 
more, and Table 10 (b) renders these figures as percentages of this 
category of unemployment amongst all ages'(46) From this evidence 
it can be seen that, during the period covered by the undertaking, 
the number of 16 and 17 year olds unemployed for six months or more 
not only trebled, but continued to rise as a proportion of the 
equivalent figure for all ages. 
Looking back now over the performance of all three of the under-
takings, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, it must 
be acknowledged that, under the prevailing circumstances, the 
substantial fulfilment of the school leaver undertaking in each 
year of the programme was a truly remarkable achievement. However, 
the significance of this achievement, in terms other than pure 
logistics, is more open to question. While it is tr~that the 
school leaver undertaking helped to ensure that great efforts were 
made to find places on the programme for some of the more difficult 
youngsters in this category, it is also true to say that it tended 
to divert attention away from other youngsters, whose need may 
have been as great, but who did not happen to be school leavers. 
Of course the other two undertakings were introduced to cover 
other groups which were considered to be in particular need, but 
still these were general definitions of need which did not take 
any account of individual circumstances. Moreover, as we have 
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seen, these other undertakings appear to have ben far less successful 
in meeting their targets than the school leaver undertaking. The 
word 'appear' has to be used, given the MSC's failure to publish 
full sets of results for these undertakings. Yet, there can be 
little doubt that by comparison with the school leaver undertaking 
they did fail, and this way why the full results were not published. 
This raises the questions of how meaningful are public undertakings, 
if the results are only published when they are successfully met? 
It seems to this observer that the failure of the MSC to make a-
full statement of the results of the undertakings given to the long-
term young unemployed and the 'other' 16 and 17 year olds did 
more to devalue the achievement of the school leaver undertaking 
TABL.c.; 10 21 tOUNe; 'pi!;OPL~ UNlJi:h 18 lJN.u;l'l1'LOY.t;l) FOt( OV~,H SIX MONTHS 
.B.l A;) A Pb,;.tl.c..:b;NTAl.,~ Of TOTAL UNJC';J.'i.PLOYl'l~lH IN l.l~T 
B.tl.ITAIN OF' OVb,;,H SIX MONTHS lJUliATION 
JAN APR JUL Oc..:T 
1980 a( 17,000 14,000 11,000 19,000 b 3.0% 2.31c 1.8/" 2.7% 
1981 a 47,000 39,000 37,000 39,000 b '5.3% 1.41" 2.8/" 2.61" 
1982 a 53,000 54,000 48,000 46,000 b 3.4/"0 3.37" 2.9/" 2.7/"0 
1983 a 43,000 58, 000 54,000 56,000 b 2.6% 3.276 3.2% 3· 4;;6 
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than the fact that these results may not have been particularly 
satisfactory. 
A further criticism that can be made of the undertakings in 
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general, and of the school leaver undertaking in particular, is that 
by inviting the public to judge the performance of the programme 
purely in terms of its quantitative input, they distorted the 
development of YOP and distracted attention away from certain 
other important goals. Each year, with the possible exception 
of the fifth, was dominated by the race to meet the undertakings; 
and what happened to the young people, both whilst they were on the 
programme and when they came out of it at the end, was relegated 
to a matter of secondary importance. It has already been seen how 
the development of the balance of the programme was largely dictated 
by the need to meet ever-increasing quantitative targets at 
maximum speed and minimum cost. If the series of unemployment 
statistics provided for each of the undertaking groups is referred 
back to again, it will be remembered that none of the undertakings, 
not even that to the school leavers, appeared to make a significant 
impact. Given the large numbers in each category (even in the 
case of the less successful undertakings) that were taken off the 
unemployment register and onto YOP for six months or so, it seems 
remarkable that the unemployment levels in these categories should 
have continued to rise as rapidly as they did, keeping pace with 
and in some cases outstripping the rate of growth for the equivalent 
categories of unemployment amongst all ages. This would seem to 
indicate that, however successful the programme was in finding 
places for the young people in the undertaking groups, a large 
proportion of them were returning to the unemployment register 
after the completion ·of their time on the programme. This raises 
the question of how successful YOP was in its objective of enhancing 
the employability of young people. 
5. Employability 
The prime objective of the Youth Opportunities Programme, 
as delineated in the Holland Report, was to help unemployed young 
people obtain permanent employment at the first possible opport-
unity. This objective was inherited by YOP from the Work 
Experience Programme, which was generally regarded as having 
performed well in relation to this criterion. Follow-up surveys 
revealed that 75% or more of WEP trainees had managed to obtain 
permanent employment, and it was assumed that YOP would enjoy 
similar success. (47) The initial advertising campaign that was 
aimed at potential trainees pictured the unemployed school leaver 
as being trapped in a vicious circle between unemployment and lack 
of experience: 'I can't get a job without experience; I can't 
get experience without a job"'(48) The promise was held out that 
the opportunities for work experience and work related training 
offered by the Youth Opportunities Programme would help the young 
person to break out of this circle. 
Throughout the history of the programme, various follow-up surveys 
were made in order to ascertain what had happened to YOP trainees 
after they had left their schemes. These follow-ups were conducted 
separately by the SPD for the work experience schemes, and by the 
TSD for the work preparation courses. (49) Both involved the use 
of simple postal questionnaires which asked ex-trainees to 
indicate what they were doing, first, immediately after their 
scheme, and secondly, at the time of the survey. Work experience 
trainees were surveyed approximately 12 months after their entry 
to the programme (thus, on average, roughly 6 months after leaving), 
whereas work preparation trainees were surveyed approximately 3 
months after leaving (i.e. 6 months approximately after entry). 
The size of sample used for the work experience scheme follow-ups 
varied between 28% and 1.5% of the total entry, but was generally 
at the lower end of this range. The response rate to this survey 
was generally between 50% and 70%. The work preparation course 
follow-ups took a regular 1 in 6 sample of ex-trainees, considerably 
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larger than the average percentage taken for work experience 
schemes. However, the response rate was generally under 50% 
and on one occasion, as low as 30%. The work experience scheme 
follow-ups were carried out at regular quarterly intervals 
throughout the life-time of the programme, starting with the 
entrants of September 1978. The work preparation course follow-ups 
were also quarterly, but did not start until the first quarter of 
1980 and were discontinued in the 3rd quarter of 1982. The results 
of the two series of the follow-ups, with regard to the situation 
of ex-trainees at the time of the surveys, are set out separately 
in Figures 5 and 6. 
The results for work experience schemes, shown in Figure 5, can 
be compared with those obtained previously by the Work Experience 
Programme. It can be seen that from the outset, with the entrants 
of September and October 1978, YOP was unable to reproduce the 75% 
plus employment placement rate achieved by WEP. Moreover, having 
started with a 70% employment rate, the figure for YOP work exper-
ience trainees fell steadily until it reached a low point of 33% 
for the entrants of the second quarter of 1980. Thereafter, it 
picked up again to just over 50% in the next quarter, and then 
varied between this level and 40% for the remainder of the programme. 
The average over the whole series of follow-ups was roughly 50%. 
Meanwhile, throughout the history of the programme, the unemployment 
rate amongst ex-trainees varied in an inverse relationship to the 
employment rate, starting off at 17% and reaching a highpoint of 
52% in the second quarter of 1980. The other possible categories 
- 'on another scheme', 'in full-time education' and 'other', -
all remained relatively stable throughout the programme, though 
it appears that more trainees were taken on by another scheme when 
the employment rate dipped. It will also be noted that the 
category of 'employed' was divided between those trainees who were 
taken on by their scheme sponsors and those who were taken on by 
other employers. Generally, between a third and a half of all 
trainees employed were taken on by their sponsors, and the vast 
majority of these were WEEP sponsors. 
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As well as providing results for work experience schemes in general, 
the follow-up surveys differentiated between the various scheme 
types. Generally, the employment placement rate of the WEEP schemes 
was considerably higher than that of the other work experience 
schemes. Thus the average for WEEP over the complete series of 
follow-ups was 56%, compared with 39% for Community Projects and 
34% for Training Workshops. This difference can be accounted for 
to a large extent by the extra opportunity that WEEP trainees had 
to be taken on directly by their sponsors. However, it also 
needs to be pointed out that Community Projects and Training 
Workshops tended to take on young people who were more dis-
advantaged in the first place. Allowing for this factor, there was 
some evidence to show that with certain types of trainee these 
schemes were at least as successful as the WEEP schemes.(51) 
Turning now to the work preparation courses, it can be seen 
from Figure 6 that their employment placement rates were in general 
considerably lower than those for the work experience schemes. 
Thus, the average rate over the period covered by the surveys 
was only 23%, almost exactly half of that for the work experience 
schemes over the same period. (52) However, if the unemployment 
rates are compared in the same way, the difference is much less 
- 43% for the work preparation courses compared with 40% for the 
work experience schemes. This is explained by the fact that a much 
higher proportion of work preparation trainees went on into a 
second YOP scheme, generally in the work experience sector. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the proportion of work preparation trainees 
entering full-time education was slightly smaller than that of 
work experience trainees. 
Unfortunately, because the two sets of follow-ups were not timed 
or spaced in the same way, it is impossible to combine their 
results together to show the trends amongst all ex-YOP trainees 
during the period in which both surveys were in operation. On both 
graphs there can be seen to be a certain annual cycle, but 
whether one works on the basis of dates of entry, dates of leaving, 
or dates of survey, the graphs do not appear to align with each 
other over the same period. The most that can be done is to provide 
combined averages. Thus, working on the basis of leaving dates, 
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the average employment rate at the time of survey for trainess 
leaving all forms of yap schemes and courses between January 1980 
and September 1982 was 42%, and the average unemployment rate 
was 40%. In other words" from the last quarter of the second year 
onwards, ex-YaP trainees were almost as likely to be found on the 
dole as in employment, if asked what they were doing between 3 
and 6 months after leaving their schemes. 
Clearly, this was not the level of success that was originally 
anticipated for yap when the enhancement of young people's 
employability was outlined as the prime objective. Furthermore, 
it is noticeable that, as was the case with the undertakings the 
Commission's reporting of the programme's performance in relation 
to this criterion became less candid as it failed to match up to 
expectations. Although it was always possible to obtain upon 
request the full results of the various follow-up surveys, those 
published in the Annual Reviews of Special Programmes and elsewhere 
became increasingly selective in what they revealed. In particular, 
after the first two years of the programme, they abandoned using 
the employment placement rate as the criterion of success, and 
substituted for it the combined rate for employment, full-time 
education or another scheme'(53) This had the desired effect of 
keeping most of the figures over 50%. It also became the common 
practice to present these results in conjunction with statistics 
illustrating the rapid rise of the general rate of unemployment. 
Thus it was tacitly being acknowledged that the general state of the 
labour market, rather than anything being done to enhance the 
employability of the trainees, was the crucial factor in deciding 
the placement rates at the end of the schemes. 
This fact was explicitly acknowledged in the conclusions drawn by 
a report on the work experience scheme follow-up surveys which 
was made by the Manpower Intelligence and Planning Division of 
the MSC'(54) Moreover, this report went further in suggesting that 
not only were the placement rates of the work experience schemes 
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directly dependent upon the general state of the economy, but 
also that they were likely to be adversely affected by any large 
increases in the scale of work experience provision with 
employers which took place under such circumstances. The point 
was made as follows: 
"Work Experience Schemes are dependent upon the 
economy as a whole to 'provide' places on schemes 
with employers; so the conditions that are most 
likely to lead to success in the sense of a high 
rate of placements into permanent employment are 
particularly likely to be absent when most needed, 
that is, when schemes are at their largest."(55) 
It was further noted that in many cases where schemes had 
apparently helped trainees into employment, their manner of 
doing so was not as might have been expected. Referring to the 
large number of trainees taken on by their sponsors, the report 
stated: 
"Instead of the schemes providing work experience 
which then makes the young people more attractive 
to potential employers, 50% of WEEP placings (and 
thus 40% of all placings) are made as a result of 
providing 'entry ports' for young people into their 
sponsors' internal labour markets."(56) 
In addition to the basic question concerning the employment 
status of the ex-trainee, the work experience scheme follow-ups 
asked certain other questions. This allowed a multi-variate 
analysis to be made of how a number of different factors might 
affect the employment prospects of individual trainess. One 
such factor was the length of time that a trainee had spent on 
their scheme. Looking at the matter rather simplistically, it 
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might be thought that if work experience schemes were really 
succeeding in enhancing the employability of trainees, the longer 
that a trainee stayed on a scheme, the better should be their chances 
of employment at the end. In fact, except in the case of those 
who were taken on by their sponsors, the evidence clearly showed 
that the opposite was true: the longer a trainee stayed on a 
scheme, the less chance they had of gaining employment afterwards. 
This did not necessarily imply that the schemes were incapable of 
enhancing the employability of trainees, but it did suggest 
that there were real limitations which had perhaps been under-
estimated. The conclusions set out in the report were as follows: 
"a) those who gain jobs quickly may well have done so 
irrespective of WE schemes influence; 
b) many of these who stay for a long time, do not gain 
employment because their scheme has not been able to 
increase their "employability" adequately. This is not 
to say, necessarily, that WE schemes are a failure, but 
rather that with hindsight the objectives they were set 
were unrealistic in view of the determining influence 
of the economy, and the secondary influence of those 
deep-seated characteristics of applicants which made 
them less able and unqualified to begin with."(57) 
In addition to the regular postal follow-up surveys, the 
MSC commissioned the Office of Population, Census and Surveys 
(OPCS) to carry out two separate and more detailed interview 
surveys. The first of these covered 1978-79 entrants and was 
conducted in March 1980, the second covered 1980-81 entrants 
and took place in April 1982. (58)Both generally confirmed the 
basic information about employment status which had been obtained 
from the postal surveys of entrants during these two periods. 
The first also provided the basis for a postal re-contact survey 
which was carried out in March 1981, a year after the original 
interviews. This was done in conjunction with two other postal 
re-contact surveys carried out in February 1981 and July 1981 
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using ex- work experience trainees who had answered the regular 
postal follow-up surveys a year earlier. (59)The idea of these postal 
re-contacts was to establish how ex-trainees fared over a longer 
period after leaving their schemes. Most of the respondents had 
been in the labour market for at least a year since leaving 
their scheme and were 18 or older when re-contacted. The evidence 
from the regular postal follow-ups and the March 1980 OPCS interview 
survey was that employment rates nearly always increased over the 
period of roughly 6 months between the leaving date and the survey date. 
However, all three of the postal re-contact surveys indicated that 
in the longer-term, over the period of a year between the 
original survey and the re-contact, the proportion in employment 
declined (by 4 - 8 percentage points) and the proportion 
registered as unemployed increased (by 6 - 10 percentage points). 
Of course, during this year there was a particularly sharp 
rise in the general level of unemployment (4 percentage points 
between March 1980 and March 1981), and as the article which 
reported these results pointed out, no firm conclusions could be 
reached about the effect of YOP on employability in the absence 
of knowledge about a comparable group of young people who had not 
been on YOP schemes. Nevertheless, reversing as it did the 
trend of improvement previously observed over the first 6 
months after leaving, this evidence concerning the longer-
term prospects of ex-trainees acted to undermine further the 
confidence which had originally been expressed in the capacity of 
these schemes to bring about a substantial and lasting improvement 
in the employability of young people. 
As was the case with the undertakings, a way of trying to assess 
the impact of YOP which allows for the general increase of 
unemployment, is to look at youth unemployment levels. This has 
already been done for the specific undertaking groups, and it was 
noted that even in the case of the 'successful' school leaver 
undertaking the impact was very slight. Figure 7 shows youth 
unemployment as a proportion of total unemployment at each October 
between 1978. and 1983'(63) It is divided into three age groups, 
under 18s, under 20s and under 25s. The first point to be noted 
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is that, apart from a slight peak reached by each of them in 1980, 
there were no substantial changes in any of the proportions during 
this six year period. The proportion represented by the under 18s 
fell from 10.4% in October 1978 to 8.1% in October 1983, but the 
proportion for 18 to 19 year olds rose by as much over the same 
period, leaving the figure for all those under 20 virtually unchanged. 
Meanwhile, the proportion for 20-24 year olds rose slightly, lifting 
the figure for all those under 25 up to 40.8% in October 1983 
compared with 38.3% in October 1978. Thus, the only detectable 
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positive influence of YOP upon these statistics was upon the 
proportion of under 18s. Yet, this can easily be accounted for 
by the sizeable proportion of the age group that were taken off 
the labour market for the six months or so that they were actually 
in the programme. In contrast, in the 18 to 19 age group only a 
small proportion would still have been within YOP, but there 
would have been many who had been through it. Furthermore, an 
increasing number each year of those in the 20-24 age group would 
have been ex-YOP's. The fact that unemployment amongst both of 
these age groups continued to rise as a proportion of total 
unemployment would tend to suggest that any effect that YOP had on 
the trends of youth unemployment was through temporarily taking 
a large number of young people out of the labour market, rather 
than through enhancing their employability in the longer-term. 
Certainly, there is no evidence to be found in such statistics that 
YOP made any positive impact on the competitiveness of young people 
in the labour market. 
Of course, it can always be speculated what would have ha.ppened 
without YOP. However, there is no way of knowing what difference 
this would have made with regard to longer-term employment 
prospects of young people. Obviously, many of those who were taken 
into the programme would otherwise have remained unemployed, at 
least in the immediate future. But whether, in the longer-term, 
they would have been slower and less likely to find permanent 
jobs is something which cannot now be proved. In this regard, 
it is unfortunate that the follow-up surveys, by which the MSC 
endeavoured to monitor the programme's performance as a route to 
employment, did not include any control groups consisting of 
comparable young people who did not go through YOP. However, these 
surveys were only devised "as something of an after-thought"; (61) 
and, even if they had been better planned in this respect, it 
would have been difficult to find a representative control group, 
given the existence of the undertakings. As it was, neither these 
surveys nor the unemployment statistics were able to provide 
any evidence that YOP was actually succeeding in enhancing young 
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people's employability. Indeed, there was no evidence that the 
programme was having any more long-term effect on youth unemployment 
than might a raising of the school leaving age, or any other 
method of keeping an equivalent number of young people off the 
streets for an equivalent length of time. What is more as will 
be seen below, there was certain evidence to suggest that its 
effect might have been less. 
Although originally the prime objective of the programme, the 
improvement of employability was not the only criterion besides the 
undertakings by which success or failure could be assessed. As 
the objective measure of the employment placement rates proved 
increasingly disappointing, more emphasis was given to the 
subjective attitudes of trainees which were monitored as part of 
the same programme of follow-up surveys. Thus, ex-work experience 
trainees were asked whether in general they had found their schemes 
useful or not , and what in particular they had liked or disliked. 
Although affected by the declining employment placement rate, the 
general level of satisfaction expressed remained comparat~vely high 
throughout the programme. Thus, the brief final review of YOP 
which was published by the MSC was able to draw some comfort from 
the headline 'satisfied but not always employed', under which 
it was reported that seven out of ten participants were either 
satisfied or very satisfied with their experience and felt that 
it had been of benefit. (62) 
Some caution should be expressed about the results of the postal 
follow-ups on this matter. Those who had been dissatisfied with 
the programme would have been less likely to respond to such 
surveys, and thosewho did respond, might have been inhibited in 
expressing their dissatisfaction by the knowledge that the research 
was being carried out by MSC. However, as was the case with regard 
to employment placement rates, the results were largely confirmed 
by the surveys carried out by the OPCS, which were not so directly 
associated with the MSC and which, as interview surveys, had a 
higher response rate than the postal follow-uPs.(63) These OPCS 
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surveys also helped to confirm what were the major likes and 
dislikes of the trainess. The most commonly expressed likes were 
for the type of work done, and for their workmates and the 
general atmosphere of the scheme. The most commonly expressed 
dislikes were about 'the money' and about being used to do work 
which should have been done by regular employees. Overall, more 
of the trainees mentioned particular things that they liked, 
than mentioned particular things that they disliked. (64) 
The general impressions that YOP could be of benefit, even if it 
did not lead to permanent employment, was further corroborated 
by an independent research study which examined the psychological 
effects of being on a scheme rather than unemployed. (65) The study 
gave more emphasis to the trainees' negative feelings towards their 
schemes - they realised that the schemes could do little to enhance 
their chances of getting permanent employment and often they felt 
that they were being exploited as cheap labour. Nevertheless, 
despite these negative feelings, the researchers found that the 
trainees were receiving tangible psychological benefits from being 
on the schemes. Thus, objective tests confirmed the common 
observations of trainees and supervisers that being on a scheme 
enhanced trainees' feelings of well-being and self-esteem, in 
comparison with when they had previously been unemployed. 
Indeed, measured in these terms, it was found that gaining a 
place on a YOP scheme had almost the same positive effect as 
getting a real job.(66) 
This illustrates the point that YOP could have benefits which were 
independent of, or at least indetectable in terms of, the employ-
ment placement rates of its trainees. It is necessary, then, to 
examine the performance of the programme in terms of the intrinsic 
quality of its content, as well as in terms of the quantities of its 
inputs and outputs. 
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Footnotes 
(1) The most important change in the method of counting the 
unemployed was that which took place in October 1982. 
The basis of the count was then shifted from the number 
registering as unemployed to the number registering 
for benefits. Because there are certain categories of people 
who may register as unemployed but not be eligible for 
benefits, the introduction of the new method brought 
about an instant reduction in the official unemployment 
total. As a test, both methods were used in October 1982, 
and the difference was found to be some 246,000. Following 
the change, the historical series of unemployment totals 
presented in the Employment Gazette were altered retrospec-
tively, so that they would be comparable with the figures 
being produced by the new method. However, the figure 
given above for April 1978 is the figure that was published 
in the Department of Employment Gazette at the time. 
The retrospectively altered figure published in Employment 
Gazettes after November 1982 is 1,187,500. Reversing this 
alteration, it is possible to calculate that if counted 
by the old method the total for April 1983 would have been 
approximately 3,567,500 rather than 3,053,300. 
(2) See above, Chapter 3 p.113. See also, MSC, Young People 
and Wbrk, May 1977, pp.22-23 and 52-53. 
(3) The figures for the actual levelof unemployment are those 
based on the pre-October 1982 method of counting, which is 
the method that would have been assumed to apply when the 
Holland Report predictions were made. In order to avoid 
discontinuity the graph has not been extended to August 
1983. 
(4) Once again the figures for reality are those based on the 
pre-October 1982 method of counting, and therefore differ 
from the retrospectively altered figures presented in the 
Employment Gazette after November 1982. 
(5) See MSC, op.cit., p.52, para.3. 
(6) The source of the annual totals of YOP entrants in Figure 
4 is MSC, Youth Training News, fusue 6, September 1983,p.8. 
(7) Table 2 is a reproduction of Table 3 in ibid., p.10. 
(8) The original budget for YOP in the financial year 1979/80 
had been £167.7m. This was revised down to £142.5m in June 
1979 following the election of the Conservative Government. 
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In total, the MSC had to make cuts of £115m during the 
financial year, £68.4m of these being imposed upon the 
Special Programmes Division. This meant halving the budget 
of STEP, as well as reducing that of YOP. Despite this 
reduction, YOP was approximately 15% underspent at the end 
of the year. (Source: Special Programmes Board Paper, 
SPB/79/24.) 
(9) See, for example, MSC, Draft Corporate Plan, Chapter 4 
Table 2, as reproduced in House of Commons Papers 444i, 
MSC Expenditure and Staff 1979-84, (Document M8). 
(10) See MSC, Review of the Third Year of Special Programmes, 
December 1981, p.12, para.3.3. 
(11) See MSC, Review of the Fourth Year of Special Programme~ in 
Special Programmes News, Special Issue, October 1982, p.16 
(12) It should be noted that these figures take no account of 
the rate of inflation over the intervening period. 
(13) See MSC, Review of the First Year of Special Programmes, 
July 1979, p.36, para.3.9; and MSC, Review of the 
Fourth Year of Special Programmes, op.cit., p.17. 
(14) See MSC, Review of the Fourth Year of Special Programmes, 
op.cit., p.17. 
(15) Table 3 is compiled on the basis of figures provided in 
the reviews of each of the five years of Special Programmes, 
plus the Holland Report plan which is reproduced as Table 
1 of Chapter 3. 
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(16) This was stated in a paper presented to the Special Programmes 
Board in May 1978 (Source: SPB/78/M3), and was implied in 
MSC, Review of the First Year of Special Programmes, July 
1979, p.16, para. 1.40. 
(17) See MSC, Review of the Third Year of Special Programmes, 
December 1981, p.17, para. 11, and MSC, Network, Autumn 1981 
(18) See MSC, Young People and Work, May 1977, p.34, para.3.19. 
(19) Following a review carried out in May/June 1978 to find 
the reasons for the failure of EICs to attract sponsors, 
arrangements were introduced to offer greater financial 
incentives: see MSC, Review of the First Year of Special 
Programmes, July 1979, p.22, para.l.67. However, these 
do not appear to have made any difference. According to 
one MSC official involved in the planning of YOP, "EICs 
never had a chance, they were simply a wild dream of 
Geoffrey Holland's largely to get the employers involved 
in the programme. 
(20) Apparently, EICs and the work experience/work preparation 
composition of YOP were 'bounced off' the Holland 
Working Party at its last meeting. 
(21) Table 4 is a reproduction of Table 9 in MSC, 'Review of 
the Fourth Year of Special Programmes, op.cit., p.16. 
(22) This account of New Training Places is derived from a 
circular sent by the Department of Employment to inform 
LEA Careers Services. 
(23) See MSC, Youth Training News, September 1983, p.9. 
It should be noted, however, that it was originally intended 
that the 100,000 NTPs would be ready by September 1982. 
(24) Geoffrey Holland,'Local Delivery of Central Government 
Programmes: A Case Study from the Manpower Services Comm-
ission' - a speech delivered at the Royal Institute of 
Public Administration Annual Conference on September 11th 
1982. 
(25) MSC, Young People and Work, May 1977, p.38, para.3.53. 
'Young people' in this context meant 16 - 18 year olds. 
(26) Albert Booth quoted in the Department of Employment Gazette, 
July 1977, p.690. 
(27) See MSC, Review of the Second Year of Special Programmes, 
1980, pp.6-7, para.l.12. 
(28) See MSC, Review of the Fourth Year of Special Programmes, 
op.cit., p.3. 
(29) The results of the school leavers undertaking during the 
first four years of YOP are given in the annual reviews of 
Special Programmes. The result for the fifth can be found 
in the MSC Annual Report 1982/83. 
(30) More than 3,000 school leavers were still without the offer 
of a place at Easter. It can therefore be questioned how 
significant was the bringing forward of the undertaking 
date to Christmas. 
(31) MSC, Review of the Fourth Year of Special Programmes, 
op.cit., p.3 
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(32) Table 6 is based on figures provided by the Employment Gazette. 
These are the unadjusted pre-October 1982 figures, based 
on the old method of collection. In order to obtain the 
average for 1982, it was necessary to make estimates of 
what the November and December figures would have been 
if the old method had continued to be used. 
(33) See MSC, Review of the Second Year of Special Programmes, 
1980, pp.6-7, paras. 1.12 - 1.13. 
(34) The only figure given was the percentage of the total number 
of entrants during the year (1979/80) that were long-term 
unemployed. This was 3%. (See MSC, op.cit., p.7, para.l.16). 
If it were assumed that this was constant throughout the 
year, then it could be estimated that some 1,650 long~term 
unemployed young people entered YOP between January 1st and 
March 31st 1980. This would give a failure rate, comparable 
to those calculated for the school leaver undertaking, of 
almost 29% for the quarter. 
(35) Once again, the only figure available is that for the 
percentage of the total number of entrants during the year 
(1980/81) who had been unemployed for more than 12 months. 
This time it was 2% (see MSC, Review of the Third Year of 
Special Programmes, December 1981, p.4, para. 1.7.). 
Assuming as above, it can be estimated that 2380 long-term 
unemployed young people entered the programme during the 
quarter, giving a comparable failure rate of some 45% 
(36) MSC, Review of the Third Year of Special Programmes, 
December 1981, p.4, para.l.4. 
(37) MSC, Review of the Second Year of Special Programmes, 
1980, p.7, para.l.13. 
(38) The source of Table 8 is the Employment Gazette, Table 
2.6. This series of statistics does not appear to have been 
altered following the change in method of collection in 
Ocmber 1982. Thus, it is possible to give a continuous 
set of figures up to the end of 1983. However, it should be 
taken into account that the change of method must have had 
some effect on these statistics, if only a year later. 
(39) MSC, op.cit., p.7. 
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(40) MSC, Review of the Third Year of Special Programmes, December 
1981, p.3. 
(41) See MSC, Review of the First Year of Special Programmes, 
July 1979, p.13, para 1.29. 
(42) The Special Programmes Board discussed the lack of 18 year 
old entering YOP at a meeting in February 1979. It was 
considered whether to raise the allowance for this age group, 
and a working group was set up to examine this and other 
options. However, by the time that this working group 
reported in July, cuts had been imposed on the MSC and 
it was no longer regarded as practical to introduce the 
scale of differential that was needed to be effective. 
(43) The high rate of refusals amongst 18 year olds was revealed 
by a paper presented to the Special Programmes Board in 
February 1979 based on evidence given by Principal Careers 
Officers. 
(44) See MSC, Review of the Fourth Year of Special Programmes, 
op.cit., p.12 
(45) Ibid., p.3. 
(46) The source of Table 10, as of Table 8, is the Employment 
Gazette, Table 2.6. The same comments apply as above 
in footnote 38. 
(47) See MSC, Review of the First Year of Special Programmes, 
July 1979, p.19. para.l.50. 
(48) See MSC, Youth Training News, Issue 6, September 1983, p.8. 
(49) The results of the first eight follow-ups of ex-work 
experience trainees were analysed in the following report: 
MSC, Manpower Intelligence and Planning Division, 'Work 
Experience Schemes: Report of Follow-up Surveys', June 1982. 
There were also individual reports on each of these and the 
subsequent work experience follow-ups, which were presented 
as papers to the Special Programmes Board. The results 
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of the follow-ups of ex-work preparation trainees were analysed 
in an internal paper entitled 'Youth Opportunities 
Programme: 1 in 6 Follow-up of TSD Ex-Trainees' (April,1983). 
(50) It should be noted that the results 'at survey' generally 
showed employment placement rates slightly above those 
'on leaving'. 
(51) See David O'Connor (Manpower Intelligence and Planning 
Division, MSC), 'Probabilities of employment after work 
experience', Employment Gazette, January 1982, pp.9-10. 
(52) It is difficult to match up the series of survey results 
exactly. For the purposes of this comparison the average 
was taken from the eleven work experience scheme follow-ups 
on trainees entering YOP between June/July 1979 and October/ 
December 1981. The average employment rate over this period 
was 46%. 
(53) Compare MSC, Review of the Second Year of Special Programmes, 
1980, p.7. para.l.15; and MSC, Review of the Third Year of 
Special Programmes, December 1981, p.7, Table 3. 
(54) See above, footnote 49. 
(55) MSC, Manpower Intelligence and Planning Division, 
'Work Experience Schemes: Report of Follow-up Surveys', 
June 1982, para.6.2. 
(56) Ibid., para 6.3. 
(57) Ibid., para.6.7. 
(58) Analyses of the results of these two OPCS interview surveys 
have been published in the MSC's Research and Development 
Series. See Trevor Bedeman and Juliet Harvey, Young People 
on YOP A National Survey of Entrants to the Youth 
Opportunities Programme, MSC Special Programmes, Research 
and Development Series: No.3, December 1981; and Trevor 
Bedeman and Gill Courtenay, One in Three The Second 
National Survey of Young people on YOP, Summer 1980 to 
Spring 1982, MSC, Training Division, Research and Development 
Series: No.13, February 1983. Both surveys involved a 
weighted sample of approximately 3,000 trainees, representing 
a response rate of over 80%. 
(59) See, L. Dawes, T. Bedeman, J. Harvey, MSC 'What happens 
after YOP - a longer-term view', Employment Gazette, 
January 1982. 
209 
(60) The source of Figure 7 is Table 2.7 of the Employment Gazette. 
For October 1982, the figures were given according to both 
the old and new methods of counting. Both of these are 
recorded on Figure 7, and it can be seen that it made only 
a very slight difference to the Under 25s percentage. 
(61) MSC, Manpower Intelligence and Planning Division, op.cit., 
para.6.10. 
(62) See MSC, Youth Training News, Issue No.6,September 1983, p.9. 
(63) See Trevor Bedeman and Juliet Harvey, op.cit., p.19; and 
Trevor Bedeman and Gill Courtenay, op.cit.,p.20. 
(64) See Trevor Bedeman and Gill Courtenay, op.cit., p.31. 
(65) See Glynis Breakwell, Barbara Harrison and Carol Propper, 
'The psychological benefits of YOPs', New Society, 
23 September 1982 pp.494-5. The evidence relevant to 
YOP was a small part of more general study of the social 
psychology of young people in and out of work. This study 
was funded by the Social Science Research Council and 
the Department of Employment. 
(66) See ibid., p.495. It is interesting to note that the 
increased feelings of well-being and self-esteem of trainees 
would not necessarily have improved their chances of 
finding permanent employment. The study found that amongst 
unemployed young people it was those with the lowest mental 
health and self-esteem scores who were most likely to find 
jobs or places on YOP. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE 
OF THE YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES 
PROGRAMME: PART II QUALITY 
1. Quality Improvement and Training Content 
Although the most prominent theme of the development of 
YOP over its five year history was that of quantitative growth, 
an important sub-theme, which on occasion broke surface as the 
key issue of the moment, was that of quality improvement. 
The Holland Report viewed YOP's qualitative advance upon 
existing provision as being at least as important as the quan-
titative development which it represented. Morevoer, 
quality improvement was related to the question of YOP's 
status as a training programme. As we have seen, there was a 
certain amount of ambiguity about this in the Holland Report. 
YOP was never referred to as a training programme per se 
yet those who participated in it were to have the status of 
trainees and to be paid only an allowance. In order to provide 
some justification for this situation it was important 'that, if 
not a training programme as such, YOP should at least have a 
substantial training content to which every trainee would have 
some access. This it was confidently believed could be 
provided within the integrated framework of the new programme. 
Thus, the Secretary of the State, Albert Booth, said when he 
announced his plans for YOP: 
"It meets the criticism that existing 
provisions do not provide adequate training for 
young people by integrating a series of measures 
for unemployed young people in the 16-18 age 
group which will provide them with a combination 
of training and work experience."(l) 
The combination of training and work experience which was 
originally promised to YOP trainees depended upon three 
features of the programme: the overall balance of provision 
between work experience and work preparation; the capacity for 
movement and progression between different schemes and courses; 
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and the integration of different elements of content within 
individual schemes and courses. As we have already seen, the pressure 
to pursue quantitative goals distorted the overall balance 
between work experience and work preparation which had originally 
been intended. Moreover, the pressure of numbers, combined with 
the effect that it had upon the balance of the programme, made 
it extremely difficult to offer planned progression to trainees. (2) 
In particular, the demise of Employment Induction Courses took 
away the element of work preparation which could most easily have 
been combined in sequence with the various work experience schemes. 
However, the fact that these two features of balance and 
progression did not develop as intended, did not eliminate the 
possibility of trainees being offered a combination of work 
experience and training within the framework of the programme. 
But it did mean that this depended upon the qualitative develop-
ment of individual schemes and courses, and in particular, upon the 
integration of training content within the work experience schemes 
which came to constitute the vast majority of the programme. 
2. The Initial Approach to Quality Improvement and its 
Measurement 
The content of work experience schemes specified by 
the Holland Report was based on the four elements of induction, 
planned work experience, an opportunity for training or further 
education, and counselling. Although these same formal 
elements of content had previously been applied to the Work 
Experience Programme, it was stressed, particularly in relation-
ship to WEEP, that certain improvements could be made. Only 
a small proportion of WEP trainees had actually received their 
entitlement to off-the-job training or further education. (3) 
In the case of the new WEEP schemes, it was stated that, 
"increased emphasis should be given to the provision of life 
and social skills courses and the opportunity to participate in 
this sort of training and in further education courses should 
become a feature of such schemes."(4) Also it was stated that 
further guidance should be developed on induction training and 
that adequate resources should be guaranteed to allow for the 
provision of proper counselling. 
When YOP was first launched in April 1978, an ad hoc advisory 
group was set up to advise the Director of Special Programmes 
(Geoffrey Holland) on the development of the educational 
and training content of the new programme. The group was 
known as the PROFILE Task Group, the initials standing for 
"the promotion of improved learning experiences." Its 
membership consisted of between 20 and 30 people with relevant 
knowledge and experience of the training and education of young 
people, acting in their own individual capacities rather 
than as representatives of the organisations from which they 
were drawn. They were serviced jointly by the MSC and the DES.(5) 
PROFILE initially established for itself four main lines of 
activity. These were: a) the development of principles 
to be used in the preparation of guidelines to assist both the 
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providers of opportunities and MSC staff in improving the 
quality of opportunities on offer; (b) the establishment of an 
information network for the purpose of disseminating 'and publicising 
interesting achievements and developments within the programme 
and elsewhere; (c) the sponsoring and encouraging of action 
research projects, in particular related to the implementation 
of PROFILE principles, and (d) the provision of information 
and advice on the training of tutors, supervisors and sponsors' 
staff associated with the programme. (6) 
The first of these lines of activity led to the publication, 
in February 1979, of Making Experience Work. This was a PROFILE 
report which set out in draft form a series of principles and 
guidelines for the provision of work experience. The principles 
were formulated on the premiss that although the primary 
objective of YOP was to get unemployed young people into 
jobs as soon as possible the programme must also have longer-
term and wider aims. It should contribute to raising the 
general quality of the workforce and should provide young people 
with learning experiences of lasting benefit. (7) 
principles followed: 
Three 
"1. Young people should be considered as 
trainees and opportunities should be tailored 
to their needs; 
2. Young people should have the chance to 
acquire skills which (a) are relevant to a 
developing labour market and are not confined 
to the practices of an individual employer, 
(b) help them in their search for work, and 
(c) help them in meeting the wider demands of 
adul t life;. 
3. Experience gained on-the-job and off-the-job 
are of equal importance, and should be mutually 
reinforcing·"(S) 
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On the basis of these three principles, the report proceeded 
to outline a series of guidelines which were designed to help 
both the providers of opportunities and those wishing to 
judge the validity of proposals. It was not expected that 
they would be implemented immediately, but it was hoped that 
they would be widely disseminated and adopted as the goals 
of a gradual process of quality improvement. These guidelines 
covered three main areas: (1) the range of skills and 
situations of which young people should be given the opportunity 
to gain experience; (2) how their learning from these 
experiences should be supported and directed; and (3) what 
procedures should be adopted by sponsors' staff, careers officers 
and MSC area staff to ensure that the maximum benefit would be 
obtained from the opportunities available. (9) 
In the context of this account, it is not necessary to 
examine the specific guidelines in each of these areas. Rather, 
it is sufficient to draw attention to certain specific devel-
opments upon which depended the whole framework of principles and 
guidelines outlined in Making Experience Work. First, there was 
the need for a massive expansion of off-the-job training and 
further education provision associated with work experience 
schemes, so that eventually it would be possible to offer this 
opportunity to every work experience trainee. Each of the three 
principles, and in particular the third, depended upon this 
development, as did individual guidelines in each of the three 
main areas. The second necessary development was that of an 
adequate system for the training and continuing support of 
scheme staff. The third was the institution and maintenance of 
the regular monitoring of schemes. Both of these latter two 
developments were covered by a single procedural guideline in 
Making Experience Work. (10) However, upon this one procedural 
guideline depended the successful implementation of all the other 
guidelines which aimed at raising the quality of learning 
opportunities offered to trainees as an integral element of work 
experience. 
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When the Review of the First Year of Special Programmes reported 
upon the initiatives which had been taken to improve the 
quality of YOP, it highlighted four areas of activity. One 
of these was the work of advisory groups, under which heading 
was included a brief report on the work of the PROFILE task group. 
Alongside this was mentioned the development work being done in 
collaboration with PROFILE by the Further Education Curriculum 
Unit (F.E.U.) on life and social skills training, and by the 
Basic Skills Unit at the National Extension College on the 
teaching of basic skills. Also there were the specialist teams 
which had been set up to advise upon provision for various groups 
of young people, such as the disabled and those from ethnic 
minorities, who were considered to have special needs'(ll) 
The other three areas of activity highlighted in the Review 
reflected the general approach to quality improvement advocated 
by the PROFILE group. Thus, the three areas were off-the-job 
learning, the training of sponsors' staff and the monitoring 
of schemes(12)- those which have been analysed above as being 
the necessary areas of development for the implementation of the 
principles and guidelines set out in Making Experience Work. 
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For each of these three areas of quality improvement, the Review 
provided a simple quantitative gauge of performance. Unfortunately, 
as subsequent Reviews became increasingly brief and sketchy, 
they often neglected to provide comparable figures, and it was 
not always possible to obtain them from other sources. Nevertheless, 
using these quantitative gauges when available, and supplementing 
them as necessary with other forms of information, it is 
possible to trace the development of these three areas of quality 
improvement throughout most of the history of the programme. 
By this means, some initial assessment can be made of the 
performance of YOP in relation to its original qualitative 
objectives. 
3. Off-the-Job Training 
The quantitative gauge provided for the programme's 
performance in the area of off-the-job training was simply 
the percentage figure for the number of work experience trainees 
who were recieving this provision. During the latter quarter of 
each of the first four financial years of the programme, a postal 
survey was made of a sample of trainees who had entered work 
experience schemes in the month of January. (13) The results of 
these surveys are set out in Table 11'(14) The questions asked in 
the 1981 and 1982 surveys were not exactly the same as those 
asked in the two previous years, and thus the results are 
not strictly comparable. In the two latter years, it was 
asked whether trainees had been offered off-the-job training 
as well as whether they had actually attended it. From the 
percentage figures given by the surveys, which were weighted 
to take account of each year's distribution of entrants between 
the various types of work experience scheme, it was possible 
to make an estimate of the total number work experience trainees 
who had received off-the-job training during each of the four 
years. 
It will be remembered that the opportunity to attend off-
the-job training had been one of the four required elements 
of content of the Work Experience Programme. It was estimated 
that approximately 25% of WEP trainees received this provision, 
principally in the form of social and life skills training. (15) 
This figure was regarded as unsatisfactory and, as we have seen, 
it was expected that there should be a considerable improvement 
with YOP. When the results of the 1979 further education 
survey were published in the Review of the First Year of Special 
Programmes, they indicated that the figure for all work experience 
trainees at this early stage of YOP was roughly the same. 
However, this result had not been weighted to take account of" the 
large proponderance of WEEP scheme entrants. In this first 
survey, as in each of the three others, it was revealed that the 
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proportion of WEEP trainees receiving off-the-job training was 
considerably lower than the proportion of trainees at other 
types of work experience scheme. (16) Thus, when subsequently the 
results were weighted to take account of the preponderance of 
WEEP, the figure for all work experience trainees had to be 
revised down to 17%, which was one third less than that achieved 
by WEP. 
The second year saw a marked improvement. The percentage 
receiving off-the-job training more than doubled, and the 
number of trainees which this was estimated to represent 
more than trebled. However, .this was only a temporary 
improvement. In the third year, when there was a massive 
increase in the number of entrants to the programme, there 
appears to have been only a slight increase in the volume of 
off-the-job training, with the result that the percentage 
figure for those attending fell back by over a third. Finally, 
the fourth year saw a modest improvement in the percentage figure, 
taking it back over the 25% level. Given the continued rapid 
rise in the number of entrants, this represented a substantial 
increase in the scale of provision. The figures available in the 
last two years for those being offered the opportunity of 
off-the-job training, as opposed to actually attending, reveal that 
the acceptance rate of such offers was just over three-quarters. 
This was thought to demonstrate that there was less resistance 
amongst trainees to this form of provision than was commonly 
believed to be the case. (17)However, by the same token, it meant 
that the numbers being offered off-the-job training were not 
as large as might have been expected in relation to the numbers 
actually attending. 
In short, what Table 11 shows is that, measured in terms of 
the proportion of work experience trainees who actually received 
off-the-job training, YOP failed to make any improvement upon 
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the performance of the Work Experience Programme. Thus, at the end 
of the fourth year, only just over a quarter of all YOP work 
experience trainees were attending any form of off-the-job 
. training. Moreover, this was also the overall proportion out of 
the total number of work experience entrants over the whole four 
year period. Assuming that the acceptance rate was the 
same in the first two years as in the latter two years, the 
overall figure for those being offered off-the-job training would 
have been roughly a third. Thus, it can be concluded that over 
the first four years of YOP approximately two-thirds of the 
total number of work experience entrants were not even given 
the opportunity to attend off-the-job training. 
Of course, the assessment of this aspect of quality improvement 
cannot be wholly reduced to this simple quantitative gauge. 
There is also the question of what actually happened during the 
off-the-job training that was available, and how it contributed 
to the overall value of the work experience schemes with which 
it was associated. This, however, will be left for consideration 
in the course of the local case study which is to follow below. 
Here it is sufficient to note that, for the vast majority of 
work experience trainees on YOP, such questions were simply 
irrelevant, because they did not receive any form of off-
the-job training. Yet, as we have seen, one of the underlying 
principles of the approach to quality improvement advocated in 
Making Experience Work was that on-the-job and off-the-job 
experience were of equal importance and should be mutually 
reinforcing. It is clear from Table 11 that this principle, and 
the other principles and guidelines which were closely related 
to it, were never really put into practice. As a result, the 
whole approach to quality improvement developed by the PROFILE 
group was seriously undermined. 
However, it can be argued (and indeed was argued) that 
Making Experience Work placed too much emphasis on the role 
of off-the-job training. As will be seen later, there were 
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many difficulties involved in its co-ordination with the 
various work experience schemes, and serious doubts can be 
raised about the contribution that it made to their overall 
quality development. Given these doubts, it is arguable 
that the lack of off-the-job training available in fact made 
little difference to the achievement of real quality improvement. 
However, if the role of off-the-job training is to be written 
off in this way, it makes all the more important the role of 
those factors which have previously been identified as 
the necessary preconditions for the improvement of quality and 
the development of training content within the work experience 
schemes themselves. This brings us back to the training of 
sponsors' staff and the monitoring of schemes. 
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4. The Training of Sponsors' Staff 
The importance of training the adults who were to 
act as the trainers and supervisors on the various schemes had 
been recognised in the Holland Report. It was explicitly 
stated that the programme would not work unless this training 
was properly done.(lS) Looking forward to the implementation of 
the programme, the Report had estimated that the capacity 
existed to produce 1,SOO or more trained instructors by September 
1975.(19) In fact, when the Review of the First Year of Special 
Programmes reported on the training of sponsors' staff as a 
gauge of quality improvement, it revealed that the number trained 
in the first year of YOP had been a mere 600.(20) This can 
partially be accounted for by the fact that the Holland Report 
had envisaged that the majority of those being trained initially 
would be staff for the Employment Induction Courses. As we 
have seen, EICs were mounted on only a fraction of the 
scale originally intended; as a result, far fewer staff needed 
training in order to run them. However, the figure of 600 was 
still disappointing when compared to the volume of unemployed 
adults that had been taken on by other schemes and were in need 
of training. Thus, by the end of the first year, there were 
more than 3,000 adult staff employed by the sponsors of Training 
Workshops, Project Based Work Experience and Community Service. (21) 
Priority was originally given to the Training Workshop supervisors. 
For those who received the training, it consisted of a two week 
course which was run by TSD Instructor Training College Tutors. 
This included the development of teaching technique and the 
consideration of the social skills required by young people to 
obtain and keep employment. The Review also mentioned that new 
approaches to sponsors' staff training were being piloted in 
conjunction with the City and Guilds of London Institute. 
(C.G.L.I·)·(22) 
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The second year of yap saw an increase to 1,500 in the 
number of supervisors and instructors trained by the MSC. 
Of these, 250 had gone through the joint MSC/CGLI pilot courses, 
which combined elements of off-the-job general training with 
on-the-job assessment leading to the award of a special City 
and Guilds certificate, the 'Instructor/Supervisor Award' .(23) 
However, the numbers involved were still small compared with 
the volume of those who were in need of such training. Thus, 
a postal survey which was carried out mid-way through this 
second year revealed that only 24% of yap adult employees 
had received MSC training for their present jobs.(24) 
In April 1980, at the beginning of the third year of yap, 
there was an important new initiative concerning the training 
of sponsor's staff. This involved the MSC training provision 
being re-organised on the basis of a three tier structure. (25 ) 
Tier I consisted of short induction courses of up to 40 hours 
length, which were usually taken in the form of a single week-
long block. These provided an introduction to the aims and 
organisation of the MSC and its Special Programmes Division, 
and also touched upon various aspects of working with young 
people, instructional and communication skills, and health 
and safety legislation. All staff directly involved in yap were 
eligible to attend these Tier I courses. This included WEEP 
staff, who were also eligible to attend Tier II training. 
However, it was realised that only a very small proportion were 
likely to be released by their employers for such training. (28) 
In contrast, for all non-WEEP work experience supervisors, 
Tier I was made a mandatory requirement. 
Tier II consisted of training courses of up to 40 hours in 
length, which were directed primarily at yap scheme supervisors. 
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The main areas of responsibility which they covered were 
the supervision of young people, instructional skills, advice 
and guidance, and the provision of social and life skills. 
This training was mandatory only for the supervisors in Training 
Workshops. A further 10 hours of on-the-job performance 
assessment could be provided if required. 
Finally, Tier III consisted of more specialised training going 
beyond the standardised provision of Tiers I and II. Three 
broad areas were covered: (1) training for specific jobs 
(for example, finance, marketing, first aid); (2) training 
for working with specific kinds of trainee (for example, the 
handicapped); and (3) training to meet specific employee 
needs (for example, refresher courses in particular skills). 
Staff from all forms of work experience schemes were eligible 
to receive this training. However, tuition and other costs 
had to be met in full from agreed scheme budgets, or in the 
case of WEEP schemes by the sponsor him/herself. 
The provision of this new three tier system of sponsors' 
staff training was organised at a regional level, and for this 
purpose the post of Regional Training Resource Manager was 
created. The job entailed working in conjunction with area 
office staff to develop and monitor comprehensive local training 
facilities within travelling distance of all schemes. Meanwhile, 
separate specific training continued to be provided for the 
small number of staff who were responsible for Employment 
Induction Courses. Finally, the joint MSC/CGLI courses, which had 
been successfully piloted at nine colleges, continued to be 
run at these loca~ions and were given the capacity to expand 
elsewhere if the demand existed. 
This major new initiative in the training of sponsors' staff 
was announced publicly in the Review of the Second Year of 
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Special Programmes. However, at the end of its first year 
of operation, no mention was made of it in the next year's 
Review. Indeed, the section on quality improvement said 
nothing whatsoever about the training of sponsors' staff. (27) 
No figures were given, and there was no indication as to 
whether the 'mandatory' Tier I and Tier II training of super-
visors had been carried out. In fact, the only indication was 
provided by the silence itself, which we have seen used before 
as the means of avoiding an admission of failure to fulfil 
a public undertaking. 
The Review of the Fourth Year of Special Programmes was far 
more helpful in this regard. Not only did it publish figures 
for the training of sponsors' staff during 1981/82; but, in order 
to demonstrate the progress that these represented, it also 
gave a figure for the previous year. (28) Thus, it revealed 
that in 1980/81 only 2,000 sponsors' staff had attended MSC 
training courses. It will be remembered that in the first year 
the figure was 600, and that in the second year it was 1,500, 
plus 250 on the joint MSC/CGLI pilot courses. Thus, by the end 
of the third year of YOP, a total of some 4,350 sponsors' staff 
had been on training courses, plus a certain 'unknown additional 
number who it must be assumed attended the continued joint 
MSC/CGLI courses in the third year. Yet, by this time, the 
number of adult staff employed on the non-WEEP work experience 
schemes had risen to 8,300.(29) Assuming that the ratio of 
supervisors to all forms of staff was approximately 5:8'(30) 
there would have been at least 5,000 for whom training was 
mandatory. Thus, even if an expansion of the MSC/CGLI courses 
is allowed for, the available evidence suggests that the 
total number of staff trained by the end of the third year of 
YOP was less than the number of those employed at that stage 
for whom such training was mandatory. Furthermore, this makes 
no allowance for staff turnover, which certain evidence indicated 
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as exceeding 50% per annum, (31)or for those who had received 
more than one form of training. Our earlier 'reading' of the 
silence on this matter in the Review of the Third Year of Special 
Programmes would appear to be confirmed. 
The figures published in the following year's Review showed 
that nearly 6,000 sponsors' staff had attended MSC training 
courses during 1981/82.(32) Furthermore, almost another 2,000 
had been catered for by the City and Guilds courses, which 
by then had been extended to 30 training centres. In the 
meantime, the total number of staff employed on the schemes had 
risen to 12,400, an increase of almost 50% on the figure at the 
end of the previous year. Assuming once again that roughly 
5 in every 8 of these were supervisors, it is possible that 
the volume of training carried out during this fourth year was 
sufficient to clear the backlog of those for whom it was 
mandatory. However, it still must be considered that the total 
number of staff employed at the end of this fourth year was 
roughly the same as the total number who had been trained over 
the previous four years, and this again makes no allowance for 
the high rate of staff turnover or those receiving more than 
one form of training. Thus, from the evidence available, it 
would appear that at the beginning of the final year of YOP there 
was still a significant number of sponsors' staff who had not 
received any form of specific training for their duties within 
the programme. 
In conclusion, I think that it can be said that the programme's 
performance in relation to this gauge of quality improvement 
was slightly more impressive than that in relation to the 
provision of off-the-job training. At least, by the beginning 
of the final year, it seems that the mandatory training of 
supervisors had been come to grips with. However, during the 
majority of the programme, many of the sponsors' staff had not 
received any form of MSC training; and it was only as the new 
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quality requirements of YTS loomed up, that the minimal requirements 
of YOP in this area were met. Also, as in the case of off-the-
job training for work experience trainees, questions can be 
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raised about the actual content of this provision and the 
effectiveness of its contribution to the overall quality of the 
programme. Again, this is something that will be examined more closely 
in the local case study. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to note 
here that, when asked in a national survey, the vast majority 
of staff who had received training said that it had been useful: (33) 
and that, in general, fewer doubts were expressed about the 
efficacy of this provision. 
A far more serious source of doubt about the contribution made 
by the sponsors' staff training programme to the overall quality 
of YOP arises from the fact that this provision appears to have 
had a negligible effect upon WEEP scheme staff. The totals 
given above for the number of sponsors' staff have not included 
those on WEEP schemes who were designated as the adults 
responsible for the supervision of the trainees on these schemes. 
These staff were eligible for MSC training, but as we have seen 
their employers had to release them at their own expense. 
There was no real encouragement for private employers to do this, 
and there is no evidence to suggest that a significant number of 
WEEP scheme staff received MSC training. Furthermore, given 
that the majority of WEEP sponsors were small employers, it 
was unlikely that many of those responsible for the trainees 
would have had formal personnel training. Yet, it must be 
remembered that WEEP schemes constituted the vast majority of 
YOP's work experience provision, and two-thirds of the 
programme as a whole. If this aspect of quality improvement 
had a negligible effect upon WEEP scheme staff, then, whatever 
its success with staff elsewhere, it could only have had a 
marginal effect upon the quality of the programme as a whole. 
At this point it should also be remembered that WEEP trainees' 
were the least likely to benefit from the limited opportunities 
available for off-the-job training. Thus, the form of work 
experience provision which catered for two thirds of all YOP 
entrants appears to have been little affected by either of these 
first two key areas of quality improvement that have been 
examined. This leaves only monitoring to be considered. 
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5. Monitoring 
The Holland Report had stated that monitoring and 
evaluating was essential for any programme, and especially 
important for YOP, given its partially experimental nature. 
The experience of JCP and WEP, it was said, had shown "the 
advantages of a carefully planned system of monitoring both 
projects and individuals, and the benefits of regular and 
comprehensive evaluation."(34) In the case of JCP, as we 
have already seen, this was certainly true - but principally 
in the negative sense of having demonstrated the pitfalls of 
inadequate monitoring and evaluation. Thus, a report made 
by the Comptroller and Auditor General had been highly 
critical of the monitoring and financial control systems operated 
by the MSC in relation to this programme. (35) It noted that 
because of staff shortages substantially fewer monitoring 
visits had been made to projects than had been intended, and 
that some projects had been completed without being visited at 
all. When questioned about these matters by the Parliamentary 
Accounts Committee, the Chairman and other representatives of 
the Commission stated that the problems had arisen from the 
rapid and piecemeal expansion of what had originally been 
introduced as a relatively small and temporary programme. They 
did not think that the two new special programmes (YOP and 
STEP) would suffer from the same problems because both were 
started on a semi-permanent basis and were not subject to 
piecemeal additions as JCP had been. Moreover, an assurance 
was given that, as the pattern of monitoring required for the 
new programmes became clear, the necessary staff would be 
provided. (36) Likewise, in the Holland Report, it was stressed 
that monitoring and evaluation must be allowed for in the 
budgetting and staffing of YOP.(37) 
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Naturally, the Public Accounts Committee emphasised the 
importance of regular monitoring as a means of financial 
control and ensuring the accountability of public spending. 
However, monitoring was equally important as a means of 
quality control and improvement. As we have seen, regular 
monitoring was one of the vital procedural guidelines 
referred to in the PROFILE report and Making Experience Work, 
and it was also one of the three gauges of quality improve-
ment established in the Review of the First Year of Special 
Programmes. Thus, the objectives of monitoring combined 
the needs of public accountability and quality control. On 
the one hand, visits were made to check upon the management 
structures and financial procedures of the schemes.(38) 
On the other hand, they were made to ensure that sponsors 
were providing the agreed minimum elements of content and to 
encourage them to make improvements. A further objective was 
to check upon the progress of individual trainees.(39) In 
this account, our concern is primarily with monitoring in 
relation to quality control and improvement. However, this 
aspect cannot be wholly separated from that of public account-
ability, since, if schemes were failing to meet the agreed 
quality requirements, their spending of public money was 
obviously in some respect unaccountable. 
The monitoring arrangements for YOP and STEP were introduced 
in October 1978.(40) The frequency and pattern of the visits, 
which were primarily the responsibility of SPD Area Office 
Staff, depended upon the type of scheme concerned. WEEP schemes 
were to be visited within three months of their start, and 
then subsequently at four monthly intervals. The other forms 
of work experience scheme, which involved larger amounts of 
money and more complex management, were deemed to require more 
intensive monitoring (as were the STEP projects). The first 
visit was to be made within one month of the start of the scheme, 
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and the second within three months of the start. Thereafter, 
visits were to be made at intervals of not more than three 
months. These were the minimum frequencies, and it was left 
to the discretion of Area Managers to increase them if thought 
necessary or desirable. These arrangements did not include 
the work preparation side of YOP, the monitoring of which 
remained primarily the responsibility of local TSD staff. (41) 
The account which follows is concerned only with SPD's 
monitoring of work experience schemes within YOP. More will 
be said about the TSD's monitoring of work preparation courses 
in the local case study. 
The monitoring visits undertaken by local SPD staff were 
recorded by means of a system of monthly returns made to 
Regional and Head Office. These showed not only the total 
number of visits made, but also whether the schemes had been 
found to be very good, satisfactory or unsatisfactory. The 
Review of the First Year of Special Programmes revealed that 
by the first half of 1979 visits were being carried out at a 
rate of well over 4000 per month, and that very few of them 
were proving to be unsatisfactory. However, it was acknowledged 
that this rate of visits was not yet high enough, and it was 
said that efforts were being made to increase it'(42) In fact, 
during this first year, there was a considerable arrears in 
the scheduled monitoring, and the rate of 4,000 visits 
per month was still less than half of that which was required. 
By March 1979, roughly 40,000 WEEP schemes had been set up, 
plus 1,250 other work experience schemes. (43) In order to 
maintain the specified regular frequency of monitoring for 
this number of schemes it would have required a rate of 
more than 10,000 visits per month, and this figure makes no 
allowance for the extra frequency of visits required for any 
new schemes. 
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The shortfall in monitoring visits during the first year of 
YOP was noted in the Comptroller and Auditor General's Report 
on Manpower Services Commission Accounts 1978-79, which was 
scrutinised by the Public Accounts Committee in June 1980. 
Also noted was the fact that the MSC's own auditors had 
expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the monitoring 
being carried out by certain of the Area Officers. The MSC 
admitted to the Comptroller and Auditor General that they 
had been concerned about the unsatisfactory monitoring position 
of June 1979, but reassured him that since then the situation 
had been transformed. Revised guidelines had been issued 
to Area Officers, focussing attention on schemes in most need 
of guidance and control, and over the following four months 
the number of monitoring visits had been increased from 4,000 
to 7,000 a month. This left a total of 8,352 visits, or 
just over one month's work still outstanding at the end of 
October 1979. The problems raised concerning the effective-
ness of the monitoring carried out during the first year were 
attributed largely to the inexperience of many of the staff 
at the Area Offices. Performance was expected to improve 
as they gained more experience, and priority was being given 
to the consolidation of instructions and to additional staff 
training. (44) 
The improvements made following June 1979 were reflected in 
the results published by the Review of the Second Year of 
Special Programmes. Here it was stated that "regular monitoring 
of schemes became a reality during the year."(45) In total, 
87,000 monitoring visits were made, 73,000 of which proved to 
be satisfactory or very satisfactory. This was said to represent 
an average frequency for all types of scheme of a visit 
roughly once every four months. However, given that some 
40,000 schemes were already in existence at the beginning of 
the year, it is hard to see how such a figure was arrived at. 
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Whatever doubts there may be about the actual frequency of 
monitoring visits during this second year of YOP, there can 
be little doubt that it was the year in which regular monitoring 
of schemes came nearest to being a reality. The Reviews of 
Special Programmes in subsequent years made no direct reference 
to the frequency of monitoring, but we have already seen how 
such silences are to be interpreted. Moreover, a clear 
picture of what actually happened can be pieced together from 
a number of other sources. 
First, documents which were presented to the Special Programmes 
Board during 1980 reveal how staff cuts imposed by the new 
Conservative Government led to a reduction in the scheduled 
frequency of monitoring visits. Initially, a 2.8% staff cut 
was imposed, which meant the loss of some 35 posts in the 
SPD Area Offices. This was achieved, without affecting the 
overall size of the programme, by a reduction in routine 
WEEP monitoring visits. Thus, from July 1980 onwards, these 
schemes were to be visited once in the first 3 months, and 
thereafter at 6 monthly intervals. 
Subsequently, the SPD was to be protected from the further 
staff cuts which were imposed on the MSC as a whole, and its 
initial staffing levels were restored and then substantially 
increased. Thus, in November 1980, another paper which was 
presented to the Special Programmes Board referred to 160 
extra posts "being distributed amongst the SPD Area Offices. 
However, this did not allow for any increase in the frequency 
of monitoring visits, since at the same time the scale of 
the programme was expending at a considerably faster rate. Thus, 
during the third year, the number of schemes almost doubled 
to approximately 140,000. A large proportion of available 
staff time had to be spent simply generating and approving the 
huge number of new schemes that were required. Consequently, 
even with the staff increases, the maintenance of the scheduled 
frequency of monitoring visits became increasingly difficult. 
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By the beginning of the fourth year, the pressure of the ever-
increasing scale of provision had made necessary a major 
review of monitoring procedures. A paper presented to the 
Special Programmes Board stated that, with the limited numbers 
of staff available, it was no longer possible to maintain a 
comprehensive system of monitoring , without the accumulation 
of substantial arrears. This being the case, it was argued 
that it would be more efficient to introduce a selectively-
targetted system. This would concentrate on the schemes invo-
lving the largest sums of money, and on those where it was 
thought that there was the greatest risk of mismanagement or 
abuse. The original plan was to maintain 100% coverage on 
Training Workshops, to vary the frequency of visits to 
Community Projects according to their individual circumstances, 
and to adopt a random sampling approach to cater for the vast 
number of WEEP schemes. However, the random sampling approach 
was never fully implemented, and instead, it was attempted 
to regulate the frequency of WEEP monitoring by the introduc-
tion of a system of classification. New schemes being approved 
were to be classified either as 'good', 'satisfactory' or 
'minimum acceptable standard'. The good would then have to 
be monitored within 18 months, the satisfactory within 12 
months, and the minimum standard within 3 months. Meanwhile, 
the monitoring of existing schemes could be deferred and 
gradually integrated into the new system. In addition, there 
was still to be a small random sample of approximately 2~%. 
When it is considered that originally all WEEP schemes were 
to be monitored once in their first 3 months and then regularly 
at 4 monthly intervals, it can be seen how much of a 
retreat was involved in the new regulations which were introduced 
in September 1981. However, the papers presented to the Special 
Programmes Board only told half the story. They only recorded 
the changes that were made in the system of monitoring; they 
did not record the actual performance of the SPD in relation 
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to this changing system. The full story was only to emerge 
when the Comptroller and Auditor General made another report 
for the Parliamentary Accounts Committee. 
It will be remembered that the Parliamentary Accounts Committee 
had originally been critical of the monitoring of the Job 
Creation programme, and that the MSC had given an assurance 
that the necessary resources would be provided to ensure that 
the monitoring of YOP was of a higher standard. When next the 
Committee examined the situation in June 1980, it found that 
already in the first year of YOP there had been a considerable 
backlog in the monitoring schedule. However, once again it 
was reassured that things had now changed and that the backlog 
had almost been caught up. The third occasion on which it 
examined the issue was in February 1983, when it was presented 
by the Comptroller and Auditor General with a memorandum 
concerned with the efficiency and effectiveness of all the 
special employment measures administered by the Department of 
Employment and the MSC'(46) It is worth quoting in full what 
the special appendix on YOP had to say about the MSC's 
performance of monitoring visits since the PAC's last examina-
tion of the subject: 
"By 1980 monitoring visits to sponsors had increased 
to nearly 8,000 a month with only a small backlog. 
During the year following PAC's report the number of 
visits fell substantially and the backlog increased. 
In March 1981 MSC recognised the monitoring system had 
broken down under the pressure of programme expansion, 
especially in the case of WEEP. MSC abandoned some 
40,000 outstanding visits in 1980-81 and concluded that, 
with the expansion of YOP to around 150,000 schemes, 
they would no longer maintain a comprehensive approach 
to monitoring. Instead they proposed to concentrate 
resources on schemes with aspects that were not wholly 
satisfactory. Despite this and the allocation of 
additional staff the backlog was not reduced. To 
overcome this problem MSC considered extending the 
frequency of visits but decided instead to adjust 
their definition of schemes requiring a visit. Even so, 
a backlog of over 30,000 visits remained at the end of 
October 1982."(47) 
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The previous assurances concerning the adequate monitoring 
of YOP had been given personally by Sir Richard O'Brien in 
his capacity as the Chairman of the MSC. However, in the 
meantime he had been replaced, and thus it was the new 
Chairman, David Young, who had to answer to the Committee 
on these matters. He explained how his predecessor, faced 
by the massive increase in school leaver unemployment, had 
decided on the advice of his officials that the priority was 
to get the young people into schemes rather than to carryon 
detailed monitoring. Under such urgent circumstances, David 
Young acknowledged that he would have reacted in exactly the 
same way. However, more recently the situation had improved 
and monitoring was again 'very nearly up-to-date", with an 
overall average of only some 18,000 visits still outstanding. 
Moreover, he was confident that, with the experience gained 
from YOP, the new Youth Training Scheme would not encounter 
the same problems. Quality would be put before quantity, 
the number of staff would be increased, and the use of managing 
agencies would greatly reduce and simplify the task involved.(48) 
Whatever credence one gives to David Young's excuses for his 
predecessor or to his assurances for the future, it is 
clear that the original assurances that were given concerning 
the monitoring of YOP were not upheld. The standards that were 
set for the frequency of monitoring visits were successively 
reduced; nevertheless, there were continuous backlogs which 
were never caught up, and which had eventually to be written off. 
Furthermore, the doubts which were raised, during the first 
year of the programme, about the effectiveness of the monitoring 
that was carried out were never adequately answered. What 
actually took place during monitoring visits will be examined 
more closely in the context of the local case study. Here it 
is sufficient to note that, however effective an individual 
visit might be, monitoring as a whole was unlikely to be 
effective if it was not maintained on a regular basis. (49) 
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At this point it should be recalled that the development 
of regular monitoring procedures was one of the three crucial 
apsects of the general approach to quality improvement 
that was originally adopted for YOP. Now it can be seen that, 
as with off-the-job training and the training of sponsors' 
staff, this third aspect of quality improvement also failed 
to keep pace with the quantitative growth of the programme. 
Moreover, as was the case in relation to the other two aspects, 
it was the WEEP schemes that fared worst in relation to 
monitoring. Thus, the scheme-type which provided places for 
2 out of every 3 YOP trainees offered the least opportunity 
for off-the-job training, had negligible staff training, and 
was by far the most irregularly monitored. In the context 
of YOP, it would appear that quality and quantity came together 
like oil and water. 
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6. Substitution and Displacement 
The substantial failure of the original approach adopted 
to quality improvement, combined with the massive quantitative 
growth of the programme, had serious implications for the 
way in which YOP was understood and justified in the wider 
context of the MSC's philosophy of manpower policy. However, 
before discussing these implications, it is necessary to 
analyse one further topic, that of substitution and displacement. 
It will be remembered that these terms were defined in the 
Holland Report, and that it was recognised, in particular, 
that the abuse of substitution on WEEP schemes could pose a 
serious threat to the normal workings of the labour market. (50) 
This issue was raised in the context of the discussion concerning 
the scale on which the new programme should be mounted. 
Obviously, the larger and more comprehensive the programme 
became, the greater was the potential for adverse interference 
with the labour market. However, the issue can also be under-
stood in close relation to the qualitative development of the 
programme, but in this case the relation is inverse. Thus, 
it was generally regarded that the development of the various 
aspects of quality improvement, and in particular that of 
monitoring, provided the most effective check upon possible 
abuses. Yet, we have already seen that in the part of YOP 
where the threat of substitution was greatest - the WEEP sector -
none of the aspects of quality improvement made much impact, 
including that of monitoring. It now remains to be seen what 
positive evidence there was of substitution and displacement 
causing labour market interference, particularly as the 
programme grew in scale. 
The principle means by which the MSC sought to establish the 
extent of YOP's interference with the labour market was simply 
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through asking sponsors why they were taking part in the 
programme, how they were using the trainees and whether it 
was affecting their normal recruitment of staff. Three surveys 
of sponsors were carried out on behalf of the MSC, one in 
September 1978, one in January 1980, and another approximately 
a year later. The first of these was restricted to WEEP 
sponsors, all of whom had previously been involved in the Work 
Experience Programme before it was incorporated into YOP. A 
brief reference was made to its results in the Review of the First 
Year of Special Programmes. (51) The second survey covered 
all work experience sponsors (as well as those in STEP), 
and its results were discussed in greater detail in the Review 
of the Third Year of Special Programmes. (52) Finally, the 
third survey which was similar to the second, was given a brief 
mention in the next year's Review. (53) 
The account of the 1978 survey which was published in the annual 
review merely stated on the question of substitution that 
the employers' answers had implied that some trainees may have 
been taking the place of people who would have formed part of 
the permanent staff. Against this was set the fact that the 
survey also suggested that these work experience schemes were 
making certain additional jobs available to young people. 
Thus, roughly a third of the trainees were recruited by their 
sponsors, and of these, about a quarter went into jobs which 
it was said would not otherwise have been filled. What was 
not published in the review was the fact that, compared to the 
1 in12 sponsors who claimed to have created additional jobs 
for YOP trainees, 1 in 5 admitted that they would have had 
to employ permanent employees had they not operated a work 
experience scheme. Moreover, 30 per cent acknowledged that the 
scheme had provided an opportunity to screen young people as 
recruits and 34 per cent that it had provided an extra pair 
of hands. (54) 
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Although not published in the Review of the First Year of Special 
Programmes, this more detailed evidence of the scale of 
.substitution associated with WEEP schemes was raised as a 
matter of concern in the context of the Special Programmes 
Board. A paper was presented to the Board which attempted 
to analyse the overall effects of special programmes on the 
labour market. (55) The main consequences of substitution and 
displacement were identified as follows: 
"(i) The burden of unemployment will be 
distributed from one group to another or even 
between different members of the same group; 
for example, young peoples' unemployment may be 
reduced at the expense of an increase in unemployment 
among older employees. 
(ii) The net effect of the programmes on the 
unemployment register will be less than that 
indicated by the gross numbers supported by 
the measures. 
(iii) The net costs of running special programmes 
will increase, because unemployment benefits have to 
be paid to those who have been substituted or displaced 
by the programme, and tax revenues that would have 
accrued had these individuals been in employment 
will be lost."(56) 
The only evidence with regard to displacement came from a 
survey of Job Creation Programme sponsors, and this suggested 
that it was not a significant problem. However, it was noted 
that a certain proportion of JCP projects would have been 
financed anyway, and it was estimated that in terms of numbers 
employed, this represented an 8% substitution rate. Already 
we have seen that the 1978 survey of WEP/WEEP sponsors 
suggested that these schemes were subject to a 20% substitution 
rate. The paper concluded that the net effects of these 
provisions on the unemployment register would be lower by 
these percentages in relation to the gross numbers involved, 
and that their net costs could be correspondingly higher. 
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As far as the redistribution of unemployment was concerned, 
it was noted in relation to the survey of WEP/WEEP sponsors 
that three-quarters of the permanent staff substituted for 
by YOP trainees would have been young people. Moreover, 
although 'additional' jobs were made available to 15 out of 
every 100 trainees at the end of their schemes, approximately 
half of these were at the expense of jobs which otherwise 
would have been available to adults. From these facts, it 
would appear that the immediate effects of these schemes were 
to destroy as many permanent job opportunities for young 
people as they created; and, in the process, to remove up to 
13 adult job opportunities for every 100 trainees going 
through the system. However, this conclusion was not explicitly 
drawn in the paper concerned. 
As well as analysing the existing evidence of substitution 
and displacement, and considering its implications, this 
Special Programmes Board paper also set out a programme of 
further research into these problems. Two projects were to 
be set in hand. The first was to be another survey of sponsors, 
which this time would include all the different types of work 
experience scheme within YOP. The second was to be a case 
study analysis specifically of WEEP schemes. This was thought 
necessary because it was recognised that an interview survey, 
which simply asked sponsors whether schemes were affecting 
their recruitment of permanent employees, was "a relatively 
blunt instrument for identifying complicated adjustments which 
take place over time."(57) The case studies would observe 
what the WEEP trainees actually did and investigate how this 
work would have been done in the past. They would also 
scrutinise the relationship between normal company training 
programmes and WEEP schemes; and finally, they would follow 
the progress of those trainees who entered into permanent 
employment with scheme sponsors. In addition to these two 
projects, it was also suggested that a limited attempt should 
be made to examine the impact of displacement in the local 
labour market beyond the sponsor's own organisation, and to 
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identify the longer term redistribution of employment opport-
unities in favour of former special programmes participants. 
As far as this observer is aware, the only part of this 
research programme ever carried out was the second survey of 
sponsors, the results of which were discussed at some length 
in the Review of the Third Year of Special Programmes. 
Certainly, if any of the other parts were implemented, no 
similar effort was made to publicise their results. By the 
end of the third year of YOP, substitution had become an 
issue of public concern, with allegations being made in the 
press and by certain trade unionists. The annual Review pointed 
out that such allegations were easier to make than to prove, 
and attempted to use the results of the January 1980 survey 
of sponsors to show that the problem was not as widespread 
as some were alledging .(58) First, it was noted that such 
abuse was largely confined to WEEP schemes, no evidence having 
been found of substitution taking place on an appreciable 
scale at the other types of work experience scheme. (59) 
Secondly, with regard to substitution on WEEP schemes, it 
was explained that this could take a number of forms. As 
we have already seen, YOP trainees could either be substituted 
for adult employees or the recruitment of young people. In 
the latter case, which was sometimes referred to as 'dead 
weight', there were two further alternatives. Either the 
employers might use the scheme as a subsidised training or 
screening period for potential young employees, or - and this 
was regarded as being far more serious - they might use it to 
replace recruitment altogether by taking on a regular succession 
of trainees instead.(60) The results of the survey, however, 
were unable to distinguish between these latter two alternatives. 
They simply revealed that in total 24% of WEEP trainees had 
been used to substitute for the recruitment of other young 
people, and that a further 5% had been used instead of adult 
employees. In mitigation, it was implied that a substantial 
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proportion of the first figure might have been constituted 
by the least serious of the two alternative forms of abuse 
that it covered. Furthermore, set against these figures for 
substitution, were the findings of the survey with regard 
to the number of additional job opportunities which it was 
reckoned had been created as a result of these schemes. Thus, 
it was estimated that for every 100 trainees going through 
WEEP approximately 11 additional jobs were provided for 
young people; six of which would otherwise have been filled 
by adults, and five of which were created especially to enable 
the trainees to be kept on. 
The publication of these results did little to quell the 
public's anxiety about the abuse of YOP, and to a large extent 
merely fuelled further criticisms. Some of these were ill-
informed,neglecting the distinction between the WEEP sector 
and YOP as a whole, and therefore assuming that a 30% substit-
ution rate had been revealed for the programme as a whole. 
Nevertheless, there were legitimate grounds for both anxiety 
and criticism. Even if it was assumed that abuse was confined 
to the various forms of sbustitution on WEEP schemes, the 
evidence was that at least 20% of all YOP placements involved 
some form of abuse. Furthermore, there had been a substantial 
increase in the rate of substitution since the previous 
survey from 20% to 29% of all WEEP schemes. This suggested 
that abuse became more frequent, either as existing schemes 
were repeated, or as the total number of schemes was increased. 
The growth in the rate of substitution was completely at the 
expense of the recruitment of other young people, the figure 
for the substitution of adults remaining static at 5%. At 
the same time, the rate of the provision of additional jobs 
for young people had declined from 15% to 11%. Thus, whereas 
on the evidence of the 1978 survey WEEP schemes created roughly 
as many jobs for young people as they destroyed, in the 1980 
survey, the rate of substitution of young people's jobs was 
more than double their rate of additional provision. 
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As well as drawing such implications from the figures provided, 
it is possible to cast serious doubts about their validity 
as a true measure of the scale of abuse which was actually 
taking place. We have already seen it acknowledged that the 
interview survey was "a relatively blunt instrument" for 
identifying the complexity of what might be taking place over 
time on a WEEP scheme. Consequently, it was suggested that 
this approach should be supplemented by the use of detailed 
case studies. However, these do not appear to have been 
carried out, and the results of the interview survey were 
presented on their own as the only available measure of the 
rate of substitution. Yet these results were obtained simply 
by asking sponsors if they would have taken on more permanent 
employees had their WEEP trainees not been available. Given 
that in the first place it was a condition of approval that 
schemes should not affect normal recruitment, what in effect 
sponsors were being asked - and not in a particularly subtle 
or devious way - was whether they had broken their agreement 
with the MSC and were abusing their schemes. Admittedly the 
questions were not being asked directly by the MSC'(6l)but 
still there must be considerable doubt as to whether the 
sponsors' answers can be regarded as a reliable measure of 
the actual level of abuse. An equivalent situation might be 
the Inland Revenue or the DHSS hiring an independent research 
agency to ask a sample of tax payers or social security claimants 
whether they had any undeclared sources of income. Would 
this be regarded as a reliable measure of the level of abuse 
taking place in this context? Of course not, it is simply 
not credible to measure the level of abuse within a system 
just by asking people whether they are abusing it. In fact, 
what must be considered remarkable is that so many sponsors 
admitted that they were abusing their schemes. Perhaps this 
is an indication that many did not fully understand the 
conditions which they had agreed to. Whatever the case, it 
must be asked, if 29% admitted that their schemes involved 
substitution, how many more were there who did not admit what 
they were really doing? 
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The results published in the Review of the Third Year of Special 
Programmes were based on the responses of WEEP sponsors to 
the direct question of whether involvement in YOP had affected 
their recruitment of permanent employees. However, the survey 
also included certain other questions which attempted to 
elicit information concerning the prevalence of substitution 
by slightly less direct means. Results based on the responses 
to these questions were presented to the Special Programmes 
Board in November 1980, as part of a more detailed report 
on the findings of the survey. These results can be summarised 
as follows: (1) when asked about their reasons for becoming 
sponsors, 18% of the respondents gave as their sole reason 
the prospect of obtaining extra help and/or cheap extra 
employees, and a further 6% said that a factor in their decision 
was that they had existing vacancies for part-time or casual 
staff; (2) 54% of sponsors said that they had used WEEP as 
a means of screening applicants before taking them into 
permanent jobs; (3) when asked what the advantages were 
in running a WEEP scheme, 37% of sponsors mentioned the 
availability of an extra pair of hands, 36% said that the 
scheme gave them a chance to assess young people and 14% 
considered it to be a cheap means of training; (4) 41% of 
sponsors identified "doing work similar to that done by 
permanent employees" as the single main activity of their 
trainees and 30% said that thcirtrainees spent more than four-
fifths of their time doing this type of work. Clearly, each 
of these results was indicative of a certain amount of 
substitution taking place. However, there is no way in which 
they can be used either to support or to deny the precise 
percentage figure derived from the direct question on substitution. 
The report merely stated that the two sets of results were 
'consistent'. Given that they could not be directly related 
to each other, it would perhaps have been more accurate to 
say that they were 'not inconsistent'. Moreover, even if they 
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could have been directly related to each other, the same 
doubts which have been raised about the sponsors' honesty in 
response to the direct question on substitution could be applied 
almost equally in the case of the answers to these more 
indirect questions. They were still not particularly subtle 
questions, and it must be considered, for example, that some 
employers who became sponsors merely in order to obtain cheap 
labour might have preferred not to admit this in response 
to a survey. 
The results of the third survey of sponsors, which was carried 
out in May 1981, were mentioned very briefly in the Review of 
the Fourth Year of Special Programmes. Here the impression 
was given that they had simply confirmed those of the second 
survey. Thus, it was reported that the evidence indicated 
abuse taking place in "about 30%" of WEEP placements. In fact, 
the results of the third survey with regard to the crucial 
direct question on substitution were very different from those 
of the second survey. A more detailed report, which was 
presented to the Special Programmes Board in November 1981, 
revealed that in the third survey only 15% of sponsors admitted 
that they would have taken on more permanent employees if their 
WEEP trainees had not been available. Moreover, because this 
15% consisted mainly of the sponsors of small schemes, the 
proportion of places affected was only 7% of the total compared 
with 29% in the 1980 survey. Yet, meanwhile, the results 
obtained from the other less direct questions had remained 
substantially unchanged. The conclusion drawn in the report 
from this contradictory evidence was that there had probably 
been little change in the rate of abuse between the two surveys.' 
The sharp drop indicated by the results of the direct question 
on substitution was considered most unlikely to have actually 
taken place; rather, it was thought that sponsors were now 
being less frank in their responses to this question, possibly 
because of the increased press coverage being given to the 
issue of substitution. Consequently, it was deemed that 
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the results of the direct question should be overriden by 
the other evidence which indicated that there had been 
little change in the rate of abuse. Hence the figure of 
'about 30%' published in the Annual Review. 
It might be thought that in this instance the MSC was given 
its critics the benefit of the doubt. However, if the Review 
had published the figure of 7%, this would have been completely 
unbelievable and would merely have exposed the unreliability 
of this whole method of measuring substitution. It would have 
been obvious that some sponsors must have lied in their 
responses to this latest survey, and this would have raised 
questions about their honesty in previous surveys. If 7% 
was unbelievable, why should 29% be believed, given that it 
had been obtained in exactly the same way? The results of the 
indirect questions were useful in so far as they indicated 
that most probably there had been little change in the 
situation between the 1980 and 1981 surveys. However, they 
provided no evidence to suggest that the rate of abuse was 
about 30% at either the beginning or the end of this period of 
time. What the results of the two surveys together demonstrated 
was precisely that there was no direct relationship between 
sponsors' answers to the direct and indirect questions on 
substitution. The results based on the indirect questions appear 
to have been more reliable but this does not eliminate the 
possibility that some sponsors were dishonest in their answers 
to these questions, and nor does it prove how many were lying 
in response to the direct question. 
The report in the Annual Review, to the effect that the 1981 
survey of sponsors had shown the rate of abuse remaining 
~ughly the same at 'about 30%', was the easiest way for the 
MSC to avoid stirring up any new controversy, while still 
appearing to be closely monitoring the situation. However, it 
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can now be seen that this report was not strictly true. The 
survey did provide some indication that there had been little 
change since the previous survey, but at the same time it 
showed that the method by which this previous survey had 
established the rate of abuse at 29% was totally unreliable. 
This returns us to the question of how many more sponsors were 
abusing their schemes than the proportion who were prepared 
to admit it in such surveys. Certain evidence provided by 
the local case study below will suggest that the 29% was merely 
the tip of the iceberg. However, this evidence falls well 
short of proof. As the MSC were always keen to point out, alleg-
ations of abuse are easier to make than to prove. Yet, this works 
both ways. As we have now seen the MSC themselves had no 
reliable means of proving what the actual rate of substitution 
was. Their surveys merely revealed that, before substitution 
was raised as an issue in the press, a surprisingly high 
proportion of sponsors were prepared to admit that they were 
abusing their schemes. This did nothing to disprove allegations 
that the rate of abuse was considerably higher; it simply 
established 'about 30%' as the minimum figure. 
As well as publishing selectively the results of these surveys, 
the MSC attempted to quell public anxiety and criticism concerning 
abuses by emphasising the preventative measures which were, 
being taken. These included: (1) stiffening the examination 
made of scheme proposals prior to giving approval; (2) seeking 
the explicit approval of trade unions where necessary, and 
involving Areas Boards more closely in the approval of schemes 
in sectors, such as agriculture, which had a bad reputation 
for abuse; (3) investigating all specific complaints and 
allegations of substitution, and in the cases where they were 
substantiated, terminating the schemes involved; and (4) 
continuing to make clear in public the Commission's resolve to 
tackle this abuse. (62) However, the most effective means of 
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preventing substitution was still said to be continued improvement 
of the quality of YOP. If sponsors had to meet more stringent 
qualitative requirements, it was thought that this would make 
abuse extremely difficult and discourage those who intended to 
use trainees merely as cheap labour'(63) This might seem 
slightly ironic, given that we have already seen the extent 
to which YOP, and in particular its WEEP sector, failed to meet 
the original objectives that were established for quality 
improvement. However, by the end of the third year of the 
programme, when these statements about the prevention of 
abuse were being made, quality improvement had begun to take 
on a new meaning and a new direction, as had the development 
of YOP as a whole. 
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7. Research and Development 
During the first year of YOP, we have seen that the 
PROFILE working group played a central role in the development 
of the initial approach to quality improvement. The culmination 
of its work was the publication, in February 1979, of the 
principles and guidelines of Making Experience Work. The group 
continued to function afterwards, but only for about six 
months before it was disbanded. Although originally it had 
been given a wider brief, the attitude of the Director of 
Special Programmes was that PROFILE had served its purpose once 
it had produced this central framework document. (64) Thus, it 
was decided that the translation of these principles and guide-
lines into practice required not the perpetuation of a central 
co-ordinating group, but rather a diversification of numerous 
ad hoc specialist groups, each working on a defined and finite 
task, and dispersing when this task was completed. (65) 
This new approach involved not only the setting up of groups 
under the direct aegis of the MSC, but also the commissioning 
of outside organisations to carry out research and development 
work in certain specific areas. We have already seen, from the 
report on quality improvement in the Annual Review, that during 
the first year of YOP there were other initiatives taking place 
alongside the work of the PROFILE group. There were, for 
example, the specialist teams set up to advise on provision 
for the various groups of young people with special needs. Each 
of these produced a report during the second year of the 
programme, and all five reports were published together under 
the collective title of Special Programmes: Special Needp .(66) 
Also, it will be remembered, there was the work being undertaken 
by the FEU on the development of life and social skills 
training, and the project of the Basic Skills Unit at the 
National Extension College which was concerned with new 
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approaches to the teaching of basic skills. The outcome of 
the FEU's work was the publication in 1980 of two documents, 
Developing Social and Life Skills and Supporting YOP. The first 
of these set out strategies for F E tutors who were concerned 
with the design and implementation of social and life skills 
curricula for 16 - 19 year olds; the second contained more 
general advice for FE colleges and their staff on how they could 
contribute to the various components of YOP. Meanwhile, from 
the end of 1979 onwards, the Basic Skills Unit was producing and 
piloting a wide range of teaching materials for supervisors, 
tutors and young people in YOP'(67) 
By the end of the second year of the programme certain other 
important initiatives were under way. These included: (1) 
the 'Grouping of Skills' study conducted by the MSC's Training 
Services Division; (2) the 'Learning at Work' development 
project which was carried out by the Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations; and (3) the development work on 'Trainee Centred 
Reviewing' undertaken jointly by the Industrial Training Research 
Unit at Cambridge and the Careers Development Unit at Leeds 
University. Each of these requires a brief explanation. 
Research on the Grouping of Skills predated YOP and had 
in fact been initiated within the Training Services Agency 
as far back as 1975'(68) The original objective of this 
research was to develop a universal system of classification 
for describing and analysing the component elements of different 
jobs. However, it soon became evident that such a universal 
system could only operate at a relatively superficial level of 
description and analysis. Hence, there was a change of 
approach, moving away from abstract generalisation and 
towards the development of specific systems of classification 
designed to tackle specific real-life problems. One such problem, 
to which this new Grouping of Skills approach was to be directed, 
was the entry of school leavers into employment. 
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During 1978, two research projects were set up to analyse the 
skill requirements of jobs being entered by less qualified 
young people, and to test whether the information obtained 
could be of use in the design of YOP provision. The first 
of these was entitled 'Young People Starting Work', and was 
conducted by the Social and Applied Psychology Unit at the 
University of Sheffield with the assistance of the Leeds, 
Liverpool and Coventry LEAs, within whose areas the research was 
carried out.(69) The second, the 'London Into Work Development 
Project', was conducted jointly by the Ashridge Management 
College and the Training Directorate of the TSD, with the 
assistance of the ILEA.(70) Having established the jobs which 
were available to young people, the crucial task for both 
projects was to develop a 'job components inventory' which could 
be used to identify, describe and analyse the broad occupational 
skills required by these jobs. The starting point for this 
process of development was provided by inventories already in 
use in North America. (71) These were madeup of simple descriptors, 
which in questionnaire form could either be answered 'yes' or 
'no', or else be given a numerical value. Both projects adapted 
these inventories to their own needs and then piloted them in 
questionnaire form. The London Into Work Project first grouped 
the jobs available into five broad families: Clerical, Sales, 
Transport, Services, Hands and Hand Tools, and Machines. It 
then attempted to analyse both the individual jobs and their 
families using a structured questionnaire containing over 
300 broad-based skill descriptors, divided between the following 
categories: Basic Calculations, Measurement and Drawing, Listening 
and Talking, Reading, Writing, Planning and Problem Solving, and 
Machines. The information obtained made it possible to identify 
which skill descriptors occurred most widely throughout all of 
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the jobs available, and to determine the characteristic skill 
profiles of the different job-families. This data was then available 
to be used in the design of Work Introduction Courses at various 
London Colleges. However, both the data, and the method by which 
it had been obtained, were capable of wider application. (72) 
The questionnaire which had been developed during the 
London Into Work project became known as the 'Basic Skills 
Checklist', and it was used as the starting point for another 
important research and development project coming under the 
general heading of the Grouping of Skills. This was the 
'Phoenix Training Workshop Study' which was carried out by 
the TSD between January and August 1980.(73) The general 
prupose of this project was to test the usefulness of the 
Basic Skills Checklist as a means of analysing the activities 
of a Training Workshop. More specifically, the aim was to 
examine 'how information (obtained) about the kinds of basic 
skills used in the manufacture of Workshop products could be 
used to help Workshop Management select products and tailor 
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training content to increase trainees' chances of getting a job."(74) 
Thus, whereas the London Into Work Project used the Basic 
Skills Checklist to analyse the youth labour market, the Phoenix 
Training Workshop Study started from the opposite direction, using 
it to analyse a certain element of YOP provision. 
The application of the Basic Skills Checklist to the Workshop 
was as follows. Initially, it was used to identify the basic 
skills used in each of the different sections of the Workshop. 
The skills thus identified were coded according to whether 
they were (a) prerequisite for entry to the section; (b) taught 
on the section; (c) optionally acquired on the section; or 
(d) exercised by the supervisor of the section. On the basis 
of this analysis, a Matrix of Basic Skills was produced for each 
section and for the Workshop as a whole. These matrices were 
then used to provide a record and analysis of the basic skills 
presently on offer at the Workshop. Furthermore, it was 
also possible to construct a Maximum Skills Matrix showing the 
full potential range of skills which each section could offer 
within its existing facilities. Two further applications of the 
Checklist related to the assessment of trainees upon entry to the 
Workshop and to the monitoring of their subsequent progress. 
First, using the Overall Workshop Basic Skills Matrix, it was 
possible to identify and produce a profile of the skills which 
were prerequisite on entry to each of the sections. This 
profile could then be used during the induction phase as a basis 
for testing and recording the capacities of the new trainees. 
By this means, each new trainee could be provided with a personal 
'can do' profile recording both their strengths and their needs. 
This information could then be used to help decide in which section 
they should be placed. Secondly, a Basic Skills Profile could 
be produced for each section, showing what it was possible for 
a trainee to learn within that section. This could then be used 
to record the trainee's achievement and their acquisition of 
particular skills. Finally, at the end of the scheme, the profiles 
of each of the sections through which a trainee had progressed 
could be collected together to provide them with a leaving 
profile to show prospective employers what they had learnt. 
The final development which needs to be mentioned under the 
general heading of the Grouping of Skills is that of 'Occupational 
Training Families' (O.T.F.s). These were a more sophisticated 
version of the broad occupational families used by the London 
Into Work Development Project. Drawing on analyses using the 
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Basic Skills Checklist, they grouped together occupations requiring 
similar initial skills training. The resulting system of 
classification included eleven different OTFs. The development 
of this system was the product of a pilot study conducted on 
behalf of the MSC by the Institute of Manpower Studies, a report 
on which was published in April 1981.(75) 
The Learning at Work development project was concerned specifically 
with the learning opportunities that could be made available to 
young people whilst they were engaged in work experience. One 
of the criticisms made of the PROFILE taSkgroup's general 
approach in Making Experience Work was that, in emphasising the 
equal importance of off-the-job training, it tended to neglect 
the potential of on-the-job experience as a learning vehicle. 
Subsequently, it was recognised within the MSC that many of the 
guidelines set out in Making Experience Work might best be 
pursued through the development of this learning potential of 
on-the-job work experience. As a result, during the last six 
months of its existence, the PROFILE group was strongly encouraged 
to turn its attention in this direction. Then, with the demise 
of PROFILE, the Tavistock Institute was commissioned to 
carry out its development project on this theme. (76) 
Initially, the Learning at Work project analysed the learning 
opportunities being offered by a sample of 100 YOP schemes. 
It was concluded from this analysis that learning objectives 
were not being given the salience that a quality programme 
would require. Nevertheless, the data collected from the schemes 
served as a basis for the project to develop various quality 
improvement strategies. The end product was a guide to the 
principles and practice of providing learning opportunities for 
young people through work experience. This was published as 
part of the MSC's Special Programmes Research and Development 
Series in August 1982.(77) It should be noted first, that although 
this document set out to emphasise the potential of work-based 
learning, it also recognised that there were limitations in the 
extent to which a real working environment could be adapted in 
order to promote learning opportunities. (78) Consequently, it 
stressed that work experience placements should be used in 
conjunction with other forms of learning provision, thus reiter-
ating what had been said in Making Experience Work. Having 
recognised the limitations of work-based learning, the guide 
set out to show how nevertheless such learning opportunities could 
be maximised. The first step was to identify precisely what 
kinds of learning opportunity might be available. The three 
main types of learning which could take place on work experience 
schemes were identified as follows: "learning basic competences 
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such as literacy, numeracy and communication; skill or 
vocational learning; and learning about the world of work, how 
workplaces operate and what is required of people at work."(79) 
The need was for individual schemes to systematically analyse 
what they could offer under each heading. Once this analysis 
had been made, it could then be determined what complementary 
off-the-job training was required. Also, it could be specified 
what kind of young person would be best suited for the scheme. 
With regard to selection, the guide acknowledged that it was 
understandable that employers should use at least some of 
their normal selection criteria in cases where they were likely 
to keep the trainee on permanently at the end of the scheme. 
However, in cases where this was unlikely, it was stressed that 
selection should be on the basis of who would benefit most from 
what the scheme had to offer. This also required that trainees' 
needs and interests should be assessed in relation to the three 
main types of learning opportunity before they were placed on a 
scheme, as well as during induction and continu~usly thereafter. 
The work itself needed to be selected, organised and supervised 
in order to promote clearly defined learning objectives which 
had been agreed upon by the trainees. The following three features 
were regarded as important: (1) that there should be variety 
in the work, yet at the same time it should all be connected; 
(2) that goals should be set for the trainees and immediate 
feedback given on their performance; and (3) that the trainees 
should be given responsibility and allowed the opportunity to 
learn from their mistakes. The process of reviewing and 
recording progress was to be continuous throughout the scheme 
and was to involve actively the trainees. A final review was 
recommended for the last week, looking back on the ~perience 
of the scheme and preparing the trainees both to apply for 
jobs and, if necessary, to copeWith unemployment. 
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The specific role of reviewing and recording trainee progress 
was examined in more detail by the project on Trainee Centred 
Reviewing. (SO) The starting point for this was to be found directly 
within the guidelines of Making Experience Work. Here it was 
suggested that trainees would benefit if they 'logged' their 
experiences as they progressed through the various elements of a 
scheme. Furthermore, it was stated that they should be given 
the opportunity to contribute to a critical review of these 
experiences. The two units at Leeds University and Cambridge 
were asked initially by the MSC to review current practice 
in education and industry with regard to the use of personal 
progress records by young people, and to consider what 
benefits such records might have within YOP.(Sl) The outcome 
of this first phase of the project was the development of the 
concept itself of 'Trainee Centred Reviewing' (T.C.R.). 
The evidence collected concerning the use of personal progress 
record systems in schools had demonstrated the value of combining 
the process of recording with that of individual and group 
reviewing. This apparently helped the students to feel more 
valued and to take greater responsibility for their own learning. 
TCR described the application of this general approach within 
YOP. Essentially, it was a process by which trainees were 
encouraged both to discuss and record their experiences, and then 
to review more systematically what they could learn from them. 
As well as enhancing their experience of the scheme, it was 
believed that this could help the trainees to develop reviewing 
and learning skills which they could then take away with them at 
the end and apply to other situations. Although the processes of 
recording and reviewing were centred upon the trainee, it should 
be noted that there was still a vital role for adult support in 
providing both structure and motivation. Finally, it should 
also be noted that TCR did not lay down a single centrally 
designed system for all YOP schemes; rather it was a general 
approach which encouraged sponsors to develop their own systems of 
recording and reviewing, "building upon their existing practices 
and recognising their individual differences and needs". (82) 
The second phase of the project tested the feasibility of this 
approach on a number of pilot schemes. This not only provided 
the opportunity to gain more concrete evidence of the benefits 
that TCR could bring within YOP, but it also enabled more detailed 
recommendations to be made about its introduction and operation 
within specific types of schemes. The preliminary results from 
these pilot schemes, together with an account of the development 
of the general approach of TCR, were published in November 
1981 as another of the reports in the MSC's Special Programmes 
Research and Development Series. 
Grouping of Skills, Learning at Work and Trainee Centred Reviewing 
were three of the main approaches to quality development which 
followed on from the ground work laid by the PROFILE group 
during the first year of YOP. However, they were only part of 
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a wider and more diversified research and development programme 
which also included, for example; 'Exemplary Projects', in the 
organisation of off-the-job training by local education authorities, 
and a project carried out by the National Institute for Careers 
Education and-Counselling on individual guidance and support 
within YOP. Thus, it can be seen that there was no shortage of 
initiatives being sponsored by the MSC which were concerned with 
the development of a higher quality programme. The problem 
was that this research and development work took time. Projects 
set up in the first two years of YOP did not for the most part 
produce results until the third and fourth years, and it was 
only in the final year of the programme that a start could be 
made on the large-scale implementation of their recommendations. 
Meanwhile, as we have seen, the size of the programme grew 
inexorably. 
8. Quality or Collapse 
With the publication of Making Experience Work at its 
beginning, 1979 had been proclaimed as 'the year of quality' 
for YOP. (83) The comparatively modest rate of growth of the 
programme during its second year made it possible for certain 
progress to be made. As we have seen, there was some 
improvement of performance in relation to each of the three 
quantitative gauges of quality that had been established at 
the end of the first year. However, this progress was slowed down 
by the financial cuts that were imposed on the MSC from June 
1979 onwards, and at the end of this second year the original 
qualitative goals were still far from being met. Then, during 
the summer of the third year, the numbers being taken into the 
programme began to rise rapidly and, as a consequence, the 
prospect of realising these qualitative goals receded still 
further into the distance. This combination of quantitative 
growth and qualitative regression precipitated a crisis of 
confidence in the credibility of the programme as a whole. 
This crisis can be understood in terms of the analysis made in 
Chapter 3, which interpreted the original conception of the 
Youth Opportunities Programme in relation to the MSC's wider 
philosophy of manpower policy. (84) It will be remembered that 
the first aspect of the MSC's approach to a comprehensive manpower 
policy involved the combination of both social and economic 
functions which was the characteristic feature of an active 
manpower policy. In the Holland Report, the social function of 
YOP was expressed in terms of the new programme being designed 
to meet the personal needs of individual unemployed young people; 
whereas the principle expression of its economic function was 
to be found in the programme's primary objective of securing 
permanent employment for these young people at the first possible 
opportunity. As we noted subsequently, the effect of the 
introduction of the school leaver undertaking was to put the 
emphasis onto the social side of this dual function, ensuring 
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that the scale of need would be the determining factor in the 
future development of the programme, thus giving YOP the 
potential to develop beyond any rationale that might be 
constructed in terms of an active manpower policY'(85) 
This, in fact, is precisely what had happened by the half-way 
point in YOP's five year life-span. When youth unemployment 
took off in the summer of 1980, YOP was forced by its under-
takings to expand rapidly in response. Yet, the deterioration of 
the state of the labour market affected not only the number of 
entrants to the programme, but also the employment placement 
rates of the trainees at the end of their schemes. As we have 
seen, by the summer of 1980, only about 40% of work experience 
trainees were finding jobs and the figure was still falling. 
Thus, the same forces that were causing the huge expansion of 
YOP as a social programme were simultaneously undermining its 
principle claim to have an economic function. 
However, YOP did have a secondary claim to the fulfilling 
an economic function - as a training programme, or rather as 
a programme with a substantial training content. This was not 
directly dependent upon the state of the labour market, but 
rather upon the balance and quality of the provision that was 
included within the programme. Yet, as we have already seen, 
at the beginning of its third year YOP was still well short of 
its original objectives in these respects, and was falling further 
back as the number of entrants began to expand more rapidly. 
Moreover, the various research and development projects that had 
been s~t up to examine new approaches to quality improvement 
were still for the most part only in their preliminary stages. 
Thus, not only was the programme losing its credibility as a 
direct means of helping young people into employment, it'was 
also losing ground in terms of this secondary claim to be 
fulfilling, at least in part, the more long-term objectives 
of a training programme. If nothing was done, the prospect was 
that YOP would become just a huge social programme, with no 
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credible objective other than keeping young people out of the dole 
queues for six months or so. 
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The second aspect of the MSC's approach to a comprehensive manpower 
policy was that of limited direct intervention in the labour 
market. YOP conformed to this principle in so far as it was 
a 'special programme', designed only to operate where the normal 
mechanisms of the labour market were failing. As it was 
originally planned on the basis of the unemployment predictions 
then available, the programme was to be 'special' in two 
different senses: first, it was to have a limited life-span 
of five years; and secondly, it was to apply only to the least 
qualified and most disadvantaged minority of young people. When 
the youth unemployment levels started their dramatic rise in 
the summer of 1980, both these senses of the word 'special' 
began to lose their application in the context of YOP. First, 
it became clear that the problem of youth unemployment was going 
to persist for the forseeable future and that YOP would not simply 
be able to come to an end as scheduled in April 1983. Secondly, 
it also became evident that the scale of the problem was going 
to increase greatly and that YOP would soon be catering for as 
many as half of each year's school leavers'(86) Thus, without 
any proper planning, YOP was being transformed towards becoming 
a permanent and comprehensive alternative to the normal entry 
of school leavers into the labour market. Furthermore, as the 
scale of the programme was growing, concern was mounting about 
some of its unintended effects upon the labour market. As we 
have seen, the 1980 survey of sponsors revealed almost a 
30% rate of sUbstitution amongst WEEP schemes. 
Finally, the third aspect of the MSC's approach to a comprehensive 
manpower policy was that of a corporatist style of policy-making. 
In relation to the original plans for YOP, this was expressed 
both in the composition of the Working Party that was responsible 
for these plans, and in the proposed composition of the area 
and national boards that were to oversee the new programme. 
Moreover, closely related to this corporatist style of policy-
making was the application of the principle of voluntarism within 
the plans for YOP. Thus, it was made clear in the Holland 
Report that all those taking part in new programme - employers, 
trade unions, voluntary organisations, colleges, and most 
importantly, the trainees - should be doing so out of choice 
and not as a result of compulsion. Both the corporatist and the 
voluntarist aspects of YOP relied on there being a certain 
consensus about its purpose and value as a policy. The crisis 
of credibility into which the programme entered during its 
third year put this consensus under severe strain. 
As we have seen, YOP was moving rapidly towards becoming both 
a permanent and comprehensive programme, yet one with admitted 
negative side effects on the labour market and no credible 
positive economic function. Under such circumstances, there 
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was some doubt about the willingness of government to continue 
meeting the rising costs that were entailed, (87) and it was 
difficult for any of the parties involved to retain much confidence 
in the future of YOP. Of the interests represented on the national 
and local boards, it was amongst the trade unions that the 
greatest sense of unease existed about the way in which the 
programme was developing. The focus of this concern was upon the 
abuse of trainees within WEEP schemes, involving their exploitation 
as cheap labour and as substitutes for permanent employees. 
Demands were made that the monitoring of the programme should 
be tightened up, and these were accompanied by threats that the 
trade union movement would withdraw their active support if 
nothing was done about theee abuses'(88) At the same time, 
signs were emerging of greater resistance to the programme on the 
part of the young people themselves. They were not directly 
represented on the boards which had been set up to oversee the 
management of special programmes, but they could always vote with 
their feet by refusing to enter the schemes, or make known their 
feelings in various forms of anti-YOP demonstrations. 
These tended to focus on the issue of 'cheap labour', but what 
was really responsible for this mounting disaffection amongst 
young people was the declining rate of job placements at the 
end of the schemes. Working a 40 hour week with little or no 
proper training included, and receivingin return a 'training 
allowance' which was only slightly above the level of social 
security benefit, was acceptable to most young people so long 
as there was a reasonable prospect of it leading to a proper 
job in the end. But, once the word got around that a large 
proportion of trainees were failing to get jobs, it became 
increasingly difficult to maintain the credibility of YOP 
amongst the young people that it was supposed to be helping, 
particularly those in the worst unemployment blackspots'(89) 
Thus, the crisis in the development of YOP affected the 
programme's status in relation to each of the three principle 
aspects of the MSC's philosophy of a comprehensive manpower 
policy. First, YOP no longer had a credible economic function, 
and therefore could not be considered as making a positive 
contribution to an active manpower policy. Secondly, it was 
no longer a special programme, but was taking over the normal 
functions of the youth labour market, and having certain adverse 
side-effects in doing so. Thirdly, there was no longer the real 
consensus about the value and purpose of the programme which was 
required for it to retain its corporatist and voluntarist 
characteristics. Moreover, the second of these points, the 
fact that YOP could no longer be considered to have the status 
of a special programme, ensured that the implications of the 
crisis in its development could not be restricted within the 
bounds of a special programmes policy, but affected the MSC's 
whole approach to the implementation of manpower policy. 
The establishment of the Special Programmes Division in April 
1978 had been a recognition of the increasing importance of this 
area of activities within the context of MSC operations as a whole. 
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Nevertheless, it was still to be a 'special' area, and 
was originally regarded as having only a limited and marginal 
role in comparison with the principle functions of the Commission 
involving the provision of employment and training services. 
Thus, in the first year of its existence, the SPD's expenditure 
amounted to only 15% of the MSC total, whereas the shares of 
the Employment Services Division and the Training Services 
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Division were 25% and 48% respectively. (90) However, by the third 
year, the SPD had overtaken the E.S.D. and its share was rising 
to over 30%.(91) This increase in the comparative importance 
of the SPD was not only the result of the growth of YOP, but also 
of the cutbacks that were being imposed on the MSC as a whole. 
Before 1979, the Commission's budget had been expanding comparat-
ively freely. But then, from June 1979 onwards, the new Conser-
vative Government had started to impos~ a series of cuts in 
planned expenditure, both for the current year and for a number 
of years ahead.(92) Initially the SPD took its share of these 
cuts and, as we have seen, they had some effect upon the develop-
ment of YOP, though they were mainly directed at the adult 
programme, STEP. However, once the unemployment levels started 
their rapid rise during 1980, it soon became clear that, whatever 
happened to STEP, the SPD would require a substantial increase 
in resources if it was going to continue to meet the undertakings 
made on behalf of YOP. Given the cutbacks being imposed on the 
MSC as a whole, these extra resources for YOP could only be 
provided at the expense of activities being carried out by the 
other two divisions. Particularly affected were some of the 
more long-term training policies of the TSD, whose share of total 
MSC expenditure was to be reduced below 40% by the end of the 
1980/81 financial year.(93) 
Clearly, then, YOP's growth and development beyond its 
original definition as aspecial programme had serious implic-
ations for the development of the MSC's whole approach to 
manpower policy. The programme was not only taking over the 
normal functions of a particular sector of the labour market, 
it was doing so at the expense of the employment and training 
services which were the MSC's principle means of fulfilling the 
dual economic and social functions of an active manpower policy. 
This would not have mattered so much had YOP itself been able to 
retain or develop a credible economic function. However, the 
fact that it had not been able to do so, meant that the 
programme's growth at the expense of the Commission's other 
activities put in question the MSC's whole development in 
relation to the fulfillment of an active manpower policy. Moreover, 
wi th regard to the third aspect of the MSC' s approach to a 
comprehensive manpower policy, the loss of consensus about the 
value and purpose of YOP threatened also the wider consensus 
which formed the basis of MSC policy as a whole. Thus, the 
growing prominence of YOP within the MSC's activities ensured 
that the programme's crisis of credibility was equally a 
crisis for the Commission itself. 
The real underlying problem was that the MSC had originally been 
created to develop manpower policy in the context of full 
employment, as guaranteed by a macro-economic policy of demand 
management; yet now it was in the front line of a special 
measures response to mass unemployment, in the absence of any 
positive government action being taken at the macro-economic 
level.(94) Examining the future development of its policies over 
the period 1980-84, the MSC made plain that the 'major 
responsibility for dealing with the level of unemployment rest(ed) 
with the Government", and that "the Commission consider(ed) its 
business to be about employment rather than unemp loyment."(95) 
However, it was acknowledged that the Commission could play an 
important supporting role through its provision of services to 
the unemployed. The question that needed to be answered was how 
this could be made a meaningful response in the face of rising 
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mass unemployment, without excessively compromising the Commission's 
principle function of administering an active manpower policy 
through its employment and training services. It was decided 
that an immediate review of the Commission's services to the 
unemployed was necessary. 
The review took place over the summer of 1980 and was reported 
to the September meetings of both the Special Programmes Board 
and the Commission itself. The report emphasised both the limit-
ations on what the MSC could do about unemployment and the danger 
of its other services being adversely affected. It was clearly 
stated that the current level of unemployment was "overwhelmingly 
ascribable to insufficient demand" in the economy and that the 
Commission could do nothing about this'(96) All that it could 
do under such economic conditions was, in effect, "to redistribute 
unemployment, by helping some people back into work at the 
expense of others who might be deemed to be better able to look 
after themselves."(97) Yet, even in pursuing this limited role, 
there was thought to be a danger of these 'distributional' 
activities impinging on the normal services to the labour market, 
and of the Commission becoming "identified as a welfare agency 
rather than as an agent of change in the labour market."(98) 
The conclusion drawn by the review was that such help would have 
to remain restricted to the two priority groups being served 
by the existing special programmes, the young unemployed and 
the long-term adult unemployed. (99) Yet, as we have seen, such 
was the scale of unemployment in prospect that even the attempt 
to continue the provision of special measures for just these 
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two priority groups posed a serious threat to the principle manpower 
policy functions of the Commission. (100) In this situation, if 
the Commission wanted to retain its manpower policy identity, 
there were two theoretical options open to it with regard to 
its services to the unemployed. First, even within these 
limited priority groups, it could abandon the attempt to keep 
its scale of provision in any way commensurate with the scale of 
need. Secondly, it could try to develop the content of provision 
in such a way that this could be regarded as making a positive 
contribution to the wider goals of an active manpower policy. 
The review in effect recommended the first option with regard 
to the long-term adult unemployed, and the second option in the 
case of the young unemployed. (101) 
The plans which resulted from this review, as endorsed 
by the Government, were announced in the House of Commons by the 
Conservative Secretary of State for Employment, Jim Prior on 
21st November 1980'(102) First, YOP was to be expanded to cater 
for 440,000 entrants in the financial year 1981-82. At the same 
time, as we have already seen, the date for completion of the 
next school leaver undertaking was brought forward to Christmas, 
and the target group of the second undertaking was altered from 
the long-term unemployed 16-18 year olds to the 'other 16 and 
17 year olds' who had been unemployed for over 3 months. As well 
as setting these quantitative targets, the Secretary of State 
promised that more emphasis would be put on good quality training 
and on progression between schemes. Furthermore, he stated what 
was the eventual goal of this new development of YOP and gave 
some indication of its wider significance. The key passages 
in this regard were as follows: 
"We are trying as resources permit, to work 
towards the point where every 16 and 17 year 
old not in education or a job will be assured of 
vocational preparation lasting as necessary 
up to his or her 18th birthday." 
"We see this development of YOP in the wider 
context of improving preparation for and 
training in work for all young people, and 
not just the unemployed."(103) 
In relation to this latter statement, it was also mentioned that 
there would be an acceleration of the expansion of Unified 
Vocational Preparation (U.V.P.). This was a programme of 
vocational preparation for young people already in employment, 
which had been run on a pilot basis over the previous five 
years. The aim was to ensure that there would be some 6,500 
places by 1981/82 and 20,000 by 1983/84. The speech also 
referred to special measures aimed at the adult unemployed. 
The cuts imposed in June 1979 had led to STEP being virtually 
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halved in size and restricted in its georgraphical coverage to 
certain designated areas. This new announcement, in effect, merely 
reversed these earlier cuts and gave the provision a different 
name. Thus, the new Community Enterprise Programme (C.E.P.) 
was to provide some 25,000 places nationwide by March 1982.(104) 
Completing the package of special measures, there were to be 
extensions made to certain existing employment subsidies. The 
total cost of all these new measures was put at £570m for 1981-
82, an increase of nearly £250m over existing provision. This 
was said to represent "a massive practical demonstration of 
(the Government's) concern for the unemployed."(105) 
The significance of this speech needs to be interpreted in terms 
of the analysis that has just been made of the nature of the 
crisis in YOP's development and its implications for MSC policy 
as a whole. First, the planned expansion of YOP to some 440,000 
entrants marked the acceptance of the fact that the programme was 
going to develop into a comprehensive form of provision. Given 
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the public sympathy which existed for the young unempl·oyed, it 
would have been politically impractical to abandon the attempt to 
match the scale of provision to that of need. Indeed, the under-
taking which existed to respond to the scale of school leaver 
unemployment was given a new emphasis by the bringing forward of 
its completion date. The only reduction in the scope of commitment 
was with regard to 18 year olds. As we have already seen, the 
change made in the second. undertaking signalled that the principle 
client group of the programme was to be narrowed down to 16 and 
17 year olds. This in fact merely reflected the reality of the 
situation that not many 18 year olds were interested in what YOP 
had to offer. (106) At the same time, it provided a useful excuse 
for not raising the training allowance, (107)thus helping to control 
the programme's level of expenditure. The goal then, as explicitly 
stated, was for a comprehensive form of provison for all 16 and 
17 year olds not in full-time education or employment. Yet, if 
the scale of this new provision was not to interfere adversely 
with the wider manpower policy goals of the Commission, it needed 
to be positively integrated into them. Hence, the importance of 
setting this development of YOP in the wider context of improving 
work preparation and training for all young people, and of 
linking it up as a parallel development with UVP. In the MSC's 
review of services to the unemployed this had been described as 
the 'traineeship option' for YOP'(108) If not yet a proper 
training programme, it could now at least be argued that YOP 
was developing towards becoming one and therefore making a 
positive contribution towards wider manpower policy goals. There 
was thus a new rationale for the programme in terms of active 
manpower policy and a new basis for consensus about its future 
development. There was even a retrospective justification for 
giving the young people the status of trainees and paying them 
only an allowance. However, all this depended upon action being 
taken to demonstrate that YOP really was heading in this new 
direction and had not merely been provided with another excuse 
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to continue its unplanned expansion. Two forms of action in 
particular were needed. First, as indicated in the speech, a new 
emphasis would have to be put upon the quality of content of the 
programme. Secondly, the Secretary of State's brief remark 
concerning the wider context of this development of YOP would have 
to be translated into a definite and detailed set of plans showing 
exactly how the re-launched programme would eventually be integrated 
into the broader training strategy of the Commission. 
Before examining the action taken in these two regards, a brief 
comment needs to be made about the plans announced to cater for the 
long-term adult unemployed. The halving of expenditure on STEP, 
which took place a year previously, had already shown that there 
was no commitment to keep the scale of provision for this group 
in line with their scale of need. Although the MSC's review 
recommended that this cut should be more than restored, it 
acknowledged that the new target of 30,000 filled places by March 
1982 would still be an inadequate response to the scale of the 
problem. (109) Given the likely increase in the numbers of the long-
term unemployed, it was noted that this might even represent a 
dimunition of the comparative scale of the programme in relation 
to the client group (which is in fact what happened). As we have 
seen, in the Secretary of State's announcement, the target figure 
for the renamed Community Enterprise Programme was reduced to 
25,000 filled places. This made it even more clear that only a 
token effort was to be made for this group, which apparently did 
not enjoy the same degree of public sympathy as the young 
unemployed. 
Returning now to YOP, it should be noted how the importance of 
quality improvement in the future development of the programme 
was given independent emphasis by the influential contemporary 
report entitled Quality of Collapse? This report, which was 
published by Youthaid in January 1981, was the product of a review 
of the programme embarked upon in May 1980. Already, by August, 
the working group which was collecting the evidence had become 
convinced that YOP would collapse unless its quality was greatly 
improved - hence the title of the report. (110) Most of the 
evidence considered has already been recorded in this chapter 
or the previous chapter, under the various heading of qualitative 
or quantitative development. Moreover, the main recommendation 
made in the final report was very similar to the plan for the 
future development of YOP which, by then, was already being imple-
mented by the MSC. This recommendation was that "YOP should be 
re-launched as a 12 month programme of vocational preparation and 
further education, available to every 16-18 year old who wishes to 
take apvantage of it."(lll) Despite the fact that it was thus in 
a sense overtaken by events, Quality or Collapse? was nevertheless 
a significant document. It provided the public with a detailed 
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and coherent analysis both of why such a re-launch of the programme 
was necessary and of what this implied, particularly with regard 
to the crucial importance of quality improvement. 
The Quality or Collapse? analysis was to a large extent agreed 
with by the senior MSC officials responsible for the development 
of special programmes policy. Already in November 1980, a paper 
had been presented to the Special Programmes Boardwhich set out a 
new framework for quality improvement within YOP.(112) The 
introduction listed a number of factors, such as the programme's 
continuing growth in scale, which needed to be recognised as 
limitations on the scope of any future plan for quality 
improvement. "Nevertheless," it was emphasised, "vigorous efforts 
must be made and must be seen to be made." Otherwise, "the 
credibility of YOP could quickly evaporate." 
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By January 1981, the date of the publication of Quality or Collapse? 
a more detailed 'Quality Improvement Plan' was ready to be 
presented to the Special Programmes Board. The first point which 
needs to be noted is that, although this plan was ostensibly 
a response to the Secretary of State's relaunching of YOP towards 
the goal of a comprehensive training programme, it still took 
the Holland Report as its starting point for the framing of 
objectives. Thus, the quality standards, which had originally 
been set as requirements for YOP as a limited special programme, 
were now to be revamped as the basis of the quality improvement 
strategy required for YOP's transformation towards a comprehensive 
training programme. This perhaps provides an initial indication 
that the plan may not have been quite all that it was made out to 
be. 
The actual content of the Quality Improvement Plan is difficult 
to summarise. This is mainly because the list of its fundamental 
objectives appears to have been set out differently in almost 
each of the documents in which it was discussed. The most 
concise list was provided by the Review of the Third Year of Special 
Programmes. This stated that there were three medium term 
objectives: 
" the development of young people's basic skills 
such as calculating, practical problem solving and 
the use of tools; 
- systematic development of model schemes linked 
to particular fields of employment; 
- ensuring that all involved with YOP at a local 
level, including young people themselves, be given 
a clear understanding of YOP, its objectives and the 
indi vidual's progress in the Programme." ( 113) 
Other lists mentioned variously: the development of a framework 
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of occupational clusters and related curricula for the improvement 
of job-specific learning; the improvement of off-the-job learning 
provision; the improvement of the operational competence of the SPD; 
the improvement of personal support and advice for the trainess; 
and the provision of a pedagogical underpinning to these other 
objectives in terms of the development of teaching aids and 
materials In each case,these objectives tend to have been 
stated as generalised aspirations rather than as precise goals 
against which future progress could be measured. This perhaps 
is not surprising, given how unsatisfactory the programme's 
performance was at this time in relation to some of the more 
straightforward quantitative gauges of quality improvement. It 
might be remembered, for example, that it was in March 1981 that 
the MSC had to recognise that YOP's monitoring system had broken 
down and abandon some 40,000 outstanding visits. 
In fact, the purpose of the Quality Improvement Plan and its 
various lists of objectives appears to have been mainly 
presentational. Both the MSC's own analysis and that of Quality or 
Collapse? demanded that there should be a major initiative on the 
quality improvement front to save YOP from imminent collapse. 
However, the quality of the programme could not be transformed 
overnight, and the MSC was already doing virtually everything 
that it ould, given its limited resources and the ever-increasing 
scale of provision. Yet, if a major new initiative was thus 
impossible, it was still vital that the appearance of one should 
be given. The Quality Improvement Plan fulfilled this function 
by providing a loose framework in which all the various piecemeal 
initiatives already taking place, such as Grouping of Skills, 
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Trainee Centred Reviewing etc., could be bundled together and 
presented in the form of something new and important. Of course, 
these various initiatives would have had to be brought together 
into a single plan at some stage in YOP's transformation. However, 
in January 1981, most of their work was still in the process of 
development, and by no means ready to be implemented on the scale 
required to make a significant impact upon the level of quality 
throughout the programme as a whole. Their re-packaging in the 
form of Quality Improvement Plan was necessary at this stage to 
distract attention away from what was actually happening on the 
ground, where in many respects quality was deteriorating. 
Essentially, the plan was ~ stop-gap measure, stalling criticism 
and enabling the programme to survive until the various quality 
initiatives were in fact ready to be implemented. 
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9. The New Training Initiative 
Being seen to be doing something about quality improvement 
was not enough. Survival also depended upon a rapid response being 
made to the Secretary of State's remarks about the eventual goal 
of YOP's development and its wider significance. The first stage 
of this response was the publication in May 1981 of the MSC 
Consultative Document, A New Training Initiative (N.T.I.). 
This was presented as the starting point of an attempt on the 
part of the MSC to reassess and reorganise the whole process of 
manpower training in this country. To this end, the document set 
out three major and inter-related objectives for training in the 
1980s. The first concerned better arrangements for skill training 
to agreed standards; the second, improving vocational education 
and training for all_young people; the third, opening up more 
opportunities for adults to train. All three of these objectives 
were understood to have some bearing on the future of YOP, but 
obviously it was the second that was of primary significance 
to the development of the programme. Stated in more detail, this 
second objectives was 
" ... (to) move towards a position where all young 
people under the age of 18 have the opportunity 
either of continuing in full-time education or 
of entering a period of planned work experience 
combined with work related training and education."(115) 
The statement of this objective confirmed the MSC's recognition of 
the fact that provision for the young unemployed could no longer 
be maintained within a special programmes framework. At the 
same time, it reiterated and gave substance to the Secretary of 
State's promises concerning the future development of YOP. Thus, 
the goal was established of a comprehensive programme of foundation 
training for all young people not in full-time education, including 
the employed as well as the unemployed. Moreover, as one of the 
three principle objectives of the NTI, this goal was firmly integ-
rated within the MSC's new interpretation of its whole training 
strategy. This meant that the development of YOP could once more 
be positively aligned within the MSC's comprehensive approach to 
manpower policy. First, as an integral element of the new training 
strategy, the future development of YOP could be regarded as 
fulfilling the dual economic and social functions required for 
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it to contribute to an active manpower policy. Secondly, with 
reference to the principle of limited intervention within the labour 
market, the goal of this development in a comprehensive form of 
provision for all under 18s not in full-time education marked an 
acknowledgement of the fact that YOP was rapidly substituting 
itself for the normal workings of the youth labour market. Yet, 
at the same time, it had the effect of separating off the whole 
age group from the adult labour market. Thus, the principle of 
limited intervention was to be restored with regard to young 
people by taking them completely out of the normal labour market. 
Finally, with regard to the MSC's corporatist style of policy-making, 
it should be noted that the NTI was initially presented in the form 
of a consultative document. This process of consultation provided 
the means of establishing a new consensus, not only for the 
NTI as a whole, but also for the future development of YOP as an 
integral element thereof. 
The outcome of the consultative process was a document entitled 
A New Training Initiative: An Agenda for Action, which was 
published by the MSC in December 1981. This stressed the support 
which had been received for the objectives of the NTI, both from 
the Government and from the other major interests concerned. (115) 
Having· successfully established this consensus, it was possible 
for a more detailed 'agenda for action' to be proposed. In 
particular, the wider agreement over the second objective was 
perceived as 'an important milestone' (116)' and the need was 
expressed to take as rapid steps as possible towards the realisation 
of the goal of a comprehensive scheme of training and vocational 
preparation for all young people not continuing in full-time 
education. (117) The first such step was to be the establishment 
of a 'high level task group' representing the usual MSC grouping 
of interested parties, which was to examine and report on the 
structure, scope and content of such a general scheme, and to 
propose a time-table for the transition towards its full implem-
entation. (118) Meanwhile, as far as YOP was concerned, the next 
step was to be the creation for its final year of 100,000 
"new style" twelve month high quality training opportunities, as 
a preliminary to the up-grading of the programme irto a proper 
training scheme covering all unemployed school leavers by 
September 1983.(119) Finally, in order to be ready for this 
transition of a special programme into a comprehensive training 
scheme, an immediate step for the MSC itself was to be the 
preparation for the early amalgamation of its Training Services 
and Special Programmes Divisions. Significantly, this was said 
to be a pre-requisite for the Commission to be able to fulfil its 
new responsibilities within the New Training Initiative. (120) 
The Conservative Government had endorsed the three broad 
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objectives of the NTI as soon as the original consultative document 
was published in May 1981. Immediately after the MSC's publication 
of its 'Agenda for Action', in December 1981, the Government 
brought out.a White Paper entitled A New Training Initiative 
A Programme for Action which set out its own interpretation 
of what needed to be done next. (121) By and large it was consistent 
with the MSC's plans. However, with regard to the training scheme 
that was to be introduced immediately following the end of YOP 
in 1983, the White Paper went into far more detail and at times 
gave an emphasis that was not altogether consistent with the 
MSC's thinking on this matter. Probably the most important 
difference concerned the way in which the new training scheme 
to be introduced in 1983 was regarded in relation to the ultimate 
aim of a general training scheme for all young people not 
continuing in full-time education. 
The White Paper introduced the Government's conception of the 
new Youth Training Scheme (Y.T.S.) as a continuation of 
'special provision' for the young unemployed which would be required 
over 'the next few years' '(122) The MSC's task group 
investigating the 'possibilities' of a wider and more general 
training scheme for all young people was acknowledged, but it 
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was said that priority must be given to the young unemployed. (123) 
Meanwhile, the development of existing training provision for those 
young people in employment was to be encouraged, but it was still 
stated that the best way of providing such training was through 
private arrangements made by employers'(124) The YTS was thus 
presented by the Government as a new form of temporary special 
provision for the young unemployed, without any foreseeable means 
of transition to the ultimate objective of NTI - a permanent 
training scheme for all young people under the age of 18 and not 
in full-time education. 
The other major point of difference between the Government and 
the MSC concerned the extent to which unemployed young people 
should be compelled to participate in the new training scheme. 
The Government's White Paper proposed that unemployed minimum 
age school leavers covered by the guarantee of a place on the new 
YTS should not be eligible for supplementary benefit in their 
own right until at least a year after the date at which they left 
school. Any young person in this category who did not 'choose' 
to join in the new scheme would be assumed to be financially 
dependent on their parents, to whom child benefit would continue 
to be paid'(125) This, in fact, was a return to the same form 
of effective financial compulsion that had been used during the 
20s and 30s to ensure the attendance of unemployed 16 to 18 year 
olds at the Junior Unemployment/Instruction Courses. As such, 
it put in jeopardy the principle of voluntarism to which the MSC 
had previously adhered in its administration of all forms of 
provision. (126) Both these points of difference with the 
Government over the YTS put in jeopardy the consensus that the MSC 
had built up around the basic objectives of the NTI'(127) However, 
the White Paper left a way out for compromise by stating that the 
Government welcomed the establishment of the task group, and would 
be 'fully prepared to consider re-allocating resources available 
for young people in any way which may contribute more 
effectively to their futures."(128) 
When the Youth Task Group published its report in April 1982, 
it deliberately set out to change the emphasis that the Government 
had put upon the introduction of its Youth Training Scheme as 
another impermanent special provision for the young unemployed. 
Thus the opening paragraph asserted : 
"This report is about providing a permanent 
bridge between school and work. It is not 
about youth unemployment. What we propose will 
improve the prospects of young people to get 
and keep jobs but we have not been concerned with 
temporary measures."(129) 
The report went on to emphasise the importance of moving 
towards a comprehensive scheme as soon as possible, rather than 
attempting further development within the existing framework of 
separate schemes for the employed and the unemployed. The limit 
placed by the Government on the total of resources available ruled 
out the possibility of moving straight to the ultimate goal of 
a scheme covering all young people under the age of 18 who had 
left full-time education. (130) However, the report set 1985 
as a target date for the meeting of this ultimate objective. 
Meanwhile, it recommended that in September 1983: 
"a start should be made by initially providing 
opportunities for all 16 year olds who have left 
full-time education for work and for those 
leaving full-time education aged 17 who become 
unemployed within the first year of leaving"(131) 
The Government's guarantee was still only to apply to unemployed 
16 year olds, and employers would still be free to employ young 
people of this age outside the new scheme: (132) nevertheless, 
the intent of being a comprehensive scheme was to be made clear 
in practice form the very outset. 
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With regard to its other major point of difference with the 
Government, the MSC reasserted the importance of the scheme 
being voluntary for all its participants, both sponsors 
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and trainees. (133) On both points of difference, the MSC eventually 
prevailed. The report received the unanimous backing of all 
the interested parties represented on the Task Group, (134) and 
in the face of this new consensus the Government was forced to 
relent. In June 1982 the Secretary of State for Employment, 
Norman Tebbit, announced the Government's approval of the plans 
made by the Task Group, though he still left himself the option 
to remove the eligibility of 16 year olds to receive supplementary 
benefit at some later date.(135) 
10. Towards a Comprehensive Training Scheme? 
The Youth Task Group Report was intended to mark the 
end of the whole special measures approach as far as the 
MSC's response to youth unemployment was concerned. In one 
simple move the problem of youth unemployment was defined out of 
existence and replaced by the historic opportunity of a 
comprehensive training scheme for all young people. (136) However, 
the real transformation that was necessary on the ground was by 
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no means such a simple matter. The NTI and the Youth Task Group 
Report may have succeeded in reconstructing the consensus required 
for YOP to survive until the end of its fifth year; but, unless 
during this final year there was clear evidence of a large-scale 
qualitative transformation taking place, this was likely to provide 
only temporary relief from the crisis of credibility affecting the 
whole arEaof policy. 
Our account of quality improvement within YOP left off with the 
Quality Improvement Plan being used as a holding operation whilst 
the various development projects completed their work. The main 
feature of the fourth year of YOP continued to be that of quantit-
ative expansion. As we have already seen in the previous chapter, 
the increase to 440,000 entrants announced by the Secretary of 
State in November 1980 soon proved inadequate, and in July 1981 
had to be raised by a further 110,000. The MSC's local staff 
were severely stretched to find these extra places, particularly 
given the additional pressure of the new Christmas deadline for 
the school leaver undertaking. Consequently, as already indicated 
by the quantitative gauges of quality improvement, little could be 
done during this year to raise the overall level of quality 
throughout the programme. However, by now the various quality 
development initiatives were producing their results, and it 
was possible to set up a small number of model 'high quality YOP 
schemes' showing the way forward for the future. Moreover, the 
large quantitative expansion of the programme which took place 
during this fourth year meant that a plateau was reached as far 
as the number of entrants was concerned. This provided the 
opportunity that was necessary for large-scale quality develo-
ments to be implemented during the final year. 
The MSC's ~genda for Action' had set the target of 100,000 
'new style' twelve month high quality training places being 
available during 1982/83. In the Youth Task Group Report 
it was stated that these would be ready by September 1982.(137) 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there were in fact only 
some 80,000 New Training Place entrants during this final year 
of YOP, and the target of 100,000 places was not reached until 
later during 1983. Nevertheless, given that at its peak there 
were just over 300,000 filled places on the programme, this 
represented the upgrading of a substantial proportion of total 
provision. Moreover, it must also be considered that during 
this year quality improvements were being introduced on many of 
the other schemes in order to prepare them for the full trans-
formation to YTS in September 1983. 
However, the real significance of these apparent changes during 
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the final year of YOP depended upon the actual content of the 
upgrading processes being implemented at the ground level of the 
programme. The diffferent forms of New Training Place, and their 
key elements of content in common, have already been described. (138) 
Certain of the elements of content were already specified for 
exi~ting YOP schemes; however, others were derived from the 
various research and development initiatives, and generally all 
of the specifications were more detailed and demanding than had 
previously been the case. Yet, these were still only changes 
in the formal elements of content and, as such, did not necessarily 
constitute real quality improvement. 
When the assessment of the qualitative performance of YOP was 
initially considered in the previous chapter, it was pointed 
out that quality could only be directly apprehended at the level 
of the individual scheme or course. (139) Subsequently, in the 
course of this chapter, it has been said of a number of issues 
that they are considered in more detail by the local case study. 
The question of the real impact of the NTP upgrading process at 
the ground level of the programme is another of these issues. 
The local case study was carried out during the latter months 
of the final year of YOP, and thus it provided the opportunity 
to examine alongside each other both 'new style' and 'old style' 
schemes. The presentation of the conclusions of this local case 
study is to be the concern of the next chapter of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE LOCAL CASE STUDY 
Introduction 
The local case study was carried out in the Portsmouth 
Travel-to-Work Area during the period between October 1982 and 
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April 1983. There were two main phases of research. The first 
consisted of the collection of background information about the local 
labour market and the development of YGP provision within it. 
The second involved a series of visits to a sample of local schemes 
and courses. Detailed accounts of both these phases are presented 
in a separate appendix, as are explanations of why such a local 
case study was carried out and why the Portsmouth Travel-to-Work 
Area was chosen for this purpose. Briefly, the object of the case 
study was to construct a detailed picture of what the Youth 
Opportunities Programme actually involved at the level of one 
particular local labour market. This was considered to be espec-
ially important, given the extent to which YOP was a locally 
organised form of provision. The Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area 
was chosen both for reasons of convenience, and because it appeared 
to be a local labour market which had certain unique features and yet 
was not unrepresentative in general terms. 
The detailed account of the local case study presents a consider-
able volume of empirical data. Some is of a factual and technical 
nature, some -is more descriptive and discursive. The object of 
this chapter is to draw out certain generalisations which can be 
related back to the central themes of the national level analysis. 
The first (and easiest) generalisation to make concerns the immense 
variety and complexity of the local programme. The analysis of 
YOP as a national programme has already established that it was 
not a single uniform provision, but rather a number of distinct 
forms of provision brought together under a single framework. 
The account of the local programme is structured primarily in 
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accordance with the three main sectors of provision - WEEP 
schemes, other work experience schemes, and the various forms of 
training course - and, within each of the latter two sectors, the 
different formal categories of schemes and courses are further 
distinguished. Yet, what is apparent from the descriptions is the 
extent to which the range and variety of individual schemes and 
courses developed beyond these formal distinctions, and to a 
certain degree across them. This was particularly so in the two 
work experience sectors, where the character of an individual scheme 
often depended more upon the nature of the organisation and 
personnel involved than upon the formal category to which it 
happened to belong. 
Within each of the three main sectors, the accounts presented are 
further structured in accordance with the elements of content 
formally~rescribedfor the schemes and courses which they included. 
The original plan was to provide a brief description of what 
each of these formal elements of content signified at the ground 
level of the programme. This format has for the most part been 
maintained, though at times it was placed under considerable 
strain. As with the formal distinctions between different types of 
schemes and courses, so with the formal definitions of their 
content, it was found that such categories were not always the most 
relevant to describe what was actually taking place. In fact, as 
the local case study progressed, there seemed to be a general 
tendency for the formal terms in which the programme was described 
at the national level to lose their capacity to describe what was 
significant on the ground. 
Obviously, in any institution or programme there will be some 
distinction between the way in which things appear from the bottom 
as opposed to the top. However, in the case of YOP, it would seem 
that this distinction between perspectives was considerably larger 
than might normally be expected. Explanations for this are not 
difficult to find. In the first place, as already emphasised, YOP 
was to a large extent a locally organised programme. Secondly, 
and more important, it was not directly delivered by the MSC, but 
relied upon the voluntary participation of sponsors and course 
providers. Very little of the provision could be described as 
'purpose-built'; rather it was a case of making use of whoever 
and whatever happened to be available. This being so, the 
development of the programme at the local level could not be 
tightly controlled in terms of formal structures. These 
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could only provide a loose framework around which the pattern of 
provision had to be allowed to grow in accordance with the local 
conditions, and the interests and capacities of those most 
directly responsible for its delivery. The significance of what 
was happening amongst the complex variety of schemes and courses 
which resulted from this process of growth could not necessarily 
be adequately understood in terms of the formal structures around 
which the local programme had originalijbeen encouraged to develop. 
This first generalisation about the nature of YOP at the local level 
poses a problem with regard to further generalisations. Given that 
there was a certain gap between the understanding of the programme 
in terms of formal structures at the national level and the 
significance of the complex reality of individual schemes and 
courses at the local lev~ generalisations derived from the local 
case study cannot necessarily be fed directly back into the wider 
analysis of the programme. However, despite the wide range and 
variety of individual schemes and courses, it was possible to 
identify within each sector a certain underlying logic to the way 
in which the provision had developed and performed. Preliminary 
generalisations with regard to each of the three main sectors are 
presented in the appendix under the headings of 'Overall Impressions'. 
These now need to be linked up and presented in a form that can be 
fed back directly lnto the wider analysis of the programme as a 
whole. For this purpose, I intend to pose a number of key questions 
on the basis of which a selective summary can be presented of the 
material that has been covered by the local case study, rendering 
what was most significant at the local level in a form that can 
be more readily translated into the terms of the wider analysis. 
These questions are as follows: (1) How relevant was the range 
of provision to the needs of the local labour market? 
(2) What were the most important factors affecting the 
quality of content of individual schemes and courses? (3) To 
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what extent did the programme interfere with the normal workings of 
the local labour market? (4) How significant was the impact of 
the various quality improvement initiatives upon individual schemes 
and courses? (5) What were the implications of the above factors 
with regard to the implementation of the Youth Training Scheme 
at the local level? 
The questions all concern issues in relation to which the persp-
ective of the local case study was able to provide a significant 
extension of the knowledge and understanding that had previously 
been gained from the national level analysis of the development and 
performance of YOP. In contrast, the statistical data concerning 
the quantitative development and performance of the programme 
was generally more complete at the national level than it was at 
the local level. Nevertheless, it was necessary to draw together 
some of the equivalent local statistics as background information 
in order to provide some further indication of how representative 
the local area might be. Obviously, there are inherent limits 
to what any single local case study can prove. However, I consid-
ered it important to demonstrate by using certain common points 
of reference that I had not chosen a particularly abnormal local 
example. 
The statistical data and other background information presented 
in the full account of the local case study confirm that in general 
terms the Portsmouth Travel-To-Work Area was not an unrepresentative 
local labour marke~. The unemployment rate was just below the 
national average and, in terms of structure, there were to be 
found alongside each other both the problems of declining tradit-
ional industries and the potential of growth industries based on 
new technologies and services. The slightly more favourable than 
average state of unemployment in the local labour market was 
reflected in the local quantitative performance of YOP. In general 
the various undertakings to provide young people with places in 
the programme were more nearly met than was the case on average 
nationally; and, from such information as was available, it would 
appear that the ratio of employed to unemployed trainees on leaving 
local schemes and courses was somewhat above the national average. 
Although in these general terms the Portsmouth Travel-To-Work 
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Area could be considered to be close to the national average, and if 
anything in a slightly favoured position, it did nevertheless have 
a distinctive character as a local labour market and its own 
particular problems. The key factor was the naval connection and 
the traditional dependence of the local economy on the employment 
provided by the Dockyard, which was in the process of being run 
down. 
1. Relevance 
The fact that, although fairly representative in general 
terms, the Portsmouth Travel-To-Wor~ Area did have a distinctive 
character and particular problems as a local labour market was 
of importance with regard to the question of the relevance of 
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the range of local provision. However, the assessment of relevance 
required a considerably more detailed analysis of the structure and 
trends of employment~nthe local economy. The original intention 
was that the background information phase of the local case study 
would provide such an analysis. But, despite considerable efforts, 
it proved possible to go only slightly beyond the level of the 
generalisations that have already been referred to. Detailed, 
up-to-date statistical information about the local labour market 
was simply not available. 
At the beginning of 1983 when this research was being carried out, 
the most recent reliable figures for the number and distribution of 
employees in employment with the Portsmouth TWA were those from the 
1977 Employment Census. Thus, over the whole period of YOP's 
existence - a period of almost unprecedented change in terms of 
labour markets - there were no new figures for the number and 
distribution of employees in employment. There had been another 
Employment Census in 1981, but the local results were not due until 
1984. (1 ) All that it was possible to do was to use the national 
results of this Census in order to make estimates of what might be 
expected to have happened locally since 1977. This of course to 
a certain extent undermined the original purpose of carrying out 
a local analysis. Furthermore, similar problems were encountered 
with the data which was specifically concerned with the entry of 
school leavers into the local labour market. Although certain 
up-to-date Careers Service figures existed for the South East 
Division of Hampshire (which was the practical equivalent of 
the Portsmouth TWA), trends in these figures could only be traced 
back over previous years for Hampshire as a whole. (2) Finally, 
it should be pointed out that all of these statistics were concerned 
with the industrial analysis of employment, as opposed to its 
occupational distribution. Yet,from the point of view of 
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vocational preparation, it is occupations rather than industries that 
are of direct significance. An industrial analysis can give some in-
dication of occupational distribution, but it needs to be taken 
into account, for example, that by no means everybody who is 
employed in the engineering industry is an engineer. 
Thus, the information necessary to make a detailed assessment of the 
relevance of the range of provision to the local labour market 
was not available. Yet, by the same token, neither was this 
information available to those who were responsible for planning 
the local programme. In so far as such planning attempted 
to take account of the distribution of employment opportunities 
within the local labour market, it could only do so in general terms. 
Likewise, any assessment of its success in doing so could only be 
made at a similar level of generality. 
In each of the three sectors of the programme, the case study 
attempted to establish what efforts had been made to relate the range 
or provision to the local labour market and to assess how successful 
these efforts had been. In the case of the WEEP sector, which as 
nationally was by far the largest of the three, there appears to have 
been little conscious effort made to relate the range of schemes 
available to the situation of the local labour market. The occup-
ational distribution of the schemes being provided depended largely 
upon which employers came forward as sponsors, or were allowed to 
do so by their unions. Nevertheless, as it happened, there seemed 
to be a certain natural tendency for this distribution to reflect 
in general terms the overall distribution of employment within the 
local labour market. Certainly, from the evidence available, it 
would appear that the movement which could be expected to be taking 
place away from traditional industries and towards various forms of 
service employment was registered in the occupational bias of this 
sector of provision. The only problem was that this bias did not 
necessarily correspond with the interests and aspirations of the 
unemployed young people for whom places had to be found. These, in 
so far as they had any realistic basis, appeared to correspond 
more closely to the traditional pattern of the local labour 
market. 
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The other two sectors, the non-WEEP work experience schemes and the 
various forms of training course, allowed more scope for conscious 
planning in so far as they were to a greater extent purpose-built 
provision. However, in neither of these two sectors can it be said 
that there was systematic planning in relation to labour market 
needs. Rather, the planning which took place was sporadic, and often 
courses and schemes had simply been set up under what were considered 
to be the 'obvious headings'. In the few cases where efforts were 
made to plan provision in relation to specific needs identified in 
the local labour market, these do not appear necessarily to have been 
more successful if judged by their capacity to place trainees in 
employment. This illustrates once again the lack of reliable up-
to-date labour market information. Yet, even if this information had 
been available, these sectors of provision could not have been planned 
systematically in response to it. Most of the schemes and courses 
were only to a limited extent 'purpose-built'. The restrictions 
placed on both resources and staff recruitment meant that new provision 
could not simply be set up in whatever vocational area was considered 
to hold out the brightest prospects for the future. In most cases, 
all that could be used were staff and facilities that were already 
in some respect redundant. Thus, they were available and could be 
afforded as YOP provision precisely because there was a lack of 
demand in their area of the local labour market. As a result, the 
bias in the occupational distribution of these schemes and courses 
naturally tended to be towards those traditional industries which were 
in decline. There was though one notable exception, the Information 
Technology Centre, which had been deliberately planned to respond 
to what had been identified as an area of growth in the local labour 
market. Yet, it was only capable of doing so because of the unique 
funding and staffing arrangements which allowed it to purchase 
expensive new capital equipment, and to recruit experienced and well-
trained staff from a highly competitive sector of the labour market. 
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In this sense, it was the exception that proved the rule. 
Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the general occupational 
bias of these two sectors towards the declining traditional 
industries helped to balance the opposite bias of the WEEP sector, 
and in doing so gave more scope for individual young people's career 
aspirations to be taken into account. 
Neither the local programme as a whole, nor its individual sectors, 
can be said to have been planned in a systematic way to respond 
to the needs of the local labour market. Yet, in so far as can be 
judged from the limited information available, it would appear that 
the natural dynamics of the way in which provision was constituted 
in each of the three sectors combined to produce a certain rough 
and ready correspondence. On the one hand, in the WEEP sector, which 
accounted for the majority of provision, the occupational distrib-
ution of places tended to reflect the developing pattern of local 
employment, with a certain bias towards the growing service sector. 
On the other hand, the two smaller sectors of yap provision tended 
to have an occupational bias in the opposite direction, towards the 
traditional industrial pattern of local employment. Together, 
they offered a certain balance between the likely pattern of future 
demand in the local labour market, and the existing pattern of young 
people's job aspirations. It could of course be argued that only 
the first of these two factors should have been taken into account, 
and that otherwise young people were being led down occupational 
blind alleys. However, some obligation existed to take into account 
the aspirations of individual young people and, given the uncertainty 
of the future pattern of demand in the local labour market, there was 
a good case for balancing the two considerations. Moreover, given 
the general lack of reliable, up-to-date and detailed local labour 
market information, there was little point in attempting to plan 
the range of provision any more systematically. For yap, with its 
limited emphasis on vocational training, a rough and ready corresp-
ondence relying on whatever happened to be available was probably 
good enough. The implications for YTS, however, will have to be 
considered below. 
2. Quality of Content 
With regard to the second question, concerning the key 
factors determining quality of content, it will be remembered 
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that it was noted above how the categories of content which formally 
defined the various schemes and courses were not always the most 
relevant for describing what was actually taking place. For each 
of the three sectors, the descriptive accounts of the local case 
study are structured in accordance with formal categories such as 
recruitment, induction, planned work experience, off-the-job-
training, counselling, etc. Yet, often these accounts merely serve 
to demonstrate how empty these formal categories were in relation 
to the reality of what was taking place on individual schemes and 
courses. This was particularly so in the WEEP sector where, looked 
at on the ground, the formal requirements were of a most minimal 
nature, amounting to little more than a matter of presentation. In 
the other two sectors the equivalent requirements meant more, and the 
fact that there was closer monitoring ensured that they were adhered 
to with greater strictness. Nevertheless, adherence to formal require-
ments was no guarantee of quality. This of course begs the question 
of what is meant by quality. But, if quality is defined broadly 
in terms of the scope and encouragement given for individual trainees 
to learn and develop, then certainly the key factor on which it 
depended was not an adherence to the formal requirements of content, 
but the capacity and interest of the organisations and individual 
staff who were most directly responsible for the delivery of the 
provision. 
This general point can be well illustrated in relation to a particular 
element of content, off-the-job-training. It will be remembered 
that the percentage of work experience trainees receiving some form 
of off-the-job-training was one of the quantitative gauges of quality 
provided at the national level of analysis. What the local case 
study revealed was that this percentage figure was of limited' 
significance, since it could not necessarily be assumed that the 
availability of off-the-job-training made any positive contribution 
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to the quality of a scheme. Quality did not simply depend upon 
there being off-the-job-training, it depended upon what this 
off-the-job-training consisted of and whether it was adequately 
integrated with the rest of the scheme. The evidence of the local 
case study was that much of the off-the-job-training provided in the 
Portsmouth TWA, and particularly that under the heading of Social 
and Life Skills, was inadequately integrated and made little positive 
contribution to the schemes with which it was associated. The 
exceptions depended upon particular combinations of individuals and 
institutions. What is more it is arguable that, given the right 
kind of supervisory staff, social and life skills could be as 
adequately imparted on-the-job, without any need for a formal off-
the-job element. Certainly this was the experience of Community 
Industry, which operated outside the formal frameworks of YOP. 
Thus far, throughout this analysis of the factors affecting quality at 
the local level, the role of individual providers has been emphasised 
as being more important than the definitions provided by formal 
structures. Given this emphasis, it is necessary to consider what 
the local case study revealed about the training and recruitment 
of staff. It will be remembered also that the volume of training of 
sponsors' staff taking place was the second of the quantitative 
gauges of quality referred to in the national analysis. As with the 
off-the-job training for the trainees, the contribution that this 
training made to the overall quality of provision depended upon its 
effectiveness as well as its volume. The evidence of the local case 
study on this' matter was less conclusive than in the case of off-
the-job training. Whereas most trainees expressed negative opinions 
of any off-the-job training they may have received, the opinions 
of supervisors on the value of MSC staff training were fairly evenly 
mixed. However, the evidence from Community Industry, (3)where the 
'scheme consultants' appeared to manage quite adequately without 
any such formal training, gave grounds for a certain amount of 
sceptism as to whether it was really necessary. Moreover, whatever 
the actual contribution of the training of sponsors' staff may have 
been, it should be remembered that it only affected one of the three 
main sectors of provision - the non-WEEP work experience schemes. 
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Although WEEP scheme staff were technically eligible for the 
same training, the evidence of the local case study confirmed that 
this was not a real factor to be taken into consideration. As for 
the training course sector (including the provision of off-the-job 
training), specific training for college staff undertaking YOP 
work was only just getting way on a systematic basis at the time of 
this research, and already it was being overtaken by the approach 
of YTS. Finally, the assessment of the effectiveness of such staff 
training as there was must be further qualified in relation to a 
consideration of staff recruitment. In the WEEP sector, of course, 
staff were not recruited specifically for YOP work, and this was 
also the case for a considerable proportion of the training course 
sector. Moreover, in the areas where staff were recruited specifically 
for YOP work, there were limitations on the choice that could 
be made. In particular, the non-WEEP work experience schemes had 
to recruit their staff off the unemployment registers. More generally, 
the nature of the pay and conditions of YOP work in both sectors 
where staff were recruited made it a marginalised and unstable 
form of employment. The effect of thism ~he relevance of the 
training that could be offered in these sectors has already been 
described. As far as quality was concerned, it meant that it was 
not always possible to recruit, or then to retain, the staff who 
would have been best-suited to the needs of the various schemes and 
courses. Rather it was a case of having to make do with those who 
happened to be available and were unable to find employment with 
better prospects elsewhere. These restrictions on the capacity to 
recruit and retain staff inevitably placed further limitations 
on the effectiveness of any staff training programme. However, this 
is not to imply that there were not individuals of high calibre 
and great dedication working within these schemes and courses. 
The point being made is that there was a lack of systematic and 
positive control over the quality of staff throughout the local 
programme, be it either through recruitment or training. 
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The third quantitative gauge of quality considered at the 
national level of analysis was the frequency of monitoring visits. 
O~ce again the significance of this quantitative gauge needs to be 
qualified with reference to the consideration of effectiveness as 
revealed at the local level. The general point about quality that 
has been made on the basis of the evidence of the local case study 
is that it could not necessarily be defined in terms of the formal 
elements of content which were specified for the various schemes and 
courses. This has a particular implication for the effectiveness 
of monitoring, given that quality was monitored primarily in terms 
of such formal requirements. What it implies is that the monitoring 
being carried out was only capable of providing a very limited 
and superficial form of quality control. On the one hand, the formal 
procedures involved could only really assess the level of presentation; 
on the other hand, the staff who were responsible for administering 
these procedures would generally have neither the time nor the 
expertise to investigate any further. These generalisations were 
above all true of the majority WEEP sector, which was by far the 
least regulated of the three. 
In conclusion, what the local case study revealed about quality 
within YOPwas that it could neither be formally defined nor 
systematically measured and controlled. To a large extent it 
depended upon individual circumstances of personnel and organisations 
that could only be influenced to a marginal extent by the local 
administration of the programme. As a result, there was a wide 
range of quality in each of the three sectors of provision. This 
can be understood as a particular aspect of the heterogenuous 
nature of the local programme which resulted from its dependence 
upon whoever and whatever happened to be available. 
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3. Labour Market Interference 
The third of the key questions set out above concerned the 
extent to which the programme interfered with the normal workings 
of the local labour market. In relation to this question, it was 
originally hoped that the local case study would be able to provide 
evidence on two separate levels; first, at the level of the local 
labour market as a whole; and secondly, at the level of individual 
schemes and courses. Unfortunately, however, the lack of detailed 
and up-to-date information about the local labour market, which has 
already been referred to in connection with the earlier question of 
relevance, meant that there was virtually no evidence to found 
at the first of these two levels. In fact, the only point worth 
mentioning is a certain paradox in the relationship between two of 
the available sets of figures which can perhaps be explained in 
terms of the substitution effect of schemes in the WEEP sector. 
It was noted when the relevance of the local programme was being 
considered that the change towards a greater proportion of service 
employment, which could be expected to have taken place in the the 
Portsmouth TWA since 1977 was reflected in the occupational bias 
of the distribution of WEEP schemes. Yet, in 1982, the proportion of 
school leavers in South East Hampshire finding their first jobs in 
service industries was almost 10 per cent less than either the 
proportion of WEEP schemes in this sector or the estimated proportion 
of the total number of employees in local employment at the same date. 
Moreover, since 1977, the number of school leavers entering these 
industries throughout Hampshire had declined by as large a percentage 
as the total entering all forms of employment(4)One possible 
explanation for why the general trend towards a greater proportion 
of service employment was not reflected in these school leavers' 
figures was the impact of the large number of WEEP schemes in this 
sector of employment, some of which might have replaced what other 
wise would have been school leavers' jobs. However, at most this 
can only be considered as a piece of circumstantial evidence, 
and the tenuous way in which the argument has had to be constructed 
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merely illustrates how difficult it was to find any useful 
information whatsoever at this level of the local analysis. Hence, 
the remainder of this consideration of the labour market interference 
of the local programme will concentrate on the evidence that was 
obtainable at the level of the individual schemes and courses. 
The main ways in which YOP might have had an adverse effect on 
the labour market were identified in the national level analysis 
as being through substitution and displacement. These particular 
problems were largely identified with particular sectors of provision. 
Thus, the abuse of trainees being substituted in some form or another 
for permanent employees within the organisation of the sponsor 
was only regarded as being a potential problem in the WEEP sector. 
Similarly, the possibility of the operation of a scheme leading to 
the displacement of employees elsewhere was normally only raised 
as an issue in the context of the non-WEEP work experience sector. 
In fact, such displacement effects were theoretically possible also 
in the WEEP sector, but they were most likely to occur where substit-
ution was already taking place and the employer was gaining an unfair 
competitive advantage through using trainees as 'cheap labour'. 
Also, with regard to the training course sector, it should be taken 
into consideration that in so far as these courses involved elements 
of realistic work experience they too were capable of affecting the 
labour market adversely, in both or either of these two ways. 
However, having mentioned these considerations, I propose to sum 
up separately, first, the evidence of substitution in the WEEP 
sector, and secondly, that of displacement in the non-WEEP work 
experience sector. 
The visits that I made to individual WEEP schemes in the Portsmouth 
TWA did not provide much direct evidence of substitution taking place. 
A single WEEP sponsor acknowledged that on one occasion he had taken 
on a YOP trainee when otherwise he would have had to hire a permanent 
employee. However, the lack of such direct evidence is hardly 
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surprising, given that the only way of obtaining it was to ask 
the sponsors themselves whether the scheme had affected their normal 
pattern of recruitment. Yet, equally, this was the only way 
open to the MSC link officers who were responsible for monitoring 
the schemes and ensuring that such abuse was not taking place. 
As was the case with quality, the main point that my visits made 
me aware of was the virtual impossibility of anybody being able to 
measure or control what was actually happening in these schemes. 
Essentially, WEEP sponsors were on trust. So long as they made some 
attempt to present what they were doing in the required form, they 
could use the trainees much as they liked, including as substitutes 
for permanent employees. Although the individual sponsors whom 
I spoke to denied that this was what they personally were doing, 
most of them acknowledged that it was a prevalent practice in the 
area of industry of which they had direct experience, and thought 
that this was inevitable given the format of the schemes. The 
national level analysis concluded that the rate of substitution 
amongst WEEP schemes was probably at least 30 per cent. Those in 
a position to have an overview of the local programme, such as the 
Careers Service, put the figure as high as 50 per cent. Yet, only 
a minute fraction of these schemes were ever closed down. The MSC 
would investigate any specific complaints, but even then it was 
virtually impossible to prove that an abuse had taken place, and 
often all that they could do was to seek the sponsor's assurance 
that the scheme was being run in accordance with the rules. 
Obviously, there is room for much speculation as to what the actual 
rate of substitution was in the local programme. What is clear is 
that the situation was not under control. 
Although there was little evidence of trainees being substituted 
directly for permanent employees, the programme of visits that I 
made to individual WEEP schemes did confirm the widespread existence 
of a more indirect form of substitution. This involved the use 
of the scheme as a substitute for the sponsor's normal system of 
recruitment and selection. Regardless of whether in the first place 
the trainees were substitutes or genuinely additional, the sponsor 
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could use the scheme as a means of trying out potential employees 
at public expense and with no obligation upon themselves. In 
theory, the provision of work experience could still be regarded 
as being separate from the selection and recruitment of permanent 
employees, but in practice they merged into a single process. 
Even if the individual sponsor was not personally using the scheme 
in this way, there was still a sense in which they could be regarded 
as testing out the youngsters on behalf of local employers collect-
ively. The implications of this form of interference with the normal 
workings of the labour market were not necessarily negative in the 
sense of reducing the total number of job opportunities available. 
However, neither were they necessarily positive. The principal and 
most direct effect was to provide employers, either individually or 
collectively, with a government-funded opportunity to tryout young 
people on 'sale or return'. Indirectly, this may have had some 
impact on the distribution of job opportunities, both amongst young 
people themselves, and between young people and adults. However, 
the effect on the total number of job opportunities available could 
only have been of the most marginal nature. For employers whose 
decisions were governed by commercial principles, the fact that they 
had been given the opportunity to tryout a young person beforehand 
was unlikely to prove the decisive factor in persuading them to 
create an additional job, however good the trainee had turned out 
to be. Certainly, whatever marginal increase in the total number 
of jobs available may have come about through this means, it would 
not have been of the same scale as the most conservative estimate of 
number of permanent jobs being destroyed by means of the direct 
substitution of WEEP trainees. Thus, WEEP schemes were interfering 
with tne normal workings of the labour market principally by offering 
employers an additional sorting mechanism for the selection of new 
recruits. But, there were also side-effects on the total number of 
job opportunities available, of which the negative were clearly 
more significant than the positive, though it was impossible to 
determine the exact scale of either. 
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With reference to the displacement effects associated with the 
non-WEEP work experience sector, one would not expect to find direct 
evidence of these at the level of an individual scheme, since by 
definition displacement was a problem which manifested itself 
elsewhere. However, it was possible to examine the areas of activity 
that were liable to cause displacement, and to establish what 
precautions were being taken against it. The main area of concern 
was where schemes in this sector were involved in the commercial 
production of goods and services. But, beyond this, there was a 
certain inherent danger of other peoples' jobs being affected by 
any form of production which was offered to the outside community, 
whether it was for sale or free. Whether in fact displacement did 
take place, depended on whether someone would otherwise have been 
employed, either directly or indirectly, to provide the goods or 
services being offered by the scheme. The MSC rules, of course, 
stated that if this was the case then the production should not be 
undertaken. But the problem was that, given the general lack of 
information which existed about the local labour market, there was 
no way of telling for sure what the repercussions of certain 
activities might be. The general practice seemed to be to attempt 
to avoid any obvious pitfalls and to consult with the relevant trade 
unions where necessary. Such procedures were for the most part 
sufficient to ensure that the displacement effects of these schemes 
did not become an issue of public controversy. However, this does 
not mean that displacement was not taking place. In a few cases, 
such as the unit which produced cheap imitations of well-known toys, 
the threat posed to other peoples' jobs should have been obvious. 
In many other cases, it was rather that it was impossible to know 
what would have happened otherwise, though it was probable that in 
certain of them someone else would eventually have been employed to 
do what was being carried out by the scheme. The scale of the problem, 
however, could by no means be compared with that of job substitution 
in the WEEP sector. For a start, the non-WEEP work experience sector 
was in itself much smaller; furthermore, it was only in relation 
to certain of its activities that there was a serious likelihood 
of displacement taking place; and, even inthese cases, the effect 
was likely to be both marginal and indirect. 
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No conclusion can be drawn concerning the overall scale of the 
adverse labour market interference of the local programme. What 
can be said, and is of importance, is that in both of the two work 
experience sectors (and by implication equally in the work 
experience elements of the training course sector) there were 
inherent dangers of permanent jobs being destroyed: yet, at the level 
of individual schemes, there was no adequate way of controlling 
these dangers; and, at the level of the local labour market as a 
whole, there was no means whatsoever of measuring their overall 
impact. 
If the answers to these first three questions of relevance, quality 
and labour market interference are now considered together, the 
overall impression that emerges is one of lack of information, 
resources, planning and control. At the national level, the sheer 
scale of numbers involved gave the impression of YOP being a massive 
intervention. At the local level, the numbers still appeared to be 
relatively large but it could be seen more clearly how minimal the 
real content was of most of the places, and hence the impression 
given at the national level was to a large extent reversed. The 
local programme was essentially an ad hoc mobilisation of existing 
resources, and as such it was caught between opposing sets of limit-
ations. On the one hand, in so far as the provision was both 
realistic and relevant, there was an inherent tendency for it to 
substitute in one form or another for what might otherwise have taken 
place through the normal workings of the local labour market. Yet 
on the other hand, in so far as the provision was genuinely additional, 
it could for the most part only make use of staff and resources 
which were redundant within the local economy, and hence it tended 
to be both artificial and irrelevant. 
4. Quality Improvement Initiatives 
The next question that needs to be considered concerns the 
impact of the various quality improvement initiatives at the 
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local level. The fact that the local case study was carried out 
during the final year of YOP made it possible in particular to assess 
the difference made by the introduction of the New Training Places. 
In summing up the conclusions of this assessment, it is necessary 
initially to consider separately the NTPs provided by the upgraded 
schemes of the non-WEEP work experience sector, and those provided 
by the Work Skills Courses, most of which were based in the training 
course sector. 
The evidence that I collected from the NTP work experience schemes 
suggested that the differences made by the up-grading process were 
largely of a superficial nature affecting the wayin which activities 
were presented and described rather than essential nature of what 
was taking place. It has already been noted that quality within YOP 
depended less upon formal structures than upon factors such as staff 
and resources. The upgrading process substantially redefined the 
formal structures of these schemes in accordance with the requirements 
of a high quality vocational training programme, but it did virtually 
nothing to alter the more fundamental limitations upon the quality and 
relevance of provision. There was no substantial upgrading of the 
staffing and resourcing of the schemes. For example, working under 
the same conditions and with very little extra training, staff who 
had been hired off the unemployment register to supervise various 
forms of rudimentary work experience were suddenly expected to take 
on the role of high quality trainers. It seemed to be hoped that the 
introduction of devices and techniques such as Basic Skills Checklists 
and Trainee Centred Reviewing would make the crucial difference. 
However, these were often too complex or too subtle to be used 
effectively by the supervisors at the ground level. What appeared 
to be happening was that they were going through the motions of the 
new procedures while in fact continuing largely as before. This was 
not necessarily a bad thing. It could be argued that the new emphasis 
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on formal vocational training which was being imposed on these 
schemes was interfering with what these schemes were best able to 
do, which was to provide some of the less able trainees in the 
programme with a basic form of work socialisation in a protected 
environment under the supervision of caring but ordinary adult workers. 
In this respect, the model of Community Industry, which did not have 
any pretensions to high quality vocational training, was perhaps 
more appropriate for most of these schemes. Certainly it was if 
their new aspirations were not be backed where it counted, in terms 
of staff and resources. The only real exception was of course the 
ITEC, which as we have seen was exceptional precisely because it had 
been designed, resourced and staffed from the outset as a high 
quality training provision. 
Turning now to the Work Skills Courses, their introduction seems to 
have made a more significant impact. They could simply be regarded 
as a combination of an extended Short Training Course with a six 
month WEEP scheme. However, the doubling the length of the training 
element, and its integration with an external work experience place-
ment, appeared to have an effect on the overall quality of the 
provision which amounted to more than the sum of the different 
component parts involved. Having said this, certain reservations 
must be expressed about the nature and relevance of the quality of 
this provision. The extended length of the formal training course 
element was often being used by its providers to intensify the nature 
of the training taking place in accordance with the traditional 
model of an apprenticeship, rather than to broaden the range of 
skills involved as required by the MSC's conception of quality 
improvement. Moreover, the additional training resources which were 
available to provide for this extension of formal training ~ourse 
provision tended to be concentrated in the traditional areas of 
industry where there had been a sharp decline in the number of 
apprentices. Thus, it could be argued against the local provision 
of Work Skills Courses that, although in a certain sense it represented 
a significant upgrading of the quality of training available, it 
only did so by reproducing a traditional form and pattern of high 
quality skills training which was unlikely to be relevant to the 
future needs of the local labour market. 
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Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of Work Skills Courses, they 
were of limited importance in the long run, since their development 
turned out to a temporary feature which was not to extend on a 
significant scale beyond the final year of YOP. All of the NTPs 
of course were originally intended as pilots for the Youth Training 
Scheme. However, the six months of formal training content made 
the Works Skills Courses expensive to run on a large scale, as well 
as there being doubts about their fulfilling the MSC's objectives 
for high quality training within the new scheme. Thus, by the time 
that I was examining these courses, it was already clear that they 
were not going to fit in with the main pattern of provision for YTS, 
where the minimum requirement of 13 weeks off-the-job-training was 
obviously going to become the norm. 
The demise of Work Skills Courses illustrates a more general point 
which can be made with regard to the impact at the local level of a 
number of quality improvement initiatives that were intended to 
prepare YOP for the transition to YTS. The development work necessary 
for the local implementation of these initiatives was often a slow 
and painstaking business, and in some cases it was only just as 
YOP was ending that it was beginning to have a real impact. Yet, 
by this time, the conception of YTS at the national level had changed 
so as to render this local development no longer strictly relevant 
to the latest blueprint for the future. As a result, it seemed 
that much of the work that had been carried out to improve the quality 
of the local programme, rather than contributing to the preparation 
for YTS, was having to be thrown up and abandoned in the face of the 
imminent arrival of the new scheme. One such example was the 
'Exemplary Projects' initiative concerning the co-ordination of 
off-the-job-training, and it seemed likely that the training system 
being developed for college staff on the basis of the 'Robinson 
Shilling' would be another. To a certain extent the whole of the 
New Training Place development can be regarded in this light. 
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Although there were some employer-based Work Skills Courses, the 
vast majority of the NTPs that were developed during the last year 
of YOP were based either in the non-WEEP work experience sector or 
the training course sector. Yet, when it came to the introduction 
of YTS, these two sectors (as Modes Bl and B2 respectively) were to 
account for only about a quarter of the total provision, while the 
remaining three-quarters was made up by the employer-based (Mode A) 
sector. In this respect, the so-called 'pilot' places of the final 
year of YOP were as much a diversion as a preparation for YTS, and 
this was a cause of considerable resentment amongst certain local 
providers. The main casualties, as we have seen, were the Work Skills 
Courses. Most of the upgraded work experience schemes were to 
survive to take their place in YTS, but in these cases doubt must 
be expressed as to how significant the upgrading process had really 
been. Overall, it must be concluded that the amount of quality 
improvement which took place under YOP that was relevant to the future 
development of YTS was by no means as large as might have appeared 
from the national perspective. 
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5. Implications for YTS 
The final question to be considered concerns the implications 
for the implementation of the Youth Training Scheme at the local 
level of the conclusions that have been drawn from each of the 
previous questions about YOP. The overall impression that has been 
built up of the local programme has been one of a multitudinous 
variety of provision which, underlying the formal structures, 
developed in a largely unplanned and uncontrolled manner depending 
upon whatever resources happened to be most readily available. 
Whatever criticisms may be made about this development, particularly 
about the lack of control over its side-effects, it can be under-
stood as a reflection of YOP's essential nature as a special prog-
ramme. For YTS, however, there could be no such excuse. If the 
transition was to be made from special programme to comprehensive, 
high quality training scheme, it would require a far greater degree 
of positive planning and control at the local level. The key factors 
in this would be relevance and quality. As far as labour market 
interference was concerned, it could be said that the d~~age had 
already been done by YOP. The way in which YTS was set up recognised 
that there was no longer a 'normal' youth labour market. The 
question now was whether the interference which had taken place 
previously could be brought under control and given a certain 
retrospective justification. This would depend crucially on the 
planning and control of the relevance and quality of provision at 
the local level. 
No real effort was made to plan systematically the relevance of 
local YOP provision, and none would have been worthwhile given 
the lack of up-to-date and detailed local labour market information. 
For YOP, a rough and ready correspondence was probably good enough. 
But, if the implementation of YTS was to bring about the transition 
from special programme to proper vocational training scheme, more 
was needed. The vocational training contentofYTS was of course 
intended to be broad-based and adaptable to changing future needs. 
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However, this did not obviate the need for it to be planned 
systematically to relate at a certain level of generality to an 
analysis of the likely future needs of the local labour market. 
Thus, if the vocational training content of YTS was to be organised 
on the basis of Occupational Training Families, in order to ensure 
that it was relevant there would have to be some form of up-to-date 
local labour market analysis that could at least be translated 
in terms of OTFs. At the time that I was undertaking my research 
in the Portsmouth TWA, no such analysis existed and nor was there 
any imminent prospect of one being made. The most that can be said 
is that the need for this kind of information was increasingly 
being recognised. After the completion of my lcoal case study, 
in September 1983, a study group (on which the MSC was represented) 
had been set up to examine the training needs and job destinations 
of young people in the Portsmouth TWA, as well as the training 
resources in the local community and the current situation and 
future prospects of the local economy. The report made by this study 
group concluded as follows: 
"Throughout the investigations that have taken place to 
produce this report a common thread had emerged - in 
almost every aspect under consideration there is insufficient 
and at best out of date information available. The desire 
to rectify this is the prime recommendation of the Study 
Group" . (5) 
When this was being stated, YTS was already at the end of its 
first year of existence, and the implication was that the systematic 
planning of its relevance to the local labour market was still 
a distant prospect. 
The main conclusion drawn about the quality of provision at the 
local level of YOP concerned the extent to which it could neither be 
formally defined, nor systematically measured and controlled, but 
depended upon the individual circumstances of particular schemes 
and courses. The problem to be faced in the implementation of YTS 
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was that of how to make quality systematic throughout the range 
of local provision. The formal requirements of the new scheme were 
of course to be more exacting and more detailed than those of YOP, 
but already we have seen with the New Training Places during the 
final year of YOP that up-graded specifications could not necessarily 
guarantee quality improvement. However, it must be acknowledged that 
YTS also involved a number of important innovations, such as managing 
agencies and accredited centres for staff training, which were likely 
to have a considerable impact upon the problem of quality control 
at the local level. The detailed implications of these changes 
cannot be discussed in this context. What can be said, on the 
basis of the evidence of this local case study, is that at the end of 
YOP there was still almost everything to be done, and whatever 
new formal requirements or systems of control were introduced with 
YTS, it would require considerable time, energy and resources before 
a high level of quality could be systematically combined with 
relevance throughout the whole range of local provision. YOP had 
provided the numbers, but otherwise YTS was having to start virtually 
from scratch. 
One final point must be made. Most of the conclusions drawn 
from this case study have been critical, and have emphasised the 
limitations and problems of the local programme. It should not, 
however, be thought that the existence of these limitations and 
problems meant that the trainees did not benefit from the programme. 
At the national level of analysis, it was noted that surveys and 
research had shown that, even if they did not get jobs, most trainees 
were satisfied with their experience of the programme and h~d received 
a certain boost to their psychological well-being. The direct contact 
that I had with both trainees and their supervisors during my visits 
to schemes and courses confirmed this impression. Even if the quality 
and relevance of provision was not all that it might have been, and 
the trainees felt that they were being exploited as cheap labour, 
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for most of them it was far better than being unemployed. At the 
very least, in the short term it gave some purpose and structure to 
their lives, plus a few pounds more than they could expect to get 
on the dole. The importance of this in personal terms should not 
be underestimated. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that for 
certain individuals the programme brought considerably greater and 
more long-term benefits. Yet, such personal and individual benefits 
were not inconsistent with the fact that from a wider perspective, 
the programme appeared to have no positive long-term impact on the 
position of young people as a whole within the labour market. The 
tragedy was that individual young people's expectations had been 
reduced to the extent that YOP was their only positive option, and 
yet the programme was incapable of affecting the overall situation 
of mass youth unemployment which was responsible for this state of 
affairs. 
Footnotes 
1. A final attempt was made to obtain these figures in 
March 1984, but they were still not available. 
2. Also, the reliability of these figures was open to 
question. They did not appear to be actively used for 
any specific purpose. 
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3. Community Industry was a scheme which operated outside the 
formal regulations of YOP and had its own distinct 
philosophy. As such, it provided an interesting 
perspective for comparison and contrast. For more 
details, see below, Appendix,pp. 512-513. 
4. See below,Appendix, pp. 464-466. 
5. Portsmouth TWA Training Study Group Report, The Local 
Economy - An Assessment of Jobs and Training Particularly 
For Young Persons, City of Portsmouth Planning Department, 
1984, p.12, para 7. 
Chapter 7 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE YOUTH 
OPPORTUNITIES PROGRAMME IN ITS 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT 
1. Summary Assessment of YOP 
The development and performance of the Youth Opportunities 
Programme in relation to its original objectives has now been 
assessed at both the national and local levels. The principle 
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task of this chapter will be to consider the significance of YOP's 
history and achievements in the wider context of its contemporary 
political and economic environment. First, however, it is necessary 
to draw together into a more concise and analytical form the assess-
ments that have been made so far. 
The major achievement of YOP was the sheer scale of the provision 
that it made available. The number of entrants rose from 162,000 
in its first year to over half a million in each of the last 
two years, and in total over 1.8 million young people were 
catered for by the programme over its five year history. Given 
the way in which unemployment rose beyond all expectations, the 
substantial fulfilment of the school leavers undertaking in each 
of its five years was a truly remarkable performance. It must, 
however, be qualified by consideration of the comparative failure 
of the two secondary undertakings to the longer term young unempl-
oyed - a failure compounded by the incomplete and misleading way 
in which their results were reported. Also, it should be taken 
into account that there was a growing number of refusers amongst 
those offered a place on the programme. Nevertheless, the outstand-
ing feature was the huge number of young people who were success-
fully placed on the various schemes and courses. 
The significance of this numerical achievement of course depended 
upon the value of what the schemes and courses were able to provide. 
If the provision had no value at all, then its scale was irrelevant -
1.8 million times zero equals zero. Much of the data presented at 
both national and local levels of analysis has cast doubt on 
the positive value of YOP provision in relation to its stated 
objectives. Yet, before setting out the conclusions drawn from 
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this evidence, it is necessary to make one point clear. In whatever 
other ways YOP may have failed, it succeeded in providing a large 
number of young people with some positive alternative to the 
utter waste and frustration of being unemployed. Thus, the 
evidence available at both national and local levels indicated 
that, despite the growing numbers of refusers and protesters, 
most trainees valued YOP as a positive experience which was clearly 
better than being on the dole. This may not seem to be saying very 
much, but to the individual young people concerned it could mean 
an immense amount in personal terms, even if the effect was only 
temporary. 
The success of YOP that has been described so far was as a social 
programme. It managed to a remarkable extent to keep up with the 
rapidly growing scale of need amongst the young unemployed and 
was able to provide the vast majority of those who entered with 
some form of immediate relief. Yet, as such, it can only be consid-
ered as a palliative. Something more was required if the programme 
was to fulfil a positive economic function. 
The principle economic objective originally set for YOP was to 
enhance the employability of its trainees, as measured by their 
employment placement rates when surveyed after leaving. This 
objective and the means of its assessment were inherited from YOP's 
predecessor, the Work Experience Programme, which had performed 
very successfully in these terms. YOP, however, was unable to 
repeat this success. The average employment placement rate of 
42% was only just over half of that achieved by WEP, and six 
months after leaving the programme, YOP trainees were almost as 
likely to be unemployed as in employment. This comparative failure 
could of course be explained largely by the general deterioration 
in employment prospects which took place during YOP's five year 
lifespan. Yet, by the same token, YOP could not be held solely 
responsible for the limited success that it registered in these 
terms. At both national and local levels, there was evidence 
to suggest that most of the trainees who were placed in permanent 
employment would have found a job anyway. Moreover, of those that 
would not have done so, the vast majority were helped by YOP at 
the expense of other young poeple and adults who were deprived 
of jobs as a result. Such redistribution of employment 
between individuals and age groups, although indicative of YOP's 
capacity to enhance employability, cannot really be regarded as 
having a net positive economic effect. In so far as it was of 
any significance, it was rather another aspect of YOP's impact 
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as a social programme involving the distribution of jobs towards 
those considered to be in most need of them. Indeed, the 
enhancement of trainee's employability could only have a real 
economic impact in so far as it led to the creation of employment 
which would not otherwise have existed, and there was little 
evidence of this taking placeona significant scale. Thus, not 
only was YOP's performance disappointing in relation to its 
principle economic objective of enhancing employability as measured 
by the trainees' employment placement rates, it was also of little 
positive economic significance even in so far as it was successful 
in these terms. 
YOP's secondary claim to having a real economic function was as a 
training programme, or rather as a programme with a substantial 
training content. This depended in the first place on the overall 
balance of the programme between elements of work experience and 
training, and secondly on the scope available to individual trainees 
for planned progression between the different elements. But, given 
that YOP never obtained its intended balance of provision and 
hence was rarely able to offer planned progression to individual 
trainees, in the last analysis the claim depended upon various 
aspects of the intrinsic quality of the separate elements of 
provision, particularly of the work experience schemes which accounted 
for the vast majority of the places on the programme. At the national 
level of analysis, three quantitative gauges were established 
to measure aspects of quality with particular reference to work 
experience schemes. These were: the percentage of work experience 
trainees receiving off-the-job training, the volume of training 
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of sponsors' staff being undertaking, and the frequency of monitoring 
visits to work experience schemes. On all three counts, the 
performance of YOP over its five year lifespan appears to have been 
highly disappointing and unsatisfactory, particularly with regard 
to the WEEP sector which until the final year accounted for roughly 
two-thirds of the total provision throughout the programme. 
The evidence from the local case study, on the one hand, demonstrated 
that quality of content at the level of individual schemes and 
courses did not depend upon the formal elements of content as 
defined and quantified at the national level of analysis. Yet, 
on the other hand, it reinforced the impression gained from such 
quantitative gauges that the quality of provision was by no means 
under systematic control. It also demonstrated, despite there 
being a certain rough and ready correspondence, that there was 
neither the information nor the resources available for the 
relevance of the programme to be planned systematically in relation 
to the needs of a particular local labour market. Thus, at both 
national and local levels, it would appear that the balance and 
content of the programme was determined largely by whatever happened 
to be most readily and cheaply available to provide the necessary 
number of places. As a result, YOP's contribution to its secondary 
economic function of training must be judged as having been 
both marginal and sporadic in relation to the overall scale of 
provisiqn. 
What then was the net economic impact of YOP? In terms of its 
two explicitly stated economic objectives relating to the employ-
ability and training of young people, the positive impact of the 
programme appears to have marginal. Against this has to be considered 
the negative impact of the various abuses and side-effects which 
accompanied the operation of the programme. Evidence at the 
national level suggested that the rate of permanent job substitution 
on WEEP schemes was at least 30%, and from the local case study 
it became clear that this form of abuse was not under control and 
could well have been taking place at a considerably higher rate. 
Even where such abuse was not necessarily taking place, the 
principle effect of these schemes was to provide employers with a 
means of testing out potential recruits at public expense and with 
few obligations upon themselves. This in itself did not 
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reduce the number of permanent job available, but neither did it 
directly increase them: it merely added an extra stage to the 
sorting process through which the young people had to go. Although 
the threat of substitution only really applied within the WEEP 
sector, wherever else the programme was offering realistic work 
experience there was an inherent danger of permanent jobs being 
lost through displacement. The scale of this problem was certainly 
not comparable with that of substitution, but once again at the 
local level it was clear that it was not fully under control. 
Obviously, it is impossible to make any exact estimate for the 
overall rate of job loss associated with YOP, but from all the 
evidence available it must be concluded that the net effect of the 
programme was to destroy permanent jobs at a considerably higher 
rate than it created them. Moreover, even if only young people's 
jobs were taken into account, there would still be a significant 
net job loss, since it was mainly their jobs that were affected 
by substitution. These conclusions were corroborated by the evidence 
of the national unemployment statistics. In the first place, these 
figures provided no indication of YOP having had any long-term 
impact on the employability of young people, either absolutely 
or relative to the population as a whole. But more than this, 
the immediate effect on the level of youth unemployment was 
considerably less than might have been expected purely on the basis 
of the number of young people temporarily taken out of the 
labour market. Thus, it was not just that YOP had little positive 
effect in terms of permanent jobs; because of the abuses and side-
effects, it had a net negative effect, even in terms of young 
people's jobs. Moreover, the only positive economic effect that 
could be balanced against this was that of the programme's 
sporadic and marginal training content. It is arguable therefore 
that the net economic impact of YOP was negative, destroying more 
job opportunities than it created, and failing to provide a 
systematic and substantial training content. 
These factors underlay the crisis of credibility in the develop-
ment of YOP which took place at approximately the half-way point 
of the programme's scheduled five year lifespan. This crisis could 
be analysed in terms of each of the three main principles of MSC 
policy: the combination of both social and economic functions in 
an active manpower policy, the limitation of direct intervention 
327 
in the labour market, and the maintenance of a corporatist/volunt-
arist style of policy-making and implementation. In terms of all 
three principles YOP was failing and, because of its huge growth in 
the context of cutbacks taking place elsewhere, the resulting crisis 
was one which extended to MSC policy as a whole. The solution 
to this crisis was found in the relaunching of YOP towards becoming 
a comprehensive training programme for school leavers. This was 
achieved in theoretical terms through the integration of YOP's 
future development within the framework of the New Training 
Initiative, leading to the design of the Youth Training Scheme as 
YOP's successor. However, the reality of the relaunch depended 
upon the implementation of quality improvements, both in order 
to develop YOP in the direction of having a credible positive economic 
function as a high quality training programme, and to bring under 
control the abuses and side-effects that were responsible for the 
negative aspects of its economic impact. 
Although a considerable amount of research and development work 
relating to various aspects of quality improvement had already been 
embarked upon, most of it was by no means ready to be implemented 
when the relaunching of the programme was first formally announced 
during the latter half of its third year. Hence, the Quality 
Improvement Plan which was drawn up as a direct response could be 
little more than a holding exercise while the developmental work 
continued on these various quality initiatives. It was not until 
the final year, with the New Training Places, that systematic 
measures of quality improvement were implemented on a significant 
scale nationally. Yet, the evidence from the local case study 
suggested that even this development was not as important as it 
appeared to be from the national perspective. Although upgraded 
in their formal content, the NTPs did not for the most part avoid 
the fundamental limitations on quality and relevance which stemmed 
from the basic conditions of staffing and resourcing YOP provision. 
Furthermore, as with certain other quality improvement initiatives 
implemented at the local level, the form in which many of these NTPs 
were developed was incompatible with that which was eventually to be 
adopted by the Youth Training Scheme. Thus, on the evidence of 
the local case study, it appeared that at the end of the final year 
of YOP there was still almost everything to be done in order to 
transform the loosely planned and controlled pattern of provision 
on the ground into the systematic high quality training scheme 
that YTS was intended to become. 
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2. The Changed Political and Economic Environment 
It will be remembered that in Chapter 3 it was concluded 
that the various special measures introduced during the latter half 
of the 1970s played the same basic role as their historical 
counterparts; they were palliatives, which, by acting against 
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the strict logic of macro and micro-economic policies failing to 
secure full employment, helped to make these policies more acceptable 
by providing a limited amount of relief from the resulting 
unemployment. This palliative role of modern special measures 
was linked to the immediate political context of the 1974-79 
Labour Government and its social contract relationship with the 
trade union movement. In return for trade union cooperation over 
incomes policy, the Government was pledged to do something about 
unemployment. However, it was not prepared to undertake a signif-
icant reflation of the economy, so instead it resorted to a series 
of special measures. (1) 
In this preliminary analysis, which preceded the detailed exam-
ination of the development and performance of the Youth Opportunities 
Programme, the launching of YOP was regarded as the culmination 
of this series. Yet, it was noted that in certain respects the 
role of YOP as a palliative was not as clear as had been the case 
with some previous special measures. In the first place, the 
objectives of enhancing employability and providing training 
gave the programme what appeared to be a more plausible real 
economic function. Secondly, the particular political context 
in which the previous special measures had played their role as 
palliatives was already beginning to break down as YOP was being 
planned and, with the final collapse of the social contract and 
the subsequent electoral defeat of the Labour Government, had 
completely disappeared within a year of the programme's launch. 
The subsequent examination of the development and performance of 
YOP has shown that in fact the programme failed to fulfil a 
significant positive economic function in relation to either of the 
two objectives of enhancing employability and providing training. 
Indeed, the success of the programme appeared to be confined to 
its social function of providing some form of immediate relief to 
large numbers of the young unemployed. Moreover, because of the 
various abuses and side-effects, it was arguable that the net 
economic effect was negative. These conclusions would tend to 
confirm that, as with the previous special measures, YOP's 
principle role was as a palliative. Yet, this needs to be under-
stood in the apparently very different political context in 
which YOP operated for the majority of its five year lifespan. 
Furthermore, it needs to be asked whether under these changed 
political circumstances the programme did not have any other more 
positive role to play. 
It is widely recognised that the election in May 1979 of a 
Conservative Government under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher 
marked an important turning point in post-war British political 
history. The commonly held view is that this Government made a 
decisive break from what could be described as either the 
Keynesian or social democratic consensus which had underlaid the 
policies of all previous post-war governments whether Labour or 
Conservative. Whilst up to a point this analysis can be agreed 
with, the nature of the break needs to be more closely defined. 
As far as this account is concerned, the key element in the original 
definition of the post-war consensus was the 1944 White Paper on 
Employment Policy. This, it will be remembered, committed all 
the main political parties represented in the war-time Coalition 
Government to accept responsibility for the maintenance of a high 
level of employment, and detailed what was basically a Keynesian 
style of macro-economic demand management as the policy by which 
this aim should be pursued. The question of when governments first (2) 
began to withdraw from this commitment has already been discussed, 
and although no firm conclusion was reached as to the origins of 
the withdrawal, it was considered to be obvious that the commitment 
was already in effect dead by the time that YOP was launched in 
1978. (3) How then, it might be asked in this respect, could the 
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incoming Conservative Government a year later be regarded as 
having made a decisive break from the past? The answer to this 
question is to be found primarily at the level of ideology rather 
than political practice. Whilst the Callaghan Labour Government 
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had been prepared to carryon tolerating high levels of unemployment 
without making a serious response in terms of a macro-economic 
policy of reflation, it still accepted that the attempt to regulate 
the level of employment by such means was a legitimate and 
feasible aim of government policy. In contrast, the Thatcher 
Conservative Government was prepared to deny that it could have 
any such direct responsibility for the overall level of demand 
within the labour market. This denial constituted a rejection 
of the fundamental premiss of Keynesian economic theory that had 
underlaid the policies of all previous post-war governments. 
Some of these might have failed to use the various tools of macro-
economic demand management to secure full employment, but none 
yet had gone so far as to declare either that it was improper to 
attempt to do so, or that it was impossible to succeed. 
The 'new' economic theory which underlay the Thatcher Government's 
wholesale rejection of Keynesian demand management policy was of 
course monetarism. Despite the technical nature of many of the 
arguments concerned with the definition and control of the 
money supply, the fundamental differences between monetarist 
and Keynesian economics can be explained in comparatively simple 
terms. Samuel Britten, the financial journalist who did much 
to popularise monetarist ideas in this country, made the dist-
inction as follows: 
"Orthodox 'demand management' has been based on the view 
that governments have the power to fix the amount of 
unemployment at a politically chosen level by monetary 
and fiscal policy. The most fundamental of the 'monetarist' 
contentions is that governments do not have such powers. 
The minimum sustainable level of unemployment is on the 
contrary, determined by the functioning of the labour 
market. Attempts to push the unemployment percentage below 
this sustainable level will lead not merely to inflation, 
but to an increasing rate of inflation and ultimately to 
currency collapse". (4) 
This latter point should be noted in relation to what was said 
It will be remembered in Chapter 1, about the Phillips curve. (5) 
that the curve illustrated what was clai~ed to be a constant 
relationship between rates of unemployment and rates of inflation. 
Thus, for any given rate of unemployment it was assumed that there 
corresponded a set rate of inflation. The events of the sixties 
and seventies, during which rising unemployment was accompanied 
by higher rates of inflation, proved this assumption to be wrong. 
The explanation given by advocates of monetarism such as Britten 
was that the original 'naive' version of the Phillips Curve had 
neglected to take account of the cumulative effect of inflation 
upon people's expectations. (6) Originally it might have been 
true that a set rate of inflation would be associated with the 
reduction of unemployment below a certain level. But, if it was 
attempted to maintain unemployment at this low level, people would 
sooner or later come to expect the associated rate of inflation. 
Once they did so, it would become assumed as the base rate at the 
start of any negotiations, and the continued inflationary effect 
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of the low level of unemployment would then be added on top of this, 
thus being doubled. Furthermore, eventually this double rate would 
become the norm and therefore itself be redoubled, and then 
redoubled again and so on ad infinitum. Thus, according to 
this argument, the attempt to maintain unemployment below a certain 
level was not merely associated with inflation, but with accel-
erating inflation which ultimately would lead to currency collapse. 
The level below which unemployment could not be lowered without 
leading to this ultimate disaster was referred to by the monet-
arists as the 'minimum sustainable' or 'natural' rate of 
unemployment. According to their argument, this was determined 
by inherent factors in the labour market and could not in the long run be 
altered by the external stimulus of monetary and fiscal policies. 
These forms of demand management might succeed in reducing 
unemployment below its 'natural' rate in the short-term, but once 
the rate of inflation began to accelerate they would soon have 
to be reversed. This deflationary policy would then give rise 
to a 'transitional' rate of unemployment which was above the 
minimum determined by the labour market and which would last until 
the inflation was brought back under control. When this was 
eventually achieved, it would be back to square one with unemploy-
ment at its 'natural rate'. 
Underlying this argument there is an important assumption which 
should be noted. It will be remembered that during the fifties, 
when the problem of inflation associated with full employment 
policy was raised in terms of the original 'naive' Phillips curve, 
the way out of this conflict of interests was seen to lie in 
some form of agreement on incomes restraint. If such means could 
have been made effective against a constant rate of inflation, 
then there was no reason why they should not have been able to 
stop the development of accelerating inflation. Thus, the 
monetarist argument relied on the assumption that all forms of 
incomes policy were necessarily ineffective. As was the case 
with the basic argument concerning accelerating inflation, 
empirical backing for this assumption appeared to be provided 
by the experience of the sixties and seventies. Thus there had 
been a succession of attempts to control inflation through both 
voluntary and statutory incomes policies, all of which had ended 
in failure. The final example was of course provided by the 
events which prepared the way for the election of the Thatcher 
Government - the collapse of the social contract and the 'winter 
of discontent'. 
Closely related to the rejection of all forms of incomes policy 
was the monetarist doctrine that trade union activity was incapable 
of having any direct impact on the inflationary process. If 
trade unions were not responsible for inflation, then there was 
no need to attempt either to agree with them or to enforce upon 
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them any form of pay restrictions. The doctrine was derived from 
a simple application of the laws of supply and demand to the 
labour market. If trade unions succeeded in using their monopoly 
powers to raise the price of labour, other things being equal, 
the direct result of this would be to reduce the total number of 
people being employed. There would only be an inflationary effect 
if government chose to intervene in this situation and attempted 
to use demand management policies to stop unemployment rising to 
the new level being determined by the labour market. But then 
this inflation could be understood as being the direct result of 
the government policy of attempting to maintain unemployment below 
its 'natural rate', and by no means a necessary consequence of 
the use of trade union power. 
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What emerges from these arguments is a clear division of responsib-
ility between government and trade unions with regard to unemployment 
and inflation. On the one hand, governments cannot be held 
responsible for unemployment, but are responsible for inflation. 
On the other hand, trade unions have no responsibility for inflation, 
but can be responsible for unemployment. Significantly, this 
division of responsibilities represented a complete reversal of 
that associated with the social contract, according to which it 
was the government that was to take action to control unemployment 
in return for voluntary pay restraint on behalf of the trade 
unions aimed at curbing inflation. Moreover, this difference 
was not simply a reversal. The social contract was an agreement 
that was based on consensus. As such, it represented another 
development in the wider trend of post-war corporatist politics 
that has already been described. The principles of monetarist 
economics, however, eliminated both the basis and the need for 
this consensus-based corporatist style of politics. On the one 
hand, government could no longer promise to control unemployment; 
on the other hand, there was no need for it to ask the trade 
unions to exercise restraint over pay. All the government could 
or should do was control inflation, which according to strict 
monetarist principles could be achieved purely through the control 
of the growth of money supply. Otherwise, everything else had to 
be left up to market forces, and it was up to the trade unions if 
they chose 'to price themselves out of jobs'. (7) Thus, laissez-
faire economics were substituted for consensus politics. 
The break with the post-war consensus made by the Thatcher 
Government can now be summarised. At the level of economic 
theory, it involved the replacement of Keynesian demand management 
orthodoxy concerning government responsibility for the control of 
unemployment, by monetarist-style laissez-faire principles 
concerned exclusively with the control of inflation. In terms of 
politics, this implied the rejection of what might be described 
as the social-democratic consensus on consensus politics itself. 
Yet, once again, it is necessary to sound a note of caution with 
regard to this summary. The pre-u-turn Heath Government had 
stepped back from consensus politics and experimented with 
laissez-faire economics. Furthermore, the Callaghan Labour 
Government had at least flirted with certain aspects of monetarism, 
introducing for example published monetary targets. But, in both 
cases, these were pragmatic measures of experimentation and 
crisis management, which at most represented deviations from the 
overarching post-war consensus. (8) The decisive difference in 
the case of the Thatcher Government was that such tactics were 
elevated to the level of absolute principles. This time there was 
'no alternative' and there could be 'no u-turnl. 
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3. Thatcherism and the M S C 
The question which must now be addressed is how this 
decisive change in the economic and political environment affected 
the position of the Manpower Services Commission. It will be 
remembered that, when the origins of the MSC were analysed in 
Chapter 1, three major themes were identified. First, the 
establishment of the Commission to coordinate a comprehensive 
manpower policy was regarded as a significant step forward in 
the development of active manpower policy, which itself was 
interpreted as being a means of micro-economic fine-tuning 
within the macro-economic framework of Keynesian demand management 
policy. Secondly, the tripartite structure of the Commission was 
regarded as an example of corporatism, the modern development of 
which was related on a political dimension to the same macro-
economic context as the development of active manpower policy. 
Finally, the status of the Commission as a semi-autonomous or 
quasi-governmental body was explained as an outcome of the trend 
of administrative reform referred to as 'hiving off', which could 
be understood as a means of enabling corporatist development. 
What should now be obvious is that the Thatcher Government's 
decisive break from the post-war consensus was a break from the 
economic and political context within which the origins of the MSC 
have been analysed. Thus,it involved the rejection of both 
the Keynesian macro-economic framework within which active manpower 
policy was set and the associated style of consensus-based 
corporatist politics which had given rise to the tripartite 
structure of the MSC. What is more, with regard to the third 
theme of hiving off, a significant aspect of the successful 1979 
election campaign of the Conservative Party had been the attack 
mounted on the so-called 'quangos', including bodies such as the 
MSC which were the products of this trend of administrative reform. 
The'great quango hunt~ as it became known, requires some further 
explanation. (9) 
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The original stimulus for the trend of hYing off, it will be 
remembered, was provided by the Fulton Report which proposed it 
as a possible means of applying the principles of managerial 
accountability to certain aspects of public administration. 
This proposal was taken up by the Heath Government, and the MSC 
was one of the most important examples of its implementation. Yet 
even as the Commission was being established, concern was mounting 
about the proliferation of such quasi-governmental bodies. (10) 
Ironically, much of this concern was centred on the issue of 
accountability. Although the establishment of accountable units 
responsible for particular functions might enhance managerial 
accountability, once they were hived off from central government, 
it raised certain questions about public accountability. The 
position of quasi-governmental bodies in relation to the traditional 
systems of ministerial and parliamentary accountability was not 
always clear, and yet there was no other means of ensuring their 
accountability to the public. Hence, concern was increasingly 
expressed by commentators on public administration about the 
unregulated growth of a diverse sphere of quasi-government, 
responsible for large amounts of public expenditure without 
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necessarily being subject to a clear system of public accountability. (11) 
This concern was subsequently taken up by the Conservative Party, 
and linked during the 1979 election campaign to a more general 
attack on the public sector. (12) Privatisation replaced 
hiving-off as the recommended means of cutting back government 
bureaucracy, and quasi-governmental bodies were condemned as 
displaying the worst of both worlds, being beyond conventional public 
accountability and yet not subject to the discipline of market 
forces. Clear indications were given that, upon the election of a 
Conservative Government, there would be a drastic cull of such 
'quangos'. 
Thus, the prospects of the MSC at the beginning of the first Thatcher 
Government did not appear to be very promising. Not only had the 
macro-economic and political frameworks assumed by its policies 
been removed, but the particular administrative form of which it 
was a leading example was under explicit threat. Soon after the 
election, the Prime Minister asked her Cabinet to prepare lists 
of quasi-governmental bodies sponsored by their departments that 
might be abolished, and subsequently a central review was under-
taken by Sir Leo Pliatsky. (13) Meanwhile, as we have already seen, 
the rapid growth of the MSC's expenditure which had taken place 
under the Labour Government was checked by the imposition of the 
first round of public expenditure cuts in June 1979. It might 
have seemed therefore that the future of the MSC was in some doubt. 
In fact, it never was. The Pliatsky Report, which was published 
in January 1980, had little impact on either the MSC in particular 
or the wider problem of quasi-government in general,and thereafter 
little more was heard about the so-called 'quango-hunt'. The MSC 
did not only survive, it flourished. Despite the initial cuts 
imposed on the planned growth of its expenditure, by the final year 
of the first Thatcher Government the total budget of the MSC was 
more than double what it had been during the final year of the 
previous Labour Government. (14) This compared with a 72 per cent 
increase in total public expenditure over the same period. (15) 
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The growth of the MSC over this period was of course completely acco-
unted for by the growth of its Special Programmes Division, and in 
particular, the Youth Opportunities Programme. Indeed, over the same 
five years, there was a substantial reduction in the total budget 
of the other two divisions which were responsible for the original 
employment and training services of the Commission. The growth of 
the SPD need not necessarily be regarded as the direct cause of the 
cuts in the ESD and TSD, but the two trends can be traced to a 
common cause - the development of mass unemployment. The way in 
which the undertakings forced YOP to expand in response to the 
rapidly rising level of youth unemployment has already been described. 
In the case of the employment and training services, the impact of 
rising unemployment was the opposite. The improvement of the 
Jobcentre network could no longer be justified in terms of the 
avoidance of labour shortages when there were already millions 
unemployed. Equally, there was no point in developing training 
services when there were few skill shortages for them to fill and 
rising percentages of the trainees from the existing courses were 
failing to find employment. Thus, while mass unemployment provided 
the stimulus for the rapid growth of YOP, it undermined the rationale 
of the employment and training services. The demise of these 
traditional MSC services will be described in more detail in the 
final chapter. The point which needs to be noted now is that, 
whereas the growth of YOP was determined purely by the scale of need 
for it as a social programme, the rationale of the employment and 
training services still depended upon their fulfilling economic 
as well as social functions, which it will be remembered was the 
essential feature of an active manpower policy. This suggests 
that the MSC's continued growth in the context of mass unemployment 
was the result of the relegation into a secondary position of its 
original role of coordinating an active manpower policy. The nature 
of its new principle role of course depended upon YOP. It has 
already been suggested that, as a huge social programme apparently 
without any positive economic functions, YOP served primarily as a 
palliative. Yet, this role still has to be understood in the new 
political context provided by the Thatcher Government. 
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4. Thatcherism and the Role of YOP as a Palliative 
The origins of the Youth Opportunities Programme and 
previous special measures have been understood in the political 
context of the Labour Government's social contract relationship 
with the trade union movement. The Thatcher Government explicitly 
rejected this corporatist style of policy-making and had no need 
to seek the cooperation of the unions with any form of incomes 
policy. Yet, it could not simply abandon the palliative role of the 
special programmes which it had inherited. Once YOP had been 
established and the undertakings set in place, it was a political 
impossibility to remove them. The special relationship with the 
unions might no longer exist, but youth unemployment was still a 
sufficiently sensitive issue with the wider public to rule out the 
possibility of going back on what had already been promised. Hence 
YOP not only had to be maintained, but it had to be expanded in 
response to the rapidly rising levels of unemployment which were 
the outcome of the Government's wider economic policy. Indeed, 
the higher the level of unemployment went, the greater was the 
need for some form of palliative. Thus, the Thatcher Government 
was drawn into an open-ended commitment to fund the expansion of 
YOP at whatever level was determined as necessary by the growth of 
youth unemployment. The crucial factor was of course the school 
leavers undertaking and this was not only maintained, but improved 
by the bringing forward of its deadline to Christmas. 
Yet, it was not just a matter of being seen by the public to be 
doing as-much, if not more, for the young unemployed than the 
previous Labour Government. YOP functioned as palliative not only 
for public opinio~ but for the young people themselves. The 
importance of the programme as a means of keeping the young 
unemployed off the streets was highlighted by the 1981 riots and the 
Thatcher Government's reaction to them. Although reluctant to 
admit any connection between those incidents and the rising level 
of unemployment, the almost immediate reaction of the Prime 
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Minister was to announce a new package of special employment 
measures which included an additional 110,000 places on YOP. (16) 
The role of YOP in this respect might be compared to that of the 
generous redundancy payments awarded to certain powerful groups of 
workers being laid off from public sector employment. (17) 
The Thatcher Government was clearly prepared to expend large 
sums of public money in order to pacify certain strategic groups of 
people whose activities might otherwise have disturbed the prev-
ailing mood of apathy in the face of rising mass unemployment. 
As well as providing a means of being seen to be doing something 
about youth unemployment and at least keeping the young people 
occupied, it can also be argued that YOP functioned as what might 
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be described as a statistical palliative. At its peak, the programme 
was taking more than 300,000 young people off the unemployment 
register, and it was asserted by some critics that its main purpose 
was to reduce the official figure for the total number of people 
unemployed. (18) However, the significance of YOP's impact in 
this respect should not be over-estimated. Given that total 
unemployment was already over three million, an extra 300,000 
would not have made a crucial difference. Nevertheless, if the 
limited impact of YOP is considered alongside that of other special 
measures and changes made in the way in which the unemployment 
statistics were compiled, it can be argued that the programme 
made a contribution to a wider strategy of 'massaging' the 
figures which had a more substantial impact. As we have seen, during 
the programme's five year life span, the headline figure for 
unemployment in Great Britain rose from 1,387,500 to 3,053,300. 
Yet, without all the special measures and the changes that were 
made in the basis of the statistical count, the final figure would 
have been close to four million. (20) Obviously, one can only 
speculate as to what would have been the political significance of 
this extra million on the official figures. But, whatever the 
absolute level reached, clearly it was important for the Thatcher 
Government during the latter half of its first term to create the 
impression that the worst was over and that unemployment was at 
least beginning to level off. The expansion of YOP and other 
special measures, combined with the changes in the method of the 
count, helped to create this impression. 
The role of YOP as a palliative can now also be analysed in the 
context of the monetarist economic strategy that was being pursued 
by the Thatcher Government. (21) The key to this strategy was of 
course the control of inflation. Yet, when the Government was first 
elected, it was committed to a series of policies which inevitably 
provided a massive inflationary stimulus. Labour had already let 
things get out of control in its attempt to win the election, and 
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the Conservative Party added fuel to the fire with its manifesto 
promises. Thus, the new Government was committed both to increases 
in certain areas of public expenditure and to cuts in direct taxation. 
Although some savings could be made in other areas of public 
expenditure, the only way that the equation could be balanced 
when it came to the first Budget was through an increase in the 
rate of V.A.T. from 8% to 15%. This instant jump in the level of 
indirect taxation gave ahuge push to inflation which came on top 
of the effects of the breakdown of the previous Government's 
incomes policy. Moreover, the Thatcher administration's commitment 
to market mechanisms meant that it did not have the option of 
attempting to impose an incomes policy of its own. Consequently, 
the immediate result of the Thatcherite takeover was the second 
highest rise in the annual rate of inflation since 1945. 
What happened could simply be understood as the cost of the 
tactics that were necessary in order to win the election. Yet, 
paradoxically, it can also be explained in terms of wider economic 
strategy. It would seem that initially the Thatcher Government had 
such faith in the efficacy of monetary policy as a means of 
controlling inflation that it was prepared to ignore all other sources 
of inflationary stimuli. The belief was that, so long as the money 
supply was kept under control, it was impossible for inflation 
to get out of hand, whatever else might be done to stimulate it. 
343 
In a certain theoretical sense this might have been true, but only 
if one was prepared to sacrifice all other economic policy objectives. 
In reality, the huge stimulus given to inflation during the first 
year of the Thatcher Government was to be paid for by three 
successive years of severe deflation, which were necessary merely 
in order to return to the level of inflation inherited from the 
previous Labour Government. The cost of this in terms of unempl-
oyment we have already seen. 
Within monetarist theory, it was expected that the process of bringing 
inflation back under control would entail a 'transitional' rate of 
unemployment which was somewhat above the minimum 'natural' rate. 
What the Thatcher Government's original stimulation of inflation 
did was to ensure that this so-called transitional rate was far 
higher than had been anticipated. Nevertheless, whatever the cost, 
there was a determination not to repeat the u-turn made by the 
Heath Government in 1972 when unemployment reached the then 
unacceptable level of one million. This time monetarist doctrine 
decreed that there was no alternative and that the Govern~ent could 
not be held directly responsible for the level of unemployment. 
How high the transitional rate rose, and how long it lasted, would 
depend upon how quickly trade union negotiators adapted to the new 
circumstances of the labour market and stopped pricing their 
members out of jobs. Meanwhile, the main responsibility for the 
Government was to maintain tight monetary and fiscal control, and 
to resist the mounting pressure for some form of U-turn. Besides 
repeating that there was no alternative, one means of counteracting 
such pressure was to attempt to raise the threshold of the 
acceptability of mass unemployment. The various aspects of YOP's 
role as a palliative can be understood in this context. By 
ameliorating the most politically sensitive issue of youth unemp-
loyment, keeping the young people off the streets, and contributing 
to the manipulation of the unemployment statistics, YOP helped to 
legitimise levels of unemployment which had previously been assumed 
to be totally unacceptable. This in turn helped the Government 
to resist the pressure to make a U-turn in its macro-economic 
strategy. In short, by maintaining the commitment of a special 
programmes response to the young unemployed, the Thatcher Government 
made it easier for itself to continue avoiding any positive macro-
economic response to the general unemployment problem. 
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5. The Alternative Economic Role of YOP 
The role of YOP as a palliative can thus be understood in 
the context of the monetarist economic strategy of the Thatcher 
Government. The question which next needs to be addressed is 
whether the programme had any more positive role to play in the 
context of this wider economic strategy. We have already seen that 
it failed to fulfil a significant positive economic function in 
relation to either of its two original objectives of enhancing 
employability and providing training. Indeed, the evidence has 
suggested that YOP destroyed permanent job opportunities at a 
considerably faster rate than it created them without having much 
redeeming value as a training programme. Thus, looking from the 
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angle of the young people who were meant to be the main beneficiaries, 
it could be argued that the intended positive economic effects of 
the programme were outweighed by its negative side-effects. But 
what if one looks from the angle of the main providers of the 
programme, the employers? 
The vast majority of YOP provision consisted of Work Experience on 
Employers' Premises. These schemes provided employers with what 
in effect was the free labour of young people, in return for certain 
obligations with regard to matters such as training and supervision. 
Yet, as we have seen, in practice these obligations were of the 
most minimal nature and could not be properly enforced. The reality 
revealed by the local case study was that for the most part sponsors 
were free to select and employ trainees much as they would any 
normal young recruits. Of course, the taking on of YOP trainees 
was supposed not to interfere with the normal pattern of recruitment. 
But, even if it did not, at the very least employers were gaining 
the temporary use of an extra pair of hands, at no additional 
expense and with few real obligations. If, however, they were 
prepared to break the rules by using the trainees in some way as 
substitutes for permanent employees - and there was no effective 
means of stopping them from doing so - they could also save 
themselves the expense of wages which they would otherwise have 
had to pay. Furthermore, without necessarily involving a breach 
of the rules, it was inevitable that YOP should become used by 
employers as a substitute recruitment and selection system through 
which they could tryout and prepare potential employees at public 
expense. Thus, while doubt may remain as to what was the actual 
level of abuse amongst WEEP schemes, it is clear that even if no 
abuse was involved employers stood to make considerable gains 
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from their participation as sponsors. The exact value of a scheme 
to its sponsor would of course vary according to a number of other 
factors, such as the capacity of the trainee, the nature of the work 
and the amount of training and supervision actually given. But, 
whatever the case, sponsors were unlikely to get involved if they 
thought that it would cause them more trouble than it was worth. 
Understandably, there had to be some incentive. Yet, as the WEEP 
sector worked in reality, it would appear that there were far more 
tangible economic benefits to be gained by the employers than the 
trainees. Even if abuses are not taken into account, the primary 
effect of these schemes was to subsidise the employers' recruitment 
and labour costs, and only as an indirect effect of doing so did 
they open up any permanent job opportunities for young people. Once 
abuses are taken into account, even on a conservative estimate, 
then not only is the subsidy being paid to the employers greatly 
increased, but the indirect benefit to the job prospects of young 
people is more than cancelled out by the permanent job opportunities 
lost through substitution. Thus, the only positive and immediate 
economic effect of the majority element of YOP was to subsidise 
the recruitment and labour costs of the employers who were directly 
involved as its sponsors. Since most of these were small employers, 
it might be regarded as a disguised form of small business subsidy. 
As well as this immediate effect of the WEEP sector, there are more 
long-term and indirect effects of the programme as a whole to be 
considered. In particular, it is necessary to take into account 
the impact of the YOP allowance on the level of wages elsewhere in 
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the youth labour market. (22) The allowance was of course 
intended to be a training allowance and not a wage. As such, it 
had original~been set at a level above that of a young persons' 
social security entitlement, yet clearly below the going rate of 
youth wages. Yet, as we have seen, the content of YOP as a training 
programme was to be marginal and for most of the 'trainees' there was 
to be little difference from working as a normal employee - apart 
from the level of remuneration. This being the case, and given the 
eventual scale of YOP's intervention in the youth labour market, 
the allowance was bound to some extent to become regarded as a 
base rate or starting point for youth wages. On the one hand, 
trainees who became used to working for only the level of the 
allowance had their wage expectations lowered. On the other hand, 
employers who had access to this form of free youth labour were 
unlikely to be prepared to pay that much more in addition to the 
level of the allowance for the privilege of being able to take on 
a young person as an employee. (23) 
If the immediate and longer term economic effects of YOP are thus 
explained respectively in terms of a subsidy for small businesses 
and a depressive influence on the wage rate of youth labour, it is 
not difficult to see how the programme could be regarded as making 
a positive contribution to the wider economic strategy of the 
Thatcher Government, beyond the role of a palliative. The provision 
of incentives to small businesses, and the encouragement of people 
'to price themselves back into jobs' both became important adjuncts 
of the macro-economic policies of monetarism. Each of these requires 
a brief explanation. 
The motive force of the economic recovery which was supposed to 
follow once inflation had been brought back under control was to 
be provided by private enterprise, and in particular by small businsses. 
Yet, as well as the rapidly rising level of unemployment, the cost 
of the deflationary policies used to control inflation was measured 
in terms of unprecedented waves of bankruptcies and huge losses of 
industrial production. Thus, the means which were intended to create 
the conditions for economic recovery threatened to destroy the 
source of its motive force. Faced by this dilemma, and still 
unwilling to reverse the main thrust of its macro-economic policy, 
one of the responses of the Conservative Government was to make 
various forms of direct micro-economic intervention to encourage 
the start-up and development of small businesses in areas of 
potential future economic growth. (24) In so far as YOP acted 
to subsidise the recruitment and labour costs of small businesses, 
particularly in the service sector, it can be regarded as making 
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a positive contribution to this policy of micro-economic intervention. 
The significance of YOP's other main economic effect, as a depress-
ive influence upon the wage rates of youth labour, can be under-
stood in the context of the Thatcher Government's interpretation 
of the nature and causes of the unemployment problem that it faced. 
As we have seen, monetarist theory anticipated that the regaining 
of control over inflation would give rise to a 'transitional' 
rate of unemployment which was higher than the 'natural' rate 
determined by the labour market itself. The transitional nature 
of this higher rate rested on two assumptions: that the policy of 
deflation would only need to be temporary; and that the labour 
market would naturally tend to restore a balance between supply 
and demand through adjustments of the price mechanism. These 
assumptions were related in so far as the reductions of wage levels 
necessary to bring down the rate of unemployment were also of major 
significance to the restoration of control over inflation. Thus, 
the crucial underlying factor on which the transitional nature of 
the higher rate of unemployment rested was the degree of downward 
flexibility of wage rates. 
In practice, the process of 'squeezing inflation out of the 
economy' turned out to be far more lengthy and burdensome than had 
been expected. It was accompanied by a rate of unemployment that 
was not only extremely high, but which continued rising without 
showing any signs of being transitional. Clearly, the spontaneous 
self-adjustment of the labour market which had been hoped for by 
the Government was not taking place. From a monetarist perspective, 
the main responsibility for this lay with the trade unions. Their 
activities were blocking the natural adjustments of the market 
mechanism, and thereby they were pricing both their own members 
and other workers out of jobs. The Government, of course, was not 
slow to put forward this argument. However, initially at least, 
it appears to have been somewhat reluctant to intervene directly 
in order to curtail the trade union powers which it held to be 
responsible for the rigidity of the labour market. Ironically, the 
Thatcher administration's determination not to repeat the Heath 
Government's u-turn seems to have made it more circumspect about 
the risk of precipitating a head-on confrontation with the trade 
union movement~25)hus, although there was a progressive build-up 
of employment legislation affecting trade union powers, the 
approach was always cautious, with the Government feeling its 
way step by step and rarely going as far as many of its supporters 
would have liked. 
In this context, the ro~of YOP as a depressive influence upon 
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the wage rates of youth labour can be understood as a means of 
outflanking rather than directly confronting trade union opposition. 
The comparatively low level of the allowance established a norm which 
by-passed and undermined wage rates negotiated by the trade unions 
for apprentices and other young workers. Thus,in effect, YOP 
provided a mechanism within the youth labour market through 
which it was possible to encourage the translation of high rates of 
unemployment into lower rates of pay. As was demanded by the 
Thatcher Government's wider strategy, young people were being shown 
how to price themselves back into jobs. 
It is possible, therefore, to demonstrate a certain alignment 
between both of the main economic effects associated with the 
operation of YOP and the wider economic strategy of the Thatcher 
Government. Yet it is necessary to be cautious about taking this 
argument one step further and suggesting that this alignment 
was the result of a deliberate policy. Two objections immediately 
spring to mind. First, YOP was originally planned and launched, 
not by the Thatcher administration, but by the previous Labour 
Government. Secondly, throughout its duration, the programme 
was actively supported by both the TUC and the vast majority of 
the wider trade union movement. These two facts, in themselves, 
do not eliminate the possibility that YOP was deliberately used 
as an adjunct of the wider economic strategy of the Thatcher 
Government. But, if such an argument is to be sustained, each 
of them requires a certain explanation. 
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6. The Significance of the 1979 General Election 
The fact that YOP was the creation of the Callaghan Labour 
Government, and yet subsequently appears to have been positively 
aligned with the wider economic strategy of the Thatcher adminis-
tration, could be explained in two alternative ways. Either there 
was no fundamental difference between the economic strategies 
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of the two governments, or the programme underwent some fundamental 
change in between. In relation to the first of these two alternatives, 
it had already been concluded that, despite the Callaghan Government's 
flirtation with certain aspects of monetarism, the Thatcher 
Government's whole-hearted commitment to this doctrine marked a 
fundamental break from the past. Thus, the main economic effects 
of YOP, which have been positively aligned with the wider economic 
strategy of the Thatcher Government, could not have been aligned 
in the same way in the case of the Callaghan Government. This 
leaves the alternative that there was some fundamental change in 
the nature of YOP itself, which can be associated with the change 
in governments. 
The account presented above has already demonstrated at considerable 
length how the development and performance of YOP differed from what 
was originally planned. In particular, it should be remembered that 
the programme to a large extent failed to meet its original 
objectives, and that the main economic effects which have been 
identified were apparently side-effects and not originally intended. 
The question which now needs to be addressed is whether this 
divergence of the development of YOP away from its original plans 
can be associated with the change in governments. The answer depends 
in the first place on the relationship between the timing of these 
two events. 
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The Labour Government remained in power for little more than the 
first year of YOP's five year life-span, and thus can only be held 
responsible for the original planning and launching of the programme. 
However, the pattern of YOP's future development, and its devergence 
away from the plans of the Holland Report, had already to a large 
extent emerged by the end of this first year. Thus the predom-
inance of the WEEP sector had been established, as had the lack of 
training content and poor performance in relation to other gauges 
of quality such as the regularity of monitoring - all features which 
contributed to the proliferation of YOP's apparently unintended 
side-effects. Such evidence would seem to suggest that the funda-
mental break in the programme's development took place in-between 
the phases of planning and launching, and since both of these were 
tre responsibility of the Labour Government, there would not appear 
to be any direct association with the change in governments. 
However, the matter is not quite as simple as that. 
The divergence from the original plans which took place during the 
first year of YOP was regarded at the time as being a temporary 
aberration, resulting from the particular set of circumstances 
that were associated with the programme's launch. Thus, the initial 
predominance of the WEEP sector was explained by its being the 
easiest and quickest form of provision to set up, combined with 
the fact that there had already been a large number of pre-existing 
WEEP schemes. As the programme became more established, it was 
expected that the other forms of provision would begin to catch 
up, and the overall balance of the programme would move closer to 
that which was originally planned. Similarly, the initial lack of 
training content and poor qualitative performance were put down to 
teething problems which it was expected would be rectified by 
the quality improvement plan embarked upon at the beginning of the 
second year. Thus, although YOP's divergence from its original 
plans began under the Labour Government, the balance and quality 
of provision which emerged at the end of this first year had not 
yet been accepted as permanent. Indeed, it was planned and expected 
that the future development of the programme would be drawn back 
in the direction of the original blueprint of the Holland Report. (26) 
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As it happened, during the second year of the programme, some slight 
progress was made towards the balance and quality of provision 
which had originally been planned. But this was soon reversed, and 
the pattern of provision which emerged during the first year turned 
out to be permanent throughout the vast majority of the life-time 
of the programme. Even in the final year, the real difference made 
by the introduction of the New Training Places was very limited. 
Two related reasons existed for why the first year'S pattern of 
provision to a large extent persisted throughout; the huge numerical 
expansion of the programme, and the limitations on the resources 
which were available for its funding. Arguably, both of these 
can be associated with the change in government. 
As soon as the Conservative Government was elected in June 1979, 
it imposed cuts on public spending which included the MSC and its 
Special Programmes Division. These immediately affected the plans 
which had been laid at the beginning of the second year for the 
restoration of balance and improvement of quality within YOP'(27) 
Then, in the following two summers, came the upward surges of youth 
unemployment, which necessitated the rapid expansion of the 
programme in order to maintain the school leavers undertaking. 
The Conservative Government guaranteed the resources that were 
necessary for this, but still imposed severe restraints. As a result, 
personnel and funds were stretched almost to the limit in providing 
the required number of extra places, and there was very little that 
could be done about changing the balance or improving the quality 
of the provision. Indeed, the predominance of the WEEP sector was 
reinforced and certain aspects of quality declined, or in the 
case of the monitoring system, broke down altogether. It was only 
in the final year, when the number stabilised, that resources 
could be made available to start the huge task of upgrading the 
content of provision. 
What would have happened to the development of YOP had Labour won 
the 1979 General Election is of course something which can only be 
speculated about. However, there are certain facts upon which such 
speculation can be based. The total number of unemployed had been 
falling gradually over the last 18 months of the Labour 
Government. This, of course, is not to imply that it would have 
continued to fall if Labour had been re-elected. But, most comm-
entators would acknowledge that the sharp increase of unemployment 
which took place in 1980 was largely the result of the Thatcher 
Government's implementation of a monetarist macro-economic strategy, 
and would not have taken place otherwise. As far as restraint 
on public expenditure is concerned, this had already begun under 
the Labour Government. Yet, apparently, neither Callaghan as Prime 
Minister nor Healey as Chancellor ever turned down a request for 
more money if it was needed to finance special measures for the 
young unemployed. (28) Indeed, the main financial problem faced 
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by the MSC under the Labour Government was that of underspending itG 
budget. Once again, it is impossible to know for certain to what 
extent this would have continued if Labour had been re-elected. 
But, given that Labour did not have the same deep ideological 
commitment to public spending cuts as the Thatcherite Conservatives, 
it would seem to be most unlikely that the financial restraints 
imposed on the MSC would have been so tight. If, at the same time, 
youth unemployment had not taken off as rapidly as it did in the 
summer of 1980 and considerably fewer additional places had been 
required, it is possible to speculate that the programme would have 
developed very differently from how eventually it did. With only 
a gradual increase in numbers after the first year and ample funds 
being made available, it would have been possible to change and 
improve quite substantially the pattern of provision which emerged 
from the initial launch, and thereby to a large extent avoid 
the side-effects that were subsequently to become characteristic 
of the operation of the programme. Moreover, if the programme had 
remained on a comparatively limited scale, any impact that it 
did have upon the normal workings of the youth labour market would 
have been correspondingly reduced. Thus, although YOP's development 
away from its original plans and towards its subsequently predominant 
form began under the Labour Government, a strong argument can be made 
that it would not have continued to develop in this direction if 
Labour had been re-elected. 
Finally, there are two further changes in the development and 
performance of YOP which, as far as timing is concerned, can be 
more straightforwardly associated with the change in governments. 
The first of these relates to what has been described as originally 
being YOP's principle economic objective - the enhancement of 
trainees' employability as measured by their employment placement 
rates. Although during its first year the programme did not in 
many ways turn outas originally planned, it did at least perform 
reasonably well in terms of this principle economic objective. It 
was only at the beginning of 1980, following the election of the 
Conservative Government and its introduction of a monetarist 
macro-economic strategy, that the employment placement rate plunged 
below 50 per cent. The second of these changes, for which the 
timing can be directly associated with the change in governments, 
involves the level of the trainees' allowance. Although under 
Labour this was originally set well below the average level of 
youth wages, at least its real value was to be maintained against 
the rising cost of living. Thus, in November 1978, the YOP 
allowance was reviewed alongside social security benefits, and 
as a result increased from £19.50 to £20.55 per week. During the 
programme's next four years under the Conservative Government, 
there were only to be two further increases and, unlike the first, 
neither of these was sufficient to restore the original value of 
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the allowance. Thus, at the end of the fifth and final year of the 
programme, the level of the allowance stood at £25; whereas, in order 
to have maintained its real value in terms of the Average Earnings 
Index, it would have needed to be almost 50 per cent higher at 
£36.50 (29) This reduction in the value of the allowance which took 
place under the Conservative Government, combined with the growing 
scale of the programme's interference with the normal workings of 
the youth labour market, would of course tend to amplify any 
depressive effect upon the rate of youth wages. 
It can now be concluded that the development of YOP into its 
predominant form, in which its main economic effects were as a 
subsidy to small employers and a depressive influence upon youth 
wages, was largely the result of the policies of the Thatcher 
Government, despite there being a certain tendency in this direction 
under the previous Labour administration. Thus, as well as it 
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being possible to align the two main economic effects of the programme 
with the wider macro-economic strategy of the Thatcher Government, 
the development of YOP which gave rise to these effects can be 
associated specifically with this Government's assumption of power. 
Yet, these two facts in themselves are not sufficient to establish 
that there was any deliberate intention on the part of the Thatcher 
administration to use YOP in a role beyond that of a palliative, 
as a positive adjunct to its wider macro-economic strategy. 
It could still be argued that,. although YOP's characteristic develop-
ment was both associated and aligned with this macro-economic 
strategy, the link was only as that of an unintended consequence. 
7. The Question of Government Intent 
In the first place, the Conservative Government had little 
choice but to continue with YOP, if only for its palliative 
effect. This meant above all the maintenance of the school leavers 
undertaking. Yet, the Government's macro-economic strategy ensured 
that the continuance of the programme and its principle undertaking 
took place under new conditions, involving both rapidly rising 
youth unemployment and severe restraint on public expenditure. 
All of the factors which gave YOP its characteristic form under 
the Conservative Government - the predominance of the WEEP sector, 
the lack of training content, the poor qualitative performance and 
the breakdown of the monitoring system, the lack of control of 
abuses and the interference with the normal workings of the labour 
market, and finally the sharp decline in employment placement 
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rates and the loss of value of the trainees' allowance - all of these 
factors can be explained in terms of the combined impact upon the 
programme of rapidly rising youth unemployment and severe financ-
ial restraints. There is no need to suggest that this form of 
development was deliberately planned so that the programme should 
contribute more positively to the wider econo~ic strategy of the 
Government. It could have been that what happened was an unintended 
consequence, and it was purely fortuitous that the main economic 
effects contributed so positively to the Government's wider strategy. 
What this means is that it cannot be established that the Conservative 
Government deliberately developed YOP as an adjunct of its monet-
arist macro-economic strategy, unless specific evidence can be 
found of its intention to do so. As far as the initial stages of 
involvement are concerned, no such evidence exists. Thus, there is 
no reason to believe that the decisions to continue with the 
programme and to maintain the school leavers undertaking took into 
account any positive contribution to the Government's wider 
economic strategy beyond the palliative effect. Originally, it 
would seem that the factors which were to make such a contribution 
did genuinely develop as unintended consequences. It was only once 
they were established and recognised that the question of Government 
responsibility necessarily arose. 
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The original plans in the Holland Report had recognised the danger 
of YOP interfering with the normal workings of the youth labour 
market. Substitution and displacement had been referred to, and 
the possibility had been noted that WEEP might come to be regarded 
by employers as a useful vehicle for assessment and a normal avenue 
for recruitment. If this were to happen, it was stated that it 
might be necessary to review the basis of funding these schemes. (30) 
By the third year of YOP, which was the second year of the Conser-
vative Government, it was evident that the programme was inter-
fering substantially with the normal workings of the youth labour 
market. Not only had it grown in scale far beyond its original 
plans, but in the majority WEEP sector there was evidence of a 
substitution rate of 30 per cent or more. Even where there was 
no such direct abuse, as we have seen, employers were commonly 
using these schemes as a subsidised means of assessment and 
recruitment. Yet, no review was undertaken of the basis of the 
funding of WEEP schemes, and no effective measures were taken 
to control the ~buses. Indeed, the monitoring system was allowed 
to collapse. This, of course, could be explained once again in 
terms of the growth in scale of the programme combined with the 
shortage of resources. But, now that it was apparent that these 
side-effects were taking place, the Government must be regarded 
as having some responsibility for allowing them to continue. 
It was not simply that the necessary resources were unavailable, 
it was rather a question of priorities. Extra public money could 
always be found to enable the programme to meet the politically 
sensitive school leavers undertaking, yet there was never enough 
allowed for adequate monitoring and quality control. The way in 
which the programme developed as a result may not have been deliber-
ately planned by the Conservative Government, but certainly it 
was knowingly tolerated. Given the positive contribution that 
it made to the Government's wider economic strategy, this is hardly 
surprising. 
Evidence of deliberate intention going beyond mere toleration 
is more difficult to establish. However, with regard to the 
reduction in the real value of the trainees' allowance, there are 
certain signs that this was deliberately planned, not only to save 
public expenditure, but as part of a wider strategy to push down 
the level of youth wages. The Prime Minister, herself, and other 
leading members of the Conservative Government, repeatedly stated 
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that the reason for the exceptionally high level of youth unemployment 
was that the differential between youth and adult wages was not 
large enough to reflect the comparative inexperience of young workers. (31) 
Consequently, it was argued, youth wages needed to be lowered in 
order to price young people back into jobs. The policy which most 
directly expressed this understanding of the nature of youth unemp-
loyment was the Young Workers Scheme. Devised by Margaret Thatcher's 
personal economic adviser, Professor Alan Walters, this scheme 
was first announced in July 1981 as part of a package of special 
measures which also included a large expansion of YOP. Its 
openly admitted objective was to encourage employers to reduce 
youth wage rates by offering them subsidies in order to do so. 
Thus, if an employer was prepared to pay a young person less than 
£40 a week, they could qualify for a subsidy of £15 a week; if 
they paid more than this, but still below £45 a week, there was 
a reduced level of subsidy at £7.50 a week. In short, the scheme 
set out directly to do those things which have been identified as 
the indirect effects of YOP's development, to provide subsidies 
to employers and to encourage reductions in rates of youth pay. 
The fact that it didso as a deliberate policy, confirms that it was 
the Conservative Government's intention that these things should 
happen. But still this intention has to be directly connected 
to YOP. 
The best available evidence of such a connection was provided 
by a 'Think Tank' report which was leaked to the press during the 
course of the 1983 General Election campaign. (32) Written some 
two years earlier, its main concern was with what was to follow 
YOP. Nevertheless, it made plain that an important aspect in the 
Government's thinking about both YOP and its successor was the 
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deliberate intention to use the trainees' allowance as a point of 
leverage in the wider strategy to force down the level of youth wages. 
In the case of YOP, this might not have been immediately obvious, 
since the reduction in the real value of the allowance took place 
solely as a result of the failure to increase its nominal value in 
line with inflation. But, once the Government published its plans 
for the new Youth Training Scheme, its intention was clearly 
revealed. The original proposals, it will be remembered, included 
a substantial reduction in the nominal value of the allowance, 
accompanied by the withdrawal of the right to claim supplementary 
benefit from all l6 year olds. The Conservative Secretary of 
State for Employment, Norman Tebbit, made little effort to hide 
the fact that these proposals were part of the wider strategy to 
reduce youth wage levels. Indeed, he even went so far as to 
suggest that trainees being paid this lower level of allowance 
might be used in special factories set up to compete with the cheap 
labour of areas in the world such as South East Asia(33) 
Thus, although in the first place YOP's development as a positive 
adjunct of the Conservative Government's wider economic strategy 
may have been an unintended consequence, it did not remain so. 
As soon as it became clear how the programme was developing, the 
Government necessarily became to some extent responsible for 
allowing it to continue in this direction. But,more than this, 
evidence has now been produced to suggest that there was an element 
of deliberate intention involved. Previously, two objections were 
raised against such a suggestion. The first of these, that YOP 
was originally planned and launched by a Labour Government, has 
already been dealt with; the second, however, remains unanswered. 
It still has to be explained why, if the programme was deliberately 
being developed by the Conservative Government as a positive element 
of its wider economic strategy, it continued to enjoy the active 
support of the majority of the trade union movement. 
8. Trade Union Involvement and the Survival of Corporatism 
The discussion above has focused on the nature of the 
Conservative Government's responsibility for the way in which 
YOP developed. At this point, however, it should be recalled that 
any such responsibility was indirect, being mediated through the 
tripartite structures of the Manpower Services Commission. The 
TUC, of course, was one of the main corporate partners represented 
on both the Commission itself and the Special Programmes Board. 
In addition, there were trade union members on all of the local 
Area Boards, and specific trade union approval had to be sought 
for individual schemes in unionised workplaces. Thus, at all 
levels, the operation of the programme relied upon the active 
support of the trade union movement. Yet, this is not to imply 
that there was unanimous support and co-operation. From the 
outset, certain individual unions and workplaces refused to 
c~perate with the programme(3~~d subsequently, as its development 
took shape under the Conservative Government, opposition became 
more widespread throughout the rank and file of the trade union 
movement. Nevertheless, despite grave reservations being expressed, 
at each year's Congress the TUC leadership was able to rally 
an overwhelming majority behind motions calling for the continued 
support of YOP. (35) 
This continuation of trade union support for YOP despite the way 
in which it developed under the Conservative Government can be 
regarded as being of key significance to the explanation of the 
broader paradox of the MSC's survival and growth under a government 
explicitly hostile to a corporatist style of politics. We have 
already seen the extent to which the MSC's thriving development 
was dependent upon its involvement with YOP. Given how the 
programme contributed to the wider strategy of the Conservative 
Government, it is not difficult to find reasons why the Thatcher 
administration should have welcomed the way in which trade union 
support was drawn in through the tripartite structures of the MSC. 
361 
What is more difficult to explain is why the trade union movement 
continued to allow itself to be drawn in thus, when the programme 
that it was supporting was being .used as a positive adjunct of a 
macro-economic strategy to which it was otherwise adamantly 
opposed. But, before attempting to answer this more difficult 
question, it is worth rehearsing the easier explanation for why 
the Conservative Government was quite content to continue working 
through corporatist structures in this particular area of policy. 
In the first place, without the active support and cooperation of 
the vast majority of the trade union movement, it would have been 
impossible to develop a programme of YOP's scale and form. If the 
trade unions had refused to cooperate, the WEEP sector of the 
programme would have had to have been restricted to non-unionised 
workplaces. Admittedly, as it was, many of the WEEP sponsors were 
not unionised; but, if these alone had been available, it would 
have greatly reduced the overall range of opportunities and made 
it impossible to generate the numbers necessary to continue meeting 
the school leavers undertaking. This, in turn, would have seriously 
undermined the programme's value as a palliative. 
There was also a more direct way in which the palliative effect 
of YOP was dependent upon the tripartite, quasi-governmental 
structures of the MSC, and in particular the trade union movement's 
involvement with them. YOP's function as a palliative, it will be 
remembered, was to ameliorate and disguise some of the most polit-
ically sensitive aspects of the mass unemployment resulting from 
the Government's macro-economic policy, thereby helping the 
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Thatcher administration to resist the pressure to carry out a 
'V-turn'. The principle way in which the programme did this was 
simply by taking large number of young people off the dole. However, 
the palliative effect of such action was greatly enhanced by the fact 
that it was not carried out directly as a government policy, but 
was undertaken through a body like the MSC which operated on the 
basis of a tripartite consensus. In particular, the inclusion of 
the trade union movement within this consensus meant that the 
operation of the programme not only acted to ameliorate youth 
unemployment, but also helped to neutralise it as a political 
issue. Doing something about youth unemployment was no longer 
363 
the sole responsibility of the Government, but was the shared 
responsibility of the all the interests represented on the Commission, 
including the Government's opponents. If what was done was 
inadequate or unsatisfactory, the Government could always deflect 
the criticisms away from itself, by drawing attention to the active 
involvement of its opponents, and then letting them argue it out 
amongst themselves. (36) If, on the other hand, there was credit 
to be received for the programme's achievements, the Government 
could step forward and take the leading share for itself. In fact, 
it would seem that the tripartite and hived off aspects of the 
Commission made it the ideal instrument for the administration of 
a palliative such as YOP. (37) Furthermore, if the programme 
developed bsyond being merely a palliative and came to be used 
by the Government as a positive adjunct of its wider economic policy, 
and yet still could be administered through the Commission with the 
active trade union support, so much the better as far as the 
Government was concerned. 
Of course, there were costs as well as benefits for the Government 
in having YOP administered by the MSC. Obviously, the Secretary 
of State for Employment could not exercise quite the same degree 
of direct control over the programme as he might have done if it 
had been run by the Department of Employment itself. Furthermore, 
if there was a consensus amongst the organisations represented on 
the Commission, the Government could be pressurised into doing things 
that it would not have otherwise done, as was the case with the 
Youth Task Group Report. However, in the last analysis, the 
Commission was still totally dependent upon the Secretary of State 
for the approval of its plans and budget. If he was pressurised 
by there being a consensus on the Commission, given the need for 
it to include the representatives of the CBI, it was unlikely to 
involve a policy radically different from what the Government would 
364 
otherwise have pursued. Moreover, certain political capital could 
be gained from showing a willingness to compromise. Yet, conversely, 
if the Government was determined to go ahead with a policy for which 
there was no possibility of gaining a consensus, there was always 
the option of by-passing the Commission altogether. This is what 
happened with the Young Workers Scheme, which was administered 
directly by the Department of Employment, and subsequently with the 
military version of the Youth Training Scheme (38) 
Thus, from the point of view of the Conservative Government, it 
would seem that the benefits of allowing the MSC to retain direct 
responsibility for YOP greatly outweighed the costs. In particular, 
it provided a means of binding the trade union movement to support 
the programme, while conceding to it only a limited degree of 
influence. But why, it now needs to be asked, did the trade 
union movement allow this state of affairs to continue, if it was 
so clearly advantageous to the Government? In almost every other 
area of policy, there was a relationship of outright antagonism 
between the trade unions and the Thatcher administration, yet 
here the unions were allowing themselves to be drawn into supporting 
a programme which contributed to the Government's wider economic 
strategy, not only as a palliative, but as a positive adjunct. (39) 
One possible explanation might have been that there was a lack 
of awareness within the trade union movement of how the programme 
was really functioning and the extent to which it was benefitting 
the Government. However, this was not the case. The opposition 
to YOP which emerged amongst rank and file trade unionists made 
clear the arguments for regarding the programme as an integral 
element of the wider strategy of the Conservative Government. (40) 
Moreover, the trade union leaders who advocated continued support 
for the programme, while perhaps not accepting these arguments, 
were certainly aware of them and of the evidence on which they were 
based. Yet, there were other arguments which they considered to 
be of overriding importance. 
First, in relation to the palliative effect of the programme, 
although this might be of benefit to the Government, it could not 
be forgotten that it derived from the real help given to thousands 
of young people for whom YOP was the only alternative to the dole. 
What is more, many of these young people were the sons and daughters 
of ordinary trade union members. If the unions removed their 
support from the programme, it was these young people who would 
suffer from the resulting shortage of places. This might reduce 
the effectiveness of the programme as a palliative for the 
Government, but then the unions could be made into the villain of 
the piece. All the shortcomings of the programme could be blamed 
upon the failure of the unions to cooperate, and they could be 
accused of putting their own vested interests before the welfare 
of unemployed young people. This consideration alone made it 
virtually a political impossibility for the trade union movement 
as a whole to withdraw its support. 
A second argument made was to the effect that the programme would 
continue with or without trade union support, and given that this 
was so, it was better to keep being involved and retain some 
influence, than to withdraw and have none. As it was, the 
programme was subject to side-effects and abuses; what would it 
be like if the trade union movement no longer had any influence 
over its management and the schemes were largely confined to non-
union premises? Not only would the palliative effect be reduced, 
but also the way would be left open for the Government to align 
the development of the programme even more directly with its wider 
economic ·strategy, and thoseyoung people who could still find a 
place on the programme would be abandoned to fend for themselves 
against the exploitation of unscrupulous employers. (41) 
The premise underlying this argument was that the involvement of 
the trade union movement was having a significant impact upon 
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both the development and performance of the programme. This, however, 
can be questioned. A key issue on which the influence of the trade 
unions can be assessed is that of the abuses and side-effects to 
which the programme was subject. It was these that helped to ensure 
that the main economic effects of the programme were aligned with 
the wider economic strategy of the Conservative Government, and 
it was these that formed the basis of the case made for the with-
drawal of trade union support by the programme's opponents. 
Conversely, those defending continued trade union involvement 
emphasised what it was achieving in terms of limiting the scope 
for abuses and side-effects within the programme. This would 
appear then to be an important test-case for the assessment of the 
influence derived by the trade union movement through its continued 
active involvement with YOP. 
In March 1981, the General Council of the TUC considered the progress 
of YOP in the light of the growing criticism emerging within the 
trade union movement of a number of its aspects. Foremost 
amongst the targets for criticism was the use of YOP trainees 
as substitutes for permanent employees, and the outcome of 
the General Council's deliberations was a series of proposals which 
were designed to crack down on this abuse. These involved 
strengthening the MSC's application and monitoring procedures; 
giving unions a greater role in approving and monitoring schemes, 
including more stringent control of schemes in non-unionised 
workplaces; and the preparation of fresh guidance for unions on 
how to prevent any abuse. Subsequently, at the 1981 Congress, 
a motion was passed which declared that if such measures did not 
produce acceptable results, the trade union movement should 
oppose and withdraw its cooperation from the WEEP sector of YOP'(43) 
The proposals put for~ard by the General Council depended upon 
action being taken both by the MSC and by the trade union movement 
itself. The MSC for its part responded by agreeing to strengthen 
its routine approval and monitoring procedures, while at the same 
time making it possible for the trade unions to playa greater role 
within them. (44)Thus, a requirement was made that all applic-
ations from employers in unionised workplaces should be counter-
signed by the relevant unions, while those from non-unionised 
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employers should at least be put before the Area Board. Furthermore 
arrangements were made whereby special vetting procedures could be 
introduced in areas such as agriculture, where there was particular 
concern about abuses taking place in the absence of strong union 
organisation. Meanwhile, the TUC sent out a circular to affil-
iated unions, advising them of these new procedures and urging 
them to take full advantage of the extended opportunities for 
trade union involvement. 
This was all very fine in theory, but whether these measures 
could produce 'acceptable results' in terms of actually controlling 
abuse within the programme was another matter. This depended 
upon the commitment and capacity of both the MSC and the trade 
unions themselves to ensure the effective implementation of the 
new procedures. The evidence that has already been presented 
concerning the development and performance of the programme during 
its latter years would suggest that something substantial was 
lacking in some or all of these regards. 
The MSC may have been committed to control the level of abuse 
within YOP, but it was not given the capacity to do so by the 
Government. The school leavers undertaking was always given 
first priority, and once this was met, there were not sufficient 
resources left to maintain the monitoring system. Ironically, 
it was in March 1981 the same date as the TUC General Council drew 
up its proposals for strengthening the approval and monitoring 
procedures - that the MSC recognised that the monitoring system 
had broken down, abandoned a large number of outstanding visits, 
and decided that it could no longer maintain a comprehensive 
approach to monitoring. Thereafter, despite adopting a more 
selective approach, and despite making further adjustments in the 
frequency of visits required for particular types of scheme, the 
MSC was still unable to catch up with its huge backlog of visits. 
Thus, at the same time as agreeing to the TUC's proposals for more 
stringent procedures to check abuses, the Commission was substant-
ially weakening and failing to maintain its existing procedures -
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presumably with the full knowledge of its TUC Commissioners. 
The TUC's proposals of course included new procedures for 
approvals as well as monitoring, but these to a large extent 
relied upon the trade unions themselves taking advantage of the 
new opportunities created for them to become more actively 
involved. 
In the case of unionised workplaces, the requirement to obtain 
the signed approval of relevant unions at least ensured that they 
were consulted. Similarly, in the case of non-unionised workplaces, 
the trade union representatives on the Area Boards were at 
least ensured the opportunity to see and approve a full list of 
new scheme proposals. However, if these and the further opport-
unities which were made available for trade unions to contribute 
to the monitoring process were to be made full use of, it 
required a level of active interest in the operation of the 
programme at the grass roots of the trade union movement which 
does not appear to have been present. The greatest danger of 
abuses was of course with the schemes in non-unionised wOfk-
places. Receiving a full list of such scheme proposals through 
the Area Board gave local trade unionists an opportunity to make 
their own enquiries and raise objections if necessary, But, if 
this was to be more than a formal rubber-stamping exercise, it 
could not be left solely to the representatives on the Area Board. 
In order to be an effective control, a large-scale coordinated 
effort was required on the part of the local trade union movement. 
Yet, this does not appear to have taken place, certainly not in the 
area of the local case study. Nor, for that matter, was there 
much evidence of trade union involvement in unionised workplaces 
going far beyond an initial agreement of approval. As for the 
establishment of special vetting procedures in areas of particular 
concern about abuses, this does not appear to have spread much 
beyond the agricultural sector in which it was originally pilotted. 
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Whether or not the capacity existed within the trade union 
movement to ensure that there was an effective control of abuses 
at the ground level of the programme, there does not seem to have 
been the commitment necessary to make full use of such opportunities 
as were available to do so. It is interesting to note in this 
context the share of blame which trade union leaders were prep-
ared to apportion to their fellow trade unionists for what 
retrospectively they were prepared to admit was the failure of 
YOP. Thus, Bill Keys,one of the three TUC representatives on the 
Commission, stated at the 1983 Congress, when trying to rally 
support for the new Youth Training Scheme: 
"One of the reasons why the Youth Opportunities 
Programme failed was because the trade union movement 
failed the young. They did not go out and they did not 
monitor the YOP as they should have done". (45) 
In a sense, it might be said that the trade unions experienced 
the worst of both worlds in their involvement with YOP. They 
gave their formal approval and they took their share of respon-
sibility, yet they failed to make full use of the opportunity that 
this gave them to exercise control over the operation of the 
programme at the ground level. It would seem that, while the 
trade union leaders acting as representatives on the structures 
of the MSC pledged their full support for the programme, their 
members were somewhat half-hearted in their desire to get involved. 
Apparently, the problems and abuses to which the programme was 
subject, instead of encouraging them to become more actively 
involved, made them reluctant to have anything more to do with it 
than was absolutely necessary. 
However responsibility should be distributed between the Government, 
the MSC and the trade unions themselves, one thing is clear: 
the results of the new procedures which were adopted in 1981 to 
strengthen the control of abuses within YOP could hardly be 
described as having been 'acceptable' from the angle of the trade 
unions. The TUC may have succeeded in having some influence upon 
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the formal rules of the programme, but it had failed to ensure that 
this was translated into an effective form of control at the level 
of individual schemes where the abuses that it was concerned about 
were taking place. 
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Other examples of the trades union movement's failure to translate 
its formal position of responsibility for yap into a real influence 
over the management of the programme can easily be found. The 
holding down of the level of the trainees' allowance has been 
identified as being an important factor in the programme's contrib-
ution to the wider economic strategy of the Conservative Government. 
It also gave rise to widespread criticism throughout the trade 
union movement. In November 1981, when the level of the allowance 
stood at £23.50 per week, the TUC made a call for it to be increased 
to £30 in order to restore its original purchasing power. (46) 
The response of the Employment S.e8retary was to raise the allowance 
to £25 from January 1982, and then hold it at this level for the 
remaining one and a half years of the programme, thus in the 
long run bringing about a further reduction of its real value. 
The TUC protested at the original meagre increase and continued 
to protest when there was no further increase, but all to no 
avail; Similarly, the trade union movement's attempts to secure 
improvements in the quality of the programme do not seem to have 
met with notable success. In both cases, despite the tripartite 
decision-making structures of the MSC, it was the Government 
which had the ultimate say through its control over the prog-
ramme's budget. 
As well as attempting to use its position within the MSC to 
influence the way in which yap operated, the trade union movement 
also sought to organise the trainees to stand up for their own 
interests on these issues. Some of the larger unions, such as the 
Transport and General Workers Union (T.G.W.U.) and the National 
Union of Public Employees (N.U.P.E.) ran campaigns to recruit 
YOP trainees as union members; and, during the latter half of 
1981, there was the 'Jobs for Youth' Campaign, of which the 
TUC was a leading sponsor. (47) But neither of these efforts could 
be described as a major success. Only a small minority of 
YOP trainees were ever recruited as union members and the impact 
of this appears to have been very marginal. On the evidence 
of the local case study, the recruiting campaigns were sporadic 
rather than concerted; and, of those trainees that were approa-
ched, few could be convinced that union membership would bring 
them sufficient tangible benefits to make it worth the payment 
of even a nominal subscription fee. As for the Jobs for Youth 
Campaign, this did initially succeed in generating a certain 
amount of publicity about the shortcomings of YOP. But, in the face 
of Government intransigence, the momentum could not be sustained. 
The climax of the first phase of the campaign was intended 
to be a mass rally to mark the arrival in London of the 'Jobs 
Express', a special train which had been on a nationwide tour 
collecting young people representing all parts of the country. 
However, on a cold November day, only 3,500 people attended the 
rally, and thereafter the campaign fizzled out. (48) 
From the point of view of the TUC, the failure of this event lay 
not only in the poor attendance, but also in the attitude taken 
by many of those who did attend. The intention had been that the 
rally should add the weight of popular protest behind the efforts 
being made to reform and improve YOP from within the structures 
of the MSC. But, as the straggling column of demonstrators crossed 
over Westminster Bridge, the main chant that could be heard was 
this: 
"Youth demand T-U-C 
Wi thdraw support from Y-O-P". 
Apparently, a considerable proportion of these young people who 
were sufficiently critical of the shortcomings of YOP to join in 
such a protest, extended this criticism to include the TUC's own 
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involvement with the programme. 
Clearly, by this stage, the case for continued trade union 
involvement as a means of exerting influence over the development 
of the programme was losing credibility. Yet, for the reasons that 
have already been explained, withdrawal of support from YOP was 
still a political impossibility as far as the TUC leadership was 
concerned. The only way out of the ,impasse was to look beyond YOP 
itself, to the wider future of vocational training. The develop-
ment of a comprehensive system of vocational preparation for all 
16-18 year olds was a long standing objective of the TUC; and, 
from the outset, its support for YOP had taken into account the 
fact that the programme might prove to be an important stepping 
stone in this direction. (49) The publication of the New Training 
Initiative Consultative Document in May 1981 added substance to 
this hope, and thereby provided a new opportunity for YOP to be 
redeemed as far as the trade union movement was concerned. However, 
this depended upon the unions being able to exert a more effective 
influence over the development of YOP's successor than they had 
managed in the case of YOP itself. 
An account has already been presented in a previous chapter of 
how the MSC and the Government simultaneously produced separate 
sets of plans for the implementation of the NTI, and of how the 
differences between these two versions with regard to the Youth 
Training Scheme were resolved when the Government endomed the 
Youth Task Group Report in June 1982 (50) The significance 
of these events, in the context of the present discussion, was that 
on this occasion the TUC appeared to succeed in using its position 
within the MSC to bring about important changes in Government 
policy. It has already been noted earlier in this chapter how 
the Government's original plans for the Youth Training Scheme 
made obvious its intention to use the new scheme as a means of 
pushing down youth wage levels. It should be added that they also 
demonstrated a lack of any real commitment to the objective of 
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going beyond a special programme for the unemployed, to a 
comprehensive scheme of vocational training for all young people. 
On both of these issues, the TUC was adamant in its opposition 
to the Government. In relation to the first, it insisted that 
trainees should receive at least the same allowance as under YOP 
and that unions should have the power to negotiate additions to this 
basic allowance; furthermore, no young people should be compelled 
to join the new scheme through the withdrawal of their right 
to supplementary benefit. All of these points were unanimously 
agreed by the Youth Task Group. Similarly, a consensus was 
reached in line with the TUC's view that the new scheme should be 
a comprehensive training provision, available to both employed 
and unemployed young people. Faced by the united opposition 
of all the interests represented on the Youth Task Group, the 
Government was forced to relent on both of these issues. 
The Government's endorsement of the Youth Task Group Report 
appeared to be a triumph for the TUC's policy of active involvement 
in the MSC's tripartite policy-making process, and certai~ly it was 
portrayed as such as the subsequent annual Congress. (51) 
Beyond the major issues that have already been highlighted, many 
other important points were established with regard both to 
scheme content and management, and to trade union involvement and 
consultation. These it was hoped would guarantee the quality 
of the new scheme, and ensure that it was not subject to the same 
problems and abuses that had caused the trade union movement so 
much concern.inthe case of YOP. But, it was not only from the angle 
of the TUC that the Youth Task Group Report could be regarded as 
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a notable achievement. As we have seen,it could also be represented 
as being of major significance in terms of the wider principles of 
MSC policy. On the one hand, YOP's replacement by a comprehensive 
and high quality training scheme made it possible for this 
increasingly important area of Commission responsibility to be 
positively aligned with its wider approach to an active manpower 
policy. On the other hand, the establishment of a unanimous 
agreement on these plans was of great significance in terms of 
the MSC's principle of consensus-based policy making, particularly 
given that the consensus on YOP had been at the point of collapse. 
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9. YTS as YOP's Redemption 
The importance of the Youth Task Group Report was not only 
with regard to its definition of the future of the Youth Training 
Scheme; in a sense, it also redefined the history of YOP itself. 
If one was to judge YOP solely in terms of what it achieved 
during the five years of its existence, taking no account of what 
was to follow, one would have to conclude that in most respects 
it was a failure. It did, of course, succeed as a palliative 
and social measure, in so far as it guaranteed large numbers 
of young people a temporary alternative to the immediate prospect 
of the dole. But, beyond this, it failed in terms of both of the 
two main economic objectives originally defined and agreed upon 
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in the Holland Report, these being the enhancement of young people's 
job prospects and the provison of a substantial element of training 
content. Furthermore, because of the abuses and side-effects 
to which it was subject, the programme arguably destroyed more 
permanent job opportunities for young people than it created. 
Only in terms which were specific to the Thatcher Government's 
monetarist economic strategy could the programme be interpreted 
as making a positive economic contribution. Yet, in so far as 
this was so, and particularly since there was evidence of it 
being intentional, it put in question the continued support of the 
trade union movement and therefore undermined the whole consensus-
based approach to the MSC. In these circumstances, the Youth Task 
Group Report not only restored the consensus which was necessary 
for YOP to continue to the end of its five year life-span, but 
also held out the prospect of YOP's failure eventually being 
redeemed. YOP itself might not have been able to fulfil a positive 
economic function for which it could command consensus support, 
but at least it might be judged in the future as having paved 
the way towards a scheme which could do so, on the basis of its 
provision of a comprehensive programme of high quality training. 
This, of course, all depended upon the Youth Training Scheme living 
up to the expectations of the Task Group Report. We have already 
seen the extent to which the implementation of YOP diverged from 
its original plans, and also how difficult it proved for the 
various quality improvement initiatives to make any impression 
at the ground level of the programme. Furthermore, it has been 
noted how large a gap still remained between YOP during its final 
year and the standards which were expected of YTS. Thus, simply 
because the Youth Task Group Report held out the prospect of 
some form of retrospective redemption for YOP, it cannot be assumed 
that this necessarily took place. Hence, before reaching any 
final conclusions concerning the significance of YOP in a wider 
historical and political context, it will be necessary to take into 
account the progress of YTS so far, and whether it has been any 
more successful than YOP in fulfilling its original plans. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES PROGRAMME IN ITS WIDER 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
1. The First Year of YTS 
This final chapter was embarked upon in September 1984, 
when the Youth Training Scheme had just completed its first full 
year. Obviously, there were limits to what could be said about its 
achievements at this early stageof development. Nevertheless, 
certain important features had already begun to emerge which needed 
to be taken into consideration before reaching any final conclu-
sions on the wider historical significance of YOP. The account 
which follows is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of the progress of the YTS in relation to its original plans. 
Rather, its purpose is to pick out certain key features which can 
be related back to the analysis that has been presented of YOP. 
First, it will be remembered that there were two main issues on 
which originally there was a divergence of opinion between the 
Government and the MSC: the.inclusion of employed as well as 
unemployed young people on the new scheme, and the maintenance 
of the level of the allowance without any form of compulsion 
through the withdrawal of supplementary benefit. On both of these, 
the unanimity of the Youth Task Group Report eventually forced 
the Government to relent. Yet, only one year into the new scheme, 
there was evidence in both cases of the Government reverting 
to its original plans. 
The objective of providing a planned foundation year for all 
minimum age school leavers, whether employed or unemployed, lay 
at the heart of the concept of YTS which was agreed upon by the 
Youth Task Group. (1) The original plan was that the new scheme 
should take in some 460,000 entrants during its first year, this 
total including not only unemployed 16 and 17 year old school 
leavers but also most 16 year olds in employment. (2) 
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Great efforts were made to prepare this number of places, 
but soon it became apparent that many would not be needed. By the 
end of the first financial year, there had only been some 
354,000 entrants recorded, and this included a certain amount of 
double counting of young people who had entered twice. The main 
reason for this substantial shortfall was the almost complete 
failure of the scheme to bring in youngsters who had started 
paid employment. (3) Thus, in its first year, YTS remained basically 
a special provision for the unemployed, the same as YOP had been 
before, and in accordance with the Government's original plan rather 
than the concept agreed upon by the Youth Task Group Report. 
The fact that this happened cannot necessarily be blamed upon the 
Government. Sufficient resources were made available for the MSC 
to generate the number of places required to cater for both 
employed and unemployed young people. The problem appears to have 
been that almost all of the effort was put into locating these 
places, rather than attracting the young people who were needed 
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to fill them. Meanwhile, more school leavers than had been 
anticipated succeeded in finding permanent jobs outside the scheme(4) 
Although the Government could not be held directly responsible 
for this, there was evidence to suggest that it was not completely 
committed to the concept of YTS as a comprehensive scheme. The 
Youth Task Group Report had stated that the Young Workers Scheme 
was inconsistent with the objective of providing a year's foundation 
training for all minimum age school leavers, and had therefore 
proposed that it should not be continued once YTS had started. 
As it was, during the first year of the new scheme, the Government 
chose to ignore this proposal, and a considerable number of those 
16 year olds who found employment outside YTS were accounted for 
by the Young Workers Scheme. Subsequently,the Government compromised 
and withdrew the elgibility of 16 year olds to be employed under 
the terms of the Young Workers Scheme. Nevertheless, doubts still 
remained about its commitment to develop YTS into a universal scheme. 
In January 1984, the Training For Jobs White Paper provided an 
up-date on the progress that had been made towards the three 
objectives of the New Training Initiative, but failed to give any 
explicit reaffirmation of the commitment to extend YTS to include 
all minimum age school leavers. This gave rise to speculation 
that the Government might be intending to continue YTS as a scheme 
primarily for the unemployed, (5)and at the time of writing this 
speculation remained unanswered. (6) 
With reference to the trainees' allowance and the eligibility 
of young people to claim supplementary benefit, the Government 
had kept its options open from the beginning. Whilst agreeing 
to the Youth Task Group Report recommendation that the allowance 
should not be any lower than the level of £25 paid under YOP, 
it had avoided committing itself to maintain the real value of 
this against inflation. Similarly, it had reserved the right to 
review at a later date the question of supplementary benefit 
entitlement of those who refused a place on YTS. In both cases, 
the Government was to make use of these loopholes. 
The unanimous agreement of the Youth Task Group had been that 
the real value of the trainees' allowance should be maintained 
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against inflation. Already, by the time that YTS was being launched, 
the allowance had lost some of its value, in comparison with 
when this had originally been agreed. Consequently, in June 1983, 
the MSC recommended that the amount should be raised from £25 
to £26.45. This was rejected out of hand by the Conservative 
Employment Secretary, Norman Tebbit, who argued that suchan increase 
could not be afforded without cutting either the size or quality 
of the scheme. He was supported in this action by the CBI, whose 
representatives on the Commission had voted against the majority 
recommendation, thus reneging on treunanimous agreement of .the 
Youth Task Group Report. (7) A year later, the issue surfaced 
again, only this time it was the TUC which found itself in a 
minority on the Commission in recommending that the real value of 
the allowance should be restored as originally agreed. The 
majority recommendation was for an increase of £1.25, which the 
Government agreed to implement from September 1st 1984. (8) 
This might just about have compensated for inflation since 
the beginning of the scheme's full operation, which was a year 
previously. But, for the allowance to have retained its value as 
originally agreed by the Youth Task Group, it would have had to 
have risen to a level of about £30; and, to be comparable with the 
original YOP allowance, it would have needed to be approaching 
£40. (9) Nor could the Government use lack of resources as an 
excuse this time, the scheme having been considerably underspent 
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at the end of its first year because a the shortfall in recruitment(lO) 
The level set for the allowance was of course only intended to 
be a minimum, the TUC having established in the Youth Task Group 
Report the right for unions to negotiate an additional 'top-up' 
for individual schemes. Yet, by the end of the first year of YTS, 
it was evident that in the vast majority of cases the minimum 
level had been taken as the norm. (11) There were exceptions and 
in some cases the top-up was quite substantial. (12) But unions 
such as NALGO, which attempted to enforce the raising of the 
level of the allowance to the 'going rate for the job', soon found 
that this was impractical as a general policy. (13) 
An issue closely related to the right of unions to negotiate 
top-ups to the trainees' allowances was that of apprentice pay. 
The Youth Task Group Report had established that, where there 
were existing collective agreements, negotiations should take place. (14) 
Furthermore, the TUC had made clear that it did not expect the 
inclusion of first year apprentices within YTS to be used as an 
excuse for disregarding existing agreements and reducing their 
pay levels. Nevertheless, during the first year of YTS there were 
numerous examples of precisely this taking place. (15) 
As far as young people's right to supplementary benefit was 
concerned, despite certain threats and scares, this was at least 
formally retained. Nevertheless, the Government managed to 
introduce an element of financial compulsion into the scheme 
which many considered to be 'a breach of the spirit, if not the 
letter, of the Youth Task Group Report'. (16) This was achieved 
through an instruction issued by Employment Secretary, Norman 
Tebbit, to the effect that young people refusing to accept a 
place on YTS should be subject to the same financial penalty 
as those who refused a reasonable offer of a job. This meant that 
for a period of six weeks their benefit might be reduced by 
40 percent, bringing it down to a level of only £9.50. Moreover, 
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the effect of this sanction was strengthened by means of the pressure 
which the Department of Employment put on careers officers to 
report refusers, when previously this had been left to their 
discretion. (17) 
It should now be apparent that, with regard to both of the main 
issues on which there had been disagreement between the Government 
and theMSC, the first year of YTS turned out to resemble the 
original plans of the Government more closely than those which had 
subsequently been agreed on the basis of the Youth Task Group 
Report. Thus, from the start, the scheme had catered almost 
exclusively for unemployed young people, and still at the end 
of its first year, doubt remained as to the commitment of the 
Government to ensure that it would develop into a comprehensive 
scheme. Meanwhile, a further depreciation of the real value of 
the allowance had been allowed to take place, and an element of 
financial compulsion had been introduced by means of the threat 
of partial loss of benefits. In none of these instances had the 
Government actually broken any formal undertaking that it had 
given, but certainly it had condoned, encouraged and instigated 
developments of the scheme that were incompatible with the ethos 
of the Youth Task Group. 
The other main feature in relation to which the first year's 
performance of YTS needs to be assessed is that of quality of 
training content. It was this, alongside the scheme's compreh-
ensiveness, that was intended to distinguish YTS from YOP, and to 
provide it with a positive economic function within the wider 
framework of the MSC's active manpower policy. Furthermore, 
it was this which was supposed to provide the justification 
for the low level of the trainees' allowance. 
The easiest way to summarise the first year of YTS with regard to 
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the scheme's quality of content is merely to state that the dominant 
theme of the previous five years of YOP was repeated. Thus, quality 
was sacrificed in the pursuit of quantity. In the rush to 
generate the places that it was anticipated would be required 
for some 460,000 entrants, the MSC made a number of significant 
compromises in the strict quality specifications that had originally 
emanated from the Youth Task Group Report. Initially, the required 
content of schemes had been clearly laid down in terms of the~eight 
following design elements: induction; assessment; planned work 
experience(up to a maximum of 39 weeks); a minimum of 13 weeks 
relevant off-the-job training; guidance and support; training 
based on one or more broad areas of related occupations; training 
in basic skills of general use in employment; and a record of 
achievement. As it happened, when it came to the implementation 
of the scheme, the MSC showed itself willing to waive certain 
aspects of the design elements, treating them as recommended rather 
than mandatory. In particular, as a result of employers' objections, 
the idea of a detailed assessment and record of achievement was 
dropped in favour of a simple statement of the standards met. 
Similarly, in the face of employer resistance, the MSC did not 
always insist upon the requirement that the training content of 
schemes should cover a broad occupational area. (18) 
Beyond these compromises in the original scheme specifications, 
there still remained the problem of ensuring that the agreed 
training content was actually delivered. The Youth Task Group 
Report had intended that the training plans drawn up on the basis 
of the eight design elements should be embodied in legally 
enforceable contracts. However, this idea came to nothing. (19) 
The Report also suggested that in view of the MSC's unimpressive 
record on the monitoring of YOP, outsiders with practical exper-
ience of education and industry should be recruited to assist 
with quality assurance. (20) It was stressed as a priority that 
these quality assurance staff should be engaged, briefed and 
trained in good time.(21) Yet, when the new scheme was launched 
no such staff had been recruited, and generally there was a 
lack of clarity about the monitoring arrangements that were to 
be adopted. It was stated that some of the monitoring could be 
carried out by telephone, and that the frequency of actual 
visits would depend upon the reputation of the sponsors. An 
assurance was given by the Chairman of the MSC, David Young, that 
there would be enough inspectors to ensure the quality of the 
scheme, but he refused to give any indication of how frequent 
the visits would be.(22) Meanwhile, employers were being 
assured that there would only be a low level of inspections. (23) 
MSC officials were said to set great store on the internal 
monitoring being carried out by the 'managing agencies' in the 
employer-based 'Mode A' of the scheme, which was the equivalent 
of the WEEP sector of YOP and accounted for some 80 per cent of 
the total number of places. (24) Managing agencies were either 
larger firms or specially created companies which were paid by 
the MSC to take responsibility for coordinating training programmes 
on behalf of groupings of smaller work experience sponsors. The 
MSC only undertook to monitor directly these coordinating 
organisations, and apart from a small sample of visits, left it 
up to them to control the activities of the individual sponsors. 
This meant having to visit some 5,700 managing agencies, as 
opposed to perhaps as many as 150,000 individual workplaces. 
Nevertheless, according to the pressure group Youthaid, only about 
half of the managing agencies had received visits by January 
1984, nine months after the scheme had first been launched. (25) 
Moreover, it was not until this date that plans were announced 
for the training of specialist programme assessors who were to· 
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operate a new system of regular quarterly monitoring visits. 
This was not be introduced until the following autumn, and itmight 
also be noted that the 1,500 assessors being trained were 
junior MSC area office staff and not experienced practitioners 
drawn from outside. (26) 
The MSC claimed that early results indicated that some two-thirds 
of all programmes met the scheme's current design and content 
requirements. (27) However, given the lack of regularity of 
monitoring during the first year and the lack of experience of those 
responsible for carryin& it out, doubt must remain as to how 
closely provision on the ground conformed to the nationally 
proclaimed standards. Even if the formal requirements were 
met, we have seen from the local case study of YOP that this 
should not necessarily be regarded as any guarantee of quality. 
A report made by Her Majesty's Inspectorate provided evidence 
that this was equally the case during the first year of YTS, 
at least as far as the contribution of the education service was 
concerned. Thus, although the requirement of a minimum of 13 
weeks off-the-job-training was upheld, the report revealed that 
the training being provided was often insufficiently related to 
the other 39 weeks of work experience. Also noted was the general 
failure of MSC guidelines to shape the content of courses, and 
in particular, to promote the adoption of a broad-based occupational 
approach. Yet, it was precisely on those courses which followed 
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most closely.the traditional narrowly craft-based approach of an apprenti-
cieship that some of the best motiviated and successful trainees 
were to be found; whereas, many trainees were reluctant to 
accept the broader occupational family approach recommended by 
the MSC. As for trainee log books, which were intended to. be the 
principle means of recording progress, the report indicated that 
their actual use was only patchy. Finally, it also pointed out some 
of the underlying restrictions on the quality of provision such 
as the low status given to YTS work in colleges, the shortage of 
suitable accommodation and equipment, and the lack of staff 
development. In relation to the last of these factors, it should 
be noted that more than fifty special 'accredited centres' had 
been set up throughout the country to provide training for YTS 
staff. Yet, many came into operation behind schedule, and 
according to the HMI's report, in-service training for college 
teachers involved with YTS was still lagging well behind. (28) 
Thus, during the first year of YTS, not only were the original 
standards of quality compromised, but also the remaining require-
ments were inadequately monitored and there was evidence of a 
considerable gulf between nationally proclaimed objectives and the 
reality of the scheme at the ground level. In each of these 
respects the experience of YOP was repeated, and when criticism 
of this emerged, the initial response was also the same. The 
shortcomings were explained in terms of the problems associated 
with the speed and scale of the scheme's launch, and it was 
promised that there would be a major improvement in subsequent 
years. A key factor in this promised improvement was to be the 
new monitoring system which has already been mentioned. Yet, even 
before it had been implemented, serious doubts were emerging as 
to the likelihood of its efficacy. These concerned not only the 
capacity of the fifteen hundred junior MSC staff that had been 
trained to form the new inspectorate, but also the way in which the 
qualitative objectives of the scheme had thus far been defined. (29) 
The eight design elements have already been listed and it has been 
described how aspects of them were compromised. In addition to 
these, there were six broad types of learning opportunity which 
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it was specified should be offered to each trainee. (30) The problem 
which emerged during the first year of the scheme was that the 
complexity of this combined structure caused confusion amongst 
those working in the field, and this was compounded by the uncert-
ainty as to exactly which aspects of the design elements were 
mandatory. This confusion has made it impossible as yet to develop 
a simple means of assessing quality in terms of a clearly defined 
and agreed set of outcomes. (31) The need for simplification has 
been recognised, and development work has been initiated under 
the aegis of the Advisory Group on Contents and Standards -
a committee of specialists set up to advise the Youth Training 
Board on such technical matters. (32) Thus, in May 1984, a new 
skills list was unveiled which it was indicated could be developed 
not only as the basis of an effective system of certification, but 
also as the key instrument of quality control. The list consists 
of 103 generic skills which it is claimed underlie the performance 
of almost all tasks at work and in many other practical activities. 
Standard methods of assessing performance in these skills are 
to be developed and used both for the purposes of certification, 
and as a means of quality control based on results. (33) The 
problem is, however, that YTS is already over a year old and this 
work is still in the initial stages of development. Moreover, 
the approach that it embodies is by no means universally agreed 
upon. For example, it is not necessarily consistent with the 
Occupational Training Families approach initially favoured by 
the MSC, some of whose proponents have previously denied the very 
existence of generic skills. Given this lack ofa fully-worked out 
and agreed upon alternative, it is hardly surprising that pract-
itioners in the field, not to mention trainees, often prefer to 
stick to the tried and tested formulae of narrowly craft-based 
training. (34) As for the new programme assessors, so long as this 
state of confusion and flux remain, theirs would seem to be an 
impossible task, however well-trained and experienced they might 
be. 
Thus, on three key points agreed by the Youth Task Group Report, 
the Youth Training Scheme has so far failed to deliver what was 
promised. First, it has failed to develop as a comprehensive 
form of provision for both employed and unemployed. Secondly, 
it has failed to maintain the real value of the trainee's allowance 
and to avoid the introduction of any element of financial compulsion. 
Thirdly, it has failed to guarantee a high quality of training 
content: indeed, quality has yet to be defined in a way that can 
be effectively measured. The only other issue which needs to be 
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mentioned is that of employability. It will be remembered that 
the employment placement rate of trainees was one of the key 
criteria by which the performance of YOP was assessed. In the 
case of YTS, the fact that it was intended to be a training 
provision for both employed and unemployed young people meant that 
less emphasis was put upon this factor. Nevertheless, claims were 
made that the scheme would substantially enhance the employment 
prospects of those who where unemployed. (35) As yet, there is 
not sufficient evidence available to make any judgement on this 
point. However, given the failure of YTS to make any substantial 
improvement upon YOP in other respects, it may prove to be crucial 
to the future credibility of the scheme. (36) 
On the evidence available so far concerning the development of 
YTS, the prospect of some form of retrospective redemption for 
YOP which was held out by the Youth Task Group Report would appear 
to be as far away as ever. YTS has repeated rather than redeemed 
the shortcomings of YOP, and there does not seem to be much immed-
iate prospect of it doing otherwise. The implications of this can 
be examined from a number of different angles. Let us start with 
the MSC itself and its characteristic approach to manpower 
policy. 
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2. The Demise of the MSC's Original Interpretation of an 
Active Manpower Policy 
Briefly recapping, it will be remembered that the MSC 
was originally established to oversee the administration of an 
active manpower policy. The main features of this, as originally 
defined in Towards A Comprehensive Manpower Policy, were that 
it should serve an economic as well as a social function, and 
that it should involve only limited direct intervention in the 
labour market. Additionally, the style of policy-making of the 
Commission was to be one based on consensus. The original 
interpretation of the dual function of an active manpower policy 
consisted primarily of the provision of employment and training 
services, and these activities initially accounted for the vast 
majority of the Commission's comparatively modest expenditure. 
Yet, from the very outset, unemployment was emerging as a major 
problem, and increasingly the MSC was drawn into the provision of 
special measures for its relief. Initially, these activities were 
only on a small scale by comparison with the employment and 
training services, and also some attempt was made to integrate 
them within the terms of an active manpower policy. However, by 
mid-way through YOP's five year life-span, special programmes 
were accounting for almost a third of the MSC's considerably 
enlarged budget, and yet YOP itself was failing to make any 
significant contribution to the Commission's wider interpretation of 
manpower policy. As we have seen, it was unable to fulfil satis-
factorily a positive economic function, either in terms of its 
employment placement rate, or in terms of the quality of its 
392 
training content. Hence, it was basically just a huge social prog-
ramme which, because of its size and the lack of adequate monitoring, 
was inevitably causing substantial interference with the normal 
workings of the youth labour market. In this context, the signif-
icance of the New Training Initiative and the Youth Task Group Report 
was that they set out, and created a consensus around, a path 6f 
development by which the simple relief of youth unemployment being 
provided by YOP could be positively transformed into an integral 
element of the training aspect of the Commission's interpretation 
of an active manpower policy. The crucial steps to be taken along 
this path were that the Youth Training Scheme should be a compreh-
ensive form of provision for both employed and unemployed young 
people, and that it should offer a high quality of training content. 
As yet, neither of these steps has been taken,and YTS in practice 
remains primarily a hug.e social programme for the relief of youth 
unemployment, just as yap was before. The implications of this 
for the MSC's pursuit of a comprehensive manpower policy are 
extremely serious. 
Some impression of the significance assumed by YTS in the context 
of MSC policy as a whole can be gained from examining the distrib-
ution of the Commission's expenditure during the first financial 
year of the new scheme. (37) The fact that YTS has failed to 
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improve much upon yap in terms of either quality or comprehensiveness 
has not stopped it from being appreciably more expensive, if only 
because of the increase in its standard length of provision. (38) 
Thus, in 1983-84 £777 million was spent on YTS, compared with 
£543 million in the previous year on yap. What is more, this 
represented an increased share of total MSC expenditure. Back in 
1980/81 yap accounted for 25 per centof the Commission's spending; 
preparing for the transition to YTS in the two following years, 
this figure rose to just over 40 percent; finally, in its first 
financial year, the share of the new scheme reached 44 per cent, 
and this despite a substantial underspend. Thus, YTS's failure 
to make the transition to a comprehensive, high quality training 
scheme has meant that approaching half of the MSC's total budget 
is being spent on what was still basically a special programme 
without any real economic function. 
The situation becomes even worse if one analyses the distribution 
of the MSC's other expenditure during 1983-4. To start with, it 
should be noted that the spending on YTS represented 72 per cent 
of the total devoted to all forms of training activity. If one 
excluded YTS, only 15 per cent of all MSC expenditure would be 
accounted for by the remaining conventional training services. (39) 
As for the employment services, the expenditure of the ESD still 
represented 36 per cent of the MSC total. However, the majority 
of this consisted of special programmes for the adult unemployed, 
notably the Community Programme. Conventional employment services 
on their own accounted for only 13 per cent of the MSC total. 
Furthermore, if the expenditure on the adult special programmes, 
together with that on Community Industry, were to be added to the 
figure for YTS, the resulting total would represent 70 per cent 
of all MSC expenditure. Thus, if it is accepted that inits first 
year YTS operated effectively as a continuation of YOP, it must 
be concluded that 70 per cent of the total MSC expenditure in 
1983/84 was devoted to special programmes of various kinds. 
Meanwhile, the conventional employment and training services, on 
which the implementation of the Commission's original interpretation 
of an active manpower policy was dependent, accounted for less than 
30 per cent between the two of them. 
Expenditure statistics alone cannot give the complete picture. 
In order to comprehend the full extent of the demise of the 
conventional employment and training services, it is necessary to 
summarise briefly what has happened to each of them during the 
period of YOP's development and the transition to YTS. Starting 
with the employment services, it will be remembered that the MSC 
took over the modernisation programme which had first been outlined 
in 1971 by the document People and Jobs, The programme involved 
the expansion and development of the job placement service, on 
the basis ofa new network of self-service Jobcentres which were to 
be located in prominent High Street sites away from the old 
benefit offices. 
Initially, the implementation of this programme was one of the 
MSC's main priorities, the efficient matching-up of job seekers 
and vacancies being regarded as an important aspect of an active 
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manpower policy. However, the imposition of cuts from 1979 
onwards, combined with the emergence of the new priority of special 
programmes for the unemployed, led to a slowing down of the 
completion of the final stages of the modernisation programme and 
a reduction in some existing services. Furthermore, the growth 
of unemployment itself led to the questioning of the whole rationale 
of the public employment service and its modernisation. With over 
two million people unemployed, there were likely to be only very 
selective problems of skill shortage and mismatch, and hence it 
could be argued that it was no longer worthwhile maintaining the 
complete network of Jobcentres, let alone improving it. In short, 
mass unemployment undermined the economic rationale of the 
employment services. 
The stimulus for a reversal of policy was provided when the 
operations of the employment services were subjected to invest-
igation by the so-called 'Rayner scrutiny process'. (40) 
A scrutiny concerned generally with the administration of benefits 
for the unemployed recommended that registration at Jobcentres 
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should no longer be compulsory for the claiming of such benefits. (41) 
Once this recommendation was implemented in October 1982, the way 
was open for further cuts to be made. A second Rayner scrutiny 
produced a report specifically on the employment services which, in 
effect, recommended the complete reversal of their previous trend 
of development. The need to have Jobcentres located on expensive 
High Street sites was questioned and it was proposed that cuts should 
be made on the existing network, together with reductions in the 
numbers of staff. (42) As a result, by 1984, the total number of 
staff in the Employment Services Division had been brought down 
to little more than 11,000, compared with more than 15,000 in 
1979 when there was no responsibility for adult special programmes 
in addition to the conventional employment services. (43) Yet, 
the Government was still demanding more staff cuts and more 
reductions in a budget which had already been steadily falling in 
real value over previous years. (44) 
The response of the MSC has been to plan for a radical reorgan-
isation of the whole Jobcentre network. This seems likely to 
involve the replacement of many Jobcentres by a combination of 
'Jobshops' offering only limited services and 'Jobpoints' which 
will act merely as publicity stalls. (45) Critics see this as 
another step in the dismantling of the public employment service, 
while its proponents within the MSC recommend it as the only way 
of preserving the principle of a public employment service in the 
face of Government pressure for public expenditure cuts and 
privatisation. Whichever may be the case, it is clear that the 
days of an expanding public employment service playing a positive 
role within an active manpower policy are over: if the service 
does survive, it will be on the cheapest and most minimal basis 
possible. 
Turning now to the training services, the story is fundamentally 
the same, though somewhat more complex. When the MSC first 
took over the Training Services Agency in 1974, it inherited two 
principle responsibilities in relation to the national training 
system. One was to oversee and coordinate the provision of training 
within industry, on the basis of the structure of sectoral 
Industrial Training Boards which had been established by the 1964 
Industrial Training Act. The other was to manage its own direct 
provision of training. It will be remembered that the MSC's 
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original policies in relation to both of these areas of responsibility 
had already been pre-defined by the 1972 document, Training for 
the Future. These involved the partial phasing out of the levy 
system operated by the ITBs and the expansion of the direct 
provision of training through the development of the Training 
Opportunities Scheme. The overall objective was to ensure that 
there was an adequate supply of skilled manpower to meet the needs 
of every sector of the economy. 
The development of the TOPS programme followed a parallel course to 
that of the Jobcentre programme within the employment services. 
The objective of the scheme was to provide adults with skills training 
for which there was an active demand within the labour market, 
and the target set was eventually 100,000 completions per year. (46 ) 
Initially, this programme of expansion was given high priority 
and took place at a rapid pace. The peak number of completions 
reached was 75,000 in 1979/80, but already cuts had started to be 
imposed and this was 4,500 below target. (47 ) The cuts continued 
in subsequent years, and in 1982/83 a low point was reached of 
less than 60,000 completions.(48) Beyond the general need for 
public expenditure restraint, a strong rationale for these cuts 
was provided by the rapidly declining employment placement rates 
of many of the coursesinthe face of rising unemployment. This 
also led to substantial changes being made in the distribution of 
provision between different skill areas. (49 ) In 1983/84, there 
was a slight recovery, with the total number of completions rising 
back up to 66,000. However, much of this was due to the exten-
sion of special work preparation courses for the adult unemployed 
rather than the restoration of proper skill training courses. (50 ) 
It is noticeable that the financial cuts continued nevertheless. 
In fact, virtually the same number of completions was achieved 
as in 1980/81 at a 4 per cent lower cash price, which takes no 
account of inflation over the intervening years. (51 ) This 
might of course indicate the elimination of certain sources of 
waste; but given also the change in the balance of the different 
types of courses, it would seem to suggest that, despite the super-
ficial maintenance of numbers, there was a continuing decline in 
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the form of recognised occupational skills training which the scheme 
was originally intended to provide. 
The demise of the Skillcentre network provides another indication 
of what has really been happening as far as the MSC's direct 
provision of training services has been concerned. The network 
was built up through the seventies in line with the expansion of 
training provision such as TOPS. Subsequently, there have been 
two distinct stages in its demise. First, there was its subjugation 
to narrow commercial principles. This took place when in April 
1983 the Skillcentre Training Agency was established as a separate, 
commercially orientated organisation within the Commission. 
Initially, it was to receive a certain amount of financial support, 
but from 1986/87 onwards it was planned that it should be run 
independently on a break-even basis. (52) The second stage, which 
followed almost inevitably, was the planning of a severe cut-back 
in the size of the network. At the time of writing, it appears 
likely that up to 29 out of the total 87 Skillcentres will be 
closed down in an attempt to meet the break-even target. (53) 
Given that the new Agency is directly dependent upon the MSC and 
in particular TOPS for the vast majority of its business, and 
given that it is having to compete with colleges which are often 
highly subsidised, this outcome was predictable. Equally predic-
table was that the cuts in the network should be directed mainly 
towards areas of high unemployment where trainees have the 
least chance of finding jobs. These are the inevitable results 
of making the network run on the narrow economic criterion of 
commercial viability. 
The introduction of exemptions into the levy/grant system operated 
by the ITBs, which was authorised by the 1973 Employment and 
Training Act, curtailed to a certain extent their influence over 
employers. However, subsequently, the MSC took over responsibility 
for the Boards' operating costs, and also made available training 
grants for them to pass on to employers. The first major initiative 
made by the MSC in this area was the 'Training for Skills Programme' 
(T.S.P.A.), ~hich was endorsed by the Labour Government in 1977.(54) 
This was designed to develop and coordinate the efforts of the ITBs 
and other training organisations in relation to the identification 
and remedying of skill shortages. However, from the beginning, 
the effectiveness of the programme was limited by the refusal of 
the employers to agree to a collective funding mechanism. (55) 
Consequently, when a review of the 1973 Employment and Training Act 
was made by the MSC in 1980, it was recommended that the ITBs 
should be given more power and authority to deal with their respec-
tive industries. (56) The new Conservative Government's response 
was to do the opposite, ordering the abolition of the ITBs in all 
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but a few key sectors, and transferring the operating costs of 
those remaining back from the MSC to the employers. The powers 
necessary to do this were legislated for by a new Employment and 
Training Act (1981). The result was that only seven out of 
twenty-three ITBs survived, and elsewhere there was a return 
to the kind of voluntary arrangements which had already proved 
inadequate prior to 1964. 
The other important event of 1981 was the launching of the New 
Training Initiative. This, it will be remembered, included two 
major objectives other than that concerned with YTS and the broader 
vocational preparation of young people. The first of these was 
for the development of skill training and the reform of the 
apprenticeship system. The second was for the widening of training 
opportunities for adults. The progress made in relation to each 
of them was reported three years later in the Training For Jobs 
White Paper. 
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In relation to the first of these objectives, it was stated that 
substantial progress had be~made in some industries towards the 
reforming of their training arrangements, basing them on the achieve-
ment of agreed standards rather than time-serving. (57) However, 
the significance of this progress was seriously undermined by the 
continuing decline in the overall volume of skills training 
taking place within industry. The MSC's NTI Agenda for Action 
had suggested as a target that by 1986 at least 120,000 young 
people should be recruited annually into occupations calling 
for an extended period of training,including apprenticeships. 
This was said to represent approximately a 20 per cent increase 
on the intake into apprenticeship of 1981/2.(58) What actually 
happened, as admitted by the Training For Jobs White Paper, was 
that by 1983/84 the volume of apprentice recruitment fell to below 
40,000. (59) This was despite some continued assistance from 
the Government inthe form of special financial grants. In the 
future, the only Government support is to be for the first year 
of foundation training within the framework of YTS. The White Paper 
makes it clear that beyond this the responsibility will rest with 
the employers and the individual trainees themselves. In effect, 
the future of occupational skills training is being left to the 
operation of market forces and their immediate impact upon the 
decisions of individual employers, tempered only by the exhortations 
of the MSC to consider such training as an essential longterm 
investment. The likely outcome, in relation to the first objective 
of the NTI, would seem to be not only the removal of out-dated 
restrictions from the traditional apprenticeship system, but the 
removal of the system altogether with no alternative being put in 
its place. 
The NTI objective of widening adult training opportunities led 
to the development of the 'Adult Training Strategy'. (60) 
This, as endorsed in Training For Jobs, consisted of a series of 
recommendations which were mainly concerned with the MSC's role 
as a catalyst in relation to the efforts of employers in this 
area of policy. Thus, the role of the MSC as a direct provider of 
training services was only to be at the margins of the strategy, 
involving the provision of distance learning opportunities through 
the Open Tech and the continuation of restructured versions of TOPS. 
With regard to the latter, ithas already been noted how an 
increasing proportion of provision has come to be accounted for by 
basic level work preparation courses aimed at the adult unemployed. 
The Adult Training Strategy proposed that two separate programmes 
should be established, one for both employed and unemployed people 
which would be directed to known employment needs in industry, 
the other to provide unemployed people with training at a more basic 
level. Under these new arrangements, the White Paper envisaged 
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more than double the existing number of people being trained annually, 
yet at no increase of cost. This was said to be possible as a result 
of tailoring provision to meet specific needs, though the possib-
ility of establishing a loan scheme through which adult trainees 
would pay for their own training was also mentioned. (61) Whatever 
the case, it is clear that the actual volume of training provided 
for adults by the MSC will not be substantially increased from its 
present reduced level, though various ways may be found of spreading 
it more thinly in order to give the opposite impression. 
One suggestion is that more basic level training for unemployed 
adults might be provided through short work preparation courses 
in conjunction with the existing Community and Voluntary Projects 
Programmes. The Community Programme, is the direct descendant 
(via the Community Enterprise Programme) of the Short Temporary 
Employment Programme which was set up alongside YOP in 1978 to 
cater for the long-term adult unemployed. After various ups and 
downs in between, 1983/84 saw a considerable expansion in the 
size of this programme. Nevertheless, there were still only 
some 113,000 filled places by the end of the year, compared with 
approaching one and a half million in the priority groups for 
which it was intended to cater. (62) As for the Voluntary Projects 
Programme, this is merely an experimental initiative designed to 
encourage projects which provide voluntary activities for 
unemployed people without affecting their entitlement to statutory 
benefits. By the end of January 1984, some 31,000 unemployed 
volunteers had taken part in the programme since its introduction 
in August 1982. (63) Clearly, in relation to the growing scale of 
long-term adult unemployment, these responses must still 'be 
considered as a token effort. The inclusion of a certain amount 
of basic level training does not change this fact, and neither 
does it change the fundamental nature of the Adult Training 
Strategy. 
The essence of the Adult Training Strategy is clearly revealed 
by the terms in which it is endorsed within Training for Jobs. 
It is said to be 'entirely in line with the market-orientated 
approach to training that is now required'. (64) Some token 
response might be made to the needs of the long-term unemployed, 
but generally the provision of training for adults is to be governed 
by the narrowly defined economic considerations of the market. 
This, we have seen, applies also to skills training in general. 
Thus, a market-led approach has been adopted in relation to both 
objectives 1 and 3 of the New Training Initiative. 
In conclusion, it must be recognised that the MSC has to a large 
extent withdrawn from the role that it was originally intended to 
play. The development programmes which it was set up to oversee 
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in both the employment and training services have ground to a halt, 
and in many respects been reversed. The reason for this is simple. 
The MSC's role as the coordinator of an active manpower policy, 
and its interpretation of this through the development of the 
employment and training services, assumed the wider context of 
full employment as guaranteed by a macro-economic policy of demand 
management. This context no longer exists, and the original 
policies do not make sense without it. 
The demise of the MSC's original interpretation of its role in 
relation to an active manpower policy can be compared to the fate 
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of the so-called 'organisationist' policy which was adopted before 
the First World War. At the end of the historical account presented 
in Chapter 2 above, it was noted that active manpower policy and 
organisationist policy were in many ways similar at a micro-
economic level. (65) The essential difference lay in the macro-
economic context in which each was assumed to operate. Thus, 
organisationist policy was designed for a macro-economic context 
in which it was assumed that a full employment equilibrium would 
be maintained by the 'natural' mechanism of the labour market. 
In contrast, active manpower policy was designed on the assumption 
that full employment would be guaranteed by the implementation of 
a Keynesian-style macro-economic policy of demand management. The 
interwar years showed that the market mechanism alone was not 
necessarily capable of sustaining a full employment equilibrium, 
and the long-term mass unemployment of that era totally overwhelmed 
the organisationist policy. The abandoning of the postwar commit-
ment to a macro-economic policy of demand management has now left 
active manpower policy in the same situation. It is like a 
mechanism to regulate the flow of water through a dam which has 
been left on its own to face the flood as the rest of the structure 
has been demolished around it. 
This can be seen not only in the case of the conventional employment 
and training services, but in all the other areas of activity that 
were originally associated with the development of an active manpower 
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policy. For example, as levels of unemployment have risen throughout 
the country, the economic rationale for a regional policy which 
attempts to ensure the efficient matching up of jobs with job-seekers 
has disappeared. The only justification left for such a policy 
is in social terms, the need being to provide some form of 
special help to attract jobs and thereby mitigate the condition 
of the worst unemployment blackspots - this almost inevitably 
at the expense of some other area, often only slightly more favoured. 
In this sense, regional policy becomes the geographical equivalent 
of special measures for young people and the long_term unemployed. 
The most that it can hope to achieve is a more equitable distrib-
ution of misery. This reality has been reflected in what has 
actually happened. Just as the development of conventional 
employment and training services has been curtailed, so has that 
of regional policy. The disappearance of the economic rationale 
has led to a withdrawal of central government resources, leaving 
what is essentially a token policy of social amerlioration. (66) 
Another important aspect of active manpower policy as it was 
originally defined, and one which was intended to be central to 
the role of the MSC, was the collection and coordination of labour 
market intelligence. (67) Thus, the development of the original 
manpower strategy of the Commission was seen as being dependent upon 
the Commission itself becoming 'an authoritative centre for 
manpower intelligence'. (68) Initially, a Manpower Intelligence 
and Planning Division was established within the central support 
services of the Commission, and subsequently a network of Regional 
Manpowe~ Intelligence Units was introduced. (69) However, these 
have never developed into the authoritative centres of national 
and regional labour market intelligence which they were originally 
intended to become. Rather they have stagnated, and the most recent 
development has been the dispersal of the staff of the Manpower 
Intelligence and Planning Division to other operating and central 
support divisions. (70) In many other ways, beyond the particular 
role of the MSC, the general state of labour market intelligence 
appears to be have stagnated or even deteriorated over recent years. 
This became evident, for example, during the local case study when 
it was attempted to obtain up-to-date statistics concerning the 
development of the local labour market. The reason for the failure 
of this aspect of active manpower policy to continue its develop-
ment is basically the same as in the case of the other aspects of 
the policy. The rationale for the development of labour market 
intelligence was that it should provide the knowledge required for 
the planning of micro-adjustments through the active intervention 
of the employment and training services. When mass unemployment 
undermined the economic purpose of such micro-intervention, it 
also removed much of the motivation for developing the sources 
of information that were necessary for its planning. In addition 
the overwhelming scale of the unemployment problem has made detailed 
manpower planning seem not only pointless, but impossible. 
Thus every aspect of the active manpower policy which the MSC 
was established in order to implement has been undermined by the 
relentless growth of unemployment. Yet, the final irony of the 
situation is that, even with more than three million people 
unemployed, skill shortages still emerge as soon as there is any 
sign of recovery in a particular sector. (71) In the circumstances 
where there still is a genuine need for such a policy, there no 
longer seems to be the capacity to respond. 
One final point about the demise of this form of active manpower 
policy is that it need not be directly associated with the ideology 
of the Thatcher Government. Of course, to a certain extent it was 
a by-product of the general desire to cut public expenditure. 
But, beyond this, the continued existence of a policy of selective 
interference designed to improve the efficiency of the operation of 
the labour market was by no means necessarily incompatible with 
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a macro-economic policy based on the principles of the free market.As we 
have seen with the organisationist policy at the beginning of 
this century, the forms of intervention usually associated with an 
active manpower policy could in theory as easily be regarded as 
positive adjuncts to a macro-economic policy of laissez-faire 
as to one based on the principles of Keynesian demand management. 
Moreover, this is no less the case when laissez-faire economics 
are presented in their modern guise as monetarism. The incomp-
atibility only comes about in practice when as a result of such 
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a macro-economic policy, mass unemployment overwhelms any mechanism 
for making finer adjustments between supply and demand in the labour 
market. In these circumstances, the scope for intervention which 
can be justified on economic grounds becomes severely narrowed, 
and at the same time it becomes detached from the forms of inter-
vention which are most needed on social grounds. As a result, 
instead of a comprehensive form of active manpower policy in which 
economic and social objectives are closely integrated, all that 
is possible is narrowly defined economic interventions on the one 
hand and token special measures on the other. 
This is precisely what happened following the breakdown of the 
organisationist policy during the depression of the interwar 
years. On the one hand, there were Training Centres whose intake 
was strictly limited in accordance with future employment prospects. 
On the other hand, there were special measures such as the 
Juvenile Unemployment Centres which acted principally as palliatives 
in relation to the vast scale of social need., (72) In modern 
times, the fate of many aspects of active manpower policy has been 
similar. Take for example the MSC's provision for adults. On the 
one hand, both the skills training courses run by TOPS and the 
employment placement services of the Jobcentre network have been 
run down in accordance with the decline in labour market demand. 
On the other hand, there has been the development of the special 
measures approach represented by the Community Programme which, 
although on a larger scale, is still only a token palliative 
in relation to huge numbers of long-term unemployed. The proposed 
introduction of a certain amount basic training into the Community 
Programme, ashas already been explained, is unlikely to change 
the essential nature of this distinction between economic and 
social programmes, though it may cause a blurring of superficial 
appearances. Yet, the purpose of this argument is not simply to 
make out a case for history repeating itself. If we return now 
to the central theme of provision for young people, it will be seen 
that there are some important differences in comparison with what 
happened during the twenties and thirties. 
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3. The Development of a Monetarist Active Manpower Policy 
The original role of YOP as a special measure could be 
compared quite closely to that of the schemes for unemployed 
young people during the interwar years. The other side of the coin 
was the collapse of the apprenticeship system and the withdrawal 
of much of the government support provided for it through the 
network of Industrial Training Boards. Thus, initially, there was 
to a certain degree a repeat of the distinctive pattern of 
development between separate social and economic programmes. 
Yet, as we have seen, YOP rapidly outgrew its original definition 
as a special programme. Tied to the growth of youth unemployment 
by the political undertakings made on its behalf, it replaced a 
substantial proportion of the youth labour market. Thus, unlike 
the schemes of the twenties and thirties, and unlike the modern 
provision for the adult unemployed, YOP took on a scale and a 
degree of comprehensiveness which precluded it from any longer 
being regarded as merely a token special measure. This it will 
be remembered brought about a crisis both for the programme itself 
and in terms of the wider objectives of the Manpower Services 
Commission. Although YOP had grown in scale beyond the bounds 
of a special programme, it did not have a substantial positive 
role beyond that of a palliative which could be aligned with the 
MSC's conception of an active manpower policy. The solution, 
of course, was foundin the development of YOP towards becoming 
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a comprehensive and high quality training scheme in which both the 
social and economic objectives of an active manpower policy could 
be realised. Yet, as we have now seen, thus far the new Youth 
Training Scheme has largely failed to make the necessary transition. 
In many ways, it is merely a larger and more expensive social prog-
ramme which is still not making a significant positive contribution 
in terms of the MSC's original conception of an active manpower 
policy. The seriousness of the implications of this should nQw be 
apparent, given the proportion of the MSC's budget devoted to 
YTS and the demise of its other activities associated with an 
active manpower policy. Yet, perhaps there is another direction 
from which the role of the new scheme can be looked on more positively. 
The initial verdict on YOP was not simply that it acted predom-
inantly as a social programme. It was also seen as having a 
real economic impact, though one which was different from that 
originally intended. Indeed, in terms of the programme's original 
economic objectives, this impact could be regarded as having been 
negative. Yet, if looked at from the new macro-economic perspective 
introduced by the Thatcher Government, the same effects - the 
undermining of youth wage rates and the subsidising of employers' 
labour costs - could be seen ina positive light. What is more, 
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there was evidence to associate the development of these 'unintended' 
effects with the takeover of responsibility for the programme of 
the Conservative administration, and thereafter, it could be 
suggested that such effects were not only knowingly tolerated 
but encouraged to the point at which they must be regarded as 
having been intended. 
Some of the evidence concerning the Government's intentions for 
YOP emerged from the process of planning its successor, and it is 
clear that YTS was originally envisaged by the Conservative 
administration as performing a similar role in relation to its 
macro-economic strategy, certainly in terms of undermining 
youth wage rates. It will be remembered that Norman Tebbit's 
original plan was for a scheme under which unemployed young people 
would be virtually compelled to accept an allowance of £15 by the 
withdrawal of their right to claim supplementary benefit. This 
seemed to have been averted by the Youth Task Group. Yet, on the 
evidence presented at the beginning of this chapter, it is arguable 
that at the end of its first year the new scheme resembled the 
original plan of the Government at least as closely as it did that 
which was unanimously agreed upon by the Task Group. The allowance 
had not been reduced to £15, but neither had its real value been 
maintained against inflation. The right to claim supplementary 
benefit had not been completely removed from unemployed young 
people, but it had been compromised by the liability of those who 
refused to join the scheme, or who left it early, to have the level 
of their benefit temporarily reduced. (73) In theory, the scheme 
had been open to both employed and unemployed young people, but 
in practice it had continued as a special provision catering 
almost exclusively for the unemployed. Finally, it had failed to 
deliver the quality of training which was so crucial to the Task 
Group's plan. 
What should now be apparent is that the pattern of development of 
YTS, which has thus far severely limited its capacity to make a 
positive contribution to the MSC's wider manpower strategy in 
the manner planned by the Youth Task Group, has not stopped it from 
making a positive contribution in terms of the Government's 
macro-economic strategy. In this respect, it could be said to 
have continued where YOP left off. Thus, it has continued to 
provide a downward influence upon youth wage levels and it has 
continued in effect to subsidise employers with free labour. 
The key factors which have brought about these effects, though not 
necessarily the same as those which have blocked the positive 
objectives intended by the Task Group, can neither be regarded 
as wholly unconnected. 
The holding down of the level of the allowance and the introduction 
of an element of financial compulsion, although antithetical to 
the original principles of the Task Group Report, cannot be 
considered as of crucial importance in relation to the positive 
contribution that the scheme was intended to make to the MSC's wider 
manpower strategy. The key factor in this context was the quality 
of training. Yet, this can be regarded in certain respects as 
being inversely related to the degree of subsidy being offered 
by the scheme to employers. Thus, the less the quality of 
training required, the greater is the opportunity for the exploit-
ation of the trainees as a form of free labour. There is of course 
the statutory element of 13 weeks off-the-job-training, but this 
has not stopped managing agencies entering the scheme with the 
clear objective of making a profit, and this is in addition to 
what they or individual employers providing the work experience 
element may gain from having the free use of the labour of the 
trainees. Also, substitution is not necessarily a less relevant 
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factor than it was in the case of YOP, though by now the 
youth labour market has been so transformed by these interventions 
that often there is no longer any 'normal' practice of recruitment 
in relationship to which such an abuse can be recognised. Yet, 
none of this is to say the Government has deliberately planned 
that the quality of training in YTS should be sub-standard. What 
can be said, though, is that it serves the Government's wider 
interests at least as well that employers should use YTS trainees 
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as a form of free labour subsidy, as that the trainees should receive 
a high quality of training. There are gains for the Government 
on either side, yet arguably th~ subsidy effect is the more central 
to its strategy. What is more, the cost of guaranteeing high 
standards of quality would be far greater, and the lon~term 
economic returns on such training must be considered most uncertain 
in the present environment. Thus, unlike the MSC, the Government 
has no reason to be particularly concerned that yrS has thus far 
largely failed to deliver the quality of training that it originally 
promised. 
The other key factor for the MSC was that YTS should be a 
comprehensive scheme, catering for both employed and unemployed 
young people. Again it cannot be said that the Government has 
deliberately stopped it becoming such. However, the lack of 
resources being put into both the quality of content and the level 
of the allowance has ensured that the scheme is not a particuarly 
attractive option to those who can find employment elsewhere. 
Also, the continuation of the Young Workers Scheme in direct 
competition during the first year of YTS demonstrated once again 
that the Government does not recognise comprehensiveness of training 
provision as an important objective. Under pressure, it has been 
prepared to compromise on this, restricting the YWS to 17 year olds, 
but still there is no reason to believe that it is particularly 
concerned that YTS has not thus far developed into a comprehensive 
scheme. It is the Young Workers Scheme, through its provision of 
a subsidy to encourage employers to reduce youth wages, which more 
directly expresses the Government's policy for the youth labour market, 
unmediated by the need to maintain a consensus within the MSC. 
This policy does not require comprehensive training. It can be 
served almost equally well, either directly through the YWS or 
more obliquely through YTS as it has developed so far. 
The conclusion which emerges is that, although both YOP and 
thus far YTS have failed to make a significant contribution to the 
MSC's original conception of active manpower policy, they have 
not failed to play a significant role in relation to the wider 
economic strategy of the Thatcher Government. Thus, as well as 
being social programmes and palliatives which in various ways have 
made youth unemployment seem more acceptable, they have made an 
active economic contribution. In this sense, they can be regarded 
as a form of active manpower policy, combining both economic and 
social objectives. Yet, it is a different form of active manpower 
policy from that on which the activities of the MSC were previously 
built. 
It will be remembered that the MSC's original conception· 
of an active manpower policy was formulated to act as an adjunct 
to a Keynesian-style macro-economic policy under which full employ-
ment was to be ensured by means of demand management. This form 
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of active manpower policy was based on the intervention of the 
employment and training services to improve the speed and efficiency 
of the labour market in matching supply and demand. It has since 
been noted that such a manpower policy need not necessarily be 
regarded as incompatible with a different form of macro- economic 
policy based upon laissez-faire principles. However, if this 
macro-economic policy gives rise to mass unemployment, then the 
potential of the conventional form of manpower policy to make an 
active economic contribution is largely destroyed. What is now being 
suggested is that, under these circumstances, YOP and subsequently 
YTS have developed in such a way as to constitute an alternative 
form of active manpower policy: one which is not only compatible 
in theory with a monetarist macro-economic policy based on laissez-
faire principles, but also capable of making a positive contribution 
when this macro-economic policy has given rise to mass unemployment. 
In short, the argument is that the real role which YOP and YTS 
have come to play is that of a specifically monetarist active 
manpower policy. 
If this is so, then it might be thought that the implications 
of the way in which YTS has thus far developed are not so serious 
for the overall philosophy of the MSC as was earlier indicated. 
One form of active manpower policy may be collapsing, but it is 
being replaced by another form. The MSC's role is to administer 
an active manpower policy within the framework of the Government's 
macro-economic strategy , therefore there should be no problem 
about its adopting this new form of 'monetarist' manpower policy. 
The situation, however, is not quite this simple. There are other 
important factors which need to be taken into consideration. 
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4. The Impasse for the MSC 
The principles governing an active manpower policy, as 
originally adopted by the Manpower Services Commission, were first 
that it should serve an economic as well as a social function, 
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and secondly that it should involve only limited direct intervention 
in the labour market. We have already seen that the alternative 
form of active manpower policy being proposed on the basis of the 
real role that has been played by YOP and YTS meets the first of 
these principles. In relation to the second, it was argued 
previously that the planning of YTS as a comprehensive scheme marked 
a recognition of the fact that the normal functions of the youth 
labour market for school leavers had been to a large extent replaced 
by these forms of state intervention. Yet, at the same time, this 
had the effect of separating off the whole age group from the 
normal adult labour market and thus in a sense restoring the 
principle of limited intervention. (74) While the comprehensiveness 
of YTS might not be so important within the new form of monetarist 
manpower policy as within the MSC's conventional form of active 
manpower policy, this does not create any particular problems in 
terms of this second principle. But, in addition to the two princ-
iples of an active manpower policy, there is a third principle 
of MSC philosophy to be considered - that of consensus-based policy-
making. It is here that the real problems emerge for this new form 
of active manpower policy. 
The MSC's original interpretation of active manpower policy, based 
on the development of employment and training services, not only 
combined economic and social objectives, but could be regarded as 
being in the mutual interest of both employers and trade unions. 
This element of mutual interest was of crucial importance, given 
that the whole constitution and mode of operation of the Commission 
was based upon the establishment of a tripartite consensus between 
these two major partners and the Government. The problem,as far 
as the MSC is concerned, with what I have described as the monetarist 
form of active manpower policy is that it does not offer this 
element of mutual interest and therefore cannot provide the necessary 
basis for any future consensus. It is an approach which attempts 
to rectify the problems of the labour market in a manner which is 
clearly to the advantage of one of the major partners and therefore 
unacceptable to the other. What is more, unlike the MSC's original 
conception of active manpower policy, it is an approach that is 
integrally related to a macro-economic strategy about which there 
is no consensus. The Keynesian style macro-economic policy, in 
relationship to which active manpower policy was originally 
developed, provided the basis for the postwar political consensus 
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of which the MSC itself was a product. The monetarist macro-economic 
strategy of the Thatcher Government provides no such basis for 
political consensus. Thus it would not seem to be a practical 
option for the MSC to adopt a form of manpower policy that is 
explicitly connected to this monetarist strategy. 
If the above analysis is correct, the MSC is approaching an 
impasse in its development. This can be defined in terms of a few 
simple statements. The MSC's role is to administer an active 
manpower policy. Its constitution demands that this is a policy 
based on consensus. Its original policy, for which there was a 
consensus, no longer makes sense in the context of mass unemployment. 
An alternative policy, which is compatible with the new macro-
economic situation cannot support a consensus. Thus, a contradiction 
has developed between the continuation of the MSC's role in the 
administration of an active manpower policy and the continuation 
of its form as a tripartite consensus-based institution. The 
remainder of this chapter will be concerned with a discussion of 
options for the future resolution of this contradiction and the 
implications which these might have for any subsequent assessment 
of the wider historical significance of the Youth Opportunities 
Programme. 
5. Alternatives for the Future 
The starting point of this discussion must be a consideration 
of the way in which the development of the contradiction has thus 
far manifested itself. In 1981/82, the New Training Initiative 
and the Youth Task Group Report succeeded in re-establishing 
the consensus required for the continued development of the training 
side of the MSC's approach to active manpower policy. Yet, sub-
sequently, as we have seen, the key element in this policy - the 
Youth Training Scheme - has failed to develop in the way required 
for it to make a significant positive contribution. As was the case 
with YOP previously, the real economic impact of the scheme has been 
more closely aligned with the alternative form of monetarist manpower 
policy than with the policy on which the MSC has based its consensus. 
At the same time, the other aspects of the New Training Initiative 
have also to a large extent failed to make the positive contribution 
which they were intended to, and the demise of the active role of 
the employment services has continued. Thus, although the MSC has 
ostensibly been maintaining the development of its consensus-based 
active manpower policy, the balance of the real impact of its 
activities has been moving more closely towards the alternative 
form of monetarist manpower policy. Inevitably, this situation has 
placed the whole consensus-based approach of the MSC under consider-
able strain. The mounting tension can be viewed from two key angles, 
that of the Government and that of the trade union movement. 
Since the original development of the New Training Initiative 
and the publication of the Youth Task Group Report in April 1982, 
there has been increasing evidence of the Thatcher Government 
attempting to exert more direct influence over the MSC's develop-
ment of policy. The start of this trend was marked by the 
appointment of David Young as Chairman of the Commission in July 
1982. (75) His predecessor, Sir Richard O'Brien, had come from 
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a business background and was associated to a certain extent 
with the CBI. Previously, there had been a tradition that the 
chairmanship of a tripartite body such as the Commission would be 
alternated between individuals drawn from either side of industry. 
However, David Young not only had no association with the trade 
union movement, but also was far more closely politically 
connected with the Government than his predecessor. Indeed, he 
could be seen primarily as a representative of the Government rather 
than either of the other two tripartite partners. As well as 
making the chairmanship a political appointment, there was inter-
ference with the nomination of the commissioner representing 
professional education interests, whose position may be regarded 
as being of key significance in the determination of the overall 
political balance of the Commission. (76) Thus, through making 
maximum use of its ability to influence the selection of the 
personnel who constitute the membership of the Commission, the 
Government has attempted to move the MSC's political centre of 
gravity closer to that of its own. In addition, when necessary, 
it has been prepared to use its ultimate power of control over the 
Commission's budget and policies in order to exert further 
pressure. Thus, for example, during the first year of YTS, there 
were a number of issues, such as the level of the trainees' allow-
ance and the cuts applied to the 'Mode B' sector of provision, 
on which recommendations endorsed by both the Youth Training 
Board and the Commission itself were subsequently over-ruled by 
the Secretary of State for Employment. (77) 
The Thatcher Government has been perfectly within its statutory 
rights in taking these measures to curtail the independence of 
the Commission. However, this exploitation of its formal legal 
powers, in order to undermine the delicate arms length relation-
ship which previously existed between the Commission and the 
Department of Employment, has gone totally against the spirit of 
consensus on which the real constitution of the MSC has always 
necessarily been based. Thus, since the original adoption of 
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the New Training Initiative and the Youth Task Group Report, 
not only has the real impact of MSC policies moved away from 
the objectives expressed in these plans and towards those more 
directly aligned with Government policy, but also the whole 
nature of the Commission itself arrlits political relationship with 
the Government has been changed in a complementary direction. 
The main losers from this dual process of change have of course 
been those on the other side of the consensus, notably, but not 
exclusively, the trade unions. ( 78) 
The Youth Task Group Report, it will be remembered, appeared in 
many ways as a triumph for the TUC leadership's policy of maint-
aining its membership of the Commission and attempting to influence 
the development of policy from the inside. Previously, the real 
impact being made by the development and performance of the Youth 
Opportunities Programme had led to a build up of pressure for the 
withdrawal of the active support of the trade union movement. 
The Youth Training Scheme as originally planned by the Government 
had appeared to be even less acceptable than YOP. Yet, as a result 
of the unanimity of the Youth Task Group Report, the Government 
had been forced to compromise on each of the key issues of concern, 
and a scheme had been produced which the TUC was able to recommend 
for the support of the wider trade union movement. 
After one full year of YTS, the situation appears to have changed 
considerably. As we have seen, the new scheme has turned out to 
resemble the Government's original plan at least as closely as 
that of the Youth Task Group, and it has continued to fulfil the 
same real economic role as YOP did previously. Meanwhile, consid-
erable ground has been lost elsewhere in relationship to other 
417 
TUC and trade union objectives for the development of both training 
and employment services. In addition, the changes which have taken 
place in the nature of the Commission and its reilltionship 
to the Government have made it a far less hospitable environment 
for the exercise of trade union influence. Consequently, a new 
wave of pressure is mounting within the trade union movement 
both for the withdrawal of active support from YTS and for pulling 
out of the MSe altogether. 
As yet then the contradiction has only partially manifested itself 
and the situation is still confused. The MSe is still ostensibly 
continuing the development of its original consensus-based concep-
tion of active manpower policy, yet the real economic impact 
of its activities is becoming increasingly closely aligned with the 
alternative form of manpower policy which is exclusively linked 
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to a monetarist macro-economic strategy. The Government is 
maintaining the formal constitution of the MSe as a semi-independent 
policy-making body, yet it is using all its available powers to 
exert an increasingly direct form of control. The Tue and the trade 
unions are maintaining their membership of the MSe and their formal 
support for its activities including YTS, but, as it is becoming 
more obvious how the Government is using the Mse and what are 
the real effects of policies such as YTS, the pressure is mounting 
once again within the trade union movement for a complete withdrawal 
of support. V9) The crisis point has not yet been reached, but 
it would seem that there must be some definite limit to the future 
development of these contradictory trends. 
The only real way out of this contradiction would be if there was 
a dramatic economic recovery leading to a massive creation of jobs 
and the eventual restoration of full employment. Under these 
circumstances, the Mse's original conception of active manpower 
policy would once again make sense. The employment and training 
services would have an important and expanding role to play, 
matching up the vast numbers of the unemployed with the newly 
created jobs and making sure that they were equipped with the 
necessary skills. The Youth Training Scheme would not necessarily 
have the same degree of prominence as it does now, but this would 
be because of the expansion of other aspects of manpower policy 
and not because of any diminution of its importance. On the contrary, 
in the context of such an economic recovery it would come into 
its own, performing a real economic function as a training scheme 
preparing young people to fill the newly created jobs. However, 
none of this seems to be very likely at the moment. 
Expert opinions differ as to the likelihood of any future economic 
recovery, but there is virtual unanimity about the fact that there 
will be no return to full employment in the forseeable future. 
It seems most unlikely that the present Government will undertake 
a dramatic U-turn in its macro-economic policy and very possible 
that it will be re-elected at the next General Election. Even 
if there were to be a change of Government, many are sceptical as 
to whether it could make a dramatic and immediate impact on the 
level of unemployment. It is now widely believed that there will 
be three million or more people unemployed well into the 1990s, 
and that the best that can be hoped for is that the situation 
will not deteriorate further. 
Let us assume for the moment that the present Government stays 
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in power for the next few years, that it continues with the same 
macro-economic policy and, at best, the level of unemployment 
gradually stabilises. Under such circumstances, there would be 
little economic rationale for making the investment required to 
develop YTS into genuine high quality training schemes. Equally, 
the economic contribution to be made by the other employment 
and training services catering for adults would be severely limited. 
In this latter case, it could be expected that there would be a 
continuation of the trend of division between narrowly defined 
economic schemes on the one hand, and token special measures on 
the other. However, in the case of provision for young people, such 
an option would no longer appear to be available. Having once 
offered comprehensive provision and made political guarantees 
to the young unemployed, it would seem to be virtually impossible 
to go back to a partial system of selective training and token 
special measures. The only option in political and social terms 
would be to carryon forward with the development of YTS: yet, as we 
have already seen, there would not be sufficient economic rationale 
for its further development as a training scheme. The only 
positive economic role that could be pursued would be in terms of 
a continuation of the alternative monetarist manpower policy 
which has emerged from the previous development of YOP and YTS. 
But how far could this be taken before there would be a withdrawal 
of trade union support? 
Throughout the latter half of YOP there were numerous threats 
made to withdraw trade union support, but as far as the TUC and 
the vast majority of the trade union movement were concerned 
they were never implemented. Each time a crisis point was reached, 
there would be new promises of improvements just around the corner, 
and each time this proved sufficient to secure another extension 
of credit, despite such promises having come to little in the past. 
The Youth Task Group Report can be regarded as the latest example 
in this series of promises. The fact that it too has come to little 
in terms of the key points of agreement apparently won by the trade 
union representatives cannot therefore necessarily be regarded as 
a sufficient cause for a complete withdrawal of trade union support. 
The factors which weighed against such a withdrawal of support in 
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the case dYOP, apply equally to YTS. The trade union movement would 
lose most of what influence it does have over the development of the 
scheme and it would be widely condemned as putting its own interests 
before those of the young unemployed. 
Beyond these particular factors, it is important to understand 
the depth of the commitment to the MSC of the trade union movement 
in general and the TUC leadership in particular. As we have seen, 
it was the TUC that was largely responsible for persuading the Heath 
Government to set up the MSC back in 1974. Subsequently, under 
the 1974-1979 Labour Government, the TUC playedan influential role 
in the development of the Commission's policies, including the 
special measures leading up to YOP. Since 1979, its influence has 
been substantially reduced, but in certain respects the importance 
of the MSC to the TUC has increased. One of the main functions 
of the TUC as an institution is to represent the collective 
interests of trade unions to the Government of the day. Its 
power and influence in this role was greatly enhanced by the trend 
of development towards a corporatist style of politics which has 
previously been described. However, the Thatcher Government has 
turned its back on this trend, and the TUC has found itself 
excluded from access to the decision-making process. The 
tripartite structures through which previously it was able to 
exert a considerable influence, if not actually dismantled, 
have been side-lined into becoming mere talking-shops, as for 
example, in the case of the National Economic Development Council. 
In this context, despite the adverse changes that it has undergone, 
the MSC remains for the TUC probably most significant forum 
through which it can attempt to exert an influence upon Government 
policy. If the TUC were to recommend a withdrawal of trade 
union support from YTS, given that the scheme is now at the centre 
of MSC policy, it would make it virtually impossible to retain 
membership of the Commission. This would be an enormous sacrifice 
for the TUC. Yet, if pushed far enough, it must be assumed that 
there would be a point at which such a decision would have to be 
taken. 
The most likely prospect of this point being reached in relation 
to the future development of YTS would be if the Government decided 
to revert to making the scheme in effect compulsory through 
the withdrawal of the right to claim supplementary benefit from 
unemployed 16 and 17 year olds. This right has already been 
compromised, and it still appears that it might be the Government's 
eventual intention to remove it completely. This can be under-
stood as the next stage of the development of YTS in terms of its 
fulfillment of the objectives of the alternative monetarist form 
of manpower policy. Once the safety net of supplementary benefit 
was removed, there would be nothing to stop the further reduction 
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of the real value of the training allowance as originally intended 
by Norman Tebbit. 
Equally, the subsidy effect of the scheme would be enhanced, as 
virtually all 16 and 17 year olds outside full-time education would 
become available to employers as a free labour force. With no 
other option available to most of these young people, the cost 
of the provision could be reduced in other ways apart from the 
reduction of the allowance, such as the dilution of training 
content. The result would be that the Government could claim that 
it had abolished youth unemployment, the expense of providing the 
palliative effect of the scheme would be reduced, and the positive 
contribution made to the Government's wider economic strategy 
would be greatly enhanced. 
The agreement of the Youth Task Group that participation in YTS 
should be voluntary, and that therefore the safety net of 
supplementary benefit for young people should be retained, was 
arguably the single most important factor in securing trade union 
support for the development of the scheme. The implications of 
a compulsory scheme, as just described, explain why this was so. 
If the Government were to override the original agreement on this 
matter and withdraw supplementary benefit altogether, it still 
could not necessarily be assumed that the TUC would recommend a 
total withdrawal of the trade union support. However, if the 
Government's action was sufficiently blunt and explicit, there 
would be little alternative. What then would be the implications 
if this did happen and it led to a complete trade union pullout 
from the·MSC? 
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Without its tripartite structure, there would be little point to the 
MSC continuing to exist. If the trade unions were absent, it 
would no longer play the role of legitimation for Government 
policies in response to unemployment. Business interests could 
always be consulted directly if necessary, as could the local 
authorities and education interests. The Commission would finally 
be left as the political and administration anachronism which it 
has threatened to become ever since 1979. Under these 
circumstances, the logical course of action for the Government would 
be to dismantle the whole structure. This might involve the 
privatisation of many of its operational functions. The reforms 
to the Skill centre and Jobcentre networks can be regarded as 
preliminary moves in this direction, and already the vast majority 
of YTS is run by private managing agencies. All that would be 
needed would be some form of Government inspectorate to provide a 
minimal control of standards. This, together with the existing 
central functions of the MSC could easily be taken back under the 
direct responsibility of the Department of Employment. Any 
remaining operational functions which were not suitable candidates 
for privatisation, perhaps for example the adult special measures 
such as the Community Programme, might be transferred to another 
department like that of Health & Social Security. (81) 
If the MSC were to disappear in this or any other similar manner, 
it would of course have further repercussions for YTS. The 
Government would be free to run the scheme completely as it 
wished. Managing agents would probably be given more autonomy 
and there would be even less concern with training standards. 
Following the logic of the monetarist manpower policy, YTS might 
well come to conform more closely with the Young Workers Scheme, 
particularly if the two were centrally administered alongside 
each other within the Department of Employment. Indeed, they 
might be combined into a single graduated scheme covering the 
whole of the 16-18 age group. 
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The result would be.a completely separate Government subsidised 
youth labour market. Employers would have the use of young people's 
labour either for nothing or in return for a token contribution. 
Young p.eople would receive 'pocket money' allowances and wages, and 
it would be assumed that they should still be financially dependent 
upon their parents. There might be high quality training in 
patches where it could be linked into a definite route of 
progression into full-time skilled employment. But, without any 
dramatic improvement in the wider labour market, for many within 
such a compulsory scheme it would just be a period of conscripted 
cheap labour at the end of which they would still have no 
marketable skills and little prospect of a real job. Indeed, the 
situation created might be compared to that which prevailed in the 
pre-war youth labour market, where large numbe~of young people 
were used as flexible cheap labour and then dumped when they 
required a full adult wage. This, after all, ensured that rates 
of youth unemployment were far less than those for adults. 
What has been presented above is of course an extreme scenario. 
It serves to illustrate where the logic of one side of the present 
contradictory trends might lead. However, in reality, it is rare 
that such trends are followed through to their logical conclusions. 
Thus, it is probably more likely that the underlying contradiction 
will never fully surface, but will continue to propel a series 
of compromises through which opposing trends are allowed to 
co-exist. The capacity of the MSC to survive and flourish in an 
apparently hostile environment has already been well demonstrated. 
For the Government, the existence of such a tripartite structure 
does play an important role in legitimising a sensitive 
area of policy and encouraging the active cooperation of the 
wider community in its implementation. As has already been 
explained, it enhances the palliative value of schemes such as 
YOP and YTS by placing them to a certain extent outside politics. 
For these reasons, the Government might be reluctant to push the 
trade unions to the point where they would have no option but 
to withdraw their support. It would still want to move YTS and 
other aspects of manpower policy towards a more direct alignment 
with its macro-economic policy, but it would adopt a more cautious 
approach than that outlined above. Thus, for example, rather than 
a complete withdrawal of supplementary benefit, there might be 
just an extension of the partial withdrawal which presently applies 
to YTS refusers; and, instead of an actual cut in the level of the 
allowance, there might be a continuation of the failure to protect 
its real value against inflation. Meanwhile, the training content 
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could be developed sufficiently to maintain the plausibility 
of this as an economic objective in the context of the MSC's 
original conception of an active manpower policy, Thus, the 
ambiguity between the two alternative forms of active manpower 
policy would deliberately be allowed to continue unresolved, giving 
the TUC leadership just sufficient pretext tohang onto its 
position within the Commission. 
Rather than being dismantled, the MSC might in fact further 
extend its activities by going beyond what are strictly speaking 
the boundaries of manpower policy and developing its role as an 
alternative education department. The initial emergence of this 
role has already been seen with the development of the pilot 
Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (T.V.E.I.) and the 
controversial proposals in the Training For Jobs White Paper for 
the take-over by the MSC of some twenty-five percent of work-
related non-advanced further education. (82) In both of these 
cases, the Commission is being used by central government to bypass 
the traditional decentralised system of educational administration 
based on the autonomy of the local education authorities and the 
indirect funding mechanism of the block grant. In both cases 
the broad objective is the same - to promote a closer alignment 
between the educational system and the needs of industry. The link 
between the so-called 'Great Debate' on education and the launch 
of YOP was drawn attention to in Chapter 3. (8~ Implicit within 
the planning of the programme was the view that secondary education 
was failing to provide many young people with an adequate preparation 
for the transition to working life at the age of 16. In this sense, 
YOP was regarded as a temporary remedial provision for those 
minimum age school leavers experiencing difficulties in making the 
transition from school to work. The New Training Initiative not 
only established that a permanent and comprehensive bridge between 
school and work was required, but also it recognised the need for 
the process to begin at school. ~4) This provided the pretext 
for the extension of MSC activities back into the educational system. 
As the catalytic agent of central government within the educational 
system, the MSC has thus to some extent developed a new role for 
itself. However, this role has its limits. Within the sphere of 
education, it is perhaps easier to establish consensus between the 
two sides of industry, but this tends to be at the expense of the 
alienation of educational interests whose active cooperation is 
also needed. Similarly, in an educational context, the MSC is 
able to distance itself from the contradictions involved in the 
development of manpower policy, but not to escape them altogether. 
Indeed, when it tries to increase the vocational relevance of 
education, it carries the contradictions involved in the development 
of training back into the educational system. Already the cred-
ibility of much academic and general education has been undermined 
by its assessment interms of the failure of school leavers to 
obtain employment. Vocational education invites this form of 
assessment much more directly. The danger for the MSC's new role 
is that, without any major upturn in the labour market, the trend 
of greater vocationalism that it is attempting to introduce into 
education might also rapidly exhaust its credibility. The under-
lying problem isthe same as in the case of YTS: vocational educ-
ation and training can prepare young people for jobs, but it cannot 
ensure that these jobs are made available. This depends largely 
upon macro-economic policy. 
If it is assumed that there is no major change in macro-economic 
policy, and also that the development of manpower policy is not 
taken to the monetarist style extreme but continues on an 
ambiguous path in which training objectives are also pursued and 
the MSC capitalises upon its sortie into the educational system, 
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under such circumstances, what might be the most favourable outcome? 
The best case, as far as the macro-economic situation is concerned, 
would seem to be a recovery of sufficient strength to halt the 
further rise of unemployment. As far as manpower policy is concerned, 
it might be the development from the basis of YTS and TVEI of a 
comprehensive system of vocational education and training covering 
427 
the 14-18 age group, which would be of a sufficient quality to 
ensure that the vast majority of those completing it would be able 
to compete successfully and secure jobs in the adult labour market. 
If these two 'best cases' are imagined in combination, the result 
is paradoxical. The new competitiveness of those emerging from 
the vocational education and training system might virtually 
eliminate the immediate problem of youth unemployment. Yet, without 
any overall increase in the number of jobs available, this would 
have to be at the expense of some other group. The most likely 
candidates to be adversely affected would be those who are already 
unemployed. Thus, the r~sult would be a reduction of the overall 
turnover between unemployment and employment, and a substantial 
increase in the scale and duration of long-term unemployment. 
Ironically, it is the long-term unemployed, alongside young people, 
who have been the main recipients of the MSC's special measures 
policy. What is more, many of those now entering the ranks of 
the long-term unemployed are those who previously went through 
YOP and were amongst the large proportion for whom it failed to 
secure permanent employment. The paradox is, therefore, that the 
very success of YTS might condemn a whole cohort of YOP 'graduates' 
to virtually permanent unemployment. As long-term adult unemployed, 
they would of course become eligible for the limited number of 
places on the Community Programme. With the planned addition of 
a certain amount of training content to this provision, for some 
it might be sufficient to restore their competitiveness in 
the labour market. Yet, their success would inevitably be at the 
expense of others, most likely those young people trying to enter 
the adult labour market from the vocational education and training 
system. Once again, it comes back to the fundamental underlying 
problem which cannot be resolved simply by the extension of,training 
provision - the shortage of jobs. 
Thus far, it has been assumed that there will be no major change of 
macro-economic policy and that the best that can be expected under 
these circumstances is that unemployment should stabilise at its 
present level. However, it is not this author's opinion that the 
present level of unemployment is inevitable, whatever form of 
economic policy might be adopted. Certainly, the introduction 
of new technology does not make it inevitable. (85) Although 
the rapid pace of technological change may be aggravating the 
situation, the present high level of unemployment is, as in 
the interwar years, predominantly the result of an insufficient 
overall level of demand inthe economy. Since the publication 
of Keynes' General Theory, the policies have existed to remedy 
this through macro-economic demand management. It is largely 
a question of political will whether they are adopted or not. 
This is not to say that such policies have been without problems 
when implemented in the past, but they have proved capable of 
maintaining virtually full employment over a prolonged period of 
time, so long as this has been regarded as the priority objective 
of economic policy. Furthermore, the associated problems, in 
particular the development of inflationary tendencies, need not 
be regarded as insurmountable obstacles. Thus, for example, 
there is no a priori reason why an incomes policy should not 
succeed; once again, it is largely a question of political will. 
However, the purpose here is not to detail an alternative economic 
strategy, but merely to note that such an alternative is not impos-
sible. Consequently, it should not be ruled out that under changed 
political circumstances there could be a rapid and substantial 
reduction in the numbers of the unemployed leading back to a 
situation of practically full employment. 
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The implications of such a course of events, both for manpower policy 
in general and the development of youth training in particular, have 
already been touched upon. The employment and training services 
would once again have an important and expanding role to play, and 
YTS would come into its own, being able to perform a real economic 
function as a training scheme. However, this must not be regarded 
simply as a one-way relationship of cause and effect between the 
macro and micro economic levels. An efficient and effective macro-
economic policy of reflation could not be implemented separately 
and discretely from the development of the corresponding active 
manpower policy. This micro-level policy would have to be built 
in from the start as an integral element through which the process 
of reflation took place. Thus investment in the employment and 
training services would itself be a means of putting money back 
into the economy, and would have to be planned and developed 
directly alongside any programme of investment injob creation. 
As far as young people are concerned, the development of quality 
within YTS and other forms of vocational preparation would become 
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an unambiguous economic requirement, determined by the jobs being 
created for them to fill. What is more, not only would the demand 
for high quality training become unambiguous, but also its definition 
and purpose. The provision would continue to fulfill a social role, 
but there would no longer be any question of its still being a 
special measure. Throughout the field of manpower policy, the 
potential would be created once more for the combining together of 
both economic and social objectives, and national and individual 
interests. 
6. Implications for the Historical Judgement of YOP 
Three very different scenarios for the future have been 
set out. Obviously, they do not cover the full range of possib-
ilities, but they do clarify certain alternatives by marking 
three key points on the spectrum. The first two indicate the 
opposite extremes of possibility within the bounds of the present 
macro-economic context, and the third looks towards the potential 
that might be opened up by an alternative macro-economic policy. 
The final question which needs to be asked is what would be the 
implication for the historical judgement of the Youth Opportunities 
Programme of each of these different scenarios. 
It can already be said, without looking into the future, that the 
massive expansion of YOP as a social programme has led to the 
effective abolition of the normal labour market for minimum age 
school leavers. The question which remains open concerns what it 
will have eventually been replaced with. If the first scenario 
were followed through, then it could be said that YOP had" led to 
a state-sponsored recreation of the pre-war form of youth labour 
market, in which many young people were used as a cheap and 
flexible form of labour being discarded on reaching adulthood. 
If the third scenario were followed through, YOP might be judged to 
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have been the starting point for the development of a comprehensive 
system of vocational education and training between 14 and 18, 
which was to become one of the keystones of an effective and 
efficient economic recovery leading to the restoration of full 
employment. Finally, within the second scenario, the same develo-
ment of vocational education and training might genuinely be 
attempted, but the most that this could achieve would be the 
redistribution of unemployment, creating an almost permanent 
cohort of long-term unemployed, many of whom might ironically be 
ex-YOPs. Thus, the historical redemption of the Youth Opportunities 
Programme depends as much upon the development of macro-economic 
policy as upon the development of the Youth Training Scheme itself. 
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portion of non-advanced further education should go ahead. See 
The Guardian, 19th and 21st September 1984. 
78. The other main losers have been the local education authorities, 
as in the case of the implementation of the Training For Jobs 
White Paper referred to in the previous footnote. 
79. This was evident at the 1984 Trades Union Congress. See The 
Guardian, 6th September 1984 and The Times Educational Supplement, 
7th September 1984. 
80. It was noticeable that the TUC was prepared to withdraw from the 
NEDC over the GCHQ affair, but not from the MSC. 
81. This scenario resembles quite closely the proposals made with 
regard to the MSC by the right-wing Adam Smith Institute. See 
Adam Smith Institute, 'Employment Policy', The Omega File, 
London 1983, pp. 9-13. 
82. The Technical and Vocational Education Initiative was launched 
by the MSC in 1982 to stimulate the provision of technical and 
vocational education for young people between 14 and 18. The 
first projects started in 1983 and involved 14 local education 
authorities. In September 1984, the number was expanded to 62 and 
it is the MSC's intention that all authorities should have the 
opportunity to take part, involving some three per cent of the age-
group. The controversial proposals of the Training for Jobs White 
Paper for the MSC to take-over some twenty-five per cent of work-
related non-advanced further education have already been mentioned. 
The relevant paragraphs of the White Paper are 43-53. 
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83. See above Chapter 3 pp. 129-130. 
84. See MSC, A New Training Initiative: An Agenda for Action, op.cit., 
p. 7, para. 40. 
85. It is a popular contemporary fallacy that the introduction of labour-
saving new technology must inevitably keep reducing the sum total 
of work available to be done by human beings. The simplest way 
of refuting this crude form of technological determinism is by 
reference to history. The development of labour-saving technology 
can be regarded as being virtually a constant factor in economic 
history, at least since the first industrial revolution. Yet, 
despite periodic phases of mass unemployment, the predominant trend 
over this period has been an increase of the active labour force, 
both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the total population. 
Obviously, therefore, there is no direct relationship between the 
introduction of new technology and the growth of unemployment. 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that in the long-term technology 
creates more jobs than it destroys. Of course, in the shorter 
term, particularly rapid technological developments may cause 
severe dislocation and this may be a contributory factor in the 
development of periodic phases of mass unemployment. But this is 
precisely where an active manpower policy is supposed to come into 
its own. 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this final section is to provide a formal summary 
of the conclusions drawn by each of the previous chapters. The 
first three were concerned with the context from which the Youth 
Opportunities Programme emerged and the definition of its 
original objectives. The next three examined the actual develop-
ment and performance of the programme in relation to these 
original objectives. The final two analysed the conclusions 
drawn from this account of the development and performance of 
YOP in the wider context established previously, considering 
the significance of changes ~n the programme's contemporary 
environment and of subsequent developments leading into the future. 
Chapter 1 established that the creation of the Manpower Services 
Commission was the outcome of three historical trends: the 
development of active manpower policy as an adjunct to a macro-
economic policy of demand management; the growth of the 
politics of corporatism; and the experimentation with 'hiving-
off' as a means of administrative reform. These gave the 
Commission both its form as a tripartite quasi-governmental body 
and its content in terms of the philosophy of a comprehensive 
manpower policy. This philosophy was defined by three essential 
elements: the combination of both economic and social objectives; 
limited direct intervention in the labour market; and a consen-
sus-based style of policy-making. The first two of these were 
the essential features of an active manpower policy, and the third 
was the key characteristic of a corporatist style of politics. 
Chapter 2 concluded from an historical account of unemployment 
and government policy that the traditional role played by 
special measures for the relief of unemployment was to act as 
palliatives in the context of market-based macro-economic 
policies which had failed to maintain full employment. Since the 
Second World War, with the adoption of a Keynesian style macro-
economic policy of demand management, such special measures had 
not been necessary. The development of active manpower policy 
leading to the creation of the Manpower Services Commission 
was presented as a micro-economic refinement within this macro-
economic framework. 
The account presented in Chapter 3 of the MSC's development of 
special measures in response to the rising unemployment of the 
mid 1970s demonstrated that, despite the initial rationale made 
out in terms of an extension of active manpower policy, their 
essential role was that of palliatives as in the past. This role 
was linked to the contempory political context of the Labour 
Government and its need to maintain the social contract agreement 
with the trade unions. The plans for the Youth Opportunities 
Programme, as set out in the Holland Report, could also be inter-
preted as an extension of active manpower policy. However, from 
the beginning, the political undertakings made on the behalf of 
the programme gave it the potential to develop exclusively as a 
social programme and beyond the terms of reference of an active 
manpower policy. This could be understood in the same political 
context as the development of the MSC's previous special measures 
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as palliatives, though there was also the additional factor of the 
Great Debate on Education. Finally, it was noted that this modern 
development of special measures implied that at some point the macro-
economic commitment to full employment had been dropped. 
Certainly, this was so by the time that YOP was launched. 
Chapter 4 examined the quantitative development and performance 
of the Youth Opportunities Programme in relation to the objectives 
originally set out in the Holland Report. The account demonstrated 
how the programme grew in scale far beyond its original plans and 
as a result also developed a different balance of provision from 
that which had been intended. These were the results of the rapid 
and unpredicted growth of youth unemployment, combined with the 
political undertakings which committed the programme to respond 
to this growth. In terms of the most important of these under-
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takings, that given to provide places for all unemployed minimum 
age school leavers, the performance of the programme was remarkably 
successful. However in terms of the other major quantitative 
criterion of performance, the enhancement of employability as 
measured by the placement statistics of scheme leavers, the 
performance of YOP was very disappointing. Also, despite the 
huge numbers being taken into the programme, there was no evidence 
of it having any positive long-term effect upon the youth unemploy-
ment statistics, though this is not to deny the short-term 
psychological benefits that it provided for many individual 
young people. 
Chapter 5, which was concerned with the qualitative development 
and performance of the programme, was a complex and lengthy 
chapter. It started by making clear the link between qualitative 
issues and the question of the status and economic contribution 
of YOP as a training programme. The qualitative performance of 
the programme was then assessed in terms of three quantitative 
gauges of quality which were established during its first.year -
the proportion of trainees receiving off-the-job training, the 
volume of staff training, and the frequency of monitoring. On 
all three counts, the performance was adjudged to have been highly 
inadequate. Closely related to the failure of the programme in 
terms of monitoring and quality control was the question of the 
scale of abuses and side-effects such as substitution and 
displacement. On this issue, it was concluded that the programme 
destroyed permanent jobs at a considerably faster rate than it 
created them, even if this was assessed exclusively in terms of 
young people's jobs. Subsequently, various other quality improve-
ment approaches were initiated, but their development was 
inevitably along-term process. By midway through the five year 
lifespan of the programme, the combination of its huge quantitative 
growth and the lack of tangible quality improvement brought the 
development of YOP to a point of crisis. This crisis could be 
understood in terms of the three main principles of the MSC's 
approach to a comprehensive manpower policy: the programme was 
failing to combine with its socialrole apositive economic contrib-
ution, in terms either of employability or training; it had 
grown beyond the definition of a special programme and was inter-
fering substantially with the normal operation of the labour 
market; and, as a result of these two previous developments, 
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its status as a voluntary, consensus-based programme was being 
endangered. Moreover, the growth of the scale of YOP meant that 
this was a crisis for the MSC as a whole. The way out was provided 
by the relaunching of YOP towards becoming a comprehensive, 
permanent and high quality training provision. This involved 
the integration of the future development of the programme within 
the wider framework of the New Training Initiative and the 
establishment of a consensus around the plans set out for the 
Youth Training Scheme by the Youth Task Group Report. At the 
same time, quality improvement initiatives were brought together 
and given a new impetus in the transitional forms which were 
introduced during the final year of YOP. However the significance 
of these developments, as with many other aspects of quality, 
could only really be judged at the local level. 
Chapter 6 summarised, and integrated within the national level 
analysis, the conclusions drawn from the local case study which 
was undertaken in the Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area between 
October 1982 and April 1983. These were largely concerned with 
the qualitative development and performance of the programme, 
though also sufficient quantitative data was supplied to establish 
that the case study was not based on an atypical local example. 
The first generalisation made concerned the immense variety and 
complexity of provision at the local level, and the way in which 
it did not necessarily correspond exactly with the formal 
categories established at the national level of analysis. 
Thereafter, questions were posed concerning relevance, quality 
of content, labour market interference, quality improvement 
initiatives, and the implications of all of these for the introd-
uction of the Youth Training Scheme. Concerning the relevance 
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of the local programme, it was concluded that there was a rough 
and ready correspondence with the needs of the local labour market, 
but there was neither the information nor the resources necessary 
to make this any more systematic. With reference to quality of 
content, the case study revealed that this could neither be 
formally defined nor systematically measured and controlled, but 
to a large extent depended upon individual circumstances of 
personnel and organisations, and therefore was subject to a 
wide range of variation. On the question of the programme's 
interference with the normal workings of the labour market, 
no conclusion could be drawn concerning the overall scale of 
adverse interference, but it was clear that there were inherent 
dangers of permanent jobs being destroyed without there being 
any adequate means of controlling or measuring such effects 
either at the level of individual schemes or at the level of the loc-
al labour market as a whole. The overall impression given by 
the conclusions drawn in relation to these first three questions 
was of the lack of content of the programme at the local level, 
and its inability to escape from the alternatives of artificial 
irrelevance and real substitution. With reference to the impact 
of quality improvement initiatives, particularly during the final 
year of the programme, it was revealed that this was not as 
substantial as might have appeared from the national level of 
analysis and, in so far as they did make a difference, it was 
not necessarily relevant to the future development of the Youth 
Training Scheme. On the basis of this and the answers to the 
previous questions, it was concluded that the implication for 
YTS was -that at the end of YOP almost everything remained to be 
done to transform it into a programme offering training of 
relevance and systematic high quality. Finally it was noted that, 
for all its criticisms, the local case study confirmed the 
positive value of the programme in personal terms to many individ-
ual trainees, despite its lack of positive impact on the labour 
market as a whole. 
Chapter 7 first summarised the previous three chapters and 
concluded that YOP had succeeded to a large extent as a 
social programme, but had failed to fulfil a positive economic 
function and had given rise to significant negative economic 
side-effects. Thus, it was primarily a palliative which arguably 
had a net negative economic impact. As such, the programme played 
fundamentally the same role as previous special measures. However, 
it did so in the context of a changed political and economic 
environment. The initial development of modern special measures 
leading to the launch of YOP was explained in the context of the 
social contract relationship between the Labour Government and 
the trade union movement. The election of the Thatcher Government 
in 1979 gave rise to a fundamentally different context, in which 
the Keynesian macro-economic policy of demand management was 
replaced by the market-based doctrine of monetarism and consensus 
politics was explicitly rejected. This change appeared to 
undermine the basis of the MSC's philosophy of a comprehensive 
manpower policy, yet the Commission not only survived but, because 
of the huge growth of YOP, flourished. This could be explained 
partially by the continued role as a palliative that YOP was 
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able to play in the context of Thatcherism, but also the programme 
appeared to take on a new form of economic role. Under the changed 
circumstances, the apparently negative and unintended side-effects 
of the operation of YOP could be interpreted rather as positive 
micro-economic adjuncts of the Government's macro-economic 
strategy, subsidising employers' labour costs and adding to the 
downward pressure upon youth wage levels. Yet, this could not 
necessarily be assumed to be a deliberate element of the Conservative 
Government's strategy. There were two particular objections: 
the programme had been initiated by the previous Labour Government; 
and thereafter it had continued to operate with the active 
cooperation of the majority of the trade union movement. In 
answer to the first of these objections, it was established that 
development of YOP which led to what were originally side-effects 
becoming its main economic function could be associated with the 
change of governments. Furthermore, there was evidence that 
subsequently the Thatcher administration not only knowingly 
tolerated this development, but also encouraged it as a 
deliberate policy. Yet, if this was the case, it was still 
necessary to explain the continued cooperation of the trade 
union movement. The explanation given was both in terms of 
the extreme political difficulty of withdrawing support from 
a measure which brought so many individual young people tangible 
benefits as a social programme, and in terms of the argument that 
only by remaining actively involved could the trade union 
movement have any influence over the way in which the programme 
developed. Given the failure of the TUC to achieve many of its 
key objectives in relation to YOP, this latter argument depended 
in the last analysis upon the claim that the Government's 
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original plans for the Youth Training Scheme had been substantially 
altered through the Youth Task Group and that the new scheme would 
turn out to be fundamentally different from YOP. Thus for the 
trade union movement in particular , as well as the MSC in general, 
the redemption of YOP depended upon the implementation of YTS. 
Chapter 8 started with a brief analysis of the development 
and performance of the Youth Training Scheme .during its first 
full year. This concluded that, on all of the key points of 
difference, the scheme had turned out to resemble more closely 
the original plans of the Government rather than those of the 
Youth Task Group, and that it had repeated rather than redeemed 
the shortcomings of YOP. The implications of this for the MSC's 
original interpretation of active manpower policy were regarded 
as being serious. The new scheme was accounting for a substantial 
proportion of the Commission's budget, but was still failing to 
make a significant contribution in terms of this form of 
manpower policy. Moreover, there had been a steady decline in the 
conventional activities of the training and employment services 
through which it had originally been intended that the policy 
should be implemented. The purpose of these activities was 
undermined by the growth of mass unemployment and, as in the past 
under similar circumstances, there was a dichotomy emerging between 
manpower policies based on narrow economic criteria and token 
special measures acting as palliatives. Yet, in the case of YOP 
and YTS, history was not simply repeating itself. They could 
no longer be regarded as mere special measures and they were 
failing to make a significant contribution to the Commission's 
original interpretation of an active manpower policy, but they 
were nevertheless having economic effects which could be regarded 
as positive within the context of the macro-economic policy of the 
Thatcher administration. Thus, it was argued that the real 
role which YOP and YTS had come to play was that of a specifically 
monetarist active manpower policy. While this alternative 
role could be fitted in with the first two essential elements of 
the MSC's philosophy of a comprehensive manpower policy as defined 
in Chapter 1, it was incompatible with the third element - the 
consensus-based style of policy-making. Consequently, it was 
concluded that the Commission's development appeared to be 
approaching a point of impasse. Three scenarios were considered 
of how these contradictory trends might work out in the future 
and what might be the implications for the subsequent historical 
judgement of YOP. The first of these drew out the most extreme 
logic of the development of monetarist manpower policy which led 
to the abolition of the MSC, and a state-sponsored recreation of 
the pre-war youth labour market in which many young people were 
used as a cheap and flexible form of labour before being discarded 
on reaching adulthood. The second considered the optimum 
development of youth training within the restraints of existing 
macro-economic policy, and concluded that the most that this 
could achieve was a redistribution of unemployment, creating 
an almost permanent cohort of long-term unemployed, many of whom 
might be ex-YOPs. The third scenario assumed an alternative 
macro-economic policy and showed the potential in this context 
whereby YOP might subsequently be judged as the starting point 
for the development of a comprehensive system of vocational 
education and training between 14 and 18, which would become one 
of the keystones of an effective and efficient economic recovery 
leading to the restoration of full employment. It was concluded 
therefore that the historical redemption of YOP depended as much 
upon the development of macro-economic policy as upon the success 
of YTS itself. 
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APPENDIX YOP IN THE PORTSMOUTH TRAVEL-TO-WORK AREA 
I INTRODUCTION 
The local case study was carried out in the Portsmouth Travel-
to-Work Area during the period between October 1982 and April 1983. 
There were two main phases of research. The first consisted of the 
collection of background information about the local labour market and 
the development of YOP provision within it. The second involved a 
series of visits to a sample of the local schemes and courses. The 
principal concern of this section is with the data collected during 
the first phase. The object is to provide an account of the local 
context within which the particular schemes and courses were operating. 
However, first it is necessary to answer two preliminary questions. 
(1) Why was it decided to carry out such a local case study? 
(2) Why was the Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area chosen for this 
purpose? 
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1. Why a local case study? 
The rationale for including a local case study as a part of this 
research can be explained both in terms of a general principle of 
methodology, and in terms of the specific nature of the object of 
research, the Youth Opportunities Programme. The general methodolo-
gical principle is, quite simply, that the effects of any institution, 
policy or programme can never be fully understood without a close 
examination of the way in which it operates at the 'ground level'; 
i.e., the level at which it makes its direct impact upon society. It 
is never possible simply to deduce the effects of a policy from the 
way in which it has been presented by policy-makers at the national 
level. 
The 'ground level' of the Youth Opportunities Programme consisted of 
individual schemes and courses set within the context of particular 
local labour markets. It has already been noted that quality of 
content could only be directly assessed within the work places and 
training establishments that catered for the trainees. However, the 
contribution of anyone of these schemes and courses could not be 
understood in isolation. They were each part of a range of provision 
designed as a collective response to the needs of the young unemployed 
within a particular locality. 
Obviously, youth unemployment exists as a national problem. However, 
young people's experience of being unemployed is generally restricted 
within the context of a specific local labour market. Research carried 
out amongst 16 year old school leavers has indicated that for the vast 
majority of this age group the geographical area of their job search 
is confined to within a few miles radius of their homes.(l) The sense 
in which youth unemployment is thus a local problem was recognised by 
the MSC in its organisation and delivery of the various special program-
mes. From the start, JCP put great emphasis on local initiatives. 
Likewise, the Holland Report stressed at a number of points the importance 
of YOP being responsive to local needs. This applied both to the overall 
balance between different types of scheme, and to the content of indi-
vidual schemes and courses. This, it was recognised, would require a 
focus of planning and organisation at the local level as well as the 
national level. Thus, it was proposed that there should be the 
maximum possible delegation of authority to local levels and that 
local area boards should be established in order to ensure the active 
involvement of key interests in the local community. (2) 
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It is clear then that the performance of a programme such as YOP could 
not be adequately assessed without examining the range of provision 
available in at least one particular local labour market. Obviously, 
an argument could be made for examining more than one local labour 
market. However, given limited time and resources, I decided that 
they would be best spent on an in-depth examination of one particular 
labour market, rather than being spread thinly over a number of local 
studies. There are limits to how far one can generalise from a single 
local study, but by relating certain of the background statistics to 
their national equivalents, some indication can be given of how repre-
sentative the local situation might have been. 
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2. Why the Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area? 
The choice of the Portsmouth area as the local labour market in 
which to conduct the case study was, in the first place, a matter of 
personal interest and convenience. I had been resident in the area 
for many years, and thus was already familiar with much of the back-
ground information concerning the locality, as well as being particu-
larly interested to find out more. However, there were also certain 
objective factors which confirmed the suitablity of this choice. 
The first of these was that the overall rate of unemployment within the 
area was not abnormal by national standards. Figure 8 presents a 
picture of the relationship between the annual rate of unemployment in 
the Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area and that for Great Britain as a 
whole, over the period between 1961 and 1983'(3) From this it can be 
seen that over a period of more than twenty years the Portsmouth rate 
remained closely in line with the national rate, sometimes being 
slightly above and sometimes being slightly below. In 1978, when YOP 
was launched, the Portsmouth rate was marginally above the national 
average. By 1979 this situation was reversed and thereafter, as unemploy-
ment rose rapidly both nationally and locally, the Portsmouth figure 
remained approximately one per cent below the national figure. Thus, 
although situated in the prosperous South East,' the scale of Portsmouth's 
unemployment can be considered fairly representative of the national 
problem. 
In terms of structure, the local labour market could also be considered 
in certain respects to represent a microcosm of the national situation. 
The largest industrial employer in the area, the Naval Dockyard, had 
been steadily running down its labour force since the late 1950s, and 
further more drastic cuts were planned for the future. Thus, many of 
the traditional industrial and craft skills present in the local labour 
force were no longer likely to be needed, and nor were the training 
facilities which in the past had provided local young people with 
apprenticeships in these skills. Yet, over the same period, there had 
been a significant diversification of the local economy. During the 
fifties and sixties, a number of technologically advanced electrical 
and electronic engineering firms had moved into the area. This had been 
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followed in the late sixties and early seventies by various commercial 
office developments in the Portsmouth city centre, and widespread growth 
of local authority and public service employment. Finally a start had 
been made upon the expansion of the commercial docks facilities, which 
it was hoped would stimulate a revival of the traditional local tourist 
industry. (4) Until the onset of the recession in the mid seventies, 
the rapid growth of these new industries and services had more than 
compensated for the loss of jobs in traditional industries. (5) Although 
in more recent years their development had slowed, and in some cases 
been reversed, it was still generally acknowledged that they retained 
a great potential for further growth, given more favourable circumstances 
in the future. Thus, alongside each other within the same local labour 
market, there existed both the problem of declining traditional indus-
tries and the potential of developing industries based on new technologies 
and services. 
A final factor supporting my choice of the Portsmouth area was its 
uniqueness. Although typical, both in the extent of its unemployment 
and in the changing pattern of its industrial structure, the area also 
had certain unique features, most of which stemmed from its traditional 
association with the Navy. Given the requirement that YOP should be 
responsive to particular local needs, I considered it an advantage that 
the area to be studied should in some respects have a distinct indivi-
dual character. 
Having explained the choice of Portsmouth, it is necessary also to 
say something about the geographical unit of the 'Travel-to-Work Area.' 
The main criteria when selecting the unit of study were: a) that it 
should be a unit for which statistical information was readily available; 
b) that it should correspond with the area of a coherent and recognised 
local labour market and; c) that it should bear some relation to the 
geographical structure of the main organisations responsible for the 
administration of YOP. Although not without its problems, the Travel-
to-Work Area appeared to be the best choice when judged according to 
these criteria. 
The smallest geographical unit for which the Department of Employment 
and the MSC collect employment and unemployment statistics is an 
employment office area. (6) However, there are various problems 
involved with the use of statistics collected on the basis of these 
areas. In terms of local labour markets, the definition of their 
boundaries is often arbitrary, taking no account of travel-to-work 
patterns. Given that a substantial proportion of the population may 
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live in one employment office area and work in another, (7) the calculation 
of an unemployment rate for such an area could never be reliable. Thus, 
for many purposes, it is more appropriate to combine a number of 
employment office areas into a group which corresponds to a reasonably 
self-contained and yet homogeneous local labour market. Such a 
grouping is known as a 'travel-to-work' area. 
Employment office areas do not necessarily correspond with local 
authority or other administrative boundaries, and thus neither do 
travel-to-work areas. Nevertheless, the concept is well recognised 
within both central and local government, and the areas themselves 
are unambiguously defined according to established criteria. The 
fundamental characteristic of a travel-to-work area is that at least 
80 per cent of the people who work within it also live within it, 
and that 80 per cent of the residents work there. In all, there are 
about 250 such travel-to~ork areas throughout the country. 
The Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area (TWA), which is highlighted on the 
map of Hampshire that is provided by Figure 9, is made up of five 
employment office areas covering approximately 340 square miles in 
the South East of Hampshire. The five employment offices are Portsmouth, 
Gosport, Fareham, Havant, and Petersfield & Liphook. By definition, 
as a travel-to-work area, it had certain recommendations according to 
the first- two criteria of choice for a local unit of study. It was an 
area for which employment and unemployment statistics were available, 
and it constituted a coherent and recognised local labour market. 
However, when it came to the third criterion, the position was more 
problematical. 
The principal organisations concerned with the local administration 
of YOP were the two operational divisions of the MSC and the Careers 
Service. The Special Programmes Division and the Training Services 
Division each had their own local network of offices. Thus, the SPD 
(1') 
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was organised on the basis of 41 local area offices and the TSD on the 
basis of 47 district offices. With regard to the Portsmouth TWA, 
although the SPD and the TSD offices were located in different places, 
the geographical area that they covered was the same. However, this 
area consisted not merely of the Portsmouth TWA, but of the whole of 
Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. 
The Careers Service, as a responsibility of the local education authority 
was organised on a county-wide basis for the whole of Hampshire. How-
ever, since September 1978, for administrative purposes it had been 
divided into three divisional areas, each corresponding approximately 
to a travel-to-work area. Within this organisational framework, the 
South East Hampshire Division of the Careers Service was the approximate 
equivalent of the Portsmouth TWA'(8) Each division had its own team 
of specialist careers officers, known as the Industrial and Educational 
Liaison (I.E.L.) Section, which was responsible for dealing with the 
young unemployed. Thus, although the Careers Service was a county-wide 
organisation, its specialist response to youth unemployment was co-
ordinated at a divisional level, which in the case of the South East 
Hampshire Division was for practical purposes the equivalent of the 
Portsmouth TWA. 
The local area office of the SPD had set up corresponding teams of 
link officers responsible for coordinating YOP provision in specific 
localities. The number of these teams varied, increasing as the scale 
of the Programme grew. Thus, although they were closely associated 
with the Careers Service divisions, there was not always a one-to-one 
relationship. At one time, a single team covered both South East 
Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. Towards the end of the Programme, 
South East Hampshire was divided between two teams. Nevertheless, the 
divisional organisation of the Careers Service always ensured that 
South East Hampshire retained its significance as a local unit in the 
organisation of the Programme. 
Thus, the Portsmouth TWA fulfilled the third criterion of choice for 
selection as the local unit of study: it bore some correspondence to 
the geographical structure of the main organisations responsible for 
the local administration of YOP. However, this correspondence was by 
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no means exact. It is arguable therefore, on the basis of this 
criterion, that it might have been better to choose either Hampshire 
or Hampshire and the Isle of Wight as the local area of study. This 
qrgument was reinforced in relation to the first criterion of choice -
the availability of statistical data - by the fact that certain 
statistical information concerning the operational details of the 
Programme was only available for either Hampshire or Hampshire and 
the Isle of Wight, and not for South East Hampshire. However, 
neither Hampshire nor Hampshire and the Isle of Wight were meaningful 
units in terms of local labour markets. 
In conclusion, it can be said that in balance the Portsmouth TWA 
came nearest to meeting the three criteria laid down for the choice 
of a local area of study. But it was not an unproblematical choice. 
In particular, it will be seen that certain important information 
concerning the operation of YOP within the Portsmouth TWA was lacking. 
Where this was the case, the information has been given for the 
nearest alternative geographical unit, usually Hampshire as a whole. 
On the basis of such information, it has sometimes been possible to 
make estimates for the smaller geographical unit. Thus, the focus 
remains throughout on the Portsmouth TWA, even if at times the picture 
has to be built up through a collage of information from different 
geographical units. Whatever the area chosen, such problems would have 
arisen. To a large extent they were indicative of the problems faced 
by the Programme itself in its attempt to co-ordinate a diverse array 
of organisations operating at different geographical levels into a 
coherent local response to youth unemployment. 
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3. The Portsmouth TWA., Employment and Economic Activity 
Having explained the choice of the Portsmouth TWA as the area 
of study, it is now necessary to give some more background information 
about the area. The City of Portsmouth is the most densely populated 
large provincial city in the country. (9) It is surrounded on its land-
ward side by a ring of suburban development consisting of the townships 
of Fareham, Gosport and Havant. Beyond these, there are the more 
outlying rural areas included in the East Hampshire and Winchester 
districts. In socio-economic terms, the area as a whole is relatively 
heterogeneous. Portsmouth itself has always been a comparatively poor 
industrial city situated in a comparatively wealthy shire county. After 
the Second World War, a large number of Portsmouth's poorer families 
were re-housed in the surrounding townships, particularly in the Havant 
area. But still, as a generalisation, it can be said that the city 
is poor compared with the surrounding suburban and rural areas within 
the TWA. Politically, however, the character of the area as a whole 
is more uniform. There is a solid Conservative majority on the Hampshire 
County Council, and all the District, Borough and City Councils included 
within the Portsmouth TWA are also Conservative. 
In the process of explaining the choice of the Portsmouth TWA for this 
case study, certain information has already been provided concerning 
the local economy and the rate of unemployment within it. Unfortunately, 
however, there was a lack of detailed up-to-date information concerning 
the scale and structure of local employment. The most recent Census 
of Employment had been carried out in 1981, but the local breakdown of 
its results was still being awaited at the time when this research 
was carried out. As a consequence, it was necessary to go back to the 
1977 Census in order to find reliable statistics for the number and 
distribution of employees in employment within the TWA. (10) 
Table 12 provides an industrial analysis of employees in employment 
within the Portsmouth TWA in March 1977.(11) From this it can be seen 
that the six industrial orders providing the largest percentages of 
local employment were then as follows: Professional and Scientific 
Services (16.1%); Distributive Trades (12.3%); Miscellaneous Ser-
vices (10.7%); Public Administration and Defence (10.5%); Electrical 
t'--
LD 
'<t 
TABLE 12 INDUSTRIAL ANALYSIS OF mPLOYEES IN EMPLOYMENT, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE PORl'SMOU'IH TWA 
GB PTWA PTWA% GB PrWA{EsT. ) 
S. I.C. ORDERS MARCH lq77 MARCH 1977 GB% JUNE 1982 JUNE 1982 
Thos. % Thos. % 3/7·7 Thos. % Thos. % 
.1 ·A~ricUlture Forestrv. Fishirur 1s~f 1.6 2.0 1.1 0.69 346 1.7 1.9 1.1 
2 Miniruz: and Quarrying 14'5 1.6 0.1 0.1 0.06 325 1.6 0.1 0.1 
'3 Food Drink and Tobacco -682 1.1 2.5 1.3 0.42 60S 2.9 2.2 1.2 
4 Coal and Petroleum Products "Ti 0.2 - - 0.00 26 0.1 - -
S Chemical and Allied Industries 411 2.0 4.1 2.2 1.10 388 1.9 1.7 2.1 
6 Metal Manufacture 481 2.2 0.3 0.2 0.09 294 1.4 0.2 0.1 
7 Mechanicl Engineering 916 4.2 8.5 4.5 1.07 724 3.5 6.7 3.7 
8 Instrument Eruz:ineeriruz: 1~ 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.29 129 0.6 0.3 0.2 
9 Electrical Engineering 744 1.4 17.0 8.9 2.62 640 1.1 14.6 8.1 
10 Shi pbuilding and Marine Erudneering 173 0.8 14.4 7.6 9.50 140 0.7 11.7 6.5 
11 Vehicles 743 3.4 4.8 2.5 0.74 rJ+7 2.7 3.5 1.9 
12 Metal Goods not elsewhere specified '510 2.4 1.9 1.0 0.42 428 2.1 loS 0.8 
13 Textiles 480 2.2 0.2 0.1 0.05. 298 1.4 0.1 0.1 
14 Lea ther. Leather Goods and Fur 41 0.2 - - 0.00 29 0.1 - -
15 Clothing and Footwear ~7 1.7 2.3 1.2 0.71 260 1.3 1.6 0.9 
16 Bricks. Pottery. Glass. Cement. etc. 2'56 1.2 0.5.. 0.3 0.25 204 1.0 0.4 0.2 
17 Timber. Furniture. etc. 2'ti 1.2 1.6 0.8 0.67 203 1.0 1.3 0.7 
18 Paper. Printing and Publishing 529 2.4 2.6 1.4 0.58 493 2.4 2.4 1.1 
19 Other Manufacturing Industries 12'5 1.1) 4.4 2.3 1.53 236 1.1 3.2 1.8 ' 
20 Construction 1225 5.6 9.4 4.9 0.88 1011 4.9 7.8 4.1 I 
21 Gas. Electricity and Water 119 1. I) 2.4 1.3 0.87 329 1.6 2.3 1.3 
22 TranspOrt and Conununication 1441 6.6 8.0 4.2 0.64 1372 6.7 7.6 4.2 
23 Distributive Trades 2674 12.2 23.5 12.3 1.01 2653 12.9 23.3 12.9 
24 Insurance. Banking. Finance and Business Services 1117 5.1 8.7 4.6 0._90 1'30 I) 6.3 10.2 5.7 
25 Professional and Scientific Services 1'572 16.1 30.7 16.1 0.99 3650 17.7 31.4 17.4 
26 Miscellaneous Services 2196 10.0 20.4 10.7 1.Q7 2484 12.0 23.0 12.8 
27 Public Administration and Defence 1'561 7.1 20.1 10.5 1.48 1497 7.3 19.3 10.7 
28 Unclassified 
TOTALS ~1969 190.7 ~0614 ~80.3 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
Engineering (8.9%); and Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (7.6%). 
Between them these six industrial orders accounted for almost exactly 
two-thirds of employment within the TWA. 
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Table 12 also provides an industrial analysis of employment throughout 
Great Britain in March 1977, with which the Portsmouth TWA analysis can 
be compared. From this it can be seen that in certain respects the 
industrial distribution of employment within the Portsmouth area was 
very similar to the national pattern. Thus, for example, the four 
leading industrial orders were the same, and came in the same order, 
both nationally and locally. However, there were also some important 
differences. Column 5 of Table B allows these to be systematically 
identified by dividing the Portsmouth TWA percentages by the national 
percentages in order to provide a Portsmouth TWA 'location quotient' 
for each industrial order. This reveals that, in 1977, the Portsmouth 
area had higher than average concentrations of employment in 8 of the 
27 industrial orders, and that its two main areas of specialisation were 
in the manufacturing industrial orders of Shipbuilding and Marine 
Engineering, and Electrical Engineering. 
The location quotient of 9.5 for Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering 
shows that, despite the process of industrial diversification that has 
been referred to, this traditional local industry still retained, in 
the latter half of the 1970s, a very significant position in the local 
labour market of the Portsmouth area. This position,of course, depended 
largely upon the employment provided by the Naval Dockyard, but there 
were other important local employers in this industry, such as Vosper 
Thornycroft/British Shipbuilders. The location quotient for Electrical 
Engineering reveals a local concentration of employment within this 
industrial order of more than 2~ times the national average. In fact, 
the bulk of local employment that was included within this particular 
industrial order could be described more precisely as the manufacture 
of electronic apparatus rather than electrical engineering per se.(12) 
This involved firms such as IBM, Marconi and Plessey, which could be 
considered to be working at the frontiers of the development and manu-
facture of the new electronic technology. It should also be pointed 
out that much of this local electronics industry was, and still is, 
heavily dependent upon defence contracts. Finally, another indication 
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of the importance of defence-related employment within the local 
economy was the fact that Portsmouth TWA had almost 1~ times the 
average concentration of jobs in the category of Public Administration 
and Defence. 
The lack of more recent statistical information concerning employment 
in the Portsmouth TWA has already been referred to. The second half 
of Table 12 attempts to remedy this by making estimates for the Portsmouth 
TWA on the basis of the most up-to-date national statistics available. 
Columns 6 and 7 reproduce the figures given by the December 1982 edition 
of the Employment Gazette for the industrial distribution of employees 
in employment throughout Great Britain in June 1982.(13) The estimates 
provided for the Portsmouth TWA in columns 8 and 9 have been made on 
the assumption that the national trends within each industrial order 
will have been reproduced at the local level.(14) 
The main impact of such an assumption upon the local figures is to 
bring about a general increase in the proportion of service employment, 
and corresponding decreases in the proportions of manufacturing and 
construction employment. Thus, the estimates show an increase from 
59.4 per cent to 63.7 per cent for the service industries, and decreases 
from 34.5 per cent to 29.6 per cent from from 4.9 per cent to 4.3 per 
cent for the manufacturing and construction industries respectively. 
The total of the estimates for the number employed in each industrial 
order indicates an overall reduction in the number of employees in 
emploment within the TWA from approximately 190,000 in 1977 to 
approximately 180,000 in 1982.(15) 
The evidence from national trends must be supplemented by a factor 
which is of particular local significance. In June 1981, the Government 
published a White Paper on Defence which proposed a series of severe 
cuts in the Navy, including "a very sharp reduction in the scope and 
volume of dockyard work at Portsmouth. "(16) The implication of this 
for the Dockyard work force was a reduction from 7,200 to 1,200 by 1984. 
As well as these 6,000 jobs to be lost within the Dockyard, other cut 
backs in naval personnel, both uniformed and civilian, were bound to 
have a disproportionate effect upon the Portsmouth area. 
The June 1981 Defence White Paper made real a threat that had been 
hanging over the Portsmouth labour market since the end of the 
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Second World War. Despite the diversification of the local economy 
that had taken place in the postwar era, the Dockyard remained the 
largest industrial complex in the area. In total, the various naval 
shore establishments in the area employed some 40,000 people, 22,000 
civilians and 18,000 uniformed personnel. (17) Moreover, in the context 
of recession, the naval reductions being proposed were likely to have 
a multiplier effect throughout the local economy. (18) Thus, although 
in recent years Portsmouth had been slightly favoured against the 
national average for unemployment, the immediate prospects for the 
area seemed particularly bleak at the time that this research was 
embarked upon. A large number of men, many with highly specialised 
traditional skills of little application outside the Dockyard, (19) 
were to be released into the local labour market over a period of two 
years. At the same time, the most important source of apprenticeships 
for local young people was to disappear. 
However, during the period in which this local case study was being 
carried out, there was an important change in this situation. In the 
wake of the Falklands War, the Government produced a new Defence White 
Paper which was published in December 1982. This canclled many of 
the naval reductions proposed by the previous White Paper, and gave a 
partial reprieve to Portsmouth Dockyard. 1,500 additional jobs were 
to be retained in the Dockyard as a result. (20) This still meant that 
4,500 jobs were to be lost, but the blow had been softened, and the 
task of restructuring and regenerating the local economy no longer 
appeared to be so immense. 
However, the local rate of unemployment was not only dependent upon 
factors affecting the level of demand within local labour market. The 
supply-side must also be considered. The population living within the 
Portsmouth TWA, when last surveyed in 1981, was just over half a million. (21) 
This was approximately the same as it had been at the 1971 Census. Yet, 
over the same ten year period, there had been a 7% increase in the number 
of people either in employment or seeking employment. Thus, the 1981 
Census classified 251,000 people, or just under half the resident 
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population within the Portsmouth TWA, as 'economically active'. The 
main factor responsible for this increase in the economic activity 
rate of the population as a whole was the increase in the activity 
rate of married women. (22) However, another important factor was the 
increase in the proportion of the population that were of working age. 
Between 1961 and 1971 the proportion of the population within the 
Portsmouth TWA that was of working age increased from 58.9 per cent to 
60.5 per cent. This increase took place despite the raising of the 
minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16 in 1973. It was largely the 
result of a substantial increase in the annual total of young people 
reaching the age of 16. This in turn was a result of the high birth 
rates that were experienced during the early 1960s. The so-called 
'baby-boom' was a national phenomenon; however, its effects in the 
Portsmouth TWA were probably exaggerated by the large number of young 
families that moved into the area during that period. (23) Its impact 
can be gauged by the fact that there were more young people in the 
16-19 age group living in the TWA in 1981 than there had been in the 
15-19 age group in 1971. What is more, the economic activity rate of 
the 1981 grouping was higher than that of the 1971 grouping. Thus 
there were approximately 9 per cent more economically active 16-19 year 
olds in 1981 than there had been economically active 15-19 year olds 
in 1971'(24) 
This large increase in the annual number of young people entering the 
labour market is of course an important factor to be considered in 
relation to the rising trend of youth unemployment and the special 
measures that have been implemented in response. Table 13 provides 
a detailed analysis of the numbers and destinations of young people 
reaching the minimum school leaving age in the Portsmouth TWA between 
1976 and 1982. The figures are based on a 10 per cent annual surv~y 
of state schools. (25) 
The first point that should be noted is the demographic trend in the 
total numbers reaching the minimum school leaving age each year. The 
final column expresses this trend in terms of an index on which the 
1976 total is given the value of 100. From this it can be seen that 
TABLE 13. DESTINATIONS 01<' THOS~ llliAGHINlr 'I'}ili MINIMUM SCHOOL 
lliAVING Alr~ IN THE PORTSMOUTH TRAVbl.-TO-WORK Al& 
1976-1982 (STATE SCHOOLS ONLY) 
~TAYING Oli FURTHER ~MPLOYMBNl UNKNOWN TOTAL 
IAT SCHOOL EDUCATIOli 
NUmbez % Numbe:r % lNumber! % Number % ~umbex % 
1976 1480 24 800 11 11'50 I ~ 550 9 6180 100 
1977 1840 26 900 1'3 1910 5S 410 6 7080 11S 
1978 1680 24 1070 lS 4070 ')1 280 4 7100 11S 
1979 17 SO 23 730 10 4410 60 SOO 7 7410 120 
1980 1710 2S 700 10 4170 60 160 '1 6960 111 
1981 2090 28 1180 15 3930 52 '370 S 7 ')10 122 
1982 2220 29 1260 17 1420 4S 670 9 7'570 122 
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between 1976 and 1981 there was a 22 per cent increase in the annual 
total of those reaching the age of 16. This was a fairly steady rise, 
except for a dip in 1980. Then, between 1981 and 1982, the figure 
levelled off with these two years being expected to mark the peak of 
the rise. 
The category of 'employment' refers to all those going out into the 
labour market, whether they succeeded in finding employment or not. 
If the years of 1976 and 1982 are compared (in which it will be noted 
that the percentage of 'unknowns' is the same), it will be seen that 
despite the 22 per cent rise in the numbers reaching school leaving age, 
there was only a very slight rise in the number of those leaving to 
seek employment. As a percentage of the total reaching the age of 16, 
the figure declined from 54 per cent to 45 per cent. Over the same 
seven year period, the percentage of those opting to stay on at school 
or go into further education rose from 37 per cent to 46 per cent. 
At first sight, these figures would appear to run contrary to the rise 
in economic activity rates amongst young people that was identified 
from the comparison of 1971 and 1981 Census results. However, if the 
years between 1976 and 1982 are examined more closely, it will be seen 
that the trend towards staying on in the educational system only took 
hold after 1980. Indeed, between 1976 and 1980, there was an upward 
trend in the percentage of 16 year olds leaving at the first opportunity 
to seek employment. Between 1976 and 1979 the figure rose from 54 per 
cent to 60 per cent, and in 1980 it remained at 60 per cent. These 
figures support the conclusions that were drawn from the Census results. 
It was only after the April 1981 Census, with the school leavers of 
1981 and ~982, that the dramatic reversal of this trend took place. 
In this connection it should be noted, when the figures are given below, 
that it was in the summer of 1980 that youth unemployment and YOP parti-
cipation in the Portsmouth TWA really took Off.(26) It would seem likely, 
therefore, that the significant increases in the percentages of 16 year 
olds staying on within the educational system in 1981 and 1982 were a 
reaction to this sharp deterioration of prospects in the youth labour 
market. This illustrates the point that there is a complex inter-
relationship,rather than a simple one-way causal connection, between 
rates of econanic activity and unemployment. 
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Of school leavers going out into the labour market, by 1982 only about 
a third were finding employment. Table 14 illustrates this point and 
provides a simple industrial analysis of the kinds of jobs being 
entered. (27) At the same time, some indication is given of whether 
any training is involved with these jobs. It will be noted that 
Manufacturing Industry accounted for almost a third of the jobs being 
entered, and that the next most important categories were Distributive 
Industry (6.6%) and Professional, Scientific and Others (5.7%). In 
total, some 17 per cent of the jobs were apprenticeships or involved 
some form of professional training. However, such figures for one 
particular year are of limited use unless they can be set in the 
context of trends identified from similar figures over a number of 
previous years. Unfortunately, there was no such series of figures 
available for South East Hampshire on its own, only for Hampshire as 
a whole. Nevertheless, these figures can give some idea of the recent 
trends in young people's employment in the locality. 
Table 15 shows the equivalent figures for school leavers throughout 
Hampshire in 1982 as percentages of the same figures in 1977.(28) 
First, it should be noted that the total number of school leavers 
entering employment during 1982 was only 40 per cent of what it had 
been six years earlier. The percentage reductions for each of the 
industrial categories varied considerably on either side of this average. 
Worst affected appear to have been Gas, ELectricity and Water (29%), 
Public Administration and Defence (30%), and Manufacturing Industry (34%). 
Perhaps surprisingly, by far the most resilient category of employment 
seems to have been Construction (65%). As far as apprenticeships and 
jobs involving professional training were concerned, these appear to 
have been reduced by a slightly greater proportion than the level of 
employment in general. Finally, the other side of these trends should 
be noted, the massive rises in school leaver unemployment (294%) and 
YOP participation (564%).(29) These require more detailed examination. 
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1O q TABLE 14 INDUSTRIAL ANALYSIS OF EI1PLOYMENT KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN ENTERED BY 
SCHOOL AND COLL.H.r;E LEAVERS DURING YEAR ENDED 39TH SEPTEMBER, 1982 
SOUTH EAST HAMPSHIRE 
DIVISION 
YOUNG ~lEN YOUNG WOHEN 
.... .... .... 
O-u o-u 0 
... *~ ... ~ 0 0 ~~ III III *-u 
P- III III P- III ., CIJ 1\1 ~ 
OM CIJ OM CIJ ..... III 
..<:..-4 1/)..-4 0..<: ..... ., ..... III ., 
~ ~ III III I/) III III III ~ en III III ;:;: CIJ ~ .... CIJ CIJ 
U 0 ..-4 -u o~ o~ bi ..... "t:I ..... ..... "t:I ..... OM OM ~ ..-4 Ill' CIJ .... ..-4 III CIJ .... o III CIJ III 
..., I/) ~ III ..., III 0 I/) ..., III ~ III ... III 0 III r: III ;' • ., 
d III OM U I/) 0 III CIJ ~ I/) OM U I/) 0 III CIJ ., CIJ III I\J 
CIJ CIJ ~ OM ... E-< CIJ..-4 ..... CIJ CIJ ~ OM ... E-< CIJ .......... ..... t.. CIJ .......... 
....... OM ... CIJ ... III III ....... OM ... CIJ ... III III III ... III III 
P- 0 III CIJ ..<: ,J:J p. ... E P. 0 n1 CIJ ..c:: ,J:J p. ... r: ... "t:I P ..... I, 
P. ...... ..... ..., ;j >< 0 CIJ P. ... ... ..... +I ;j >< 0 CIJ o ~ >< 0 c· 
« Po. f~ 0 Q til (" ~ (1..4 ..-c 0.. r-.. 0 0 Vl r.l ~ r .. F-< III '·1 ~ ft, 
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Mining 1 
- Y? )8 0.6:;t. 1 - 7 .(j 0.1% 46 0.810 
2. Manufacturing Industry 1)1 - 195 )26 5·Ji6 
.. 
) 1 ?)7 241 ).9% 567 9.'" 
3. Construction 54 1 124. 179 2.911> - - 26 26 0.4,. 205 ).~ 
4. Gas, Electricity and Water 7 - 1- 8 O.l~ - - ) ) 0.1% 11 o.~ 
5. Communication 10 - 26 )6 0.6% - - 11 11 0.2% 47 0.8% . 
6. Distributive Industry 2 
- 161· 16) 2.7% - - 241 241 ).9:;t. 404 6.6'/0 
7. Insurance, Banking and Fin~ce 
- -
1) 1) o.~ - - 50 50 0.8% 6) 1.0,. 
8. Professional, Scientific and Others 21 5 84 110 1.8% 54 2 187 24) ).~ )5) 5·7% 
9. Public Administration and Defence 22 2 79 10) 1.7" 1 - 4) 44 0.7% 147 2.4% 
10 Total Number of School leavers known to have 
• entered employment 248 8. no 976 15·9" 59 ) 805 867 14.1% 184) )0.0'f0 
11. No. of School leavers still unemployed on JU.1o.82. 2001 )2.6% 
12 No. of School leavers estimated to be ensaged on 
• Youth ~portunities ProF.ra~me on J~. 1o.8~ •• 1800 29.4% 
13 No. of School leavers known to hnve l~rt nc~ool for 
• employment but about whom there i8 no information 492 8.0% 
14 Total estimated no. of school leavers estimated no 6144 10QO~ .:_:.~.J'-Il"in. left fIIchoo1 for emnlovment 
----
TABLE 15 
HAMPSHIRE SCHOOL AND COLLEGE LEAVERS, 1982 ENTRANTS ·TO EMPLOYMENT 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF 1977 ENTHANTS 
t. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Mining 41' 
2. Manufacturing Industry ;4% 
J. Construction 64% 
4. Gas, Electricity and Water 2% 
5. Communication 
) 
) 
6. Distributive Industry 
) 42% ~ , 7. Insurance, Banking and Finance L 
8. Professional, Scientific and Others 42% 
9. Public Administration and Defence JO% 
10. Total Number of School leavers known to have entered em~loIment 40% 
It. No. of School leavers still unemployed 294% 
12. No. of School leavers estimated to be engaged 564% on the Youth 0EE2rtunities Programme 
1J. No. of School leavers known to have left school for 44% em~l0Imentl but about whom there is no information 
14. Total estimated no. of school leavers estimated as 91% having left school for emElo~ent 
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*()7% Apprentice-
ships or Profes-
ional Training) 
4. Youth unemployment, special measures, and the development 
of YOP in South East Hampshire 
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The main statistical information concerning the numerical growth 
of youth unemployment and special measures provision in the Portsmouth 
TWA has been summarised in the form of three graphs. The first of 
these, Figure 10, records the monthly totals of young people registered 
as unemployed within the South East Division of the Hampshire Careers 
Service between January 1974 and April 1983.(30) It should be noted 
that these totals do not include those young people in the 16-19 age 
group who registered at Employment Offices rather than Careers Offices. 
The numbers in this category were quite large, but most of them were 
18 or 19 year olds or those who had already had experience of employ-
ment.(31) Thus the Careers Service totals, which were made up mainly 
of 16 and 17 year old school leavers, probably give a more accurate 
impression of the growth of YOP's potential client group. Moreover, 
the availability of individual monthly totals allows the annual cycle 
of youth unemployment based round the summer school leaving date to 
be clearly observed. 
Figure 11 provides a quarterly record of the monthly totals of young 
people participating in YOP and its various special measure prodecessors 
in Hampshire between January 1976 and April 1983.(32) Unfortunately 
there was no regular set of figures available for South East Hampshire 
before August 1980. However, the figures that were available subsequ-
ently are recorded on the graph, and, on the basis of these figures 
and the occasional figure that exists before 1980, estimates for South 
East Hampshire are projected back to 1976. 
The third graph, Figure 12, provides a combined picture of the growth 
of youth unemployment and special measures within the Portsmouth TWA 
for the quarterly months between January 1976 and April 1983. On this 
occasion, the youth unemployment figures include both the totals of 
young people registered at Careers Offices in South East Hampshire and 
the totals of 16-19 year olds registered at Employment Offices in the 
Portsmouth TWA. (33) The estimates for YOP and special measures provision 
in South East Hampshire before August 1980 are transferred from Figure 11. 
The text that follows provides a brief commentary on the information 
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that is summarised by the three graphs, and gives further details of 
the local development of YOP and its special measure predecessors. 
A County Careers Service Report described 1974 as "the last full year 
of what was known as 'full employment' in Hampshire. "(34) In January 
of that year (the month in which the MSC carne into existence), there 
were 424 young people registered as unemployed at Careers Offices 
throughout the county: 201 of these were located at offices within 
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South East Hampshire. Even with the impact of school leavers in the 
summer, the highest monthly total of the year for the South East Division 
was only just over 400. At the beginning of 1975, however, the figures 
began to climb, and allowing for the pattern of seasonal variation they 
rose continuously until reaching a peak of some 3,350 in the summer of 
1977. 
Special measures in response to youth unemployment were first introduced 
in Hampshire towards the end of 1975. Originally, they consisted of 
roughly a hundred places on short courses and a mere handful of jobs 
sponsored under the Job Creation Programme. As unemployment continued 
to rise during 1976 and 1977, there was a steady build-up. of the level 
of special measures provision throughout the county. The short courses, 
most of which were 13 week 'Industrial Appreciation Courses' organised 
by the TSA at local F E colleges, increased their capacity to almost 
350 places by the autumn term of 1977. Meanwhile, JCP expanded to reach 
a maximum level of some 70 places, most of which were sponsored by the 
Hampshire County Council. The schemes included a library service for 
the housebound, the restoration of a canal, and the provision of faci-
lities for parks and nature reserves. Further additions to the range 
of provision in the area were provided by the introduction of Community 
Industry and the Work Experience Programme. The South Hampshire Unit 
of Community Industry was established in April 1976, initially offering 
some 30 places and subsequently expanding to more than 80. WEP was 
introduced later during the same year, and likewise started on a small 
scale with only some 40 places available throughout the county. However, 
during 1977, the numbers increased rapidly and by March 1978 the total 
had reached almost 500. Finally, to complete this picture of pre-YOP 
special measures to relieve youth unemployment, it should be mentioned 
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that during 1976-1977 some 375 young people were employed in Hampshire 
under the Youth Employment Subsidy. (35) 
The Youth Opportunities Programme, it will be remembered was launched 
nationally in April 1978. Its immediate impact in Hampshire does not 
appear to have been particularly dramatic. A Local Area Board was set 
up covering Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, and generally administra-
tive arrangements were put on a better co-ordinated and more permanent 
basis. Existing schemes changed their names and the steady growth of 
new schemes continued. But there was no major change in either the 
scale or the composition of provision to mark the introduction of the 
new programme. The most significant growth in scale during this early 
stage of development had already taken place with the expansion of WEEP 
in response to the large numbers of unemployed school leavers in the 
summer of 1977. Moreover, this had also set the trend for the future 
development of the composition of provision, with the VJ ork Experience 
on Employers Premises element predominating over the training courses 
and other forms of work experience. 
The launching of YOP co-incided with the start of a period of respite 
in the growth of youth unemployment. In South East Hampshire, as in 
the rest of the county, the 1978 summer peak for the total of those 
registered at Careers Offices did not reach the same level that it had 
the year previously. This improvement continued through into 1979 when 
the summer peak came back down to the level of that in 1976. Such 
figures gave the impression that YOP had made an important impact on 
local youth unemployment. However, although YOP may have helped, the 
improvement was largely the result of a general reduction in the level 
of unemployment affecting all ages, which can be seen from Figure 8 to 
have taken place both in the Portsmouth TWA and nationally during 1978 
and 1979. Indeed, during this period, the growth of the numbers parti-
cipating in YOP throughout the county came to a halt. Allowing for the 
characteristic pattern of seasonal variation, the quarterly month figures 
for YOP participation inHampshire remained virtually static between 
October 1978 and 1980.(36) 
As was the case nationally, it was in the summer of 1980 that the local 
youth unemployment figures began to take off again. By July 1980 there 
were over 3,600 young people registering as unemployed at Careers 
Offices in South East Hampshire, a figure clearly surpassing the 
previous peak of July 1977, despite the build-up of YOP provision 
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which had taken place in the meantime. The response of the local 
Programme reflected the gravity of the situation. Between July and 
October 1980, the number of young people participating in YOP throughout 
Hampshire more than doubled. Moreover, the figures available for 
those on YOP in South East Hampshire show that the October total in 
this single division of the county was very nearly as high as the 
total for the whole of the county had been in July, and higher than 
it had been in April. 
Despite this massive increase of YOP provision, the youth unemployment 
figures during the latter quarter of 1980 failed to come back down to 
the levels of previous years. Thus the figure for those registered 
as unemployed at Careers Offices in South East Hampshire stood at 
1,841 in January 1981, 80 per cent above the previous highest for this 
month in 1978. The summer peak that followed was slightly below that 
of 1980, but the figures came down even slower than the year before, 
leaving a total of 2,174 still unemployed in January 1982. 
Meanwhile, the growth of YOP provision continued to chase the unemploy-
ment statistics upwards. Between October 1980 and October 1981, the 
numbers participating in the Programme increased at every quarter, 
ignoring the previous pattern of seasonal variation. Over this 
period of a year, the totals for Hampshire and South East Hampshire 
both more than doubled, the South East Division maintaining approximately 
a 40 per cent·share of provision throughout the county. The pattern 
of seasonal variation resumed in 1982, but the summer of that year saw 
record figures for both youth unemployment and YOP participation. In 
July 1982, there were over 3,800 young people registered with Careers 
Offices in South East Hampshire, and, by October, there were over 6,000 
on YOP throughout Hampshire and over 2,500 in the South East Division. 
These figures represented a 32 per cent increase in youth unemployment 
and a five fold increase in YOP provision since the first summer of 
the programme in 1978. 
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Some description has already been given of the composition of special 
measures provision throughout Hampshire before the introduction of YOP. 
Table 16 provides an analysis of the changing composition of local 
YOP/special measures provision based on annual monthly figures for 
participation between October 1977 and October 1982. The month of 
October was chosen for this purpose because at that time of year all 
the different scheme types tended to be running at near maximum capacity 
dealing with the inflow of summer school leavers.(37) Once again, the 
figures for South East Hampshire are only available from August 1980. 
In general, it will be seen that they match closely those for the 
county as a whole. (38) 
The most important trend over the first five years was the growth of 
the Work Experience on Employers' Premises element in relation to the 
other types of provision. As we have already seen, this trend was 
started by the expansion of the Work Experience Programme in 1977, 
before the introduction of YOP. Nevertheless, it would appear that at 
the beginning of YOP there was a smaller proportion of WEEP provision 
locally than was the case nationally. (39) Conversely, the proportion 
of places provided by the various kinds of training courses seems to 
have been higher than at the national level. However, as the scale of 
the local programme as a whole expanded, the size of this latter sector 
of provision remained virtually static, while the vast majority of the 
new places were provided on WEEP schemes. As a result, by October 1981 
the WEEP sector appears to have become even more predominant within 
the local programme than it was nationally. (40) 
The major change which took place during the final year was the emerg-
ence of the New Training Places. The first of these were introduced 
in June 1982, and by October there were over 700 occupied places in 
the South East Hampshire Division. This represented almost 30 per cent 
of the total provision in the area, which was well above the national 
average and roughly in line with the original target of 100,000 places 
being available throughout the country by September 1982. The majority 
of these New Training Places were improved and extended versions of 
previous schemes and courses. Thus the Training Workshop, which had 
been established in Portsmouth back in September 1980, no longer appears 
TABLE 16 
COMPOSITION OF YOP I SPECIAL MEASURES PROVISION IN HAMPSHIRE AND SOUTH EAST 
HAMPSHIRE, 1977 - 1982 
SCHEME / CQURSE TYPE AREA OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT 12ZZ 12Z8 12Z2 1280 1281. 1282 
WORK EXPERIENCE ON HAMPSHIRE 44% 56% 60% 68% 7::J}1 ~% 
EMPLOYERS I PREMISES I WEP S.E.HANTS 66% 74% 54% 
COMMUNITY PROJECTS / HAl1PSHIRE 13% 6% 7% ~ 6% 
cs, PBWE, JCP S.E.HANTS 4% 8% 5' 
TRAINING WORKSHOP HAMPSHIRE 2% ~ S.E.HANTS 4% 2% 
COMMUNITY INDUSTRY HAMPSHIRE 7% 6% 7% :fo 2% 2% S.E.HANTS ~ J% J% 
WORK PREPARATION COURSES H.UU'SHIRE 36% 3J% 27% 18% 11' 9% 
/ IACs, SICs, STC$, WICs S.E.HANTS 17% 13% 10% 
Nh.'W TRAINING- PLACES HArv1PSHIRE 27% S.E.HANTS 28% 
TOTALS HAMPSHIRE 910 1140 1144 2476 5252 6145 S.E.HANTS 1019 2121 2583 
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separately in the statistics because by now it was upgraded to provide 
some 130 NTPs. Likewise, a number of the larger Community Projects 
had been raised in status in order to contribute over 100 further 
places to this new category. However, a completely new form of provision 
was the prestigious Information Technology Centre, which was located 
in the Portsmouth Civic Offices and initially provided some 30 places. 
The remainder of the NTPs were accounted for by the 12 month Work Skills 
Courses, the vast majority of which were upgraded and extended versions 
of previous college-based courses. (41) 
As was the case at the national level, it would appear from these local 
statistics that an important change took place in the nature of YOP 
during its final year. However, this account has already provided 
certain indications that nominal changes did not necessarily correspond 
with real changes. Certainly the introduction of NTPs had an impact 
on the local statistics, but what difference did it make at the level 
of individual schemes and courses? This was one of the questions to 
be considered during the second phase of this local case study, the 
programme of visits and interviews. However, before this is presented, 
it is necessary to mention briefly two further aspects of the quanti-
tative performance of YOP in the local area,the undertakings and the 
employment rates of the trainees. 
Complete statistical records relating to the fulfilment of the under-
takings at the local level were not available. However, there was 
sufficient information to enable certain comparisons to be made with 
the national level results. During the first two years of the school 
leaver undertaking, the Easter deadline appears to have been met through-
out Hampshire without much difficulty. (42) In the third year with youth 
unemployment taking off, it was not so easy. In the South East Division, 
some 50 young people were left without their promised offer of a place. 
Nevertheless, this was still well below the national average, given 
the scale of local provision. However, when in the fourth year the 
deadline was brought forward to Christmas, the total of failures in the 
South East rose to a figure of almost 200, which represented slightly 
more than the national average. This though was the exception, and in 
the final year the total was reduced to less than 20, representing a mere 
fraction of the average failure rate throughout the country. (43) 
As was the case nationally, results for the other two undertakings 
were difficult to obtain. However, it would appear that during the 
period when the undertaking to the long-term unemployed was in force, 
this category of youth unemployment was not really a problem in 
Hampshire. When the undertaking started in January 1980, there were 
only about 50 young people who had been unemployed for more than a 
year in the whole of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. Two of these 
still remained without the offer of a place three months later. (44) 
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No other results were available locally, but it should be noted that 
when the undertaking came to an end in March 1981 there were still 
less than 50 young people who had been registered as unemployed with 
the Hampshire Careers Services for more than a year. Likewise, the 
fulfilment of the undertaking to the other 16 and 17 year olds appears 
to have been considerably easier in Hampshire than in certain other 
areas of the country. The results available for the six month periods 
ending in April and October 1982 both showed less than 30 young people 
left without the offer of a place throughout Hampshire, and less than 
10 within the South East Division. (45) 
Thus, in general, it would appear that locally YOP was c00siderably 
more successful at meeting the various undertakings than it was in 
average throughout the country. This was particularly so in the case 
of the two undertakings to the longer term young unemployed, suggesting 
that the high failure rates of these undertakings were not evenly 
distributed in relation to overall levels of unemployment, but were 
concentrated in the particular unemployment blackspots. The only 
major exception to the relative success of the local area was the fourth 
year of the school leavers undertaking. This can probably be explained 
by the fact that until this year the local programme had not been put 
under the same pressure as that faced in many other areas of the country. 
As a result, there was perhaps greater reluctance to classify as r.efusers 
those young people for whom it was difficult to provide. Moreover, the 
bringing forward of the deadline to Christmas caused a certain amount 
of resentment within the Careers Service. It was felt that the local 
autonomy and professional responsibility of the Service was being under-
mined, and that increasingly it was being forced to order its priorities 
around guarantees imposed arbitrarily by the Government and the MSC.(46) 
By attempting to maintain open access to YOP for youngsters outside the 
478 
main undertaking groups, the Hampshire Careers Service made the job of 
fulfilling the undertakings that much more difficult for itself. 
Finally, in relation to employability, Figure 13 summarises the 
destinations of young people leaving YOP schemes and courses in South 
East Hampshire between January 1980 and September 1982.(47) Unfortunately, 
for a number of reasons, these figures can only be compared in a vague 
and tentative manner with the national results that were set out in 
Chapter 5.(48) It will be remembered that, between January 1980 and 
September 1982, the average employment rate of trainees leaving all 
forms of schemes and courses within the national programme was 42%, and 
that the average unemployment rate was 40%. Over the same period, the 
average employment rate in South East Hampshire was 38%, and the average 
unemployment rate 24%. Both of these figures are smaller than was the 
case nationally because there was a much larger miscellaneous category 
for those who left the Careers Service register and whose destination 
was unknown. Amongst those whose destination was known, the local 
employment placement rate was at least as good as the national average 
and the local unemployment rate considerably better (i.e., lower). 
No firm conclusions can be drawn, but it would seem from the evidence 
available that the achievement of the local programme in relation to 
this criterion was, as generally so with the undertakings, average or 
above average. Certainly, in relation to the national picture, the 
Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area was by no means a blackspot as far as 
the statistical performance of YOP was concerned. 
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FIGURE 13 
II THE LOCAL PROGRAMME 
The second phase of the local case study consisted, prin-
cipally, of a series of visits to a sample of the YOP schemes and 
courses being provided within the Portsmouth area. The broad 
objective was to establish how the detailed operation of the 
Programme at the level of individual schemes and courses within 
a specific local labour market related to the stated aims and 
objectives of the Programme as defined at the national level of 
policy-making. The visits were carried out in February/March 1983, 
at the end of the final year of the Programme, when it was already 
in the process of transition towards the new Youth Training Scheme. 
The sample was selected in order to cover the full range of 
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provision available within the area, and to reflect the relative 
numerical importance of the different types of schemes and courses. 
Twenty-one visits were carried out in all, distributed as follows: 
nine to WEEP schemes, three to Community Projects, one each to the 
Training Workshop, the Information Technology Centre and the Community 
Industry Unit, three to Colleges providing YOP courses, and three 
to other providers of YOP courses. During the course of these 
visits, I interviewed people at both managerial and supervisory 
levels, and I spoke informally with some of the trainees. The 
information that I obtained is presented below. The bulk of it 
is organised into three broad categories: (A) WEEP schemes; (B) other 
schemes and projects; (C) training courses. These correspond 
respecti vely with Mode A, Mode B1 and r.lode B2 wi thin the subsequent 
organisation of provision under the Youth Training Scheme. Finally, 
there is a separate section (D) which is concerned specifically 
with the provision of off-the-job training across all three of 
these sectors. 
A WEEP Schemes 
We have already seen that, in numerical terms, WEEP was always 
by far the most important type of YOP provison within both Hampshire 
and South East Hampshire. It never constituted less than half of 
the total number of places occupied and, in the fourth year of the 
Programme, it amounted to almost three-quarters. With the intro-
duction of a large number of New Training Places in the final year 
of the Programme, the proportion of WEEP was sharply reduced, but 
it still constituted the majority element of the Programme. 
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In December 1982 there were over 2,600 places available on WEEP schemes 
in South East Hampshire. However, only half of these were filled. 
This low occupancy rate can be explained partially by the fact that 
by this stage the WEEP sector was being allowed to run down in 
preparation for the introduction of YTS. However, another important 
factor was that of occupational mismatch. Table 17 provides an 
analysis of the distribution according to 'Occupational Training 
Families' of the 2,600 WEEP places available in December 1982.(49) 
What should be noted is that 2 of the 11 O.T.F.s, 'Administrative, 
Clerical and Office Services' and 'Personal Services and Sales 
Occupations', accounted for 50 per cent of the total number of places 
available. The local MSC was always able to 'find plenty of shops 
and offices that were ready to act as sponsors for work experience 
placements. However, there was only a certain proportion of those 
registered unemployed with the Careers Service for whom such opportu-
nities were suitable. Many lacked either the aptitude or the incli-
nation for clerical or retail employment, but were keen to gain 
experience of practical manual work in the construction and manufactur-
ing industries. The problem was, that in these industries, it was 
far more difficult to find the number of work experience placements 
which were required to meet the demand. Thus the Careers Service 
and the MSC sometimes found themselves in the embarassing position 
of having, simultaneously, large numbers of unoccupied places for 
which they could not find suitable young people, and large numbers 
of eligible unemployed young people for whom they could not find 
suitable placements. This led to complaints of mismanagement in the 
local press, and one of the local Conservative MPs went as far as 
TABLB 17 OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF WEEP PLACES - BOTH FILLED AND 
UNFILLED - IN SOUTH EAST HAMPSHIRE I DECEMBER 1982. 
INSTITUTE OF MANPOWER STUDIES WEEP PLACES FILLED 
OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING FAMILIES AND UNFILLED 
1- Administrative Clerical & Office 588 2~o Services Occupations. 
2. Agriculture, Horticulture, Forestry & 1.58 6% Fisheries Occupations. 
3. Construction and Extractive Occupations. 236 9~ 
4. Craft and Design Occupations. 75 3'fo 
5. Electronic, Electrical and Mechanical 
Engineering Occupations. 
(A) Manufacturing and Assembly 144- 6'10 
(B) Installation, Maintenance and Repair 216 8~ 
6. Food Preparation and Service Occupations. 164 610 
7. General Manufacturing and Processing 85 J% Occupations. 
8. Personal Services and Sales Occupations. 730 28% 
9. Community and Health Service Occupations. 61 2% 
10. Technical and Scientific Occupations 74 ~ 
11. Transport Services Occupations 85 3";0 (including Warehousing). 
TOTAL 2,616 100"ft> . 
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accusing the young unemployed of being "bone idle" because they 
were not prepared to "get on their bikes" to take up YOP "jObS"'(50) 
The distribution of WEEP schemes needs also to be considered in 
relation to the structure of the local labour market, and in 
particular to the job prospects of local young people. Table 12 
483 
of the previous section provided an industrial analysis of employment 
in the Portsmouth TWA, and Tables 13 and 14 gave further such analyses 
of the entry into employment of school and college leavers in Hampshire 
and South East Hampshire. Unfortunately, however, these industrial 
analyses cannot be directly related to the occupational analysis 
of WEEP places in terms of OTFs that has been presented here. Moreover, 
as yet, there was no analysis available of the local labour market 
that could be presented in terms of OTFs. Thus, comparisons between 
the distribution of WEEP places and the distribution of jobs in the 
local labour market can only be made in a generalised way. In total, 
64% of the WEEP places available were in service occupations. This 
compares with 58% of employees in service industries within the 
Portsmouth TWA in 1977. However, if it is assumed that individual 
industries within the TWA developed subsequently in the same way as 
they did nationally, then it could be expected that by December 1982 
the percentage of employees in service industries was almost identical 
to the percentage of WEEP places offered in service occupations. 
Yet, if the statistics for the entry of school leavers into employment 
are referred to again, it will be seen that in 1982 still only some 
55% of young people in South East Hampshire were finding their first 
jobs in service industries. Furthermore, between 1977 and 1982, the 
number of school leavers entering these industries throughout Hampshire 
had declined by as great a percentage as the total entering all forms 
of employment. Thus, while at a very general level the distribution 
of WEEP places appears to have corresponded closely with the structure 
of the local labour market as a whole, reflecting the trend towards 
a greater proportion of service employment; its correspondence with 
the pattern of young people's entry into employment, where the trend 
towards service industries appeared to be absent, was by no means 
so exact. The possible significance of this somewhat paradoxical 
situation is considered in Chapter 6 of the main text. 
Another feature which should be noted about the WEEP sector in 
South East Hampshire concerns the size of the schemes. On average 
there were 1.3 trainees per individual scheme. Thus, most 
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trainees were on their own in a single placement with a small employer. 
One reason for this, and indeed for the occupational distribution 
of placements that is described above, was the influence of the 
trade unions. Their organisation tended to be strongest in the larger 
well-established concerns in the traditional local manufacturing 
industries. At the same time, it was in this sector of local industry 
that the largest concentrations of redundancies were being experienced. 
It is not surprising, then, that the unions concerned often blocked 
the introduction of work experience schemes into these areas of 
employment. One notable example was the Naval Dockyard. At one 
time it had a scheme catering for 25 trainees, but as soon as 
redundancies were announced the unions demanded that it should be 
discontinued. Amongst smaller employers and throughout the clerical 
and retail sectors, union organisation tended to be weaker, and in 
many cases was non-existent. Naturally, the distribution of schemes 
tended to be biased towards those areas where the potential for 
union resistance was weakest. The majority of schemes in the area 
were in non-unionised workplaces. 
Of the 21 visits that I made to schemes and courses in the Portsmouth 
area, nine were devoted to a survey of WEEP schemes. Originally I 
asked the local MSC office for a list of 10 WEEP sponsors that I could 
visit. I specified that they should include a representative range 
in terms of both size and type of business. I received a list of 
14 employers~ all of which I attempted to make contact with. Of 
these, two I was unable to contact and three declined to be interviewed, 
leaving nine with which I successfully arranged and completed inter-
views. For the purpose of these interviews I made out a standard 
questionnaire form which I filled in during each interview, using 
it as an open-ended structure. A copy of this questionnaire is 
reproduced below. (51) As well as carrying out interviews with the 
sponsors, I made use of any opportunity that I could to speak to the 
trainees. I also obtained further information by accompanying an 
MSC link officer during an afternoon of monitoring visits on a 
Group WEEP scheme. 
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It must be stressed from the outset that the results of such a survey 
can only be taken as illustrative of certain features that have 
arisen on this type of scheme, and cannot be considered as definitive 
of all WEEP schemes in the area. I have no reason to believe that 
the list given to me by the MSC was unrepresentative, however, I 
do suspect that it was the higher quality sponsors who were most 
ready to be interviewed. The results are set out in accordance with 
the structure of the questionnaire. 
1. Background 
The first section of the questionnaire was designed to collect 
certain background information about the employer and the scheme 
that they were sponsoring. The results should help to convey some 
idea of the range and representation of the survey. 
a) Employers 
Of the nine employers that I interviewed, there was one large 
nationalised industry, one large retail chain store, a local 
charitable organisation, a printer, a wholesale distributor, a 
catering butcher, a tyre-fitter, a travel agency and a small fishing 
tackle shop. 
The first two of these firms each employed more than 50 people at 
the worksite that I visited. Of the others, three employed between 
10 and 50 people, two employed between five and 10, and two employed 
less than five. OL the nine, three had increased the numbers of 
their permanent staff during the time that they had been YOP sponsors, 
three had decreased the number, and three had remained static. 
However, six of the nine sponsors thought that employment prospects 
were poor in their type of business. 
At six of the nine workplaces there was no union presence, one had 
a closed shop arrangement, one had some employees in a union, and 
one employer did not know, but thought that some of his staff might 
be in a union. 
b) Schemes 
Most of the sponsors had joined YOP between 18 and 30 months ago, 
though two had only become sponsors during the last year and one 
had been a sponsor over the last four years. 
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Most had been directly approached by the local MSC, though the larger 
firms with national head offices had generally been informed of the 
Programme via their head office. The information that they received 
about becoming a sponsor took the form of a standard MSC booklet. (52) 
When asked why they had decided to become sponsors, a third of those 
interviewed acknowledged that it was a form of recruitment strategy. 
Two said that it was out of concern for the young people, two said 
that it was a head office decision, and one (the charity) said that 
there was work that needed doing. 
Between them, the nine sponsors offered 27 places. Three offered a 
single place, three offered two places, one offered three places, 
one offered four places and one (the charity) offered 11 places. 
Of the 16 places offered by sponsors other than the charity, six 
were in retail occupations and five were in clerical work. Since 
they first joined the Programme, the nine different sponsors had had 
just over 100 trainees through their schemes. 
In the minority of cases where there was a union presence, the unions 
appear to have had virtually no impact upon the schemes. In the 
case of the nationalised industry with a closed shop, an agreement 
had been made at national level and the local union representatives 
had been informed, but their involvement did not appear to have gone 
any further. 
2. Recruitment and Selection 
Sponsors were not allowed to recruit directly for their schemes, but 
had to rely on the Careers Service (and to a much lesser extent the 
Job Centre) to send them suitable candidates. They could, however, 
select from amongst the candidates that they were sent. (53) 
handbook gave the following guidance: 
The MSC 
"Sponsors should bear in mind that the Youth Opportunities 
Programme is designed to help particularly the less able 
less qualified young people. It would be inappropriate to 
apply the normal selection procedures and conditions used 
for recruiting permanent employees. When selecting trainees 
an important question should be 'What is he or she likely 
to be capable of?' rather than 'What is he or she qualified 
to do?' " 
. • (54) 
I was interested to find out whether sponsors exercised their right 
to select, and if they did, whether they followed this guidance. 
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Two out of the nine had been prepared to accept all of the candidates 
that were sent to them by the Careers Service. Both of these had 
experienced problems with trainees, and had had a high turnover rate. 
All except one of the employers said that they were prepared to 
accept young people of either sex for the places that they were 
offering. However, their intake generally conformed to conventional 
sex roles. This they claimed was a reflection of the candidates that 
they had been sent, rather than of their own selection policies. 
Most of those who selected did so on the basis of subjective factors 
of personality, attitude and appearance which they claimed to be 
able to judge. Keenness, common sense and the ability to fit in, 
were the positive qualities most often mentioned. Only one (the 
large nationalised company) required certain minimum qualifications, 
though another (the retail chain store) administered their own simple 
test. However, the majority said that their selection was the same 
as it would have been for normal employees. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
MSC guidelines for WEEP schemes referred to four main components .-
induction, planned work experience, training or further education, 
and counselling. I asked the sponsors how they had gone about providing 
each of these components. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
3. Induction 
The MSC guide to potential sponsors stated that for young people 
to benefit from the scheme they would need to know: exactly what 
work experience was; an idea of the activities of the organisation 
they had joined; what they would be doing; attendance requirements 
and the supervision and support that was to be provided; and safety 
procedures. (55) 
The degree of formality of the induction procedure varied greatly 
amongst the different sponsors that I interviewed. As might be 
expected, the larger employers with their own specialist personnel 
staff provided the most formalised introductions for their trainees. 
Thus, for example the nationalised industry laid on a one week 
residential course which covered all of the elements specified by 
the MSC. Amongst the smaller firms the procedure was less formal 
and it was sometimes difficult to establish exactly what had taken 
place. In most cases it seems to have consisted of a brief chat, 
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a tour of the premises, and an introduction to the people that they 
would be working with. Some sponsors said that they had found the 
MSC booklets useful and had based what they did on these. Others 
appeared to have been more lax. Not all of the trainees that I spoke 
to had been told about health and safety precautions. In some cases 
the main emphasis seems to have been put upon rules and discipline. 
The vague promise that "there might be a job in it" was used as an 
incentive for hard work and good behaviour. 
4. Planned Work Experience 
This of course was the main component of a WEEP scheme. The MSC 
guide to sponsors stressed that it was essential that the trainees 
should be given as wide a range of work as possible. The range that 
was to be covered was agreed beforehand between the sponsor and the 
MSC, and was described in the proposal forms. (56) 
The range of work experience available varied from scheme to scheme, 
depending on the nature of the business. In the case of the larger 
employers the necessary range of experience was achieved by means 
of a formal system of rotation between a number of quite narrowly 
defined areas of work. For example, in the scheme run by the 
retail chain store, the trainees spent six weeks in each of these 
four areas: the checkout tills, personal service, shelf-filling, 
and the office or stock room. Amongst smaller employers, such a 
formal system of rotation was rarely practical. However, this did 
not necessarily mean that they could not offer as wide a range of 
experience. In businesses where there was no rigid technical 
division of labour and 'everyone mucked in', it was quite possible 
that a trainee could stay in the same position for the whole six 
months and gain at least as wide a range of experience as they 
would from being rotated between numerous different positions in a 
larger firm. For example, the post of shop assistant in the scheme 
run by the small fishing tackle shop probably covered a wider range 
of work experience than the four different posts rotated between 
in the scheme run by the large retail chain store. It was in the 
smaller firms with a more rigid technical division of labour that 
the range of work experience was likely to be most limited. The 
MSC always tried to maximise the range of activities covered, but 
sometimes both the sponsors and the trainees were reluctant to be 
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as flexible as the MSC would have liked. Some employers, understandably, 
were unwilling to put trainees in positions of responsibility where, 
for example, expensive machinery was involved. Others believed that 
the trainees would gain more if they stayed in one particular area 
of work, rather than being forced to move around. This was particu-
larly the case where the work involved a certain level of technical 
skill. The MSC philosophy of adaptability and skill transfer was 
not always appreciated, especially by those whose own background was 
as skilled craftsmen. This was a view shared by some trainees. They 
tended to identify with the area of work in which they were first 
placed, and were unwilling to be moved on. 
The training content directly associated with the work experience 
varied in a similar way. With the larger employers the training 
content was integrated into the formalised system of rotation, so 
that the trainees could be given some introductory training for the 
work that they would be doing at the beginning of each new section. 
With the smaller employers, the organisation was again less formal, 
and the actual amount of training given varied greatly. Some small 
employers were prepared to give their trainees a lot of individual 
attention and went out of their way to teach them as many aspects 
of the job as they could. Thus, for example, the trainee in the 
490 
small fishing tackle shop learnt not only how to be a sales assistant, 
but also how to make and repair a variety of items of fishing tackle. 
Other small employers merely showed their trainees how to do a 
few simple repetitive tasks and let them get on with it. 
The work experience was supposed to be supervised closely, yet at 
the same time to be realistic. The questions that I asked revealed 
a certain incompatibility between these two objectives. Most sponsors 
claimed to supervise their trainees closely, at least initially. 
As the trainees gained experience, they tended to be given more 
responsibility. Some sponsorq admitted that on certain occasions, 
such as when other staff were away sick, trainees would be left to 
work without supervision. It was argued that trainees wanted to 
be trusted in this way and that they benefitted from being responsible 
for working on their own. One sponsor's idea of supervision was to 
'bug' his trainees through an intercom system while he was away. In 
general, those who supervised their trainees least tended to regard 
the work experience that they provided as being most realistic. Four 
out of the nine sponsors interviewed said that their trainees did 
not work in any way differently from their normal employees. 
5. Off-the-job Training 
In addition to any training that trainees might receive directly 
during their work experience, they had the right to be released by 
their sponsors for one day per week in order to undertake relevant 
training or further education. It was not mandatory for trainees 
to take up this opportunity. Nor was there any obligation upon 
sponsors to make th~ necessary arrangements: their only duty was 
to release the trainees if requested. (57) The local MSC arranged 
the provision. The main providers were local colleges, though 
private training organisations and the sponsors themselves could 
contribute if they had suitable facilities. The content of the 
training and further education generally came under the heading 
of social and life skills, though remedial and vocational education 
was also included. More will be said specifically about the provision 
of off-the-job training in the Portsmouth area in the separate 
section which is devoted to this subject. The analysis below is 
restricted to the view obtained from the angle of the WEEP sponsors 
whom I interviewed. It should, however, be noted at this stage 
that throughout Hampshire there was provision for only about 10-12% 
of the total number of work experience trainees. 
Of the nine sponsors that I interviewed, two had sent all their 
trainees on off-the-job training. These were the two larger 
companies. The nationalised company had made attendance at a BEC 
General Clerical Studies Course a requirement of its training. 
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The retail chain store had sent all its trainees on a Social and Life 
Skills Course at a local college. Four other sponsors had had some 
of their trainees go on Social and Life Skills Courses. None of 
the trainees from the remaining three sponsors had received any form 
of off-the-job training at all. 
The BEC General Course seems to have fitted in well with the work 
experience being offered by the nationalised company. Both the sponsor, 
and one of the trainees that I spoke to, had a good opinion of it. 
In contrast, all of the sponsors who had released trainees to attend 
Social and Life Skills Courses had a low opinion of this form of 
provision. They complained that the courses were badly organised 
and irrelevant to the needs of the trainees. Some thought that the 
staff running the courses ('college trendies') had little understanding 
of the realities of the world of work. Or as one sponsor remarked, 
"What can an unemployed teacher tell an unemployed school leaver about 
holding down a job?" The low opinion of Social and Life Skills pro-
vision at local colleges was shared by most of the trainees that I 
spoke to, some of whom had given up attending after a short while. 
They said that it had been a waste of time, or at best, just a 'skive' 
from work. Teachers had turned up late, and when they arrived, they 
did not know what they were doing. They kept talking about what 
the trainees were going to do, rather than getting on with it. The 
purpose of the activities that did take place, such as role-playing 
games and opinion surveys, were not always understood and were often 
regarded as either ridiculous or irrelevant. When trainees did 
co-operate in these exercises they were not always followed up or 
explained. One trainee told me that his course ended up with the 
teachers just letting the trainees club together to rent videos 
like Mad Max 2. 
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Those sponsors whose trainees had not attended any kind of off-the-job 
training provision claimed that it was because the trainees were 
not interested. The main reason given was that it seemed too much 
like going back to school. Sponsors generally claimed that they 
informed the trainees of the opportunity that existed and left it 
up to them to decide whether they took advantage of it. In one case, 
however, a trainee contradicted what his sponsor had told me. The 
Careers Service informed the trainee of a course which he thought 
sounded interesting and wanted to attend. The sponsor, however, told 
him that the course was rubbish and that he was not to attend. The 
trainee, of course, had the right to ask for day release and could 
have complained to the MSC if he was not granted it. However, he 
was in no position to argue since he was hoping that he might be 
kept on permanently by the sponsor. The sponsor had told me merely 
that the trainee was not interested in the course. 
6. Counselling 
The sponsors were supposed to provide their trainees with support 
and personal advice when it was required. I asked them how they 
went about this. As well as the counselling provided by sponsors, 
it was intended that trainees should have continued access to the 
Careers Service whilst they were on schemes. (58) This aspect of 
counselling, however, is dealt with under the next heading of 
'monitoring' .(59) 
I found it difficult to establish exactly how the sponsors were 
interpreting the requirement to provide counselling. The larger 
schemes, as before, tended to be organised in a more formal manner. 
The retail chain store and the charity both made arrangements for 
the trainees to have regular chats with the personnel officer 
responsible for administering the scheme. In other schemes arrange-
ments appeared to be more vague and informal. Some managers 
merely said that they were available if the trainee wanted to see 
them ("my door is always open"), but there was no definite arrange-
ment and they did not really expect the trainee to come to them with 
any personal problems. In some of the smaller firms, if there was 
any counselling at all, it existed as an indistinguishable element 
of day to day working relationships. Moreover, there was a tendency 
to interpret the principal function of counselling as being that 
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of reinforcing work discipline - "I give him an occasional bollocking 
to keep him on his toes." Yet, the sponsor who made that remark 
also described how he had tried to help a trainee with drink and 
drug problems that were affecting his work. Another sponsor told 
me that she had been instructed by the MSC to treat the trainees 
as she would any other new starters. This seemed to be the general 
rule with regard to counselling, and as such, it sanctioned almost 
anything, and almost nothing. 
7. Monitoring 
WEEP schemes were supposed to be monitored on a regular basis by 
MSC staff. Visits were generally carried out by Area Link Officers 
in the Special Programmes Division (until it was merged into the 
Training Division in December 1982). The main purpose of these 
monitoring visits was to ensure that the sponsors were keeping to 
the terms of their agreement with the MSC, both with regard to 
financial procedures and scheme content. As well as maintaining 
accountability and quality control, visits gave the MSC the opportu-
nity to check the progress being made by individual trainees. 
This was also a responsibility of the Careers Service, whose duty 
it was to keep in contact with the trainees whilst they were on 
schemes and to continue to advise them about job prospects. I asked 
the sponsors that I interviewed how frequently they had been visited 
by the MSC and the Careers Service, and what had happened during 
the visits. 
Many of the sponsors that I spoke to, particularly the smaller 
employers, did not understand the organisational distinction between 
the MSC and the Careers Service, and therefore were unable to 
distinguish between visits made by the two different organisations. 
It seems that on average a scheme would receive a total of two 
visits every six months. Judging from those sponsors who were 
able to make a distinction between the 'Manpower' and the 'Careers', 
in most cases, one ,of these visits would be from each organisation. 
Thus trainees might expect, on average, one visit from an MSC Link 
Officer and one from a Careers Officer during their six month stay 
with a sponsor. However, there were sponsors who seemed to under-
stand that there were two separate organisations and who said that 
there had been no contact between the Careers Service and their 
trainees. 
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The content of the visits from the two different organisations, 
judging once again from those sponsors who were able to make the 
distinction, appears to have been similar. The visitor would speak 
to both the sponsor and the trainee separately. They would ask how 
the trainee was getting on, and whether they were to be kept on 
permanently by the sponsor. The main difference recognised by the 
sponsors was that the MSC were more concerned with the administrative 
and financial details of the scheme. They would check that the 
agreed programme was being followed, and were critical if they 
thought the range of work experience being offered was too narrow. 
The sponsors were not always impressed by those that monitored them. 
The monitors did not always appear to have a clear idea of what they 
were doing. They did not understand how the particular industry 
operated, and sometimes they did not know about the details of their 
own scheme. The impression of confusion was enhanced in the case 
of those sponsors who were unaware of the distinction between the 
MSC and .the Careers Service. They realised that the people visiting 
them had different approaches to the scheme, but they did not under-
stand why. 
As well as gathering the opinions of sponsors, I questioned the local 
MSC about their monitoring practices and I accompanied one of their 
link officers during an afternoon of visits to a Group WEEP scheme. 
First, a more formal impression of the content of monitoring visits 
to WEEP schemes can be gathered from the standard report form that 
was used by the local link officers. The form consisted of a series 
of 29 questions under the headings of Recruitment, The Scheme, 
Management and Supervision, Financial Procedures, Conditions and 
Welfare, and Trainees' Comments. Most of these questions required 
a simple answer of 'yes' or 'no'. However, in the cases where the 
answer was 'no', some explanation or account of action that was to 
be taken was expected. The last question allowed the link officer 
the opportunity to record general observations about the scheme. 
S/he then had to classify the scheme into one of four general 
categories - a) very good; b) good; c) satisfactory; and 
d) unsatisfactory - and recommend any additional action that might 
be necessary. In the case of an unsatisfactory report, a letter 
would be sent to the sponsor,' stating why the scheme was considered 
unsatisfactory and detailing the improvements that were necessary 
for it to be allowed to continue. A copy of the standard report 
form is reproduced in full below.(60) 
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On the question of the frequency of monitoring visits to WEEP schemes, 
it was said that this varied between six months and a year, depending 
upon what other demands were being put on the time of the link 
officers. At times in the past, when the number of places had needed 
to be expanded rapidly, link officers had had to concentrate on 
setting up new schemes. During such periods, regular monitoring 
had not existed. However, during most of 1982 it had been possible 
for link officers to devote two-thirds of their time to monitoring 
and it had been carried out on a regular basis. This experience of 
the immediate past was reflected in what I was told by the sponsors. 
However, at the time that I was actually carrying out my programme 
of visits, almost no monitoring of WEEP schemes was taking place. 
The MSC was concentrating almost exclusively on preparations for 
the new Youth Training Scheme, and the WEEP schemes were being 
allowed to run down. 
The Group WEEP scheme that I observed being monitored was envisaged 
as a possible prototype for the Youth Training Scheme. It consisted 
of a number of small employers, and a large department store which 
took on the official role of sponsor. However, the real organising 
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force was one of the local colleges. It had been responsible for 
putting the group together in the first place, and it, in effect, 
managed the scheme on behalf of the official sponsor. The explana-
tion for this situation lay in the fact that, under the Youth Training 
Scheme, colleges were not to be allowed to take on the role of manag-
ing agencies. In order to bypass this restriction, certain local 
colleges were attempting to set up consortia of employers which could 
act officially as managing agencies, while the colleges would in 
effect be in control. The Group WEEP scheme that I visited was 
intended to be a step in this direction. It catered for 32 trainees, 
and covered a number of different Occupational Training Families. 
The idea was that trainees might be rotated between different place-
ments within the same OTF. The visits on which I accompanied the 
MSC link officer were all to small private rest homes. 
In certain respects these visits were not typical. Because the main 
administrative and financial responsibilities were being undertaken 
by the college and the department store, these were not matters of 
major concern during the visits. The principle objective was to 
check what the placement providers had understood about the scheme 
from the college, and to see how they and the trainees were getting 
on. During the visits, the link officer had informal chats with 
both the sponsors and the trainees, not always separately. Although 
what I observed was perhaps not typical, I do believe that it 
illustrated some of the real problems that were encountered by link 
officers, particularly when attempting to monitor the smaller employers. 
When making my own visits I was struck by the vast gulf that existed 
between the formal administrative regulations of the MSC and the 
personalised, and often idiosyncratic, practices of individual 
sponsors. This impression was reinforced by what I observed when 
accompanying the MSC Link officer on his visits. It was not 
necessarily the case that sponsors fell short of the MSC's formal 
requirements, it was more that these formal requirements were of 
only marginal relevance to the assessment of what was actually going 
on. Those sponsors who were best able to present their scheme in 
the terms formally approved by the MSC, were by no means necessarily 
the best sponsors. On the other hand, there were those whose 
formal understanding of the scheme was poor and whose organisation 
was vague, who, nevertheless, put themselves out to provide the 
trainee with a valuable experience. Thus it was impossible for 
the link officer to go strictly 'by the book'. Room had to be 
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left for compromise, and assessments were necessarily impressionistic. 
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the point is to present a cameo 
picture of one of the visits on which I accompanied the link officer. 
The particular rest home was situated in a substantial Victorian 
house in the Southsea holiday resort area of Portsmouth. The owner 
was a woman who herself was quite elderly. When we first came in 
we were introduced to some of the residents who were dozing in 
armchairs in the lounge. The only place where the link officer 
could talk in private to the owner was in a resident's bedroom. 
The link officer attempted to establish what she had been told 
about the scheme by the college, and to introduce to her the concept 
of the Youth Training Scheme. Although she tried to be helpful, 
the owner obviously knew little about the formal structure of the 
scheme that she was a part of. Furthermore, she was apprehensive 
about any changes that might be involved in a new scheme. In the 
end the link officer merely reassured her that for providers of 
work experience like herself the requirements of the Youth Training 
Scheme would be much the same as those of YOP. Throughout, the 
owner was anxious to make it clear that she was very satisfied with 
the trainee and kept repeating that she was "a good girly". Also, 
in the course of the conversation, it became clear that there was 
another YOP trainee undertaking some form of part-time work experience 
at the h0me. This the link officer knew nothing about. The trainee 
was not present at the time, and the owner was again confused, but 
it seemed probable that the girl concerned was on a Work Skills 
Course at another local college. The link officer did not attempt 
to talk in private to the trainee that he had come to see. Such 
conversation as he had with her took place round a kitchen table 
with the owner and other members of staff present. The link officer 
was sat down on a low sofa, with a cup of tea. The questions he 
asked the girl were mainly about the arrangements that had been made 
for her to collect her allowance from the department store that was 
acting as the official sponsor. Trainees elsewhere had complained 
about the inconvenience of this arrangement. This girl, however, did 
not appear to be worried. For the most part she sat and smiled 
shyly. Meanwhile, the link officer was harassed by a licking dog. 
8. End of Scheme 
Under this heading I was concerned to find out how long trainees had 
stayed on the schemes, and what had happened to them when they left. 
Approximately 70% of the trainees taken on by the sponsors that 
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I interviewed had stayed for the normal maximum period of six months. 
The most common reasons for tr.ainees leaving early were as follows: 
(1) the sponsor was not satisfied with the trainee; (2) the trainee 
was not interested in the work experience being offered; (3) the 
trainee thought that the allowance was too low; (4) the trainee found 
a permanent job elsewhere. 
Sponsors gave many reasons for having to dismiss trainees as unsatis-
factory: laziness, illness, stupidity, lateness, drug taking, 
stealing, etc. Some complained that the Careers Service had misled 
them by not telling them what the trainees were really like. It was 
those who had been least selective that had the most problems. The 
two sponsors, who had been prepared to accept any trainee sent to 
them by the Careers Service, had dismissed as unsatisfactory more 
than two-thirds of the trainees they had taken on. 
Every sponsor except one had taken on at least one of their trainees 
as an employee at the end of the scheme. In the case of the single 
exception, the sponsor had offered jobs to three of his trainees, 
but they had all found employment elsewhere. Overall, the sponsors 
had taken on almost a third of the trainees they had originally offered 
work experience places to. However, not all of these were taken on 
as full-time permanent staff. Some were part-time, some were temporary, 
and some were taken on under the Young Workers Scheme. The new wage, 
after deductions, often amounted to little more than the old training 
allowance. Thus YOP was, in many cases, only the first rung on a 
ladder of low paid probationary status work. 
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Most of the sponsors knew what had happened to some of the trainees who 
they had not taken on. It seems that those that found jobs were more 
likely to do so in a field of employment other than the one in which they 
had gained experience. Some sponsors said that, if they did not offer a 
trainee a permanent job, it was unlikely that any other employer in the 
same field would. For those trainees who did not find employment elsewhere, 
it was either unemployment, more work experience, or emigration. 
When asked what benefits trainees had received from their work experience, 
other than the chance of it leading directly to employment, sponsors 
emphasised the following qualities: confidence, responsibility, maturity, 
worldly wisdom, the ability to mix with a variety of people of different 
ages, work discipline, and the discipline to get up in the morning. They 
also mentioned the certificate that trainees received at the end of their 
scheme, though some were sceptical of its value. Some said that, at 
the very least, the trainees might have found out what they were not 
suited to do. One sponsor, however, thought that if the trainee did not 
get a job at the end of the scheme, then its effect was worse than doing 
nothing. It was cruel, he said, to give a young person a taste of work 
and then to snatch it away - "like offerirgsomeone a cream cake, and then 
slapping their hand when they reach out to take it." 
9. Costs and Benefits for the Sponsor 
Finally, I asked the sponsors to assess the costs and the benefits of 
their involvement in the scheme. Participation in the scheme was 
not supposed to affect a sponsor's normal pattern of recruitment. 
I included a direct question on this subject. I also asked the 
sponsors whether they were intending to contribute to YTS. 
Most of the sponsors said that their original recruitment of trainees 
had been in addition to their normal recruitment of employees. How-
ever, when they took trainees on as employees at the end of their 
schemes, this was instead of their normal recruitment. Thus, the 
scheme gave them a free six months 'trying out' period, at the end 
of which, if the trainee was satisfactory and there was a vacancy 
coming up, they had someone tried and tested who was ready to fill 
the gap. One sponsor admitted that, from the outset, if he had not 
taken on a WEEP trainee he would have had to employ another permanent 
member of staff. However, this was not as part of a normal pattern 
of recruitment, but as an expansion plan. Another sponsor said that, 
jn order to keep on certain trainees at the end of their schemes, 
jobs had been created which would not have otherwise existed. This 
was the charity, and it was exceptional in its ability to create new 
jobs in this way. 
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When asked what it had cost them in terms of time and money to run 
the scheme, most sponsors found it difficult to quantify, but said 
that it did not amount to very much. The main factors mentioned were 
supervision and paper work, but neither of these were considered to 
be particularly burdensome. Some sponsors also mentioned the cost 
of breakages and mistakes for which trainees were responsible. 
Sponsors' opinions on the productive contribution of the trainees 
varied greatly. The majority acknowledged that the trainees had 
worked hard and made a large contribution. In some cases it was said 
that this contribution had been comparable with that of permanent 
employees. In contrast, about a third of the sponsors said that the 
trainees had contributed very little. The main differenee seems 
to have been in the kind of work that was being carried out. Where 
higher levels of technical skill were involved, trainees could not 
work productively on their own. The supervision that they needed 
tended to cancel the help that they could give. 
Finally, with regard to the Youth Training Scheme, the sponsors split 
roughly evenly between those that expected to contribute and those 
that did not. Some, however, knew very little about the scheme. 
Amongst those that were negative towards it, the concern was expressed 
that if work experience placements were reduced to less than six 
months they would not be worthwhile, either for the trainee, or for 
the employer. 
General Impressions 
As well as recording specific answers to specific questions, after 
each visit I wrote some notes on the general impression that the 
scheme had left with me. I tried to sum up the character of each 
scheme, what it had been doing, and why. I have now attempted to 
draw these notes together into a collective impression of the WEEP 
schemes that I visited. 
Before making generalisations, the first impression that must be 
conveyed is that of variety. The sample of schemes that I visited 
was intended to cover a wide range of different types of sponsors. 
What my visits emphasised was that different types of sponsors 
produced very different types of schemes. It was not simply that 
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the content of work experience differed according to the area of 
industry in which the sponsor was located. Different work experience 
content gave rise to different organisational and supervisory needs. 
How these needs were met often depended upon the size of the sponsor's 
organisation. Larger organisations were generally able to provide 
more formally structured programmes. With smaller employers, the 
organisation tended to be more vague and personalised, and the 
character of the scheme depended largely upon the character of the 
individual employer. Two of the schemes that I visited were in 
certain respects more like other types of YOP scheme than they were 
like the rest of the WEEP schemes. Thus, the scheme sponsored by 
the charitable organisation resembled in character a community project, 
and that sponsored by the national industry was like a high quality 
training course. 
The great variety which existed amongst WEEP schemes was indicative 
of the emptiness and formality of the MSC's administrative definition 
of this type of scheme. As we have seen, most of the sponsors selected 
their trainees in the same way that they would have selected normal 
employees, and then treated them as they would have any other new 
recruits. The four required elements of content were in practice 
of the most minimal nature, amounting to what any good employer might 
be expected to provide for a young and inexperienced recruit. 
Induction and counselling, it seems could be interpreted by the 
sponsors very much as they liked. With regard to off-the-job 
training and further education, the sponsors' only obligation was 
to release their trainees for one day a week. Most trainees did 
not make use of this opportunity (some having been discouraged by 
their sponsors); of those that did, most thought that the courses 
were a waste of time. Finally, 'planned work experience' was often 
little different from the work carried out by ordinary employees. 
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The MSC tried to ensure that the trainees experienced a range of 
different tasks, but this was not always appreciated by either the 
sponsors or the trainees. Moreover, trainees were not always closely 
supervised and sometimes received no more than the absolute minimum 
of training required for them to be able to carry out the simple tasks 
that constituted their work experience. In effect, sponsors were 
being provided with free labour paid for by the MSC, and so long as 
they were prepared to make certain gestures in the direction of the 
required elements of content, they could use these extra employees 
much as they liked. MSC monitoring, even when it was carried out 
regularly, could only amount to a superficial inspection of what was 
happening. 
Of course, some sponsors were prepared to put themselves out and to 
do considerably more than the minimum that they could get away with. 
But these were generally the employers who in the past would have 
acted in this way on their own initiative. For example, the scheme 
at the nationalised industry stood out from the rest that I visited 
as a well organised programme which systematically integrated work 
experience and training. However, it must be pointed out that two 
years before the company had been running its own year long programme 
for clerical trainees. The new WEEP scheme was merely a simplified 
version, using the same facilities, but with the MSC now paying the 
trainees. Similarly, those small employers who gave a lot of indivi-
dual attention to their YOP trainees, probably would have done the 
same for young recruits in the past. 
If there were some sponsors who were prepared to go beyond the minimum 
formal requirements, there were also those who were prepared to break 
the basic rules of the scheme. Substitution was of course the most 
controversial area of abuse. According to the regulations, the 
recruitment of YOP trainees was not to replace a sponsor's normal 
training and recruitment patterns, and was not to displace people 
who might otherwise have filled permanent jobs. At none of the schemes 
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that I visited was it admitted, or was I able to detect, that 
trainees were regularly being taken on instead of ordinary employees. 
However, at one of them it was admitted that, during a phase of 
expansion, a trainee had been recruited when otherwise a permanent 
employee would have been hired. This illustrates an important point: 
at many of the small employers who were the typical WEEP sponsors, 
there was no such thing as a normal pattern of recruitment and 
training. Thus, it was virtually impossible to establish conclusively 
whether or not they were using YOP trainees as a substitute for 
permanent employees. Yet, nor was the matter necessarily straight-
forward at a larger firm that did have a regular pattern of recruitment 
and training. At such firms, trainees were normally rotated between 
a number of different departments or areas of work. As a result, it 
could never be proved with absolute clarity that they were being used 
as substitutes for permanent employees in any particular department 
or area of work. Even if such a firm was simultaneously taking on YOP 
trainees and making permanent employees redundant, it could always 
be argued that the trainees were being taken on in a different area 
of work from where the redundancies were being made. Furthermore, 
as has already been seen in the case of the large nationalised industry 
sponsor that I visited, it was possible to replace an existing training 
scheme with an MSC funded WEEP scheme, so long as a certain period 
of time was allowed to elapse between the abolition of the one and 
the introduction of the other. 
Although only one of the sponsors that I interviewed actually admitted 
that they themselves had taken on a YOP trainee instead of a permanent 
employee, a number of them stated that they knew of particular examples 
of such abuse and that they were sure that it was widespread within 
the area of business with which they were familiar. One estimated 
that the substitution rate was as high as 80%. While this may have 
been an exaggeration, a number of people that I spoke to locally, 
including a representative of the Careers Service, believed that the 
figure was around 50%. Generally, amongst employers and those in 
close contact with them, I was given the impression that, although it 
might be difficult to put your finger on it, there was a lot of abuse 
taking place. Moreover, this was accepted in a matter of fact way. 
Given the format of the scheme, it was thought naive to expect anything 
otherwise. 
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Obviously, the local MSC were aware that some substitution was taking 
place. Their own research at a national level had revealed a 30% 
rate of abuse. However, the official attitude that was usually 
adopted was one which attempted to minimise the scale of the problem. (61) 
It was acknowledged that there were abuses, but it was implied that 
they were not on a significant scale. At the same time, it was 
emphasised that, if any allegation was made about a particular scheme, 
it would be followed up immediately. Furthermore, the regular process 
of monitoring was supposed to act as a check upon such abuses. 
However, as we have seen, this was sometimes irregular and generally 
superficial. Whilst the fact that a link officer was liable to 
come round periodically might have had a certain generalised deter-
rent effect, there was no specific procedure involved that could be 
expected to reveal substitution taking place. If the standard 
monitoring form reproduced below is referred to again, it will be 
seen that Question 7 asks, "Are sponsor's normal recruitment and 
training arrangements continuing?" So long as the sponsor affirmed 
that they were, there was little that the link officer could do to 
prove otherwise. Furthermore, given that the majority of a link 
officer's time was spent in trying to generate new places, often under 
considerable pressure, there was little motivation for them to probe 
too deeply into the operations of an existing sponsor. Thus, as a 
general rule, it appeared to be assumed that schemes were not involved 
in abuses, unless someone specifically alleged that they were. Such 
allegations were sometimes made, either by the Careers Service, or 
a trade union, or the media, or a particular individual such as the 
parent of a trainee. But even then, given the complications of 
irregular recruiting and trainee rotation that have been described 
above, it was almost impossible for the MSC to prove that the abuse 
had taken place. Generally, they had to be satisfied with a statement 
from the company saying that no substitution was involved. If this 
was not regarded as satisfactory, the scheme could be closed down, 
or put on 'hold', or the numbers of trainees reduced. 
On the basis of the research that I carried out, it is impossible to 
conclude with any certainty on the proportion of WEEP trainees in the 
Portsmouth TWA that were being used as direct substitutes for perma-
nent employees. However, what can be said, and is of some importance, 
is that the local MSC had no way of knowing either. All they could 
do was ask the sponsors to abide by the rules, follow up any 
allegations, and assume, if they did not hear otherwise, that every-
thing was in order. This did not amount to being in control of 
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the situation. Moreover, while nobody could say for certain how much 
substitution was taking place, it should be recorded that there was 
a widespread feeling amongst those who were close to the situation 
that the schemes investigated and closed down by the MSC represented 
only the tip of the iceberg. 
Although during my visits to WEEP schemes I saw little evidence of 
the direct substitution of YOP trainees for permanent employees, 
I was continually aware of a more indirect form of substitution 
taking place. All but one of the sponsors had recruited at least 
one of their YOP trainees as a permanent employee, and overall 
approximately a third of the trainees had been given employment by 
their sponsors at the end of their schemes. This of course was 
perfectly legitimate and was generally regarded as an important 
measure of the success of this kind of provision. However, if 
what was actually happening was examined more closely, it became 
more questionable. Let it be assumed that in the first place 
sponsors were, as they were supposed to, taking on trainees in 
addition to their normal permanent staff. Then, when it came to 
the end of the scheme, a proportion of these trainees were being 
kept on permanently by their sponsors. In theory these two phases 
could be regarded statically as discrete events. First the sponsor 
offered the trainee work experience, then at the end of the scheme, 
in the same way as any other employer might have done, they offered 
the trainee a permanent job. In practice this was very rarely what 
took place. At most of the schemes that I visited, from the outset, 
the offering of work experience was explicitly regarded as an alter-
native strategy for the recruitment of permanent employees. As one 
sponsor put it to me, he had the trainees on "sale or return". He 
could try them out for six months without any obligation and at 
governement expense. Then, if they had come up to scratch, he could 
use them to fill his permanent vacancies. Given such an opportunity, 
there could be little incentive for any employer to offer a permanent 
job to an untried school leaver. 
Thus, although WEEP may not have been replacing permanent employees 
directly, it was at least partially replacing the normal system of 
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recruitment for school leavers into permanent employment. Further-
more, when viewed dynamically, the principal effect of such a system 
was not to enhance the job opportunities of school leavers, but to 
delay their entry into permanent employment by adding the requirement 
of six months work experience as a pre-condition for being considered. 
Of course, there were certain individual trainees, particularly 
perhaps those with poor school records, who through work experience 
were able to prove themselves capable of doing a certain job, when 
otherwise they might not have been given the opportunity. But then 
this was likely to be at the expense of some other school leaver, who 
might otherwise have been offered the job merely on the strength of 
their school record. Or else it might be at the expense of an 
unemployed adult who could not be tried out on such advantageous 
terms before being recruited permanently. Rarely could the jobs 
being offered to YOP trainees at the end of their work experience be 
described as additional jobs that would not have otherwise existed. 
Of the sponsors that I interviewed, it was only the charitable orga-
nisation, which was in a slightly different situation from an ordinary 
business, that was able to create a new job specifically for a 
trainee whom they wanted to keep on. Elsewhere, with the strict criteria 
of profit and loss applying, it was highly unlikely that the fact that 
a good trainee was available would prove to be the decisive factor in 
a decision to create a new job. Thus, generally, what was happening 
was that the six months of work experience was merely being integrated 
as a pre-condition into the normal pattern of recruitment. 
The MSC were of course well aware that this was how the scheme was 
being used by many sponsors. So long as in theory it could be argued 
that the permanent jobs were not being filled by the trainees until 
they were actually employed at the end of their work experience, the 
situation had to be accepted as legitimate. Indeed, insofar as it 
helped to raise the placement rate of the Programme and to enhance its 
image as a job-getter, it was regarded as positively beneficial. 
Moreover, a sponsor was more likely to be considered with suspicion 
if they never recruited a trainee onto their permanent staff than 
if they regularly recruited a certain proportion of their intake. 
Thus, for most practical purposes, it was accepted and encouraged 
that WEEP schemes should be operated by their sponsors as adjuncts 
to their normal means of recruitment. The implications of such a 
situation for the wider aims of the Programme did not appear to 
be seriously considered. 
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Drawing together the points that have been made above, the general 
impression that emerges is that of the strength of the WEEP sponsors' 
position and the benefits that accrued to them from their involvement 
in the Programme. The MSC was heavily dependent upon their good will, 
and to a large extent had to trust them to fulfil their obligations 
to the trainees and to abide by the ground rules of the scheme. 
Meanwhile, the sponsors enjoyed six months of free labour from the 
trainees and the opportunity to try them out as potential future 
employees. Yet it was the trainees, not the sponsors, who were 
supposed to be the princlpal beneficiaries of the schemes. 
It has already been seen that as far as opportunities for recruitment 
into permanent jobs with their sponsors were concerned, the benefits 
that trainees derived from WEEP were marginal. The principal effect 
was to add six months of work experience as a pre-condition for being 
recruited into jobs which otherwise they might have got straight from 
school. Much the same analysis can be applied to the situation of 
trainees who were recruited by employers other than their sponsors. 
Such employers were not directly using WEEP as their own recruitment 
mechanism, but still it was unlikely that they were creating additional 
jo~specifically to be able to take on the trainees. Thus, whether 
recruitment was by sponsors, or by other employers, the situation was 
much the same from the point of view of the trainees - the six months 
work experience was an additional test that they had to go through 
before being considered for a job. Moreover, for those trainees who 
were not recruited by their sponsors, their work experience was not 
necessarily an asset in the search for jobs elsewhere. Because many 
sponsors were using WEEP as a recruitment mechanism, the fact that a 
trainee had not been kept on at the end of their scheme could in some 
circumstances be taken as an indication that they were not capable of 
doing that form of work. It will be remembered that some sponsors 
indicated that if they did not offer a trainee a job, it was unlikely 
that the trainee would be able to find one elsewhere in the same line 
of work. Thus for the trainee who had not been recruited by their sponsor, 
the fact that they had undertaken work experience without being taken on, 
might have a negative effect on their prospects of finding similar 
employment elsewhere. 
Of course, the benefits that trainees derived from WEEP schemes 
cannot be judged purely in terms of the effects on their prospects 
of being recruited for permanent employment. Sponsors mentioned 
qualities of character, such as confidence and maturity, which they 
felt that the work experience had helped to develop in their 
trainees. On the other hand, the view was also expressed that for 
trainees who were not subsequently offered permanent employment, 
work experience did more harm than good, by raising hopes that 
were then dashed. One impression that particularly struck me during 
my case study visits was that of the vulnerability of the position 
of the trainees. Most were fresh out of school and by definition 
had little experience of the world of work. They were likely to be 
the only such trainee at their work place. They had no organisation 
of their own. Trade unions were often not present, and where they 
were, rarely had any contact with the trainees. One visit each from 
the MSC and the Careers Service could be expected over the six month 
duration of a scheme. Of course, in theory, the trainees had the 
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right to complain if they thought that their sponsors were not treating 
them correctly. However, under such circumstances, few would have 
the confidence to do so. For most trainees, any work was better than 
the boredom of being on the dole, even if they only received a training 
allowance. Many regarded the schemes as real jobs and felt obliged 
to their sponsors. Such feelings of obligation were often reinforced 
by the hope that they might be kept on permanently at the end of the 
scheme. Thus, the inevitable corollary of the strength of the 
position enjoyed by the sponsors, was the weakness of that of the 
trainees who found themselves in the position of being on 'sale or 
return' . 
In conclusion, it should be noted that, apart from cheapness, the 
most widely acknowledged advantage of WEEP schemes over the other 
forms of YOP provision was their 'reality'. It was this that was 
seen as giving the experience its inherent value and its effective-
ness as a route to permanent employment. Yet, at the same time, it 
was the reality of the experience that led to the problems that have 
been identified above. Because the trainees undertook work that 
was often indistinguishable from that carried out by permanent 
employees, there was always an inherent danger of substitution. 
Yet, if they had always been carefully supervised and monitored, 
and everything had been done 'by the book', could the experience 
still have been described as 'real'? Arguably, the most important 
thing that a school leaver has to learn about the reality of the 
world of work is precisely that things are not like that. Thus 
there was a 'Catch 22' situation about such work experience. The 
more real the work, the more valuable it was as an experience for 
the trainees, yet the more likely it was that they were doing what 
could have been a real job, either for them or for someone else. 
And even when a scheme was not being used directly to substitute for 
permanent jobs, it was likely that it was merely providing the 
sponsor, or employers in general, with a substitute mechanism for 
selection and recruitment. Thus, while the strength of WEEP was 
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that it was 'part of the real world', its weakness was, that as such, 
it often replaced existing opportunities rather than making a positive 
addition. Through paying the trainees' allowances, the MSC was to 
a large extent subsidising employers to do what they would have done 
anyway, while bringing only marginal benefits to the trainees. 
B Other Work Experience Schemes and Projects 
By September 1982, this sector of YOP was providing approximately 520 
places in South East Hampshire. The places were distributed as 
follows: there were 10 Community Projects providing over 270 places; 
one Training Workshop (divided between two locations) providing 150 
places; one unit of Community Industry providing approximately 70 
places; and an Information Technology Centre providing 30 places. 
The occupancy rate throughout the sector was approximately 90 per 
cent, and the sector accounted for just under a quarter of the total 
number of occupied places in South East Hampshire. The Training 
Workshop, the ITEC, and the larger Community Projects had, by this 
time, been upgraded to provide New Training Places. 
The upgrading process had been carried out by a Regional Quality 
Improvement team acting in liaison with the Local Area Office staff. 
In the case of a large project, such as the Training Workshop, the 
process had consisted of an eight day programme spread over a three 
month period. The content of this programme was mainly concerned with 
the introduction of the Basic Skills Profile and Trainee Centred 
Reviewing. A summary timetable is reproduced in the appendix 
below. (62) 
My local case study included six visits to non-WEEP schemes and 
projects. Three were to Community Projects and one each to the 
Training Workshop, Community Industry and the ITEC. Between them, 
these six schemes accounted for more than two-thirds of the total 
number of places available within this sector. Thus it was possible 
to observe a much larger proportion of the total provision within 
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this sector than it was within the WEEP sector. The questionnaire 
that I used varied slightly from scheme to scheme. It had the same 
common core as the WEEP questionnaire, but it also had additional 
elements which were adapted to the requirements of individual schemes. 
The results that were obtained are set out below in a manner similar 
to the presentation of the WEEP sector material. 
In addition to the programme of visits, I attended a meeting of local 
scheme managers with representatives of the MSC and the Careers 
Service. The main concern of this meeting was with the transition 
to YTS. Nevertheless, it provided some further useful information 
about the experience of YOP in this particular sector of provision. 
1. Background 
I collected certain background information about the history and 
development of each of the schemes that I visited. This I have 
summarised in the form of a brief character sketch for each of 
the six schemes. 
a) Community Project 1 
This was a large and varied Community Project sponsored by the 
Portsmouth Council of Community Service. It had been set up in 
July 1981, and originally it catered for 30 trainees divided between 
five groups carrying out different kinds of work. Since then it had 
expanded rapidly. When I visited in March 1983, 23 staff were 
employed providing places for over 100 trainees divided between 13 
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groups, with a 14th group in the process of being established. 
The groups, which were spread throughout locations in the city, 
were as follows: three painting and decorating - working on 
churches, community centres and the homes of elderly people; two 
catering - providing luncheon clubs for the elderly and the disabled; 
two environmental - carrying out a variety of outdoor work such as 
ground clearance, landscaping, pathing, fencing and general renovation; 
one communications - offering art, design and photographic services; 
one materials bank and craft unit - collecting and distributing 
industrial scrap materials to playgroups, and making large toy units 
such as Wendy Houses; one clerical - providing a community clerical 
and typing service; and one electrical workshop - designing, fitting 
and servicing battery powered. units for the disabled. The 14th 
group which was in the process of being set up was to be a sewing 
workshop. Since September 1982, the project had been upgraded to 
the status of providing New Training Places. 
b) Community Project 2 
This was one of a number of small drama projects sponsored by the 
Hampshire Education Department. It had been set up in September 1981, 
and was attached to a community drama centre located in an old school 
building. It employed one supervisor and offered places for eight 
trainees. the main work of the project was the staging of educational 
plays for local schools. It had also performed a street theatre on 
behalf of charity. At the time of my visit, it had not yet been up-
graded to provide New Training Places and its future under YTS was 
still uncertain. 
c) Community Project 3 
This was a small renovation project sponsored by the Portsmouth Youth 
Activities Committee. It had been started in January 1981 with 
one supervisor and six trainees. It had since expanded to three 
supervisors and 14 trainees. It was located in a 19th century fort 
which had been allowed to fall into a state of partial dereliction. 
The work of the project was to renovate and maintain the fort so that 
it could be used as a youth activities centre. At the time of my 
visit the project was in the process of being upgraded to provide 
New Training Places. 
d) The Training Workshop 
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This was a large scheme sponsored by the Portsmouth City Council and 
supervised by a committee with charitable status called the Beneficial 
Foundation. This committee took its name from the Old Beneficial 
School, a listed building located in a rundown area of high unemploy-
ment known as Portsea. In October 1978 the City Council agreed to 
acquire and refurbish the old school so that eventually it could be 
used as a Training Workshop. Meanwhile, in the spring of 1979, a 
pilot scheme was started for 20 trainees located in temporary premises. 
In September 1980 the Training Workshop was officially established 
in the refurbished Old Beneficial School. It originally offered 40 
places divided between five areas of work. Subsequently it expanded, 
and in April 1982 an extension was opened in an old factory at Pauls-
grove which was another local unemployment blackspot. This brought 
the potential capacity of the scheme up to 150 places. I only visited 
the Portsea site. At the time of my visit it offered places for 
approximately 70 trainees divided into six sections: Upholstery, 
Joinery, Brickwork, Outwork, Catering and Administration. A seventh 
section, working with Glass Reinforced Plastic; was planned. The 
scheme as a whole had been officially upgraded to provide New Training 
Places in October 1982. 
e) Community Industry 
The first point that must be made about Community Industry is that 
it was never a part of the official structure of YOP. Thus it is 
necessary to make certain preliminary remarks about Community Industry 
in general, before detailing the particulars of the South Hampshire 
unit. Community Industry was created more than 10 years ago in response 
to the historically high levels of unemployment experienced in the 
winter of 1971-72. The idea came from the National Association of 
Youth Clubs, and the Department of Employment provided a grant to 
finance the scheme. The object was to provide disadvantaged young 
people, who were experiencing difficulty finding or keeping regular 
employment, with up to a year of realistic work experience on 
community projects which would not have otherwise been carried out. 
The scheme was originally implemented on a small scale in eight 
selected areas, but it gradually grew, so that by 1979 7,000 places 
were being offered nationally. Although in that same year the MSC 
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took over the administration of its grant, Community Industry continued 
to maintain a separate identity from YOP. It was run by its own 
National Management Committee, with its own national and area level 
administrative organisation. It aimed at a particular client group, 
and it maintained a distinct philosophy of the purpose of the work 
experience that it provided. Unlike YOP, it took young people on as 
employees and paid them wages. Admittedly, after deductions, there 
was little difference between a 16 year old's wage on Community 
Industry and the YOP allowance (£29.70 compared to £25), but there 
was a larger differential for 17 and 18 year olds. 
My reasons for including the South Hampshire unit in the local case 
study were twofold. First, because it was an important and integral 
element of local provision for the young unemployed, and therefore, 
for practical purposes, was often regarded as a part of YOP. Secondly, 
because it was in fact part of a distinct and different organisation, 
and therefore could be used to contrast and throw into relief certain 
features of local YOP schemes. The South Hampshire unit was set up 
in 1976 under the sponsorship of Hampshire County Council. Based at 
Paulsgrove on the outskirts of Portsmouth, it covered an area extending 
as far west as Southampton. Originally the unit had vacancies for 
50 young people; subsequently it expanded to offer approximately 70 
places. Small teams carried out projects in the following areas of 
work: painting and decorating - redecorating churches and community 
centres; building - work for churches and local voluntary societies; 
landscaping - reclamation and maintenance of an overgrown estate ,on 
behalf of a local borough council; a sewing and upholstery workshop 
producing curtains for schools and community centres, and soft toys 
to be sold to charities at cost price; a joinery workshop - servicing 
site projects and providing play group equipment; and various 
placements, mainly at day nurseries. Because Community Industry was 
outside YOP, the unit was not subject to the upgrading process in 
preparation for YTS. 
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f) The Information Technology Centre 
Although a part of YOP, the Information Technology Centre (ITEC), 
like Community Industry, must be regarded in some respects as an 
exceptional scheme. ITECs were not one of the original elements of 
YOP, but were introduced during the fourth year of the Programme as 
part of the quality improvement plan leading towards the introduction 
of YTS. They were first announced by the Prime Minister in July 1981, 
in a package of special measures which can be seen as a response to 
the riots of that summer. Initially, 20 ITECs were to be established 
in inner city areas with high youth unemployment. They were to be 
modelled on the well-publicised success of the Notting Dale Technology 
Centre, a YOP funded training workshop in West London sponsored by 
the Notting Dale Urban Studies Centre. Their objective was to provide 
unemployed young people with training and work experience in electronics, 
computing and basic information technology skills. They were except-
ional in respect of the fact that they were a joint venture, funded 
both by the MSC and by the Department of Industry. MSC funding was 
to be on the same basis as for training workshops. The Department of 
Industry was to provide each scheme with an extra £35,000 in its first 
year for additional capital equipment and the topping-up of staff 
salaries, and a lesser amount in subsequent years, principally to 
maintain the continuity of the salary top-up. 
Portsmouth was not one of the locations originally suggested for an 
ITEC. However, the Conservative-led City Council responded rapidly 
to the announcement of the scheme, offering to act as a sponsor and 
to provide accommodation for the centre within the Civic Offices. 
Although in national terms Portsmouth could not be considered an 
unemployment blackspot, the rundown of the Dockyard which had been 
announced only a month previously made the city a strong candidate 
for some gesture of Government concern. Portsmouth duly emerged as 
one of the 20 proposed sites, and once the scheme had been approved 
in principle, a consultant on loan from the locally based computer 
multi-national IBM was commissioned to make a more detailed 
feasibility study. His report argued that Portsmouth was 'ideally 
suited' for the scheme. (63) The rundown of the Dockyard was bound 
to lead to a further decline in the tradional skill based jobs in 
heavy engineering; whereas, given some improvement in the economy, 
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the existing nucleus of high technology industries around Portsmouth 
could be expected to expand. The role of the ITEC in this context 
would betQencourage some of the less academically qualified young 
people in the area to look for job opportunities in these new and 
growing industries, and to give them a better chance of being success-
ful. Discussions with selected local employers established that the 
training to be given in the proposed centre could help the trainees 
to find work, "particularly with those firms trying to identify young 
people looking for sub technician level training and those looking 
for clerical staff to use computer terminals."(64) It was also 
established that the training would complement, rather than duplicate, 
courses requiring academic qualifications being run by local colleges. 
The report concluded that the scheme should go ahead without delay. 
The Portsmouth ITEC started up in May 1982, located in the Civic 
Offices and sponsored by the City Council. IBM provided a manager 
on secondment. The scheme offered 30 New Training Places of 12 months 
duration. 
2. Recruitment and Selection 
The formal requirements laid down by the MSC for recruitment and 
selection were the same for these other work experience schemes as 
for WEEP schemes. Recruitment had to take place through the Careers 
Service or the Employment Service, but the sponsors were allowed to 
have the final say on selection. Once again they were asked to take 
account of the fact that YOP was aimed particularly to meet the needs 
of less able and less qualified young people. (65) 
All the schemes that I visited recruited exclusively through the 
Careers Service and the local Job Centres, apart from one, which had 
placed its own advertisement in the local paper. 
Selection policies varied. The Training Workshop and Community 
Projects 1 and 3 were prepared to accept virtually any young person 
sent to them by the Careers Service. Because WEEP sponsors and 
certain other schemes tended to 'cream off' the most able and best 
qualified young people, these more open schemes were usually left 
with the lower ability trainees and those with particular problems. 
Thus, for example, at the Training Workshop 30% of the trainees had 
literacy and numeracy levels below the age of eight, and almost as 
many had criminal records. These figures would have been higher if 
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a certain degree of selection had not been introduced in order to 
maintain what was considered to be a manageable balance. The problem 
for these schemes was how to remain open to the lower ability trainees 
that needed them, without being regarded as the last resort ('a dust-
bin') for the rejects from the more selective schemes. It was a 
problem that was impossible to solve while WEEP schemes and other 
elements of YOP were allowed to select with no real obligation to 
meet the needs of the less able. 
The other two YOP schemes that I visited were both more selective. 
The ITEC did not require any minimum academic qualifications, but 
it did not accept those at a remedial level of ability. Candidates 
sent by the Careers Service were interviewed and tested. It was not 
necessarily the most able who were selected. Youngsters who had the 
ability and the qualification to get onto a conventional computer 
course at a further education college, were recommended to do. Those 
selected were those whom it was thought would gain the most from what 
the ITEC had to offer, and who displayed the most interest and enthu-
siasm. The result was a group of trainees without any special 
academic qualifications, but for the most part well-motivated and 
without the kind of problems having to be dealt with at the Training 
Workshop and other less selective schemes. The other selective scheme 
was the drama project. Selection was carried out by means of auditions. 
The ability to fit in with the rest of the group was said to be the 
most important quality required. No formal qualifications were asked 
for. However, this scheme had the highest average level of academic 
qualifications of any that I visited - six '0' levels, the range being 
between none and fo~r 'A' levels. It was this scheme that had used 
the local press to advertise, and it seemed to have attracted and 
selected young people who were already highly motivated towards a 
career in acting - indeed, one of the trainees had been to drama 
school. 
Finally, Community Industry's recruitment and selection was different 
insofar as its policy was de1iberte1y to pick out the young people 
with particular problems and difficulties. The Careers Service 
referred youngsters whom they thought might benefit. Community 
Industry accepted anyone prepared and able to work. 
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Five out of the six schemes that I visited recruited a disproportion-
ate number of male trainees. At the Training Workshop and Community 
Industry the ratio was 2:1, at the ITEC it was 4:1. The exception 
was the drama project. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The same four main components that were specified for WEEP schemes 
induction, planned work experience, training or further education, 
and counselling - were specified for all other work experience schemes. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
3. Induction 
With regard to induction, the most noticeable difference amongst the 
schemes that I visited was between those that had been upgraded to 
provide New Training Places, and those that had not. The New Training 
Place schemes (the Training Workshop, Community Project 1, and the 
ITEC), had much more formalised induction procedures than the other 
schemes. In the case of the Training Workshop, the induction stage 
lasted two weeks. As well as including information on domestic 
arrangements, health and safety, and rules, there were assessments 
made of the trainees by a personnel officer and individual profiles 
were compiled. At the end of the process, a training programme was 
negotiated and agreed with the trainee. In the case of the large 
Community Project, the procedure was similar, but lasted for only one 
week. As well as being assessed on the basis of a 'Can-Do' profile, 
trainees were given the opportunity for systematic job sampling before 
they were matched up with a particular scheme. At the ITEC induction 
lasted for only two days, but was followed by a month of basic intro-
ductory training before trainees decided in which area they would 
like to specialise. 
In the case of the schemes that had not been upgraded, induction 
consisted of little more than a brief chat about rules and domestic 
arrangements. ~omminity Industry put less emphasis on induction 
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than any of the YOP schemes. New employees would be given only the 
minimum information necessary before getting started at the worksite. 
4. Planned Work Experience 
Some indication has already been given of the range of work experience 
offered by each of the schemes and projects. During my visits I was 
concerned to find out how this range of work experience had been 
decided upon, and what relation it bore to the demands of the local 
labour market. I was also interested to find out how individual 
trainees' programmes were organised within the total range of work 
experience on offer at each scheme. Finally, I tried to establish 
what training content was included directly with the work experience. 
The three largest schemes (the Training Workshop, Community Project 1, 
and Community Industry) covered an overlapping range of work experience. 
Thus, all three had groups (or were planning to have gro~ps) working 
in upholstery/sewing workshops; both the Training Workshop and the 
Community Project offered catering and administrative/clerical work; 
the Training Workshop and Community Industry both had joinery workshops 
and undertook building maintenance/outwork; the Community Project and 
Community Industry both undertook painting and decorating, and environ-
mental/landscaping work. Given these overlaps, it was interesting to 
compare the reasons put forward by the different schemes for including 
the same kinds of work experience. 
Both the Training Workshop and the Community Project claimed that 
they had taken account of the needs of the local labour market, but 
were vague about how exactly this had been done. References were 
made to consultations with the Careers Service, the Chamber of Commerce, 
and certain Industrial Training Boards, but it was not clear what 
information had been obtained, or how it had been used. Only the work 
experience and training undertaken in the sewing and upholstery workshops 
seemed to have a definite connection to sources of demand in the local 
labour market. Both the Training Workshop and the Community Project 
had made arrangements for local clothing manufacturers to take on 
some of their trainees. In one case the arrangement went sofar as 
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the firm providing sewing machines and dismissing its training officer, 
so that the scheme could then re-employ this training officer and use 
the sewing machines to train its trainees to the requirements of that 
firm. Yet, where such close arrangements did not exist, there seemed to 
be little evidence that the needs of the local labour market were being 
systematically considered. Rather it seemed to be the case that the 
kinds of work experience being provided were those for which staff 
and facilities were most readily and cheaply available, and these 
were likely to be in precisely the areas of the local economy in which 
demand for labour was slack. This was unavoidable, given the limited 
resources available to be spent on capital equipment, and the fact 
that staff had to be recruited from the unemployment register, generally 
on short-term contracts at low rates of pay. Almost by definition, 
the skills of the staff employed were likely to be redundant within 
the local labour market, since otherwise the individuals concerned 
would not have been available or willing to work for the schemes. 
Unlike the two larger YOP schemes, Community Industry made no claim 
that the work experience that it provided was related to the needs 
of the local labour market. Rather, it took on work that needed to 
be done in the local community, and which could be easily and cheaply 
organised. The fact that what it undertook overlapped so closely 
with the range of work experience being provided by the two YOP schemes 
reinforces the impression that the same factors were of determining 
importance for these schemes also. 
Of the three smaller YOP schemes, two of them acknowledged that the 
work experience that they provided had not been planned in relation 
to the needs of the local labour market. For example, there was little 
chance of any of the trainees in the drama scheme finding employment 
locally as actors. The main factors determining the range of work 
experience available had been the needs of the projects themselves 
and the skills of the staff which they had been able to recruit. 
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The exception was the ITEC. As we have already seen, at the planning 
stage of this scheme a feasibility study was carried out which made 
some attempt to examine the likely future demand for information 
technology skills in the Portsmouth area. The analysis was only at 
a very generalised level, and the ITEC was never intended to give 
a precise vocational training for specific opportunities identified 
in the local labour market. Rather the purpose was to provide a small 
number of school leavers with an added layer of technological training 
and work experience. Nevertheless, it was possible to take some 
account of the jobs that might become available locally, and of the 
particular knowledge that might be required by a young person applying 
for them. 
The ITEC was exceptional insofar as the training and work experience 
that it provided was directed at an expanding area of the local labour 
market. It is important to understand why this was possible. Other 
schemes, we have seen, were restricted by limitations of staff and 
resources. The ITEC was able to avoid these restrictions because it 
was provided with the necessary financial support in order to do so. 
As we have seen, it not only received the standard MSC funding for a 
training workshop, but also a substantial additional amount from the 
Department of Industry. Thus the sum spent on each ITEC trainee, 
approximately £4,000 per annum, was almost double that spent on the 
average YOP trainee. This additional amount was earmarked, in the 
first place, to enable the purchase of the more expensive capital 
equipment required to provide training and work experience in such a 
modern industry, and secondly, to provide the salary top-ups necessary 
in order to recruit staff from a more competitive labour market. 
Furthermore, as a prestige scheme, the ITEC received special assistance 
from the City Council and from local industry, both in terms of the 
provision of premises and the secondment of staff. Thus in many respects 
the ITEC must be regarded as a special case. It had advantages that 
were not shared by the average YOP scheme, and which could not have 
been, without a substantial increase in costs. 
With regard to individual trainee's programmes and the integration of 
training content, as had been the case in the WEEP sector, the orga-
nisation tended to be more systematic in the larger schemes. These, 
it will be remembered, had already been upgraded to New Training Place 
status. 
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In the larger of the tnree Community Projects that I visited (Community 
Project 1), each trainee went through two 16 week units of work ex-
perience on separate projects. Training was integrated into each 
of the units and was assessed by means of a skills profile. Then 
there was a further 16 week unit of work experience in an external 
industrial placement organised and monitored by the Project's staff. 
Although this programme had been formalised through the process of 
upgrading to New Training Place status, the basis had already existed 
before. 
At the Training Workshop, the introduction of New Training Places 
seems to have necessitated more radical changes in the programmes 
pursued by individual trainees. Originally the MSC had emphasised 
the need for the Workshop to recover a certain proportion of its 
running costs by producing and selling goods on a profitable basis. 
This overriding consideration had acted as a constraining influence 
upon the organisation of the programmes of individual trainees. What 
tended to happen was that a trainee would be assigned to a certain 
section, given some rudimentary training, and then expected to get on 
with productive work which was often of a highly repetitive nature. 
Thus the pressure for profitable production minimised the scope for 
the development of training content. Furthermore, there was no 
systematic rotation of trainees between the different sections. Some 
stayed on the same section, going through the same repetitive pro-
duction work, for the whole duration of their programme at the Workshop. 
However, this was often the result of their own choice. As has been 
noted already of some of the larger WEEP schemes, many trainees preferred 
to stay in the area of work that they were first introduced to, and 
resisted any attempts to move them on. The effects of NTP upgrading 
were just beginning to show at the time of my visit. A shift in 
emphasis was taking.place, away from profitable production work towards 
more formalised training. The sections were being organised within a 
framework of Occupational Training Families, and the trainees were to 
be rotated systematically between sections covered by the same or 
related OTFs. They were to spend three months in each of the three 
sections, before going out to an external work experience placement 
for their final three months. The training content within each section 
was being increased so that up to 40% of the time was to be spent on 
off-the-job training. For each section a systematic training 
programme had been identified, and a Basic Skills Checklist was 
being introduced to give a profile assessment of the trainees' 
achievements. 
Once again it is interesting to compare these two larger YOP schemes 
with the Community Industry Unit. It should be remembered that the 
young people at Community Industry were employees, not trainees. 
No attempt was made to rotate them between different areas of work 
or to include any elements of formalised training. When a young 
person was taken on, they would be allocated to a team, and so long 
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as they were able to fit in, they would stay with that team for the 
rest of the year. The theory underlying this approach was that the 
work undertaken was primarily a medium for personal development rather 
than vocational training. What was important was the personal and 
social skills developed through working together in a disciplined 
team under the supervision of an adult, rather than any vocational 
skills that might be associated with the content of the work. Thus 
continuity of working relationships within teams was valued above the 
breadth of range of work experience covered. This order of priorities 
was also reflected by the mode in which the progress of the youngsters 
was reviewed. Thus the formal reviews, which took place at four, 
seven and 10 months, were more concerned with attitude, behaviour, 
and personal development, than with job performance or vocational 
skill development. 
It can now be seen that, although there was a considerable degree of 
overlap in the overall range of work experience offered, the under-
lying approach and actual organisation of individual programmes was 
different at Community Industry from the two larger YOP schemes. 
However, this difference should not be over-estimated. Although the 
philosophy was different, the actual practice at the Training Workshop 
before it had been upgraded to New Training Place status was in fact 
quite similar to that of Community Industry. As we have seen, the 
training content was minimal and the trainees tended to stay in their 
original sections. Furthermore, in certain respects,the NTP upgrading 
process seemed to have been going against the grain. Some trainees 
had left the scheme altogether rather than be moved away from 'their 
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section'. Also some of the supervisors appeared to be unhappy with 
the use of complex skill checklists, and preferred to assess trainees 
in more rudimentary ways which were mainly concerned with attitude and 
behaviour. So although the YOP schemes were being pushed into a more 
clearly defined vocational training mould, there seemed to be a natural 
tendency for them to revert and converge with the more long-established 
practices of Community Industry. And, insofar as this convergence was 
taking place, Community Industry appeared once againto provide the 
more accurate and meaningful rationale for what was going on. 
The two smaller Community Projects had not yet attempted to introduce 
more formalised training programmes. Basically the trainees carried 
out whatever work needed to be done for the project, and were given 
any training that might be necessary for them to be able to do it. 
However, both were in the process of making plans for more systematised 
training programmes that would be acceptable under YTS. The fact 
that these had not yet been introduced should not be thought to 
indicate that these smaller schemes were necessarily of inferior 
quality. During my visits to the various schemes, I was struck by 
the fact that the formal presentation and organisation of training 
programmes was no guarantee of their quality. Far more important 
than any formal structures was the character and experience of the 
individual supervisors who were working with the trainees. Thus the 
best and the worst organised units of work experience and training 
that I saw were both accommodated under the same formal structures 
within one of the larger schemes that I visited. 
Finally, of all the schemes that I visited in this sector, the ITEC 
was the one that most resembled a formal training course, in both 
presentation and reality. All the trainees were given a month's basic 
training, during which they were introduced to both hardware and 
software. They were then allowed to choose in which of these two' 
areas they would like to concentrate. Within each of them, they could 
follow their interests through a range of courses leading towards 
some form of longer term project. Their progress was reviewed on a 
monthly. basis using a specially designed 10 page profile which listed 
all of the skills that could be learnt at the ITEC. What the trainees 
could prove that they had learnt over the previous month was ticked 
off on the profile, and a plan was made for what they would tackle 
over the next month. The review thus consisted primarily of the 
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objective testing of vocational skills, though some assessment of 
attitude and behaviour was also made. 60% or more of the year was 
made up by these courses. The remaining time was taken up by external 
work experience placements which were organised and monitored by 
the ITEC. 
5. Off-the-Job Training 
YOP trainees in this sector had the same right to day release for 
off-the-job training as those in the WEEP sector. In general, these 
schemes played a more positive role in organising this kind of pro-
vision for their trainees than did the WEEP sponsors. 
With the exception of the Drama Project and Community Industry, all 
of the schemes sent some of their trainees on Social and Life Skills 
courses at local colleges. However, they had all found the arrange-
ment unsatisfactory and were looking for alternatives. The major 
problem seemed to be the lack of liaison between the colleges and 
the schemes. The result was that the provision put on by the colleges 
often appeared to be irrelevant or antithetical to the work being 
done by the schemes. One scheme administrator admitted that their 
scheme might be partly to blame for this, but in general it was the 
colleges that were regarded as being at fault. One scheme manager 
complained bitterly of the bad organisation and loose discipline of 
the college staff that was undermining his efforts to build up good 
work habits amongst his trainees. As was the case in the WEEP sector, 
the trainees shared these poor opinions of college provision. At the 
Training Workshop, all the trainees were sent on an initial three day 
block release, which was then followed by weekly day release. Most, 
however, stopped going, complaining that it was boring and irrelevant -
"they kept talking about what we were going to do, but we never did 
anything." In one case, at a different scheme, the trainee was so 
intimidated by the school-like atmosphere of the college that he did 
not get past the door. 
The main alternative being considered by the dissatisfied scheme 
managers was to organise their own 'in-house' off-the-job training. 
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They could then ensure that it would fit in with the rest of the 
programme. This was already being done by the larger of the Community 
Projects, which was able to offer remedial numeracy and literacy as 
well as social and life skills. It is also interesting to note the 
success of a discussion group which was led by one of the supervisors 
at the Training Workshop. Every Friday afternoon, instead of working, 
this supervisor had a free-ranging discussion with the trainees in 
his section. The same youngster who had got bored by all the talking 
at college apparently enjoyed these discussions. The difference was 
that they were with their mates in a familiar environment, and the 
discussion could flow naturally from their working relationships. 
The supervisor could lead the discussion because he had gained their 
respect by working with them, and was not just talking abstractly 
about things that they were going to be doing. However, it should 
be said that not every supervisor was capable of playing this role. 
At the Drama Project, formal off-the-job training in social and life 
skills was considered to be unnecessary. The development of social 
and life skills was regarded as an integral element of drama. Acting 
developed the confidence of the trainees, taught them how to work 
together and solve problems as a team, and sometimes forced them to 
improvise under pressure. Likewise, at Community Industry, there was 
no provision made for formal social and life skills training. Insofar 
as social and life skills were considered, they were regarded as some-
thing that might be passed on informally by the adult supervisors 
in the course of normal working relationships, rather than as a 
separate skill that could be taught off-the~ob. This in fact was 
a view that was shared by a number of the staff on the yap schemes. 
They regarded the acquisition of social and life skills as something 
integral to the experience of working with adults, and did not think 
that they could be taught in a conventional educational context such 
as that provided by the colleges. 
As well as sending their trainees on social and life skills courses, 
some schemes encouraged them to use their day release entitlement to 
study for vocational qualifications. At the Training Workshop, 20% 
of the trainees were undertaking City and Guilds courses, and a further 
5% were preparing for 'a' levels and RSA examinations. These courses 
appear to have been more satisfactory. Another scheme had sent 
two of their trainees on a three day residential course organised 
by a private training organisation, and reported that it had been 
very successful indeed. 
6. Counselling 
The requirement that trainees should have access to support and 
personal advice applied to these schemes in the same way as it did 
to those in the WEEP sector. 
As was the case in the WEEP sector, it was difficult to establish how 
exactly this requirement was interpreted in practice. For the most 
part, in all of the schemes, counselling was regarded as an integral 
but informal aspect of the supervisors' responsibilities. The way 
in which it was carried out varied from individual to individual. 
Some saw their role as providing the stability and discipline that 
was sometimes lacking in the trainees' home backgrounds. Often they 
took pride in being able to bring the trainees out of themselves. 
Other remained more aloof, but available to offer personal advice 
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if asked. Finally, there were some who resented this role, stating 
that they were skilled craftsmen and not social workers. As was so 
with regard to the quality of training programmes, far more depended 
upon the character of individual supervisors than any formal require-
ments laid down either by the MSC or the scheme management. 
In the case of the schemes offering New Training Places, the intro-
duction of systems of profiling and reviewing was intended to give 
trainees the opportunity to become involved in negotiating and 
managing their own programmes of experience. At the ITEC, for 
example, the review-process encouraged trainees to prove what they 
had learnt over the previous month and to negotiate a plan for the 
next month. Elsewhere, also, trainees were involved in reviewing 
their progress, though there was not always sufficient flexibility 
to allow meaningful negotiations about future plans. 
7. Monitoring 
Because of the larger capital sums involved in the schemes of this 
sector, the MSC gave a higher priority to the maintenance of regular 
monitoring visits than they did in the WEEP sector. In addition to 
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a standard monitoring form that was similar to that used in the WEEP 
sector, a financial monitoring report form was also employed. Once 
again, it was the Area Link Officers of the Special Programmes Division 
who were responsible for making these visits. As was the case in 
the WEEP sector, the Careers Service was supposed to maintain contact 
with the trainees whilst they were on the schemes and to continue 
to advise them about job prospects. 
In general, it appears that the MSC would make a monitoring visit 
to the schemes in this sector at least once every six months. The 
main concerns during these visits were with financial procedures, and 
with health and safety. The training content of the schemes does 
not appear to have been closely monitored, except during the visits 
from regional staff which were associated with the NTP upgrading 
process. Community Industry, although not a part of YOP, also 
received visits from the MSC, during which financial procedures were 
examined and it was checked that the unit was complying with the terms 
of its grant. 
The Careers Service seems to have concentrated on keeping in regular 
contact with the larger schemes, including Community Industry. Amongst 
the smaller schemes contact was less regular, and in one case it was 
restricted to the sending of a list of vacancies every now and then. 
Some schemes also received visits from local authority inspectors. 
The Training Workshop, in addition, was inspected for health and 
safety by trade union representatives. 
8. End of Scheme 
Community Industry and the larger YOP schemes which had been upgraded 
to New Training Place status offered trainees/employees programmes 
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of 12 months duration. Places on the two smaller YOP schemes were 
still only for six months. I was concerned to find out what happened 
to the young people when the various schemes came to an end. 
At the Training Workshop and Community Project 1, between 35 and 40% 
of the trainees found jobs at the end of their programmes. At 
Community Industry the figure was nearer 50%. The ITEC had not yet 
had enough trainees pass through it for a meaningful figure to be 
given, and the other two schemes did not keep detailed figures. It 
is particularly interesting to note the comparative success of 
Community Industry in relation to the two larger YOP schemes. This 
might be thought surprising, given Community Industry's deliberate 
policy of selecting disadvantaged youngsters, and given its lack of 
concern with vocational training and the relation of work experience 
to the needs of the local labour market. The superior performance 
can probably be explained largely by the extra effort put into the 
placement of young people in permanent jobs at the end of their 12 
month stay. Community Industry kept in very close contact with the 
Careers Service throughout the year, and when a young person's final 
10th month review was due, they would invite a specialist careers 
adviser to attend. The Careers Service then made special efforts to 
find a suitable job for the young person concerned, and meanwhile 
Community Industry made use of the contacts with local industry that 
it had been able to build up over the years. Furthermore, if it 
was thought necessary, staff from the unit would accompany the young 
people to interviews. The YOP schemes also offered trainees the 
opportunity for careers counselling towards end of their programmes, 
but it did not appear to be as systematically organised, or as closely 
co-ordinated with the Careers Service. The fact that Community Ind-
ustry employees were deemed to be particularly disadvantaged, in this 
instance, seemed to work to their advantage. However, the percentage 
success rate of Community Industry was probably also raised by the 
fact that those who were unable to find jobs were not automatically 
turned out of the scheme at the end of the 12 months. The decision 
depended upon the young person's individual situation, and, if it was 
thought that leaving would be particularly detrimental to them, there 
was enough flexibility to allow them to stay on for a further six months 
or so. At the YOP schemes, the 12 month maximum was more rigidly 
enforced. 
Success, of course, can be measured by other criteria than job 
placement rates. Many of the staff that I spoke to referred to the 
remarkable transformations that they had witnessed in young people. 
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In particular, how they had gained confidence in themselves and learnt 
to work together in a team. However, it was doubted that such 
improvements would be permanent if the youngsters went straight back 
on the dole afterwards. Concern was expressed that there was 
insufficient follow-up after the schemes. The Training Workshop was 
in fact trying to do something about this, by setting up an unemployed 
drop-in centre in a nearby derelict pub. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The headings above duplicate those used to analyse the WEEP sector 
schemes. The headings below are different and are used to analyse 
some of the distinctive features of the schemes in this sector. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
9. Production for Sale 
Schemes in this sector, unlike the various enterprises to which 
trainees were attached in the WEEP sector, were set up primarily with 
the purpose of providing opportunities for work experience and 
training. Nevertheless, some of them were expected to contribute to 
their running costs by marketing the goods and services that were 
produced by their trainees. The danger implicit in this situation 
was that one of these schemes, with its capital grant from the MSC 
and the free labour of the trainees, might be able to compete unfairly 
with local firms, causing a displacement of jobs. In order to avoid 
this danger it was explicitly stated that schemes should only produce 
goods and provide services which would not result in a loss of jobs 
elsewhere or compete unfairly with local firms. It was suggested that 
sub-contract work might be undertaken which for various reasons would 
be uneconomical for firms to undertake themselves, or that local 
authority sponsored schemes might produce goods for their own depart-
ments. Furthermore, in order to head off any allegations of under-
cutting or competing unfairly by using cheap labour, schemes were 
instructed to seek the general support of local industry and the 
trade unions for their activities. 
The three largest YOP schemes - the Training Workshop, Community 
Project 1 and the ITEC - were all to some extent involved in selling 
their goods and services. Of the other two YOP schemes, the drama 
project did not charge for its performances, and the work of the 
fort restoration project was self-contained. Community Industry 
always worked on the basis that it provided the labour for free, 
while the people whom the work was beingdone for met the cost of the 
materials. 
The most commercially orientated scheme was probably the Training 
Workshop. It has already been described how in the past the MSC 
had emphasised this side of its work, and how this had interfered 
with the development of the training function of the workshop. The 
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main areas of commercial production were in upholstery and joinery. 
Markets had originally been identified by means of a market analysis 
survey, which had been carried out by a student for a small honorarium. 
These had subsequently been developed by means of advertising, can-
vassing and the exploitation of contacts made through a local community 
association. Such was the success of these efforts that at one time 
the problem became that of being overloaded with orders. work was 
carried out for a wide variety of different customers - the City 
Council, the Polytechnic, PTAs, the YMCA, a local brewery and some 
other private concerns. Also there were certain standard items, such 
as bird tables, that were sold to the general public. A differential 
pricing policy was adopted which distinguished between certain categories 
of customer. The full commercial rate was charged to private customers; 
the cost of material plus 25% to community associations; and just the 
cost of materials to charities. Charging these rates, the Training 
Workshop had succeeded in making an overall profit of £7,000 on a turn-
over of £35,000 during its first fully operational year. But what of 
the danger of displacing jobs elsewhere? The manager assured me that 
they took great care to ensure that this did not happen. Most of the 
work that they took on would not have been done otherwise. For example, 
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they repaired furniture from the Polytechnic halls of residence, which 
otherwise would have been thrown out because the Polytechnic did not 
have the staff or facilities to do the repairs for themselves. 
Moreover, trade union and local industry representatives on the 
workshop's management committee oversaw all their activities. However, 
not all local trade unionists were convinced that the workshop did 
not pose a threat to their members' jobs. When the Portsmouth Trades 
Council was asked to approve the extension of the workshop at Pauls-
grove, a number of misgivings were expressed about job displacement. 
Although eventually approval was given in response to appeals from 
a Paulsgrove Labour councillor, the reservations still remained. (66) 
Communi ty Projects were not encouraged to enter into commercial produc-
tion to the same extent as Training Workshops. Nevertheless, Commu-
nity Project 1 was involved in a number of commercial enterprises. 
I examined in particular the commercial activities of the materials 
bank and craft unit. This had started off purely as a warehousing 
and recycling operation. Industrial scrap materials that could be 
played with or used as teaching aids were collected from factories in 
the surrounding area, and warehoused on shelves at the unit's head-
quarters. Schools and playgroups were then invited to come in and 
collect whatever they wanted. The operation was made profitable by 
the institution of a subscription system. The fee varied from £8 per 
annum for a small playgroup to £25 per annum for a school. For this, 
they could help themselves to whatever they liked as often as they 
liked, the only limit being imposed by the amount of materials put 
out on the shelves. The scheme had proved very popular, and the number 
of member subscribers had risen to 170, 65 of which were paying at the 
maximum rate. Such was the demand in fact that they had been forced 
to limit the number of new subscriptions. Subsequently, a second line 
of business had been introduced - 'craft' products. This involved 
using off-cuts of material to make large toys such as Wendy Houses, 
telephones and postboxes. These were sold to subscribers at a cost 
of materials price, which was considerably below the standard commercial 
catalogue price for the equivalent item. For example, the catalogue 
price for a Wendy House was £70. A rough and ready equivalent that 
it took a trainee a month to make was sold by the unit for £17. Cheap 
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material such as chipboard and plywood were used, and the workmanship 
was not always of a particularly high standard. Nevertheless, the 
items were in demand from organisations who in an environment of 
financial restraint could no longer afford to pay for the real thing. 
A third line of business which was just being developed at the time 
of my visit was that of bulk purchasing. Play materials such as 
crayons and balloons were bought in bulk and then sold at a 10% mark-
up, which was still considerably cheaper than if the playgroups had 
attempted to buy the same items indivudally for themselves. The same 
doubts about the effects of these activities on jobs elsewhere can 
be raised as in the case of the Training Workshop. Again, I was 
assured that trade union approval had been sought, and that there 
was no danger of job displacement taking place. However, it would be 
difficult to discount the possibility altogether. Thus it may have 
been the case that if some playschemes had not bought certain items 
of equipment from the materials bank and craft unit, they would not 
have been able to purchase such equipment at all. But it would be 
unlikely that this would always be the case, and if it was not, then 
the unit was effectively undercutting some other business and possibly 
putting jobs at risk. 
ITECs, like Training Workshops, were encouraged by the MSC to enter 
into commercial production. This had been one of the features of the 
original Nottingdale ITEC, and in the terms of reference of subsequent 
ITECs it was stated that, "in order to create a realistic working 
environment", they should "develop, produce and sell new technology 
items."(67) In fact, the Portsmouth ITEC had very little involvement 
with commercial activities, apart from collecting a small revenue for 
the use of certain services, such as those provided by its Prestel 
equipment. The reason for this, as explained by the manager, was 
precisely the fear of causing a displacement of jobs in the local 
labour market. Locally there were a mass of small firms that had 
grown up to supply the component needs of the high technology giants 
such as IBM and Plessey. If the ITEC were to use its resources to 
enter into the local market, the danger would be that it might put 
one of these smaller firms out of business. Rather than risk this, 
the manager thought that it was preferable that the ITEC should 
concentrate on the development of ideas rather than their marketing. 
It could then feed these ideas out into local industry, along with 
the trained youngsters, thereby acting as a support rather than 
a competitor. In other areas, where new technology industries were 
not so highly developed, the manager thought that the situation 
might be different, and that it might be possible for an ITEC to 
exploit a gap in the market without threatening someone else's 
business. The interesting point here is that the same features of 
the local labour market that made Portsmouth a suitable location 
for the training function of the ITEC, made it unsuitable for the 
commercial function. This highlights a more general paradox that 
affects production for sale in any training scheme. If the trainees 
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are being trained in skills for which there is a well developed local 
labour market, then if they use these skills for commercial production, 
there is always the danger that they will be undermining the permanent jobs 
which they hope eventually to obtain. If, on the other hand, the 
trainees commercial activity does not compete with that of any local 
industry, then the chances are that the skills which they are develop-
ing will not be in demand locally. 
The danger of job displacement does not in fact only ari?e from 
commercial production. Community Industry did not attempt to make 
any revenue from its projects, but still the problem of displacement 
arose. Although most of the work that the unit undertook was for 
churches, charitable organisations and other such 'good causes', it 
also undertook work for local authorities. Thus at Fareham it had 
undertaken a quite major land reclamation scheme on behalf of the 
Borough Council. This, it was argued, would not have otherwise been 
done. However, the trade unions at Portsmouth City Council, with their 
members already being made redundant, were highly suspicious of such 
arguments. Fearing that CommUnity Industry might be used to undermine 
more of their members' jobs, they had vetoed its working for the .City 
Council. Even the work that Community Industry (and equally YOP 
Community Projects) undertook on behalf of good causes such as 
churches can be questioned on grounds of job displacement. Community 
Industry and Community Project 1 had between them carried out repairs 
and renovation work on quite a number of churches in the local area. 
But it must be asked what would have happened if these schemes had 
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not existed? Can it really be said that the work would not have other-
wise been done? Something would have had to be done eventually or the 
churches would have started crumbling around their congregations' ears. 
It is possible that the work would have been done through the voluntary 
efforts of local parishioners. But in this case it might be asked why 
the youngsters should be expected to save them the trouble, when pro-
bably they live in other parishes and have no interest in churches 
anyway. The only other possibility would seem to be that of raising 
the necessary money to hire professional builders and decorators. If 
this were the case, the scheme concerned would be taking away work from 
local firms, and possibly helping to destroy the jobs in which the 
young people might otherwise be employed. 
10. Staff Recruitment and Training 
Unlike in the WEEP sector, schemes in this sector were responsible for 
the employment of specialist staff who were concerned exclusively with 
the management and supervision of YOP trainees. The importance of 
staff recruitment and training has already been underlined 'bytne 
observation made above that the quality of the work experience and 
training provision on these schemes was crucially dependent upon the 
capacity of individual supervisors. Thus I was particularly interested 
to establish how the supervisory staff were recruited and what training 
they received. General regulations concerning the staffing of schemes 
were set out by the MSC in their guide to sponsors. (68) The overall 
staff/trainee ratio was not allowed to exceed that of one member of 
staff to five trainees. The direct supervisor/trainee ratio was ex-
pected to be about one supervisor to eight trainees. All members of 
staff had to be recruited from the unemployment register, and technical 
officers from the MSC Area Office were involved in the selection pro-
cesses for both managerial and supervisory posts. Between them, the 
management and supervision team were expected to have a collective 
blend of experience and skills covering a wide range of areas. In 
particular, the supervisory staff were expected to have a wide indus-
trial experience combined with the ability to get on withyoung people. 
Those employed were to be paid salaries or wages "at the appropriate 
local negotiated rate, according to their qualifications, experience 
and the level of responsibility of the post"'(69) up to a certain 
maximum laid down for that level of responsibility by the MSC. All 
supervisors were to attend a basic training course in supervision, 
including instructional techniques and guidance. 
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Most of the YOP schemes that I visited recruited supervisors primarily 
on the basis of their knowledge and experience of certain industrial 
or commercial skills. The case of the drama project was slightly 
different in that it required qualified and experienced drama teachers. 
At the other schemes some experience of working with young people 
was regarded as an advantage; and, with the upgrading to New Training 
Places, a background in training was increasingly being sought after. 
However, some schemes seemed to have found it difficult to obtain the 
kind of staff that they wanted, and there was a certain amount of 
resentment expressed about the restriction of having to recruit from 
the unemployment register. In one case, apparently, this restriction 
had been bypassed. The ITEC, of course, was not hampered by such 
restrictions, and with the help of its extra grant from the Department 
of Industry was able to offer salaries considerably above the MSC 
maximum. Furthermore, we have seen that it was also the beneficiary 
of secondments from local industry. With these advantages, it was 
possible to put together a well-bafanced team, all except one of which 
had previous training experience. Neither was Community Industry 
restricted by the necessity of having to recruit from the unemployment 
register. Otherwise its criteria for selecting supervisors were 
similar to those of the other YOP schemes, except that more emphasis 
was placed on the need for the applicant to be able to counsel young 
people on personal and social problems. They were not merely to be 
work supervisors, but 'scheme consultants', a title that was meant 
also to imply a caring role. 
The provision of training for YOP scheme staff was organised at the 
regional level of the MSC Special Programmes Division (subsequently 
Training Division), by the Regional Training Resources Manager. Thus 
staff training for the whole of the South East Region was organised 
from the regional headquarters at Basingstoke. As described above in 
Chapter 5, there were three tiers of training available. Tier I, it 
will be remembered, was an induction training course designed to 
introduce new staff to the Programme and to their role within it. 
This was mandatory for all supervisors. Tier II embraced a number 
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of courses concerned with job skills development. All supervisory 
staff were eligible to attend, but it was compulsory only for Training 
Workshop supervisors. Finally, Tier III consisted of various kinds 
of specialist training designed to respond to particular staff needs. 
Once again all staff were eligible, but it was not compulsory for 
any of them and, unlike with Tiers I and II, the costs had to be 
met from within the scheme'S operating budget. 
At the two larger YOP schemes all the supervisors had been on Tiers I 
and II. At the Training Workshop, some supervisors had received 
additional first aid and health and safety training, and certain of 
the senior supervisors and management had been on Tier II(b). Further-
more, staff training had been stepped up in line with the NTP upgrading 
process: eight supervisors were in the process of taking a one year 
Further Education Teaching Certificate, and three more were taking 
courses under the MSC Tier III. Similarly, at Community Project 1, 
some of the supervisors had taken additional first aid or commercial 
courses, and some had gone on a Tier III course. Also the project 
had organised some of its own 'in company, made-to-measure training' 
to deal with the particular needs of its staff. At the ITEC, it was 
only thought necessary for the member of staff who did not have any 
previous training experience to go on any of the MSC courses. Similarly, 
at the Drama Project, it was thought a waste of time for trained 
teachers to attend. At the other Community Project, previous super-
visors had been on Tiers I and II, but those there at the time of my 
visit were still waiting for their training. In contrast to the 
prevalent attitude in YOP, Community Industry did not believe that 
it was necessary for its scheme consultants to have any special 
training beyond first aid and health and safety. The view expressed 
was that the skills involved could not be taught formally, but had 
to be developed through experience, supported by the guidance of senior 
staff and the exchange of ideas at staff meetings. This was consistent 
with the wider Community Industry philosophy which emphasised the 
informal development of working relationships as opposed to formal 
vocational training. 
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The average supervisor that I met on my visits was a man aged between 
40 and 55, who had some kind of apprentice or craft training, often 
with a background in the Dockyard or the Navy. Some had previous 
experience of having apprentices or trainees under them, and in 
particular there were a number of professional instructors at the 
Training Worskhop who had come from the Dockyard Apprentice Training 
Centre which had recently been closed down. Overall there was a wide 
range of skill and training experience - from the semi-skilled 'jack 
of all trades' handyman, to the retired chef who had previously been 
in charge of catering training at a large naval shore establishment. 
The supervisors at the ITEC and the Drama Project were of a different 
nature again, being for the most part professionally trained rather 
than craft trained. Finally, at Community Industry, I observed that 
the scheme consultants tended to be somewhat rougher and tougher 
characters than the average YOP supervisor, though probably lacking 
the same degree of technical skill. 
The YOP supervisors that I met expressed a wide variety of opinions 
on the MSC training that they had attended. Some thought that the 
training as a whole had been very useful, others that it had been a 
waste of time. Some thought that Tier I had been interesting, but that 
Tier II had been boring; others thought the reverse. What became 
evident was that reactions were largely dependent upon the supervisors' 
previous experiences. What for some was 'old hat', for others was 
vitally useful information. The problem faced by the MSC's regional 
training staff was that of organising courses that were capable of 
meeting the individual needs of people with such a wide variety of 
previous experiences. Clearly they were not altogether successful. 
A cause of widespread complaint amongst YOP supervisors at the time 
of my visits was the increase in their responsibilities that was being 
demanded by the upgrading to New Training Places and the transition 
to YTS. The exact nature of the complaint varied. Some supervisors 
resented the change itself. A typical statement was this; "I'm a 
skilled painter and decorator, and I was employed to supervise 
trainees painting and decorating. I am not a lecturer, and I am 
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not a social worker, and I didn't come here to fill in forms." Others 
were more accepting of the change, but did not think that they were 
being adequately prepared for it. Although staff training was being 
adapted to the needs of YTS, most of the attention was being given 
to the new staff. For those who had already been through Tiers I 
and II, there were as yet few opportunities for refresher training 
being provided by the MSC. Finally, there was the complaint that 
they were not receiving adequate recognition for their new role. 
This was given strong expression at the local scheme managers' 
meeting that I attended. Although YTS was supposed to provide a 
much higher quality of training than Yap, there was to be no increase 
of staff trainee ratios, and no upgrading of staff status or rates 
of pay. Thus they were being expected to fulfil a far more complex 
and demanding 'high quality training' role, with the same number of 
trainees and at the same level of remuneration as before when they 
were mere supervisors. Their wage rates were worked out on the basis 
of local authority basic non-manual rates of pay, and thi~basis of 
comparison was not being changed, despite the change in their job 
description. As a result they considered themselves to be grossly 
underpaid compared with trainers in further education who were paid 
according to the Burnham Scale. A further issue was that of job 
security. As a scheme manager at the meeting which I attended explained, 
he had to advise his staff that their jobs were only temporary and that 
they should continue looking for more permanent employment. Because 
of the annual uncertainty about the continued funding of the scheme, 
they could only be offered one year contracts, and it was sometimes 
only three weeks before these contracts were due to expire that they 
were informed whether or not their jobs would be continuing. In these 
circumstances, he asked, how could the staff be expected to concen-
trate on the introduction of long-term plans for a permanent high 
quality training scheme. In short, the complaint was that there was 
nothing in YTS for the staff. Given the previous observation that 
the quality of YOP schemes in this sector was in general very 
dependent upon the quality, experience and motivation of individual 
supervisors, this did not augur well for the future development of 
this sector of YTS as high quality training provision. 
11. Trainee Representation 
Given that these schemes were set up specifically for the purpose of 
providing work experience and training for young people, I was inter-
ested to find out what arrangements had been made for the representa-
tion of the interests of the trainees in their management. I was 
also concerned to establish what role, if any, the trade unions had 
played in the organisation of young people at these schemes. 
The two largest YOP schemes had both made semi-formal arrangements 
for the self-representation of trainees. At the Training Workshop a 
trainees' committee had been established. Points arising from the 
minutes of this committee were taken up to the management committee 
of the workshop by a trainee representative. However, this never 
seems to have been much more than a token arrangement, the issues 
raised remaining at the level of demands for soft toilet paper and 
such like. Moreover, the committee's existence depended on the 
enthusiasm of a few individuals, and when they left the Training 
Workshop, the arrangements for the committee fell into disuse. The 
only other trainee contribution to the management of the Training 
Workshop was as health and safety representatives. Each section 
appointed a trainee health and safety representative whose task it 
was to report on any hazards in other sections. The scheme was run 
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on a competitive basis between the sections. While this may have been 
a useful device for teaching the trainees about health and safety, it 
cannot be said to have given them much real influence over their working 
environment. At Community Project 1 the situation was much the same. 
Each worksite had a trainee project leader who was appointed according 
to a system of rotation. These project leaders would attend trainee 
meetings, from which matters could be taken up to the management. The 
kind of issues raised were of a kind with those at the Training 
Workshop: for example, there was a demand that trainees working in 
the canteen should not have to wear white overalls. In addition, 
there was a standard grievance procedure through which individual 
trainees could take up complaints. At the smaller yap schemes, 
trainees were sometimes consulted informally about the work that 
they were doing, but there were no formal arrangements for trainee 
representation. Neither were there any at the Community Industry 
Unit. 
As was the case in the WEEP sector, at none of the schemes had there 
been any significant trade union impact. Some attempts had been 
made to recruit trainees at both of the two larger yap schemes, but 
only a very small number had joined. Apparently, even a token levy 
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of lap a week was enough to put trainees off. The most persistent 
attempts at recruitment had been made at Community Project 1, where 
NUPE,the TGWU and the Labour Party Young Socialists all made approaches 
to the trainees. The scheme manager was quite willing to allow these 
organisations access, his view being that the trainees were adults and 
should be allowed to find out about things for themselves. A group 
of about a dozen trainees were given time off to go on a day trip to 
London organised by NUPE so that they could lobby Parliament on behalf 
of the Jobs For Youth Campaign. However, it was the manager's 
observation that the trade union representatives had difficulty 
communicating with the trainees, and that the small number which they 
were able to attract soon became disillusioned. Other managers were 
more defensive. They regarded the trainees as being too young to 
join a union~ and thought that it might be detrimental to their chances 
of finding permanent employment. There was particular apprehension 
about the trade unions' political role in relation to the trainees. 
Such managerial attitudes, combined with trainee apathy and union 
ineffectiveness, ensured that there was negligible trade union influence 
at the other schemes. 
General Impressions 
As in the WEEP sector, there was considerable variety and each scheme 
that I visited had a distinct character. Nevertheless, there were also 
certain interesting similarities. The three larger schemes, the 
Training Workshop, Community Project 1 and Community Industry, had 
the most in common. This was true despite the fact that the Training 
Workshop and Community Project 1 were in separate categories of YOP, 
and Community Industry was not a part of YOP at all. The similarity 
did not depend merely upon size. As has been noted, there was a 
considerable overlap in the range of work experience offered by these 
three schemes. Also there was an overlap in the kind of young people 
recruited, albeit that in the case of Community Industry there was 
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a positive policy to select those who were most disadvantaged, whereas 
in the case of the other two schemes it was a question of their being 
left with those not wanted by the WEEP sponsors. Finally, as far as 
quality was concerned, the range between sections or groups within 
each scheme was probably larger than between the schemes taken as a 
whole. 
Of the smaller schemes, Community Project 3 (the renovation project), 
was the most similar in character to the three larger schemes. It 
recruited a similar kind of trainee, it provided typical construction 
orientated work experience, and although it had not been upgraded to 
New Training Place status, its quality was at least on a par with 
the average to be found on the larger schemes. Community Project 2, 
the drama project, had a different ethos which reflected the fact 
that it was an education based scheme. Its character was more like 
certain college-based off-the-job training than it was like any of 
the other schemes in this sector. Although no formal qualifications 
were required, it attracted trainees with a much higher average level 
of qualifications than any other scheme. Furthermore, the theatrical 
work experience was unlike that provided in any other scheme. Given 
that it was so different in these other respects, it would be almost 
impossible to assess its quality in relation to the other schemes. 
Finally, the ITEC was different again. It stood out as a prestige 
scheme which enjoyed special funding status. Although it did not 
necessarily select the trainees with the best qualifications, it only 
took on those who were well-motivated. The content of the scheme was 
more like a formal training course than was the case in any of the 
other schemes. Given such advantages, it could aspire to a level of 
quality that was beyond the reach of the rest of this sector. 
Leaving aside for the moment the drama scheme, what is interesting 
to note here is the different positions of Community Industry and 
the ITEC in relation to the rest of the schemes in this sector. 
Although Community Industry was not a part of YOP, in most respects 
it was closer to the rest of the provision in this sector than was 
the ITEC. This is significant, given that Community Industry claimed 
to embody a distinctly different approach to work experience and 
training from YOP in general. 
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It will be remembered that the Community Industry approach gave primary 
emphasis to work experience as a medium for personal and social develop-
ment. The acquisition of vocational skills was very much a secondary 
consideration. As a result, no special effort was made to relate the 
range of work experience to the needs of the local labour market. What 
was provided was what was easiest and cheapest to set up, and this 
often depended upon the avalability of staff and the requirements of 
the local community. No attempt was made to include systematic voca-
tional training or to ensure that employees had the opportunity to 
sample a wide range of work experience. The crucial element of content 
was the social unit of the group working together under the supervision 
of an adult. The development of relationships within the group was 
regarded as far more important than the vocational content of the work 
experience that they happened to be carrying out. 
The YOP schemes in this sector, compared to those in the WEEP sector, 
tended to follow more closely the formal elements of content that 
were laid down by the MSC. However, beneath these formal elements 
of content, the reality of what was taking place tended to converge 
with the theory and practice of Community Industry. This was parti-
cularly so before the upgrading process to New Training Place status. 
The range of work experience offered had not been considered systema-
tically in relation to the local labour market. The fact that in many 
cases it overlapped closely with that offered by Community Industry, 
suggested that the same factors of choice had predominated. Nor had 
the trainees always been systematically rotated through a range of 
different work experience, and often the training content had been 
sparse. Under these circumstances, the nature of the experience, 
and the benefits that trainees might derive from it, came closer to 
the Community Industry model than to a vocational training model. 
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Obviously, the intention of the New Training Place upgrading process 
was to change this situation by reorganising the content of the schemes 
by means of the Basic Skills Checklist into systematic programmes 
which integrated a range of work experience and formal training content. 
At the time of my visits, the two larger YOP schemes had already been 
through the upgrading process and were completing the implementation 
of the changes. What was evident was that these changes were encounter-
ing resistance amongst both trainees and supervisors. Trainees did 
not like being moved around from one area to another. Supervisors 
were reluctant to take on the extra responsbilities of formal training 
and assessment based on complicated skills checklists. Thus, it 
seemed that these schemes still had a certain natural affinity with 
the Community Industry approach. 
The ITEC stood apart from the other schemes in this secto~ by virtue 
of the extent to which it was able to realise the objective of a 
systematic programme which integrated work experience and formal 
training content. A number of factors can be brought forward as 
explanations for this comparative success. First, the ITEC had not 
needed to go through the upgrading process; from the beginning it 
had been set up to offer places of NTP status. Secondly, it had 
been able to select well-motivated trainees who were likely to be 
able to adopt a more flexible approach to a varied programme. But 
most important was the privileged status that it enjoyed with regard 
to both capital and staffing resources. This stemmed principally 
from the extra funding that it received from the Department of Ind~stry, 
but also from the support that it was given as a prestige project by 
the local council and by local industry. The extra money made it 
possible to buy the modern equipment that was necessary to train young 
people for such a new and expanding industry. Moreover, without the 
restriction of having to recruit from the unemployment register, it 
made it possible to attract staff who had marketable skills and 
relevant training experience. 
If it is concluded that the difference between the ITEC and the other 
YOP schemes in this sector was primarily the result of the additional 
resources available to the ITEC, the implication must be drawn that 
the quality and relevance of the ITEC's provision could not have been 
reproduced elsewhere without its privileged funding status being 
generalised throughout the sector. Thus, the position of the ITEC 
highlighted the limitations of the other schemes. They did not have 
the resources to purchase modern equipment, and nor were they likely 
to be able to recruit staff with marketable skills and training 
experience. For the most part they were a ghetto, where rejected 
trainees were catered for by redundant staff using old equipment in 
old buildings. Under such unfavourable circumstances, commendable 
efforts were made. Yet, it must questio~ed how realistic it was to 
aspire beyond the Community Industry model of what could be achieved 
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in these circumstances, towards the kind of high quality training 
programme that the ITEC was able to offer. The problem was illustrated 
graphically at the scheme managers' meeting which I attended concerned 
with the transition to YTS. With the same staff working under the 
same conditions, with little extra training or resources, these schemes 
were apparently expected to transform themselves onto a new level of 
high quality training provision. Somehow, a series of visits from 
the Regional Quality Improvement team, armed with a Basic Skills 
Checklist and Trainee Centred Reveiwing, were supposed to enable these 
schemes to transcend the limitations that were inherent in the condi-
tions under which they were being expected to operate. 
Before concluding the impressions on this sector, a separate note needs 
to be added on the drama scheme which thus far has been left out of 
consideration. It stood apart from the rest of the schemes in this 
sector as an education based provision. Its strength lay in what could 
be described as its social and life skills content. Also it should 
be said that it was providing a useful service for schools in the 
local community. The problem was that it lacked any realistic voca-
tional content. Most of the trainees whom I asked said that they 
were hoping to pursue a theatrical career. Yet, there did not 
appear to be any opportunities for them to be able to progress on 
such a career at the end of the scheme. Arguably, then, the scheme 
was leading well-qualified trainees down an occupational blind alley. 
Without a realistic vocational content, the future of this scheme 
under YTS was in some doubt, though no decision had been made at the 
time. 
Summing up, the inherent problems of this sector can be considered 
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in relation to those of the WEEP sector. The fundamental problem 
underlying WEEP provision was that of substitution; not merely in the 
narrow sense of YOP trainees being used to substitute for permanent 
employees, but in the wider sense of there being an inherent tendency 
for this form of provision to take the place of what employers might 
have offered on their own initiative and at their own expense. For 
the non-WEEP schemes, the problem was in a sense the opposite, not 
one of substitution, but one of addition. Because they genuinely were 
additional provision, they were inherently more expensive. If the money 
had been available to provide modern equipment and to recruit staff 
with marketable skills, then it might as well have been spent on 
creating real jobs. As it was, such resources could only be made 
available for the odd showpiece, like the ITEC. Elsewhere, it was a 
case of making do with the left-overs from the real economy in a 
marginalised and artificial setting. Of course, production for sale 
offered some schemes the opportunity to supplement their resources 
and to enhance the realism of the work experience that they provided. 
However, insofar as the work became real, the same problems began to 
emerge as those that were inherent within the WEEP sector. The trainees 
on these schemes could not be substituted for permanent employees, but 
there was always the danger that their productive work could contribute 
to the displacement of jobs elsewhere. Thus, non-WEEP and WEEP schemes 
together were caught between the twin evils of artificial additionality 
and real substitution. 
C Training Courses 
In the final year of the Youth Opportunities Programme, there was a 
major expansion of the number of places available in this sector of 
provision. Previously, the number of trainees on training courses 
had not exceeded 300, and this had constituted only about 13% of the 
total number for South East Hampshire. However, by October 1982, 
the number had risen to over 700, constituting approximately 26% 
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of the total number of trainees on the Programme in the area. This 
doubling of training course provision was associated with the intro-
duction of New Training Places at the beginning of this final year 
of YOP. Thus, approximately 60% of the total number of New Training 
Places available were provided in this sector. 
There were three main types of course available. First, there were 
the 12 month Work Skills Courses which provided the 450 or so New 
Training Places in this sector. These were new courses which were 
being introduced for the first time. Generally they consisted of six 
months of formal training at a specialised training establishment, and 
six months work experience at an industrial or commercial placement. 
Secondly, there were the 13 week Short Training Courses, which had 
always been a part of YOP and until this final year had provided the 
vast majority of places in this sector. With the introduction of 
Work Skills Courses, the number of trainees on these courses had been 
reduced to approximately 200. Finally, there were a small number of 
Work Introduction Courses which aimed to provide disadvantaged and 
low achieving young people with a sheltered introduction to the world 
of work. These were usually 13 weeks long, though there were some 
courses which lasted six months or a year and were included as Work 
Skills Courses. In all, approximately 50 Work Introduction Course 
places were offered at anyone time. 
These different types of courses covered a wide variety of vocational 
areas. The pattern of distribution was to a certain extent influenced 
by the type of course. Thus, amongst Work Skills Courses, the main 
concentrations of places were as follows: 35% in Engineering, 12% in 
Construction, and 12% in Motor Vehicle Repair. Whereas, amongst the 
Short Training Courses, 30% of places were in Construction, 25% in 
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Office Skills and 22% in Engineering. Work Introduction Courses 
were different in that they did not concentrate on any particular 
vocational area, but aimed to offer a wide range of sampling. In 
contrast to the occupational distribution of WEEP schemes, the overall 
bias of the vocational courses in this sector of provison appears to 
have been towards the declining traditional manufacturing and 
construction industries, rather than the newer service industries. 
Having said this, it should be remembered that there was evidence 
of Construction holding up as a source of employment for school 
leavers far better than its overall position in the local labour 
market might suggest. But this was not the case with Engineering, 
and yet it was the vocational area with the largest concentration of 
the new high quality Work Skills Courses. 
The majority of these courses were provided by the four further 
education colleges located within the Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area. 
Thus 18 out of 22 Work Skills Courses were college-based, as were 
60% of places on Short Training Courses and all the Work Introduction 
Courses. The rest were provided by a variety of private training 
organisations. The six visits that I made within this sector included 
three out of four of the local colleges and three other training 
organisations. Between them, these institutions provided approximately 
90% of the sector's places. However, it should be pointed out that 
often I was only able to examine a sample of the provision available 
within a particular institution. 
During my visits I followed a standard list of questions, similar to 
those that I used in the other two sectors, but adapted to the 
specificity of this sector. In addition to questions concerned 
with the training courses provided within this sector, where appro-
priate, I included q~estions about the off-the-job training that 
was provided on behalf of schemes in the other two sectors. Having 
already examined this provision from the angle of the work experience 
schemes with which it was associated, I thought it necessary to 
provide the balance of a second analysis from the angle of the insti-
tutions in which it was provided. This analysis is written upwithin the 
separate section D. 
1. Background 
I collected certain background information about each of the insti-
tutions that I visited, and about the history and development of YOP 
provision within it. Once again, I have summarised this information 
in a series of brief character sketches. 
a) College 1 
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This was a large, well-established college situated on the outskirts 
of Portsmouth. It had close contacts with local industry, and a 
strong reputation for high level training in traditional skill areas, 
such as construction and engineering. Its involvement with YOP 
provision went back to September 1979, when a Short Training Course 
in Construction had been established. This had run continuously 
ever since, offering up to 30 places three times a year. However, 
it was not until September 1982 that there was any further expansion 
of YOP provision. At this point eight new Work Skills Courses were 
introduced, as it was thought, in preparation for the Youth Training 
Scheme. These new courses were as follows: Road Motor Vehicle 
Servicing (RTITB); Construction (Vocational Preparation Scheme); 
Leisure and Caring Services; Repair and Maintenance of Hotel, Catering 
and Public Building Services; Business Studies; Introduction to 
Engineering; Vocational Preparation Training in the Construction 
Industry; and MSC/TEC Foundation Course in Engineering. This brought 
the total number of YOP places on offer at the college up to about 
135. But this was still insignificant in relation to the total 
capacity of the college. Another recent development had been the 
introduction of off-the-job training in brick-laying for a small 
number of trainees from work experience schemes in the construction 
industry. Previously, the college had not involved itself in the 
provision of off-the-jobtraining for other YOP schemes. 
b) College 2 
This was a modern purpose-built college located just outside Portsmouth. 
It had been involved in running what were referred to as 'Gateway 
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Courses' for the young unemployed since 1975. These had been 13 
week courses in either Engineering or Office Skills. Another import-
ant pre-YaP experience had been the running of a Unified Vocational 
Preparation Course for employed youngsters. The development of this 
course had been very successful in its own terms, but it had failed 
to attract sufficient support from local employers and therefore had not 
been continued. With the introduction of Yap, the Gateway Courses 
were re-labelled as Short Training Courses, but continued much as 
before. Each of them offered up to 30 places three times a year. 
In addition, a Work Introduction Course was introduced, offering up 
to 12 places three times a year. Subsequently, in 1981-82, another 
Short Training Course was developed which offered training in what 
was referred to as Personal Services. In September 1982, two new 
Work Skills Courses were established, one in Engineering and the other 
in Personal Services. However, this did not constitute a major 
expansion of provision. Although all the existing Short Training 
Courses continued to run, the number of places was reduced on those 
covering the same areas as the new Work Skills Courses. At the same 
time, the length of the Work Introduction Course was extended from 
13 to 26 weeks, but the throughput was reduced from 36 to 24 trainees 
a year. Altogether, at the beginning of this final year, the college 
was offering about 115 places on these various yap training courses. 
Once again, this was not a very large figure in relation to the total 
provision of the college. In addition to these college-based training 
courses, for a number of years it had provided a small amount of day 
release off-the-job training for local work experience schemes. Two 
groups of 12 trainees each were catered for per term. Finally, it 
should be noted that this college was also involved in yap as a WEEP 
sponsor, offering four places, two in the Engineering Department and 
two in the Office. 
c) College 3 
This college, which was located in the centre of Portsmouth, regarded 
itself as the 'different college'. Its original and principal 
function was as an art and design school, teaching courses up to 
degree standard. However, since 1976, it had been developing a 
secondary function as a community college providing various forms 
of continuing education. From the very beginning, the provision 
of courses for the young unemployed had developed as an important 
aspect of this secondary function. First, in September 1976, the 
college had established a short course in Painting and Decorating. 
This was followed in 1977 by the development of a Work Introduction 
Course. With the formal introduction of YOP in 1978, the college 
diversified its provision of Short Training Courses so as to include 
both Office Skills and Retailing, in addition to Painting and 
Decorating. These Short Training Courses, together with the Work 
Introduction Course continued to offer between 60 and 70 places per 
term throughout the history of the Programme. In September 1982 
this provision was added to by the introduction of four new Work 
Skills Courses. Three of these were run by the College on behalf of 
a private training organisation which had set itself up as a pilot 
managing agency for the Youth Training Scheme. These courses were 
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as follows: Front Office/ Reception; Recreation/ Leisure/ Tourism; 
and Distribution/ Warehousing. The fourth Work Skills Course, which 
was the sole responsibility of the college, was in Craft, Design and 
Technology. The addition of these four new courses brought the 
college's capacity up to about 125 YOP trainees at anyone time. Also 
during this final year, the Work Introduction Course was extended to 
offer places of either six months' or a year's duration. The college 
had also been involved from the beginning of YOP in the provision of 
off-the-job training in social and life skills for work experience 
trainees. This was originally organised on the basis of day release, 
but after about a year a system of block release was introduced. The 
capacity rose from about 120 trainees per annum in 1980/81 to a 
potential throughput of between 5-600 trainees in 1982/83. Finally 
it should be mentioned that this was the college that in February 1983 
was responsible for setting up the Group WEEP scheme that has already 
been described above. Overall, YOP work constituted approximately 
20% of the provision of the college, and as such was of more signifi-
cance than in the other two colleges. The revenue thus gained-from 
the MSC was regarded as particularly important to the development of 
the community college side of its work. 
d) The Apprentice Training Centre 
This was a Shipbuilding Apprentice Training Centre situated just 
outside Portsmouth. The demand for apprentices had been declining 
over recent years and it had introduced YOP training courses in 
order to make use of its spare capacity. This started in 1980 with 
the provision of Short Training Courses in Pipework and Joinery. 
In September 1982 a Work Skills Course was introduced in Engineering 
Practical Skills. This catered for 60 trainees in addition to the 
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36 on Short Training Courses. The apprentice intake for this year 
was 53, compared with 140 in 1979. Thus in a period of just three 
years YOP training had taken over two-thirds of the Centre's capacity. 
e) The Skillcentre 
This was an MSC Skillcentre located in Portsmouth.. Its principal 
function was toprovide TOPs courses for adult trainees. These were 
offered in 17 different trades: seven in engineering, five in auto-
motive servicing and repairs, three in electronics, one in construction 
and bricklaying, and one in gents hairdressing. Most of these were 
26 weeks long and were run off a staggered entry. The total capacity 
of the Centre was for approximately 200 trainees. Its involvement 
with YOP courses had begun in autumn 1981, when a number of 13 week 
Short Training Courses were set up. These were provided for on the 
basis of infilling the existing TOPs courses. A trade union agreement 
allowed for two YOP trainees to be infilled into each TOPs section. 
The Short Training Courses were then made up of between one and three 
sections, with the pairs of trainees being alternated between sections 
in the m~ltiple section courses. The courses provided were as follows: 
Engineering and Machine Operative; Refrigeration; Motor Vehicle 
Servicing; Motor Body Repair and Spraying; Construction; and Gas and 
Electric Arc Welding. These offered 26 places in all. In September 
1982, two Work Skills Courses were introduced. The first of these was 
a course in Road Motor Vehicle Servicing which the Centre ran as an 
agent on behalf of the Road Transport ITB. This offered three places, 
doubled up to six by alternation with work experience placements. The 
second was a Mechanical Engineering course of their own design which 
offered eight places, doubled up to 16 by alternationa. Finally 
the Skillcentre offered a unique form of YOP course referred to as 
a Training Experience Course. This was a special 10 week course of 
job sampling for trainees who were proving difficult to fit into 
other training opportunities. It provided 10 places for trainees 
who were infilled into different sections on a flexible week-to-
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week basis. Altogether, the three different types of courses were 
catering for between 50 and 60 YOP trainees. This represented between 
25 and 30% of the capacity of the Skillcentre. 
f) The Engineering Training Association 
This was an association of some 50 engineering companies in the 
Portsmouth area that had been set up to service the training needs 
of its members. As well as providing advice for its members and 
organising courses for their employees, it also ran a Training 
Centre on the outskirts of Portsmouth which catered almost exclu-
sively for the young unemployed. This had been set up in 1977 in 
response to a request from the Engineering ITB, and originally it 
ran a machine operating course under the aegis of that organisation. 
With the introduction of YOP, this course had been taken over by 
the MSC as a 15 week Short Training Course. Subsequently, in 1981, 
a second electronically based Short Training Course had been intro-
duced. Then, in September 1982, a Foundation in Electronics and 
Engineering Work Skills Course was launched, which combined the contents 
of the two Short Training Courses. The three courses had a combined 
capacity for between 45 and 50 trainees. 
2. Recruitment and Selection 
By the time that I was making my case study visits the Special 
Programmes Division and the Training Services Division of the MSC 
had been merged into a single Training Division. However before this 
took place in December 1982, although it was the Special Programmes 
Division that was responsible for the management of YOP as a whole, 
it was the Training Services Division that directly administered the 
training course sector of YOP provision. Its role in recruitment 
and selection was more active than that of the Special Programmes 
Division in the case of work experience schemes. The formal system 
was as follows. The Training Services Division would first approve 
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a course and then send relevant details of it to the local Careers 
Service (and Jobcentres). The Careers Service would then recruit 
suitable candidates bearing in mind any selection criteria that might 
have been stipulated for the course. These pre-selected candidates 
would then be sent for a final selection interview at the training 
establishment where the course was to be run. Generally representa-
tives of both the Careers Service and the Training Services Division 
would attend these interviews, as well as members of staff at the 
training establishment. 
Within the bounds of this formal system, I found that there was a 
considerable variation of practices from course to course. The most 
significant differences were between the three main types of courses 
rather than the different institutions that were running them. 
Work Skills Courses were in general the most selective in their 
recruitment practices. As well as a high level of motivation, often 
certain minimum academic levels of achievement in relevant subjects 
were stipulated as requirements for pre-selection. For example, the 
MSC/TEC Foundation in Engineering Work Skills 'Course at College 1 
specified that applicants would need a minimum of CSE grade 3 in 
Mathematics, a suitable science subject, and English Language or a 
non-technical subject requiring English as a means of communication. 
Generally, CSE grade 3 was the minimum level required. Notice was 
also taken of results obtained in a locally administered engineering 
grading test, which originally had been set up to assist companies in 
the selection of their apprentices, and which was taken as a matter 
of course by many young people in the area during their last year of 
school. Thus, for example, the Skillcentre was looking for grades 
A-C for its Work Skills Course in Mechanical Engineering; grade A 
being 'technician level' ,grade B 'upper craft level', and grade C 
'craft level'. Up to twice as many applicants as the number of places 
available would be pre-selected by the Careers Service to go for 
interview. As well as the actual interview, applicants were often 
expected to undergo various aptitude tests. Thus, for the Road 
Transport ITB's Road Motor Vehicle Servicing Work Skills Course 
which was run at both the Skillcentre and at College 1, applicants 
were not only interviewed but were tested in simple arithmetic, 
mechanical skills and I.Q. In general, those selected were those 
who showed the greatest ability - often young people who previously 
might have expected to get an apprenticeship. Work Skills Courses 
were regarded as high quality provision, and as such, for the most 
part they were reserved for the higher ability trainees. There were 
however exceptions, like the Personal Services Work Skills Course at 
College 2, which required of applicants nothing more than motivation 
towards employment in community care or the service industries. 
In contrast to most Work Skills Courses, Short Training Courses 
generally asked for minimal formal requirements and were prepared 
to accept almost any candidate sent by the Careers Service. In some 
cases the basic ability to read was required, and this was assessed 
by means of a simple test. At the Engineering Training Association, 
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all candidates had to take the engineering grading test and a minimum 
grade D (lower craft level) was made a requirement for safety reasons. 
Elsewhere, the line was drawn above ESN level. However, the Construc-
tion course at College 1 regularly offered two places to ESN-M trainees. 
Thus, Short Training Courses were in general far more open than Work 
Skills Courses. Indeed, some of the training staff that I spoke to 
were of the opinion that the most fundamental difference between the 
two types of course was not in their length or their content, but 
in the type of trainee that they recruited. 
Work Introduction Courses were different again, insofar as they 
deliberately sought to attract lQw achievers and the disadvantageq, 
young people lacking motivation and with little understanding of the 
world of work. Thus, in the case of the Work Introduction Course 
at College 2, three or four ESN-M trainees were included on each 12 
place course. For this particular course, the Careers Service pre-
selected about 25 suitable candidates who they thought might benefit 
from it. These young people were then invited to a half-day open 
day which included an interview. The emphasis in selection was put 
on them choosing the course and wanting to do it. 
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One feature that was common to the recruitment for both Work Skills 
Courses and Short Training Courses was sexual stereotyping. Only vey 
occasionally did I come across a girl on an engineering or a contruc-
tion course, or a boy on an office skills course. The explanation 
usually given was that only the members of one sex had expressed any 
interest in the particular course to the Careers Service. However 
there was one kind of course, the Personal Services Short Training 
Courses and Work Skills Course at College 2, which had been designed 
specifically with girls in mind. This had led to certain protests 
from feminists at the college, and, with some reluctance, the courses 
had been opened up to boys as well. However, very few boys had 
wanted to go on such courses, and those that did, had experienced 
difficulties in fitting in. In the case of Work Introduction Courses, 
sexual stereotyping of recruitment did not so much apply, since these 
courses were not directed to a particular area of vocational training, 
but to a particular level of ability and motivation amongst the 
trainees. 
A final feature that ought to be noted is the difficulty that some 
institutions were experiencing in filling their courses. During my 
visits, certain of the training staff complained that the Careers 
Service were not sending them enough recruits to be able to maintain 
the numbers on their courses. This particularly applied to Short 
Training Courses which were being refilled for the second and third 
time that year. The Engineering Training Association had bypassed 
the Careers Service and successfully mounted its own advertising in 
orderto attract sufficient trainees. Elsewhere the opinion was 
expressed that the Careers Service were not doing enough to keep 
in contact with the young unemployed and to attract them onto the 
provision that was available. However, this may have been a temporary 
problem resulting from the upheaval of the transition to 12 month 
training programmes under the Youth Training Scheme. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
In the same way as the MSC Guidelines established the four main 
components of scheme content for the two work experience sectors, 
they did so for this sector. However, the headings were not exactly 
the same as those in the work experience sectors, and there were 
certain variations between the main types of course. The main 
components of the Short Training Course syllabus, as laid down in 
the MSC Guidelines, were as follows: (i) Induction; (ii) Training 
in Work Skills; (iii) Job Seeking and Other Social and Life Skills; 
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and (iv) Personal Advice and Support (Counselling ).(70) The principal 
difference here as compared to work experience schemes was in element 
(ii) where 'Training in Work Skills' replaced 'Planned Work Experience'. 
The Work Introduction Course syllabus repeated the main components of 
the Short Training Course, but made certain additions and changes of 
emphasis. Alongside Induction at the beginning of the course, more 
emphasis was put on initial Assessment. 'Training in Work Skills' 
was re-worded as 'Training in Basic Work Skills', with the emphasis 
on training in simple skills covering a wide range of employment 
opportunities. Finally, instruction in Number and Communication was 
placed alongside training in Social and Life Skills as a requirement 
of content. (71) The principal way in which the content of Work Skills 
Courses differed from that of Short Training Courses was that it 
included 'Planned Work Experience' at an external placement, as well 
as 'Training in Work Skills', the two elements being integrated into 
a complementary package. (72) In this respect, a Work Skills Course 
could be regarded as a combination of a six month WEEP and an extended 
Short Training Course. However, there were other differences which 
will be explained as they arise. Despite these complications, I 
intend to keep to four basic headings similar to those that I have 
used in the two work experience sectors. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
3. Induction 
This was to include the introduction of trainees to each other and 
the training establishment, and information about the purpose of the 
scheme, the payment of allowances, safety at work, disciplinary 
arrangements, etc. In the case of Work Skills Courses and Work 
Introduction Courses, it was also emphasised that the young people 
should be assessed during the early stages of the course in order 
to determine their training needs. This assessment would then be 
used in the planning of their subsequent progress through the course. 
In the case of Short Training Courses, such an initial assessment was 
optional. As with recruitment and selection, Training Opportunities 
Advisers were directly involved in the induction process. 
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On the courses that I examined, in general, the induction procedures 
closely followed the MSC Guidelines. Thus, for example, the standard 
procedure at the Skillcentre included the three following elements. 
"1. A tour of the premises noting the location of toilets, 
emergency exits and first aid facilities. 
2. The need for: safety at work, discipline, care when 
handling equipment, etc.; workshop and personal 
cleanliness. 
3. Introduction to supervisors and potential colleagues 
and/or peers." 
In addition all trainees had to take an arithmetic test to assess 
whether they needed any extra numeracy training in order to be able to 
complete their courses. Although these were not Work Introduction 
Courses, 90% needed some form of remedial help. Elsewhere procedures 
were similar. At industrial, as opposed to college-based, training 
establishments there was a tendency for more emphasis to be put on 
discipline, and rules and regulations. Thus, at the Apprentice 
Training Centre, each new trainee had to read and sign a copy of the 
rules, agreeing to abide by them and the accompanying disciplinary 
procedure. At colleges, the tendency was for more emphasis to be put 
on the establishment of social relationships. Thus, the Work Intro-
duction Course at College 2 started off with a week's residential 
which was designed to help the trainees get to know each other and 
the staff. 
4. Training in Work Skills and Planned Work Experience 
The MSC Guidelines on the syllabus of a Short Training Course stated 
the following with regard to Training in Work Skills: 
"Under supervision, trainees will be given instruction 
in a range of work skills which are required by local 
employers. A course in office skills, for example, would 
be widely based so that it might lead to employment as 
a typist, receptionist, clerk, telephonist or business 
machine operator. The time spent on each activity should 
be sufficient to allow young people to develop occupational 
skills and to make realistic assessments of their own 
interests and capabilities."(73) 
In the case of work Introduction Courses, the emphasis was placed on 
a wider range of sampling: 
"Courses should provide the young people with as many 
simple work skills as possible to prepare them for a 
wide range of employment opportunities."(74) 
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Once again it was stressed that the skills taught should be relevant 
to the trainees' local labour market. In addition, it was stated that: 
"The needs of the young people may require the training 
to be provided in the form of structured work experience 
within the training establishment. Such work experience 
must be supervised by the course tutor."(75) 
Finally, in the case of Work Skills Courses, formal occupational 
training of the kind specified in the Short Training Course syllabus 
was to be extended and integrated with planned work experience at 
an external placement. (76) 
Some idea has already been given of the overal range of training 
courses available in the local area, and of the particular courses 
available at the training establishments that I visited. During my 
visits I was interested, firstly, to find out why particular training 
courses had been laid on by particular training establishments, and 
how these decisions had been related to the needs of the local labour 
market. Secondly, I sought to gain more information about the training 
content of these courses, and once again how this was related to the 
local labour market. Finally, in the cases where the courses 
included planned work experience, I tried to establish how this 
had been organised and integrated with the training content. 
The first point which must be noted is that, in this sector as the 
other two sectors, there was no systematic plan made by the MSC to 
ensure that training provision was directly related to the needs of 
the local labour market. Rather it was the case that the pattern 
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of training course provision gradually evolved in response to several, 
often conflicting influences, one amongst which was the needs of 
the local labour market. Originally, both before and at the begin-
ning of YOP, courses were simply laid on under what were considered 
to be 'obvious headings' such as Construction, Painting and Decora-
ting, Engineering, Office Skills, etc. Such headings were 'obvious' 
because they related to traditional areas of industry, in which young 
people had expectations of finding employment and for which training 
facilities were most readily available. Courses continued to be offered 
under these same headings throughout the Programme, though, as will 
be seen, there were some efforts made to develop the content beneath 
these headings. At the same time, as the demand for pla~es rose, 
there was a gradual addition of new courses, which in the final year 
was greatly accelerated by the introduction of Work Skills Courses. 
With the development of these newer courses, some attempt was made to 
take more systematic account of the local labour market. Analyses 
were carried out of the Careers Service vacancy statistics and the 
Industrial Training Boards were consulted for relevant information. 
However, it was never possible simply to plan the pattern of provision 
so that it systematically related to an analysis of the available 
information concerning the present and future needs of the local 
labour market. Two other factors, which have already been alluded to, 
always had to be taken account of and often ran counter to the 
influence of the needs of the local labour market. The first, and 
most important, of these was the availability of suitable training 
facilities. As will be seen below, it was often the case that high 
quality training facilities could be made available to the Programme 
precisely because there was a lack of demand in the local labour 
market for the skills in which they were able to provide training. 
Under the pressure of limited time and money the MSC generally had 
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to accept such facilities as it was offered. The second counter-
vailing factor that had to be taken account of, at least in theory, 
was the personal preferences of the trainees. Often these prefer-
ences were directed towards trade areas in which there was a family 
tradition, and collectively this tended to produce a pattern of demand 
for training aimed at the traditional local labour market, rather 
than that of the forseeable future. Thus, insofar as trainees' 
preferences were taken account of, their influence tended to reinforce 
the effects of the limited availability of training facilities, and 
to undermine further the relation between training course provision 
and the future needs of the local labour market. The way in which 
these various factors combined to determine the range and pattern of 
courses provided was exposed in more detail when I investigated how 
individual training establishments had come to provide the particular 
courses that they did. 
At each of the colleges that I visited, YOP courses had to some extent 
made use of facilities which had previously been used for apprentice 
training. The exact extent varied from college to college, depending 
upon the vocational areas in which the particular college specialised. 
In general, it was the courses in traditional manual trades that were 
most likely to be using spare capacity made available to them by the 
decline of apprentice training. Thus, for example, at College 1 it 
was possible to provide the facilities for the Road Motor Vehicle 
Servicing Work Skills Course because of the decline in the number of 
apprentices and other privately sponsored trainees. At the same time, 
this was an area of training for which many YOP trainees had expressed 
a preference. Furthermore, for other courses, this college made use 
of accommodation and facilities at the Unicorn Training Centre, which 
had previously been the Apprentice Training Centre for the Dockyard. 
At College 2, the Engineering courses similarly made use of spare 
capacity created by the reduction of apprentice training. College 3, 
however, was different insofar as it had never been involved with 
traditional apprentice training. Nevertheless, like College 1, 
it made use of accommodation at the Unicorn Training Centre for the 
provision of YOP courses. 
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However, it was only a minority of the training course provision in 
colleges that simply replaced previously existing apprentice training 
in this way. The rest was provided as an addition, which in some 
instances was made room for by the more efficient usage of existing 
staff and facilities, and in other instances involved the taking on 
of new staff and the provision of new facilities. In these cases 
there was probably more scope for the active consideration of the needs 
of the local labour market, but still much depended upon which depart-
ments were the most enthusiastic, and the most willing and able to 
adapt themselves to the requirements of YOP provision. Relevance to 
the local labour market, in some cases, seemed at best a fortunate 
coincidence, which was only introduced as an important consideration 
in order to provide a retrospective rationalisation for decisions 
taken on other grounds. The college courses, for which the most 
elaborate efforts had been made to establish the demand in the local 
labour market, were those run by College 3 on behalf of the private 
training organisation which had set itself up as a pilot managing 
agency. Available local labour market information had been analysed 
by the training organisation in order to identify areas of potential 
future growth for which training might be needed. At the same time 
a catalogue had been made of existing local training facilities and 
this then had been related to the training needs identified. The 
result of this process was the three Work Skills Courses in Front 
Office/Reception, Recreation/Leisure/Tourism, and Distribution/Ware-
housing .. In support of the other Work Skills Course at this college, 
that in Craft, Design and Technology, the argument was made that the 
need for the repair and maintenance of a predominantly 19th Century city 
created a demand for the skills that it taught. Elsewhere, at College 1, 
the Repair and Maintenance of Hotel, Catering and Public Building 
Services Work Skills Course was regarded in a similar way as being 
responsive to a particular area of growing demand on the local labour 
market. Finally, at College 2, the long-running Office Skills 
Short Training Course had from the beginning been seen as a response 
to the continuing local demand for junior typists and clerks with 
some basic training. Thus, at all three colleges, there were 
examples of local labour market needs being given serious consi-
deration in the decision to mount a course. 
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However, it is necessary to becareful~ since such serious conside-
ration was not necessarily all that it seemed. At College 2, the 
publically presented rationale for establishing the Personal Services 
Courses was to provide girls with vocational training to help them 
find employment in the expanding services sector of the local economy. 
The real reasoning was different. The Careers Service had specifi-
cally requested the college to lay on a course for low ability young 
girls, many of whom, faced by the likelihood of unemployment, were 
seeking to gain status by getting pregnant or marrying young. Thus, 
the hidden objective of the course was to develop the domestic skills 
of the girls in order to help them to cope with what was considered 
realistically to be the likely circumstances of their future lives. 
The recent unpopularity of 'A' level Domestic Science at the college 
meant that, by 'happy coincidence', the staff and facilities were 
available to provide such courses. 
Turning now to the non-college training establishments, at two out of 
three of these, YOP provision had simply replaced existing apprentice-
ships and training courses for which there was insufficient demand. 
It has already been mentioned how, at the Apprentice Training Centre, 
YOP courses were used to fill the spare capacity left by the rapid 
decline of apprenticeships in shipbuilding. Simiarly, at the Skill-
centre, there had been no overall increase of training capacity, but 
rather the in-filling of YOP trainees had been used to replace adult 
TOPs trainees. The number of TOPs trainees had been reduced because 
of the declining rate of job placements at the end of courses. In 
theory, the range of courses was supposed to be adapted to the 
changing needs of the local labour market. However, it was both 
expensive and time-consuming to keep introducing new courses in an 
attempt to respond to such changes. The easier solution was to 
tighten up the entry requirements for TOPs courses, by putting more 
emphasis upon candidates being able to demonstrate that they would 
be able to get a job at the end of their course, and then to fill 
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the spaces thus created with YOP trainees. Thus, at the Skillcentre, 
the situation was that YOP trainees were being in-filled onto courses 
which had reduced their intakes of adult trainees because of the 
difficulty being experienced in finding employment at the end of 
such courses. 
At the Engineering Training Association, however, there was a different 
situation. Although the development of YOP courses had coincided 
with a decline in the number of apprenticeships being catered for 
by the association, there was apparently no direct connection between 
the two. The association did not use its own facilities to carry 
out the training of its members' apprentices, but those of the local 
colleges, in particular College 1. The association's own Training 
Centre, at which the YOP courses were provided, was used almost exclu-
sively for the training of unemployed young people. As has already 
been mentioned, it had been set up six years previously for this 
specific purpose, in response to a request from the Engineering Indus-
trial Training Board. Moreover, this request had been the outcome of 
a labour market survey which had revealed that young people were 
experiencing great difficulty in making a direct transition between 
school and employment as machine operators. Thus the Centre had been 
set up to meet this need for school leavers to be provided with some 
form of basic junior operator training. Likewise, when subsequently 
the association had introduced a second electronically based Short 
Training Course, this had been developed as a result of information 
obtained from the Careers Service, the MSC and the Engineering Indus-
trial Training Board, which had persuaded them that there was growth 
in this area of the local labour market. As it happens, this informa-
tion appears to have been misleading, since great difficulty was ex-
perienced in finding jobs for the trainees when they completed the 
course. This only goes to show that, even when serious consideration 
was taken of available labour market information, this information 
could not necessarily be guaranteed to be sufficiently detailed or 
reliable to identify exactly where additional training provision 
was needed. 
Looking back across the whole range of training courses available, 
both in colleges and in other training establishments, it can now 
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be seen that many factors intervened to ensure that there was only a 
partial correspondence with the range of demand in the local labour 
market. Yet, even if a particular course corresponded to a general 
area of demand, this did not necessarily mean that it was relevant to 
that area of demand. Relevance depended also upon the content of 
the course, and whether it was kept up to date with developments in 
the corresponding area of demand. Consequently, I was interested to 
establish from what sources course curricula had originally been 
derived and how they had subsequently been developed and reorganised. 
The curricula of both Short Training Courses and Work Skills Courses 
were normally based on pre-existing modules of training which were 
already being provided by the particular training institution. In 
the case of the colleges, these were generally taken from established 
further education courses, such as BEC and TEC, and City and Guilds. 
Elsewhere, at the Apprentice Training Centre the 1st year apprentice 
training course was the source, and at the Skillcentre it was the 
TOPs courses. The exception was the Engineering Training Association, 
where the operator course had been designed specifically on the basis 
of information gained from the Engineering ITB survey which had 
originally identified the need for such a course, combined with the 
association's own local knowledge of training needs. 
Short Training Courses had often been run under the same heading 
year after year, sometimes from as far back as 1976. The content' 
of many of these had originally been very narrow. The training 
modules on which they were based had been stripped of much of their 
theoretical 'classroom' content, and a few basic practical skills 
had been concentrated upon, which could be taught to comparatively 
low ability trainees over a period of 13 weeks. Over the years, the 
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MSC had encouraged various measures of quality improvement such 
as, more adaptation to the needs of the individual trainee, the 
inclusion of a work experience element, and in particular the 
widening of the vocational area covered by individual courses through 
an increased emphasis on the development of transferable skills. 
Furthermore, it was seen as important that they should keep up with 
technological developments taking place in outside industry. 
However, amongst the courses that I examined, there was considerable 
variation in the extent to which their content had been developed 
and improved over time. 
For example, the Office Skills course at College 2, which had started 
as a 'Gateway' course in 1976, had altered little over the following 
six years. By concentrating on the basic skills required by junior 
office staff, such as typing, and working on the development of the 
trainees' general communication skills, the course had originally been 
able to achieve practically a 100% job placement rate. Although sub-
sequently this rate dropped, the course was still regarded as suffi-
ciently successful to carryon without substantial modification through-
out the history of the Programme. In contrast, the Short Training 
Course in Construction at College 1, which dated back to September 1979, 
had undergone substantial modification during its subsequent history. 
Throughout, it had specialised in dealing with difficult, aggressive 
male trainees who had low educational attainments and/or a record of 
not wanting to work. Originally, the course had included no formal 
training content and had consisted of labouring projects which were 
little more than "digging holes in the ground and filling them in 
with concrete". The primary purpose was to achieve attitudinal changes. 
Otherwise it was just a way of keeping the lads occupied and off the 
dole. Nevertheless, at this stage, the course had been able to place 
up to 90% of its trainees in employment. Subsequently, as it became 
more difficult to maintain a high placement rate, more emphasis was 
placed on the development of the training content of the course. The 
project work was continued for two and a half days of each week, but 
the remaining two and a half days were devoted to formal 'off-the-job' 
training. Four half days of training were provided in each of the 
following construction skill areas - bricklaying, carpentry, plumbing, 
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and electrics. The remaining half day was spent on general education. 
Subsequently, in September 1981, an optional three month external work 
experienceplacement was added to the basic three month course. To 
be allowed to go on to such a placement, trainees had to prove during 
the course that they were capable of coping with the work involved. 
Throughout the development of the course, the department which ran it 
was able to monitor the local labour market through its contacts in 
the construction industry and its involvement with the running of 
courses for the Contruction ITB. Despite a high rate of unemployment 
amongst construction workers in general, there was a certain level of 
continued demand for young people entering the industry • (77 ) However, 
over recent years, the pattern of this demand had changed. The demand 
from large firms working on large construction sites had declined, 
whereas there had been an increase in demand from small builders involved 
mostly in repair and maintenance work on private homes. This had been 
taken account of in the development of the content of the course. As 
well as requiring an emphasis on slightly different skills, private 
repair work made appearance and manners more important attributes in 
a potential employee than was the case with building site work. 
Work Skills Courses, because they tended to select higher ability 
trainees and because they had twice the length of training content 
of Short Training Courses, were generally able to retain more of 
the theoretical content of the training modules from which their 
curricula were derived. Indeed, some of these courses were able to 
offer their trainees the opportunity to obtain further education 
qualifications or to undertake the same training as that normally 
given to first year apprentices. However, in certain instances, there 
was a tension between this reversion to conventional models of high 
quality training and the forms of quality improvement that the MSC 
was expecting from these new courses. The development of Short Training 
Courses had demonstrated the difficulties involved in identifying 
local labour market needs and matching course provision to them. 
As a result of this experience, as we have seen, gradually more 
emphasis was put upon training in transferable skills that could be 
made more relevant to wider vocational areas. with the introduction 
of Work Skills Courses, the concept of skill transferability was 
extended and given more formal organisation in the new system of 
Occupational Training Families. However, the impact of this MSC 
initiative upon the individual courses that I examined was sporadic 
and inconsistent. 
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The Work Skills Course in Engineering Practical Skills at the Appr-
entice Training Centre provides an example of the way in which the 
MSC's concept of quality improvement based on the development of 
broad transferable skills came into conflict with a more conventional 
model of high quality training based on traditional craft skills. 
During the first six months of the course, before they went out on 
work experience placements, the YOP trainees went through exactly 
the same training programme as the first year apprentices did. The 
only differences between the two groups were that the apprentices had 
brown overalls, whereas the YOP trainees had blue overalls, and the 
apprentices were paid roughly double the YOP allowance - a cause of 
certain resentment. The training programme which both groups under-
took was based on craft standards and had originally been designed in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Shipbuilding ITB. The 
first 10 weeks consisted of a common basic training, which included 
an introduction to each of the main skill areas covered at the training 
centre. Then the trainees were divided between two main streams, one 
specialising in metal work, the other in engineering and electronics, 
with a third, smaller subsidiary group in woodwork. Such specialisa-
tion went against the drift of MSC policy. Furthermore, it seemed 
that little consideration had been given to the particular needs of 
the YOP trainees or to the requirements of the local labour market 
outside the shipbuilding industry. Indeed, the attitude of the train-
ing centre management was that such considerations were not their 
responsibility. They provided what they believed was the highest 
quality training possible with the existing staff and facilities. If 
the MSC wanted something different they would either have to go else-
where or provide the funding necessary to adapt the facilities and 
retrain the staff for what they wanted. As far as the concept of 
skill transferability was concerned, this was used to support the 
status quo of specialist craft training based on the traditional 
model of apprenticeship. If skills could be transferred, it did 
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not so much matter that the training was not as broad as it could 
have been. Without actually changing the curriculum, it could be 
hoped that the trainees would be able to adapt the basic manipulative 
skills that they had learnt to a variety of different jobs that 
might be available in the local labour market. 
Another aspect of quality improvement that the MSC re-emphasised with 
the introduction of ~~rk Skills Courses was the inclusion of various 
aspects of new technology, in particular micro-electronics. However, 
once again the influence of this policy was only occasionally evident 
in the courses that I examined. The Work Skills Course at the Appren-
tice Training Centre was in fact one of the courses that included some 
content concerned with computer awareness, as was the Engineering 
course at College 2. Interestingly, in both cases, these innovations 
were the initiatives of the course providers rather than having been 
directly encouraged by the local MSC. Elsewhere, I saw little evidence 
of such developments. In certain cases, training was being carried 
out on obsolete machinery and techniques were being taught that it was 
acknowledged were no longer used in local industry. One such example 
was the inclusion of instruction in filing techniques as part of the 
Mechanical Engineering course at the Skillcentre. The problem often 
was that the training establishments could not afford the new machinery 
which incorporated the technological advances. 
Apart from having twice the length of training content of Short Train-
ing Courses, the principal way in which Work Skills Courses differed 
was that they included six months of related work experience. Although, 
as we have seen, some Short Training Courses included an element of 
work experience, it was never a statutory element constituting 50% of 
the course. The responsibility for arranging and monitoring of the 
work experience placements was that of the course providers. The 
effort involved in finding suitable placements varied from course to 
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course. The course providers with good contacts in relevant areas of 
local industry found it comparatively easy. For example, the Engineer-
ing Training Association was able to place almost all of the trainees 
on its course with member companies. In other cases, the Careers 
Service was able to provide lists of suitable placements, usually 
with firms that had previously acted as WEEP sponsors. However, for 
some courses, it was still very difficult to find all the places 
that they needed. The Work Skills Course at the Apprentice Training 
Centre, at the time of my visit, looked like finding only 60% of the 
places that it required. Thus, 40% of the trainees were going to 
have to stay on at the training centre doing projects with the appren-
tices. Furthermore, not all the places that had been found were 
relevant to the training that had been given. This was a cause for 
complaint amongst trainees on certain other courses as well. Never-
theless, the monitoring of placements by the course providers was 
generally far more frequent than that carried out by the MSC in the 
WEEP sector. They were still responsible for paying the trainees 
their allowances, and therefore visits were often made as frequently 
as once a week. Furthermore, some course tutors expressed the opinion 
that their monitoring visits were not only more frequent.but more 
effective than the MSC's. This was because they had a more intimate 
knowledge of the particular local industry and could obtain better 
access to individual companies. Finally, it should be noted that the 
six months duration of these placements could be made up in various 
ways. In some cases, such as the course at the Apprentice Training 
Centre, the work experience came in a single six month block at the 
end of the formal training element. In other cases, shorter periods 
of work experience, generally of between one and two months in length, 
were alternated with periods of formal training of similar length. 
This would generally be arranged so that there would be two groups 
of trainees swappingwith each other between the two elements. This 
made it possible for both the training establishments and the work 
experience placements to be filled to capacity all the year round. 
Having described and compared the training and work experience content 
of Short Training Courses and Work Skills Courses, it should be noted 
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that almost unanimously amongst course providers the latter were 
regarded as the most successful format. Opinions on Short Training 
Courses varied: some regarded them as useful in their own right, 
others thought them a waste of time. In contrast, Work Skills Courses 
were generally highly regarded. The extra length of formal training 
content was often seen as making all the difference. It was not 
merely that the quantity of training was doubled, the extra time also 
made an essential qualitative difference. On the one hand, the 
trainees apparently regarded the longer courses far more seriously. 
On the other hand, the course providers felt that they had time to 
organise what they regarded as high quality training. The integrated 
work experience placement was also seen as giving the Work Skills 
Courses a great advantage. It gave an added element of realism to 
the course as a whole, particularly when it was organised on the 
basis of alternation with the formal training content. Furthermore, 
it gave trainees a useful contact with employers which greatly enhanced 
their chances of finding a permanent job at the end. However, the very 
success of Work Skills Courses was a cause of grievance amongst their 
providers, particularly at the colleges. It had originally been under-
stood, when the MSC had asked for these 12 month courses to be developed, 
that they were to be pilots for the Youth Training Scheme which was 
to be introduced in the following year. Hence they were commonly 
referred to as 'NTI pilots'. On this understanding, it was claimed, 
a lot of work had been put into developing and ensuring the success 
of these courses. However, by the time that I was making my visits, 
it was becoming increasingly clear that this format of training course 
was not going to be continued under the Youth Training Scheme. The 
vast majority of places were going to be provided by the employer-based 
'Mode A' sector, and the main role of colleges and other training 
establishments was going to be the provison of the 3 months off-the-job 
training for these programmes. Thus, the development work that had 
been carried out on the basis of the so-called'NTl pilot' format had 
largely been a waste of time. This was a cause of widespread resent-
ment, particularly amongst college staff. The feeling was that they 
had been misled and let down by the MSC. Furthermore, the reduction 
of the formal training content from 26 to 13 weeks was generally 
regarded as a regressive step that would reverse much of the quality 
improvement that the extra time available to Work Skills Courses had 
allowed. 
Work Introduction Courses were different from Short Training Courses 
and Work Skills Courses insofar as they were job sampling courses 
rather than being directed towards specific vocational areas. As 
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such, they could not so easily be derived from pre-existing training 
modules. Consequently, their design and development tended to involve 
a greater degree of innovation. At College 2, however, the staff 
were able to make use of the previous experience which they had 
gained from the development of the Unified Vocational Preparation 
Course. An inter-departmental team was already established which had 
experience of working together on the development and organisation 
of individual courses. This provided the foundation of a cross-college 
approach to course provision which helped greatly. with the devempment 
of the diverse job sampling content of the Work Introduction Course. 
Besides job sampling, the main elements of training content in a 
Work Introduction Course were social and life skills, and various 
forms of remedial education. These are considered separately in 
the next section. As far as the work experience content was concerned, 
this was in general flexibly organised to meet the needs of individual 
trainees. At College 2, after the residential induction week at the 
beginning of the course, trainees were gradually moved towards under-
taking two days a week of work experience in sheltered placements. 
Often these were located within the college, in the stores for example, 
so that the trainees were never far away from support if they needed 
it. Otherwise, the course had developed a register of 20 or 30 suit-
able placements, where there were sympathetic employers who were 
prepared to make some allowance for the special needs of these part-
icular youngsters. The total amount of work experience undertaken by 
a trainee whilst on the course depended upon the needs of the indivi-
dual. If it was thought to be beneficial, the time spent at a place-
ment could be expanded to as much as four days a week. However, when 
the extended Work Introduction Course was introduced in the final 
year, some of this flexibility was lost. The 13 week course was run 
as usual, but then the trainees were sent out on 26 week work 
experience placements. During these placements, they returned to 
the college on day release once a week. 
5. 'Off-the-Job Training' (Social and Life Skills, Remedial and 
Further Education) 
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Inverted commas are necessary here since the whole content of training 
courses in this sector, except for the work experience placements, 
could be described as off-the-job training. However, what is being 
referred to is only those elements which were the equivalent of the 
off-the-job training that was associated with work experience schemes. 
This means, primarily, social and life skills, and remedial numeracy 
and literacy. However, in the case of some Work Skills Courses, it 
also refers to separate vocationally based further education courses 
which trainees undertook whilst on day release from the establishments 
at which they were accommodated during the rest of the week. As with 
the analysis of off-the-job training in the two work experience 
sectors, this analysis is based on information obtained from the 
questioning of those with overall responsibility for these courses. 
An analysis from the angle of those specifically responsible for the 
provision of the off-the-job training content will, as has already 
been explained, be provided separately. 
In the case of the training courses based at colleges, their social 
and life skills and remedial education content was generally provided 
by the Liberal or General Studies Department within the particular 
college. Although both part of the same formal institution, there 
was not always close liaison between these departments and those with 
the overall responsibility for the provision of the courses. Thus 
the problem, which has already been identified in the two work exper-
ience sectors, of off-the-job training being inadequately related to 
the main content of the scheme/course, was sometimes reproduced in 
this sector, even when the two elements of the course were accommodated 
within the same institution. 
Only one of the three non-college training establishments used local 
college provision of social and life skills training as the 'off-the-
job' element for some of its courses. This was the Engineering 
Training Association which made weekly day release for social and 
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life skills training at the local college a compulsory element of its 
Short Training Courses. Once again, in this case, coordination 
appears to have been poor. Furthermore, the course organiser shared 
the low opinion of college-base social and life skills training that 
was previously expressed by work experience sponsors and managers. 
Specifically, he complained that the college tutors were not committed 
to what they were doing and were merely delivering a pre-packaged 
syllabus. This, he observed, was reflected in the negative attitudes 
of the trainees. It was like going back to school, and that was the 
last thing that they wanted. At the Apprentice Training Centre, 
there does not appear to have been any formal 'off-the-job' social 
and life skills content included as part of the Short Training Courses. 
However, the training instructors were expected to include a certain 
amount of information about job applications, bank loans and similar 
matters, alongside the main vocational content of the course. Finally, 
at the Skillcentre, there was an education instructor who was respon-
sible for providing both social and life skills training and remedial 
numeracy to the YOP trainees whilst they were on courses at the 
centre. 
In practice, the 'off-the-job' content of Work Skills Courses was 
often the same as that of Short Training Courses. In the cases where 
it was different, the difference lay in a move away from social and 
life skills training towards courses with a greater vocational content 
which led to formal qualifications. Thus, for example, both the 
Engineering Training Association and the Apprentice Training Centre 
sent their work Skills Course trainees on day release to local colleges 
to undertake City and Guilds 200 Basic Craft Studies courses. These 
courses included an element of social studies as well as their voca-
tional content, but generally they were regarded as much more satis-
factory than the social and life skills provison. 
Finally, the case of Work Introduction Courses is slightly different 
insofar as it is more difficult to identify a separate element of 
content that can be labelled 'off-the-job training'. On these 
courses, the social and life skills and remedial education were not 
peripheral, but were a core element of course content. Thus, at 
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both the colleges that ran Work Introduction Courses, the provision 
was located in the Liberal/General Studies Department, and it was 
developed in parallel with the 'off-the-job' training being provided 
for other schemes and courses. At College 2, the \!Jork Introduction 
Course was regarded as a social and life skills course per se. The 
sampling of a range of specific vocational skills was thus principally 
a vehicle for the development of these more general skills. 
6. Counselling and Trainee Centred Reviewing 
For each of the three different types of course, it was a requirement 
that there should be available to the trainees personal advice and 
support provided by a responsible adult. Other agencies, such as 
the Careers Service, were to liaise and help as necessary. Addit-
ionally, in the case of Work Skills Courses, the need was stipulated 
for a continuous review of progress to be made, culminating in the 
production of a profile showing the trainee's attainments and general 
development. Furthermore, it was emphasised that the trainees them-
selves should take an active part in this process, logging their own 
progress and discussing it with their tutor. 
As has been mentioned before, it is difficult to isolate and analyse 
the counselling content of a scheme or course. As one course co-
ordinator put it to me, "Counselling - that's 100 per cent of the job." 
Usually, the prime responsibility for counselling lay with the tutors 
and instructors who worked with the trainees on a day-to-day basis. 
They generally regarded this counselling role as a natural extension 
of their working relationship with the trainees. As such, it was 
something that was learnt through experience rather than any specific 
training. The attitude of those in managerial positions was often 
expressed by the phrase "my door is always open". However, they did 
not expect to be bothered with minor everyday problems, and it was 
usually only with serious disciplinary matters that they would 
become directly involved. In such cases, the Careers Service and the 
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trainee's parents might also be brought in. At the Skillcentre, 
the education officer who provided the social and life skills, was 
also the person primarily responsible for counselling. He regarded 
the two roles as being closely related and the discussion groups which 
he ran were intended to cover both areas, though trainees of course 
could also speak to him individually if necessary. Similarly, at 
College 1, the tutors at the Liberal Studies Department, who were 
responsible for providing social and life skills training, regarded 
counselling as an important aspect of their role. They described 
themselves as providing a safety valve, through which trainees could 
let off steam about other areas of the course provison. 
The reviewing of trainees' progress on Work Skills Courses usually 
took the form of weekly reports filled out by instructors. From 
these, an overall profile of trainee achievements could be built up. 
Often these reports and profiles were modelled on those used for 
apprentices. Sometimes they had already been adopted for Short 
Training Courses as well. Trainee involvement usually took the form 
of their writing up some kind of log book. However, this process 
often appeared to be kept completely separate from the reports being 
made by the instructors, so in fact there were two parallel processes 
of review rather than a single collective process centred on the 
trainee. Only at one course did I see trainees given the opportunity 
to negotiate and to participate actively in the assessments that 
were made of their progress. In some cases they did not even see 
these assessments. 
7. Monitoring 
Once again, this was the responsibility of the Training Services 
Division rather than the Special Programmes Division. Training 
Opportunities Advisers, who were also responsible for monitoring 
adult training courses, undertook the equivalent role of Special 
Programmes Division Area Link Officers. Under these arrangements, 
this sector of YOP was in general more tightly administered ana 
closely monitored than the two work experience sectors. 
At all but one of the training establishments that I visited, the 
Training Opportunities Advisers had maintained regular and close 
contact with the course providers. The exception was the Skill-
centre which, as an internal element of theMSC training network, 
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had not been thought to require separate monitoring of its YOP pro-
vision. However, at the time of my visit, this situation was in fact 
changing in response to the increasing independence of Skillcentre 
operations from direct MSC control. Elsewhere, in addition to being 
closely involved with both the recruitment and induction processes, 
the Training Opportunities Advisers usually made visits at least 
once a month during which they would speak to the trainees indivi-
dually. In some cases, particularly where the training establishment 
was also involved in TOPs provision, contact was far more frequent 
than this. As well as checking on the progress made by individual 
trainees, it was ensured that health and safety standards were being 
upheld and that the agreed training programme was being followed. 
Financial monitoring seems to have been less of a priority than in 
the work experience sectors, probably because the Training Services 
Division retained direct control over the payment of trainees' 
allowances and thus there was less delegation of financial responsi-
bility to the course providers. Finally, because of the close contact 
maintained by the Training Services Division with courses in this 
sector, the role of the Careers Service as a secondary monitoring 
agency was less important than it was in the two work experience sectors. 
8. End of Scheme 
Under this heading, I was concerned to find out what happened to 
the trainees at the end of the various different kinds of courses. 
Being the first year of the 12 month Work Skills Courses, there were 
not yet available any figures for the placement rates of trainees 
leaving these courses. Thus, the account that follows is based only 
on the figures from the Short Training Courses and the 13 week Work 
Introduction Courses. 
In general, the work preparation side of YOP was considerably less 
successful at placing trainees in employment than the work experience 
side. Originally, in the pre and early YOP era, many courses had 
achieved placement rates as high as 90%. It seemed then that, 
almost regardless of the content or quality of the actual training, 
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the status of having attended a college or training establishment 
course was sufficient to give the young people the lift that they 
needed to get them into a job. However, as the general situation of 
the labour market had deteriorated, the placement rate of the short 
courses had dropped sharply, particularly in the case of those provid-
ing training in traditional skill areas such as engineering. By 1982, 
only 15% of those completing Short Training Courses and Work Intro-
duction Courses were finding permanent employment, compared with just 
over 40% from the various work experience schemes. Between a third 
and a half of those unable to find permanent employment would go onto 
another YOP placement, most usually a WEEP scheme. Most of the rest 
would go back on the unemployment register. Of all those leaving YOP 
training courses in South East Hampshire between April and June 1982, 
41% went straight into unemployment. There was usually no follow-up 
provided by the course providers. At best these young people took 
away with them a few basic skills and a certain amount of work 
discipline that might help them to use their 'leisure' more creatively. 
At worst they had had their hopes raised and then dashed by a course 
which had trained them in the basic skills of jobs that no longer 
existed. 
9. Production for Sale 
The providers of the various training courses were not encouraged 
in the same way as Community Projects and Training Workshops to 
contribute to their running costs by producing goods for sale. Never-
theless, some of the non-college training establishments included 
production work as an element of their course content. 
Thus, the Training Centre at which the Engineering Training Associa-
tion provided its courses for YOP trainees was production based, 
carrying out various kinds of sub-contract work. Similarly, the 
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Skillcentre made standard charges for jobs such as car repairs 
and resprays which were undertaken by the trainees. These activities 
of course raise the same questions about unfair competition and job 
displacement that were considered under this heading with reference 
to the second of the two work experience sectors. However, there is 
another side to this argument which needs to be illustrated. At 
the Apprentice Training Centre the trainees carried out exercises 
in carpentry and metalwork, the end products of which would often 
be destroyed and used as scrap. Ironically, the level of craftsman-
ship deployed in these exercises was often a great deal higher than 
that in the goods produced for sale by the work experience schemes. 
The course could not be accused of endangering other people's liveli-
hoods, but it could be accused of being wasteful. At the same time, 
this example illustrates the vast gulf that existed between the 
worlds in which different local YOP schemes were operating. While 
the materials bank and craft unit of Community Project 1 scrounged 
scraps of hardboard which could be tacked together, painted and sold 
as rough and ready toys, the Apprentice Training Centre had trainees 
carrying out highly skilled work in wood and metal which, once 
completed, would only be taken apart again or destroyed. 
10. Staff 
The MSC Guidelines had little to say about the staffing of courses in 
this sector. It was merely indicated that a course proposal should 
specify the person with overall responsibility for the course and 
the number of other course staff available. (78) 
Unlike in the non-WEEP work experience sector, staff were not usually 
recruited and trained specifically for YOP training courses. Most of 
the staff who were responsible for the running of these courses had 
previously been employed by the various training establishments in 
some other capacity, either dealing with apprentices, further education 
students or TOPs trainees. The exception to this rule was provided 
by the Engineering Training Association. Because its Training Centre 
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had from the beginning been established in order to cater for 
unemployed school leavers, the staff had been recruited and trained 
specifically for this purpose. Elsewhere, staff who were used to 
dealing with well-motivated apprentices and students had experienced 
certain difficulties with the new influx of YOP trainees. This was 
particularly so in the case of the colleges, which for their Short 
Training Course had tended to be less selective than the other training 
establishments. Not only did the tutors have to adapt to a new client 
group, they also had to construct a new kind of course. Initially, 
little help appears to have been available from the MSC in terms of 
training and support, so not surprisingly the process of adaptation 
had in some cases been fairly traumatic. One college course co-ordina-
tor recalled that the initial reaction of his staff had been one of 
revolt. Oonsiderable support and discussion had been necessary before 
eventually they had come to terms with the new situation. Of course, 
in certain vocational areas where the YOP courses represented a net 
increase of provision rather than a means of filling spare capacity, 
some new staff had been taken on. However, the main area in which 
colleges had recruited new staff specifically for YOP was that of 
Social and Life Skills training. This is dealt with separately, below, 
in the sub-section under the heading of 'Off-the-Job Training'. 
As the scale of YOP provision in colleges was expanded, and attention 
was turned towards the development of pilot courses in preparation 
for YTS, the MSC nationally had come to recognise the need for 
additional development and training support to help further education 
staff cope with the new demands that were being placed upon them. 
Consequently, it had made available to LEAs for this purpose a 
discretionary supplement for the three year period, 1981-84. The 
supplement, popularly known as the 'Robinson shilling', was calculated 
on the basis of 5p per student hour for each YOP trainee being ca~ered 
for. This represented the amount necessary to provide 25 days' staff 
and curriculum development for tutors working full-time on YOP, and 
proportionally less for those with less involvement. 
Hampshire, in common with many other LEAs, proposed its own programme 
for YOP staff development and submitted an application for the MSC 
supplement. The main feature of this programme was to be the esta-
blishment of local curriculum groups which would meet at weekly 
workshops/seminars. Attendance was to be obligatory, with time 
being allowed on tutors' teaching timetables for this purpose. 
At the sessions, it was intended that curriculum development and 
staff development should be brought together, and discussed in 
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close relation to the localised reality of the on-the-job situation. 
This was an approach that had already been piloted in relation to UVP 
and YOP work in Hampshire, and which owed much to the influence of 
ideas put forward in the literature of the FEU. In addition, it 
was proposed that special pre-course induction sessions should be 
arranged to introduce all new staff to the key issues of Vocational 
Preparation. Finally, it was proposed that a series of optional 
conferences and courses should be organised at a county level with 
the objective of encouraging the exchange of new ideas and successful 
practice. 
The emphasis placed by the Hampshire programme on local curriculum 
groups rather than formal courses was considered to be a unique feature. 
Nevertheless, this general approach had been enthusiastically endorsed 
by the MSC and the original proposal had been accepted with only 
minor alterations. However, it was not until January 1983 that the 
programme started to be implemented with the setting-up of the local 
curriculum groups. At the same time, a regular succession of one day 
courses had been arranged mainly concerned with the introduction of YTS. 
But even as the new arrangements were coming into operation, doubts 
were arising about their future, and in particular, about how they 
would fit in the MSC's plans to set up 'accredited centres' for YTS 
staff development and training. It was hoped that, if the local 
curriculum groups could be made a regular fixture by September 1983, 
they would survive. 
11. Trainee Representation 
My concern was to find out what arrangements had been made for trainees 
to represent themselves or to be represented by trade unions in the 
management of these courses. 
In the non-college training establishments the style of management 
was generally autocratic. Individual grievances could usually be 
taken up through standard industrial procedures, but there was little 
scope for the trainees to have a collective say in the way in which 
the courses were run. Apart from at the Skillcentre, where the 
581 
number of YOP trainees that could be infilled per section was regulated 
by a union agreement, the trade unions appeared to have had little 
or no impact upon the courses. Some Transport and General Workers 
Union leaflets had been handed out at the Apprentice Training Centre, 
but they had not succeeded in attracting the trainees. The attitude 
of the management was hostile to any union interference in the running 
of the Centre, and the trainees were regarded as being too young to 
be involved in such activities. As for the trainees themselves, 
whilst not overjoyed with their £25 a week, they were prepared to 
accept it if they were getting some proper training, and they were 
not prepared to lose any of it in union dues, even if these were only 
nominal. 
At the colleges, the style of management was less overtly autocratic, 
but still the trainees had no organised collective input. Likewise, 
trade union influence was again negligible. An alternative source 
of trainee organisation was theoretically available in the Students 
Union, which the trainees were eligible to join as part-time members. 
However, the Union naturally tended to be dominated by the full-time 
further education students, and in most cases there seems to have 
been little contact between them and the YOP trainees. The Students 
Union representative whom I spoke to at College 1 did not know whether 
any YOP trainees had joined the Union. No special efforts had been 
made to Fecruit them, and no particular issues had been taken up on 
their behalf. Apparently, there was a certain feeling of resentment 
amongst the full-time students about the YOP trainees receiving a 
£25 allowance, when many of them had no financial support at all. 
General Impressions 
For a number of reasons, this was the most formalised and the most 
tightly regulated of the three sectors of provision. First, by their 
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very nature, training courses tend to be more formal and therefore 
more easy to regulate than work experience. Secondly, these particular 
courses were located in established institutions whose specific 
function was that of training. Thirdly, there was the fact that 
this sector was administered and monitored by the Training Services 
Division of the MSC, rather than directly by the Special Programmes 
Division. The TSD, through its responsibility for TOPs courses, 
already had close contacts with most of the institutions at which YOP 
courses were located. Moreover, its administrative control of TOPs 
provision was in general far tighter than the SPD's was of YOP provision. 
Thus, when it came to the administration and monitoring of this sector 
of YOP on behalf of the SPD, the TSD was able to extend a tighter form 
of control to the courses concerned. 
The fact that provision in this sector was more formalised and more 
closely regulated meant that in certain respects there was less 
scope for variety than in the other two sectors. The different 
institutional locations, and in particular the contrast between indus-
trial and educational environments, had a certain effect upon the 
character of the courses. However, the main lines of distinction in 
this sector were drawn by the formal definitions of the three main 
different kinds of courses - Short Training Courses, Work Skills 
Courses and Work Introduction Courses. The distinctions were made 
both in terms of selection and content. With the introduction of 
Work Skills Courses in September 1982, what might be described as a 
'tripartite' system ofse~ction was instituted in this sector. Thus, 
while the Work Skills Courses creamed off the more able trainees, 
the Work Introduction Courses selected out the most disadvantaged, 
leaving the Short Training Courses to take those who fell in-between. 
This pattern was not without exceptions: there were extended Work 
Introduction Courses that were accorded Work Skills Course status and 
there was, for example, the Personal Services Work Skills Course at 
College 2 which catered specifically for low ability girls. However, 
given such exceptions, the distinction between the three main types 
of course formed the basis of what in the final year had developed 
into a clearly defined system of selection. As far as content was 
concerned, it will be remembered that the main differences lay in 
the fact that Work Introduction Courses were not directed towards any 
particular vocational area, whereas both Short Training Courses and 
Work Skills Courses were vocationally specific, with the former pro-
viding 13 weeks of formal training and the latter double this length 
of training combined with six months of work experience. 
The fact that both Short Training Courses and Work Skills Courses 
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were directed towards particular vocational areas gave rise to the 
question of their relevance to the needs of the local labour market. 
As we have seen, there was no systematic plan to relate the vocational 
distribution of the courses to an analysis of local labour market 
prospects. Rather courses were set up under the 'obvious' headings, 
which depended as much upon the availability of staff and facilities 
as upon what might be described as a 'commonsense' knowledge of local 
needs. As was the case with the availability of staff in the non-WEEP 
work experience sector, the availability of staff and facilities in 
this sector tended to be positively related to a lack of demand in 
the local labour market. Thus, some courses in this sector were put 
on as a direct result of a fall in demand for apprentices in declining 
local industries. Yet, even when the courses were genuinely new pro-
vision, and efforts had been made to direct them towards areas of 
growing demand, the information available was not necessarily suffi-
ciently detailed or reliable to ensure that these courses would be 
able to place a high proportion of their trainees in permanent 
employment. 
The placement record of this sector was, in general, poor when compared 
with that of the two work experience sectors taken together. However, 
the figures available were for the Short Training Courses and Work 
Introduction Courses that had been run before the final year of the 
Programme. These had the disadvantage of catering mainly for the 
lower ability trainees who had been rejected by WEEP sponsors. Also, 
although they offered well-regulated training, they could not for 
the most part provide the realism of work experience. Indeed, it could 
be argued that the fact that they were well-regulated and 'went by 
the book' contributed to their artificiality, particularly in the 
educational environment of the colleges. The Work Skills Courses 
largely avoided these handicaps. Most selected trainees above a 
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certain minimum level of ability, and, through the six month placement, 
they were able to offer trainees both realistic work experience and 
the opportunity to prove themselves to a potential employer. Unfor-
tunately, because they were 12 month courses and had only been intro-
duced in September 1982, at the time that this case study was being 
carried out no figures were yet available for the placement rates 
achieved by trainees at their completion. 
Generally, the course providers considered the format of Work Skills 
Courses to be more satisfactory than that of Short Training Courses. 
Not only did the trainees gain the additional benefits of work exper-
ience, but also they received twice the quantity of training and this 
was widely regarded as making an important qualitative difference. 
Indeed, the best Work Skills Courses were able to provide an integrated 
programme of formal training and work experience that was qualitatively 
on a par with that offered by the ITEC. However, there were problems. 
Unlike in the case of the ITEC, not all the high quality courses in 
this sector were directed towards identifiable areas of growth in the 
local labour market. As we have seen, some were merely filling in 
for apprentices that were no longer in demand. Furtherm?re, the under-
standing of quality training of the course providers was not always 
fully in agreement with that of the MSC. Thus, there was sometimes a 
tendency to use the extra time available on these courses for further 
trade specialisation on the model of the apprenticeships that were 
being replaced, rather than broadening the range of skills available 
as the MSC would have liked. But probably the most serious problem 
was that of expense. Training courses were expensive compared with 
work experience, and doubling the period of training doubled their cost. 
Of course the ITEC was expensive also, but it was only a token showpiece 
for 30 trainees. Work Skills Courses, by contrast, were catering for 
450 trainees, which represented two-thirds of the total of this s.ector 
of provision. 
By the time that I was carrying out this case study, it was already 
clear that Work Skills Courses had little future under YTS. Although 
three months off-the-job training was specified as the minimum for 
a YTS training programme, it was generally understood that in most 
cases this would be the maximum. At the same time, the size of the 
training establishment-based sector of provision (Mode B2) was 
being reduced in the MSC's plans, particularly in the South where it 
was expected to be easier to find the necessary employer-based 
provision (Mode A). Thus, it was becoming increasingly evident that 
the shape of provision in the final year of YOP, when the training 
course sector represented over a quarter of the total and consisted 
in the majority of one year courses including six months of formal 
training was a one-off situation and not the shape of things to come 
under YTS. 
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This fact was a source of some bitterness amongst course providers in 
this sector. The feeling was most strong in the colleges. They had 
put considerable effort into the development of the new Work Skills 
Courses on the understanding that they were to be pilots for the 
Youth Training Scheme. Now it was being revealed that YTS was no 
longer going to include such courses, and that the scope of provision 
under the control of the colleges was to be reduced to little more 
than a few extended Work Introduction Courses for trainees whom the 
employers could not cater for. Otherwise they were to be left to 
compete with private training organisations for the 13 weeks off-the-
job training associated with the schemes run by employers' managing 
agencies. 
The demise of Work Skills Courses illustrates the underlying limita-
tions of provision in this sector. It will be remembered that the 
problems of the two work experience sectors were analysed in terms 
of either substitution or addition. Leaving aside for the moment 
their work experience content, the courses in this sector were essent-
ially additionalprDvision like that in the non-WEEP work experience 
sector. As such, they were subject to the same fundamental limitations 
of expense and artificiality. However, there was also a certain 
element of substitution present. The courses were provided by esta-
blished institutions, for the most part using existing staff and 
facilities. The availability of these staff and facilities made it 
possible, in the final year of YOP, to bring about a large expansion 
of genuinely high quality training provision in this sector through 
the introduction of Work Skills Courses. However, in many cases the 
staff and facilities were available for these new YOP courses because 
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they were no longer required for other training courses which had 
existed previously. This is not to imply that there was a parallel 
form of substitution to that taking place in the WEEP sector, in the 
sense of the MSC funding training which otherwise would have conti-
nued to be funded from elsewhere. Rather, the problem was that this 
training would not have otherwise continued, thus implying that there 
was no longer a demand for the kind of skills that it produced on 
the local labour market. Moreover, such provision tended to adhere 
to the same ideals of quality as that which it had replaced, rather 
than adopting those espoused by the MSC. However, if the MSC had 
wanted to reproduce a comparable level of quality in accordance with 
its own ideals, and to have related the provision more systematically 
to the needs of the locai labour market, it would have had to produce 
far more funding for the development of new courses. Thus it comes 
back to the fundamental underlying problem of additional provision, 
that of expense. To this can be added that of artificiality, as 
reflected in the poor placement record of this sector. Yet, if the 
realism of these courses was enhanced through the introduction of 
a work experience placement with an employer or production for sale, 
the same problems of substitution would arise as in the other two 
sectors. Thus, this sector also was trapped between the problems 
of additionality and sUbstitution. 
D Off-the-Job Training 
The contribution of off-the-job training has been examined separately 
in each of the three sectors of provision that have been described 
above. At times the accounts given have been highly critical. However, 
it should be remembered that these accounts have been derived principally 
from the opinions expressed by those responsible for providing the main 
body of the work experience schemes and training courses. Not being 
directly responsible for the off-the-job training, it might be expected 
that they would tend to be more openly critical of this element of the 
provision. Thus, in order to provide balance, I sought also to obtain 
the opinions of the staff who were directly responsible for the off-
the-job training throughout Hampshire as a whole. 
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In October 1980, Hampshire was one of 12 local education authorities 
nominated by the MSC to act as an 'Exemplary Project' for the provision 
of off-the-job training to work experience trainees. The Exemplary 
Projects initiative was one element of the wider quality improvement 
campaign that has already been described from the national perspective 
in Chapter 5. As we have seen, the proportion of work experience 
trainees receiving their entitlement to off-the-job training was 
regarded as an important gauge of quality. However, during the first 
year of the programme, only 17% of them had received this entitlement; 
and although the figure had risen to 35% in the second year, this was 
still not considered to be satisfactory. ~he objective of the Exemplary 
Projects initiative was to examine ways of increasing this proportion 
by replacing the ad hoc responses of individual colleges with co-ordinated 
authority wide plans. Each authority taking part received a £10,000 
grant to fund the development work that was involved. The initiative 
as a whole was co-ordinated and monitored on behalf of the MSC by the 
Further Education Staff College at Combe Lodge. (79) 
Before its designation as an Exemplary Project, Hampshire already had 
a County Working Group covering all aspects of YOP. This formed the 
basis of the County Exemplary Project Group which was subsequently estab-
lished, and which included senior level representatives of the MSC and 
the Careers Service, along with College Principals and Officers of the 
Edcation Department. The task which this Project Group set itself was 
to analyse the existing state of off-the-job provision in the county~ 
and to formulate a plan for its expansion and development. At the 
start of the Exemplary Project, the county's level of provision was 
well below the national average. Only 10% of all the trainees on work 
experien~e schemes, and only 5% of those on WEEP schemes, were receiv-
ing planned further education through the LEA. This for the most part 
consisted of social and life skills courses which were available at three 
of the ten colleges in the county. Otherwise, a small amount of in-
filling of trainees took place on existing voational courses. This LEA 
provision was supplemented by a small number of three day social and 
life skills courses run by the private training organisation, JMB 
development training. 
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The plan formulated by the Project Group included a substantial 
expansion of existing social and life skills provision, involving not 
only the colleges, but also the youth and community services as 
providers. Also, three experimental vocational/social and life 
skills courses were to be piloted, one in each of the county's 
three Travel-to-Work Areas. Each course was to cover a different 
vocational grouping, selected on the basis of an analysis of the 
vocational distribution of WEEP scheme placements within each 
respective Travel-to-Work Area. As well as being concerned with the 
expansion of provision, the Project Group spent a considerable time 
discussing curriculum development and produced a common outline for 
social and life skills courses in the county. Half of the develop-
ment grant provided by the MSC was spent on the servicing and expenses 
of the Project Group. The other half contributed towards the salary 
of a curriculum development officer who was given responsiblity for 
liaising between the Project Group and the individual providers, and 
monitoring the implementation of the plan. 
During the period of the Exemplary Project, the overall level of 
LEA off-the-job provision available to work experience trainees more 
than doubled. Thus, in the year to December 1981, there were 1470 
places available compared with 550 in the previous year (some of these 
new places being provided in association with the youth and Community 
Services and the Adult Basic Education Service rather than directly by 
the colleges). However, with the local youth unemployment situation 
deteriorating rapidly over this period, the number of trainees entering 
work experience schemes had increased almost as quickly as the level 
of off-the-job provision. As a result, the proportion of all work 
experience trainees that could be provided with planned further educa-
tion by the LEA rose only marginally from 10% to 12%, and still remained 
well below the national average. 
In certain other respects also, the achievement of the Exemplary Project 
was disappointing, particularly with regard to the Portsmouth Travel-
to-Work Area. The vocational grouping chosen for the pilot course 
in this area was the construction industry, and it was intended that 
the new provision should be located at College 1. However, the 
relevant department was reluctant to participate, and expressed the 
opinion that worthwhile vocational training could not be provided 
within the day release format, unless the trainees had already been 
on a Construction Short Training Course. After a series of 
abortive negotiations, the proposed pilot course was abandoned and 
instead the department ran a 12 month Vocational Preparation Scheme 
designed by the Construction ITB. It was next suggested that 
College 2 should run a day release course in Community care for 
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WEEP trainees in that vocational grouping. This time the college was 
more enthusiatic, and eventually the course was launched. However, 
when I enquired about it during my visit, I was told that the course 
had only been run once. Apparently, when the college had tried to 
repeat it, the Careers Service had informed them that there were not 
enough suitable WEEP trainees to make it worthwhile. Thus, in the 
Portsmouth Travel-to-Work Area at least, it would seem that this 
aspect of the Exemplary Project made very little impact. 
I enquired more generally about the impact of the Exemplary Project 
at each of the three colleges that I visited. In each case it did not 
appear to have been great. Where development and innovation had taken 
place, in most cases it was thought that this would have happened 
anyway without the encouragement of the Project. Conversely, where 
there had been a lack of enthusiasm for this kind of provision, the 
Project did not appear to have been able to bring about a change of 
attitude. In hindsight, perhaps the most useful function served by 
the Exemplary Project was to provide a context for regular meetings of 
executive level representatives of the main organisations responsible 
for co-ordinating the local delivery of the programme. However, the 
Project Group did hot continue to meet once the Project was over. 
Indeed, it was notcieable at both college and county levels that rather 
than being incorporated into the process of development towards YTS, 
the Exemplary Project seemed to have been something that had been 
dropped and forgotten about in the rush to prepare for the new programme. 
As seemed likely to be the case also with the staff development pro-
gramme, just when a local response to a national initiative had had time 
to establish itself, a new initiative was overtaking it and rendering 
it obsolete. 
Preliminary details of the off-the-job training provision at each 
of the three colleges that I visited in the Portsmouth TWA have 
already been given in the background accounts of these institutions 
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at the beginning of this section. It will be remembered that College 
l's involvement was for the most part restricted to the servicing of 
its own courses. As we have seen, it had not been prepared to 
accommodate the Exemplary Project's pilot vocational day release 
course. Ironically, however, at the time of my visit the Construction 
Department was organising on its own initiative a half-day release 
course in bricklaying for 15 trainees in the local building industry. 
College 2, in addition to servicing its own training courses, had 
since 1979 regularly provided day release off-the-job training in 
social and life skills for 24 work experience trainees per term. 
Attempts to expand provision beyond this level, as in the case of the 
Exemplary Project Community Care course, had been hampered by the 
difficulty experienced in maintaining a regular supply of suitable 
work experience trainees. Indeed, during 1982, the standard number 
being catered for had been reduced to 12 per term. College 3 was by 
far the largest local provider of off-the-job training. It had been 
involved in this provision since the beginning of YOP, and by 1982-83 
its capacity had risen to a potential annual throughput 'of 5-600 
trainees. However, it, like College 2, had recently been experiencing 
difficulty in recruiting sufficient work experience trainees to fill 
the available capacity. 
The form taken by the off-the-job training for work experience trainees 
differed between the local colleges that were responsible for its 
provision, and at both the main locations had been subject to develop-
ment and innovation. At College 2, the standard format was a 12 day 
course made up of weekly day release over a 12 week period. However, 
on a number of occasions, an alternative format had been used which 
included a three day residential in addition to 10 days of day release. 
Apparently, this innovation had not originally been supported by the 
MSC. Nevertheless, it had proved very successful, helping to make the 
course a more intensive experience of the trainees. It had not been 
continued because a shortage of college funding had made it impossible 
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to release the necessary staff. College 3 had originally provided 
a 12 week, one day a week, day release course similar to the standard 
format used at College 2. This had not been successful and there 
had been a high drop-out rate. The situation was analysed and the 
conclusion was reached that the main problem was the day release 
format. One day a week did not allow the trainees long enough con-
secutive spans of time to establish social relationships with the 
staff or with each other, or to get involved with the content of the 
course. Often they would forget what they had done the week before. 
Thus, in an attempt to ensure a greater continuity, a new format was 
introduced which consisted of four blocks, each three days long. 
Following this reform, the drop-out rate fell, and generally the new 
system was regarded as more satisfactory. Consequently, it was adopted 
on a permanent basis. It would seem that this block release format 
played the same role as the residential did when it was in operation 
at College 2. It helped to create a sense of group identity and to 
intensify the trainees' experience of the course. 
Another dilemma faced by those organising provision was that of how 
best to cater for the wide range of abilities amongst the trainees. 
Originally, most of the trainees had been drawn from the lower ranges 
of academic ability. However, as the youth unemployment situation 
had deteriorated, increasing numbers of better qualified young people 
had come into the programme. Responses varied once again between 
the different colleges. At College 1, the social and life skills 
and remedial training provided for those undertaking YOP courses 
at the college was divided into three streams based on different levels 
of ability. In contrast, at College 3, no selection took place. A 
wide mix of abilities within a group was regarded as something positive 
which could contribute to the experience of all the trainees involved. 
At all three of the colleges that I visited the main component of off-
the-job training was social and life skills, alongside or including 
education in numeracy and literacy. At each of these locations much 
time and effort had been put into the development of the social and 
life skills curriculum. It will be remembered that one of the products 
of the Exemplary Project was the drafting of a common outline curri-
culum for the whole of the county. The intention of this was not to 
impose a rigid framework upon the individual colleges. Rather it 
was to be an open-ended set of aims and objectives, and as such, it 
was not so much a blue-print as a post facto summary drawn from 
the development work that had already been taking place for a number 
of years in the individual colleges. 
The starting points for the development of Social and Life Skills 
curricula had been various. There was of course the MSC's own 
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Instructional Guide. (SO) However, tutors also drew upon existing 
General Studies material, which they tried to adapt to the particular 
needs of YOP trainees. Originally, heavy emphasis was placed on 
the development of job finding skills, such as the writing of applica-
tions and interview techniques. But, as the employment prospects 
deteriorated, the staff became aware that for a considerable pro-
portion of the trainees the most likely future prospect was that of 
prolonged periods of unemployment. Thus the need was seen to include 
in the curriculum, in addition to job search skills, survival skills 
that would help the trainees to cope with life without a job, should 
their job ffiarch prove unsuccessful. Furthermore, it was increasingly 
realised that the skills being taught had to be transferable, so that 
they could be used in a number of different situations in the context 
of a rapidly changing and unpredictable society. These ideas were 
reflected in the two principal aims of the county's outline curriculum: 
" (1) To enable young people to develop their capacities to make 
the best use of changing opportunities in society. 
(2) To .improve the young person's ability to find, gain and 
retain employment and to cope with extended periods of 
unemployment. " 
In the light of these two aims, the following objectives were detailed: 
" It is intended that throughout the course the young person should 
1) develop his/her self-confidence 
2) develop ways of coping with changing roles in adult life 
3) increase his/her self-reliance and develop a sense of 
self-worth 
4) develop a realistic self-assessment 
5) become more self-directing 
6) develop the means to make sense of his/her Work Experience 
placement or Special Programmes involvement 
7) develop inter-personal skills and the ability to work 
with others 
8) develop methods and attitudes to enable him/her to cope 
with problems which arise in the work place 
9) develop methods to overcome fear of new experience, learn 
relevant new skills and develop adaptability 
10) discover resources for employment, community activities, 
and leisure 
11) improve his/her communication skills (including literary 
and numeracy). "( 81 ) 
Setting out aims and objectives is one thing, implementing them is 
another. As has been referred to before, YOP trainees were not for 
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the most part the usual college clientele. Often, they were those 
whom the educational system had previously chosen to brand as failures. 
Consequently, they brought with them attitudes of both fear and 
resentment towards a conventional educational environment. It was 
soon found that they could not just be sat down and taught. Their 
interest had to be engaged through practical tasks. 
Curriculum development along these lines had probably been taken 
furthest at College 3. Originally, it had been attempted to improve 
the communication skills of trainees through straighforward literacy 
classes. However, when the format of the courses was changed from 
day release to block release, the emphasis was moved away from formal 
classes to practical projects. Under the new system, the first block 
was primarily concerned with induction and the development of group 
interaction, though it also included job search material. Thereafter, 
the other blocks consisted of various exercises and projects. Thus, 
for example, during one block the group might be set an exercise which 
involved the making of a video. During another, they might be asked 
to go out into the local community and carry out a surveyor find out 
certain information. The formal content of such exercises of course 
had an inherent value of its own. However, more important was the 
'hidden curriculum', which involved the development of the communica-
tion skills and working relationships that were necessary to carry 
out such tasks successfully. Recently, further changes had been made 
in the course curriculum, with the result that the whole of the 
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course was vocationally and practically based, and there was nothing 
that could be described as social and life skills per se. The new 
course was set up so as to provide as wide a choice of practical and 
vocational skills as possible. The range of possibilities was extended 
by the use of facilities at what had previously been the Dockyard 
Apprentice Training Centre and by the buying in of certain skills that 
the existing staff could not provide for themselves. The list 
included: filing and welding, electronics, video-making, photography, 
food preparation, sewing, interior design, theatre skills and commu-
nity care. Trainees were encouraged to negotiate the content of their 
courses on the basis of what was on offer. 
Apparently, then considerable effort went into the development of courses 
that would respond to the needs of individual trainees. Yet, at this 
point, it should be recalled that both the sponsors and the trainees 
that I interviewed in the work experience sectors were often highly 
critical of the social and life skills provision that was available at 
the colleges. It will be remembered that it was thought to be both 
badly organised and irrelevant to the work experience, with too much 
time being spent talking about doing things, rather than actually doing 
them. Obviously, the reforms and developments that have been described 
above indicate that the college providers were not unaware of such 
criticisms and were continually trying to respond to them. However, 
it must be pointed out that the particular criticisms that I recorded 
were voiced by people who for the most part had experienced the more 
recent versions of the courses, which were supposed to have already 
taken on board these points. Clearly, despite the efforts that had 
been put into curriculum development, residual problems remained. I 
want now to attempt to examine these from the angle of those who were 
responsible for the social life skills provision in the colleges. 
The first problem, which has already been mentioned, was the fear and 
loathing expressed by many trainees towards educational institutions. 
This was obviously to a large extent the product of the trainees' 
previous educational experiences, for which the colleges had no direct 
responsibility. However, it also seemed to college staff that these 
negative attitudes were sometimes being reinforced by the prejudices 
and hostility of employers and other sponsors, who were turning the 
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trainees against the college provision before they had had the chance 
to try it out for themselves. Furthermore, in the case of some WEEP 
sponsors, it seemed that they were deliberately discouraging their 
trainees because they did not want the disruption of having to release 
them from their work. As we have seen, this was certainly the case 
with one of the sample of WEEP sponsors who were interviewed for this 
case study. 
The prejudices of both the trainees and the sponsors were reflected 
in the difficulties that colleges experienced in recruiting trainees 
to fill their courses. It seems that originally the MSC assumed that, 
if the provision was available, the trainees would not need any special 
encouragement to come and make use of it. However, despite the fact 
that the amount of provision was only sufficient to cover a small pro-
portion of those who were eligible, finding trainees to fill the courses 
often proved to be a problem, as we have seen already in connection 
with the Exemplary Project. The easiest way to ensure that a course 
was filled, was to make some kind of permanent arrangement with one of 
the larger schemes. However, increasingly, such schemes were opting 
to organise their own 'in-house' dff-the-job training. Thus the colleges 
were being forced to recruit more of their trainees from the smaller 
WEEP schemes. This was often a difficult and time-consuming process. 
The most effective method was for members of staff to make personal 
visits to the trainees and their sponsors on the individual schemes. 
However, no time or resources could be specifically allocated for 
this purpose. Furthermore, it was on occasion suggested that the MSC 
had to some extent been conniving with the employers' obstructive 
attitudes, by not emphasising the trainees' entitlement to off-the-job 
training for fear that it would discourage their participation as 
sponsors. In this connection, it is noticeable that the standard 
monitoring forms for WEEP schemes, unlike those for Community Projects, 
did not include any question asking whether trainees were encouraged 
to participate in appropriate off-the-job training. (82) 
The problems associated with recruitment can be regarded as manifest-
ations of a wider problem, that of the lack of co-ordination and 
co-operation between the college providers of off-the-job training 
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and the work experience sponsors. This also had a detrimental effect 
upon the content of the courses. Because the college staff had 
little contact with the work experience schemes, they were not always 
fully aware of what the trainees were doing on these schemes. Thus, 
although the off-the-job training might be designed to be relevant to 
the world of work in general, it was difficult to ensure that it 
connected to the particular experience of work of the trainees 
concerned. Again, the staff tried to remedy the problem by making 
individual visits to the trainees and their sponsors, but once again 
they were restricted by the fact that there was no allocation of time 
and resources for them to do so. However, the problem was not merely 
one of physical distance. Such lack of co-ordination sometimes 
existed between the providers of training courses and the providers 
of associated 'off-the-job' provision within the same college. 
Underlying this was a fundamental difference of philosophy. Most 
sponsors and providers of vocational training courses tended to 
understand the social and individual development of trainees in terms 
of their ability to adapt and fit in to a given working environment. 
In contrast, many college providers of off-the-job training understood 
trainee development in terms of their ability to act autonomously and 
to question the status quo. They did not want merely to assist in 
the production of compliant and adaptable industrial cannon fodder 
for employers. Thus, the lack of co-ordination with sponsors and 
trainers was not always an omission on the part of providers of social 
and life skills training, but in some cases was a deliberate attempt 
to provide the trainees with a countervailing influence. 
Given such philosophical differences, it is not surprising that some 
of the criticisms made of the social and life skills provision by 
work experience sponsors were aimed directly at the college staff. 
It was alleged variously that they were disorganised, that they did 
not have any interest in the trainees, and that they lacked experience 
of the realities of the world of work. Once again, I tried to examine 
the problems giving rise to such allegations from the angle of the 
colleges themselves. The underlying problem appeared to be that, in 
the context of college activities as a whole, YOP work in general, 
and social and life skills training in particular, were considered 
to be short-term and low status areas of work. This underlying 
problem manifested itself differently in different situations. 
At Colleges 1 and 2, where social and life skills provision was 
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on a comparatively small scale, it could for the most part be handled 
by the existing staff of the General/Liberal Studies Departments, and 
if it was necessary to take on new staff, they would not be solely 
concerned with this type of provision. In this situation, the problem 
took the form of the YOP off-the-job training not necessarily being 
amongst the highest priorities of those who were responsible for its 
provision. Furthermore, these staff had generally been appointed on 
the basis of their academic experience and qualifications, primarily 
to teach further education students. Thus, they were not always best 
prepared to teach non-academic trainees about social and life skills 
in the world of work. At College 3, however, the situation was 
different because of the larger scale of provision. Here, staff were 
recruited specifically to provide off-the-job training to YOP trainees. 
But there was still a problem. These staff could only be offered 
short-term contracts, and thus their position always tended to be 
insecure. Under these circumstances, it was difficult to attract 
high calibre staff with relevant experience. Although efforts were 
made to recruit staff with a wide range of experience other than 
teaching and academic experience, this was not always possible and it 
was acknowledged that there was some truth in the observation that 
unemployed teachers were being employed to teach unemployed school 
leavers about the world of work. Indeed, it seemed that this was 
often an opportunity for those who were looking for teaching experience -
a kind ~f work experience for prospective teachers and lecturers. 
Naturally, in these circumstances, there was a high turnover of staff. 
Those who were relatively competent and successful would use the 
experience as a stepping stone to more secure and higher status 
employment within the educational system. Whilst those who could not 
cope would not be offered a new contract. Meanwhile the permanent 
staff who were overseeing this area of work, once again, had other 
priorities and did not have time to keep close control of what was 
happening, particularly as they were located on a completely different 
site. As for staff development and training, whether with permanent 
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or specifically recruited staff, we have already seen that the 
county-wi de programme of local curriculum groups for all college staff 
involved in YOP work was only just being established in January 1983. 
In conclusion, I think that it has to be acknowledged that many of 
the criticisms that were made of college provision of social and life 
skills training were justified. Certainly, during my visits I gained 
firsthand experience of the poor level of organisation which sometimes 
existed. Yet, at the same time, it needs to be recognised that some 
of the problems arose from circumstances beyond the control of those 
directly responsible for this provision. Social and life skills 
training in colleges seemed to suffer twice over from being a peripheral 
activity. On the one hand, it was peripheral to the work experience 
schemes that it was servicing. On the other hand, it was peripheral 
to the activities of the colleges as a whole. Thus, it tended to fall 
into the chasm between education and industry, over which YOP provi-
sion was supposed to be building a bridge. 
Yet, this fate did not necessarily befall all YOP off-the-job training 
provision. The experience of trainees who enrolled on established 
college courses which carried with them qualifications tended to be 
far more satisfactory. In this case there were two important diffe-
rences. First, the colleges and their staff were providing what they 
were used to and merely adding numbers to existing provision. Secondly. 
the trainees concerned tended to be better motivated and more able to 
accept the college provision on its own terms. As far as social and 
life skills training was concerned, it appeared to have been more 
successful when it was not college-based, but provided 'in-house' at 
work experience schemes and training establishments. 
One such example was the social and life skills and remedial education 
provided for trainees undertaking YOP courses at the Skillcentre. 
Here, it will be remembered, that the proviSion was made by an educa-
tion instructor who worked on-site at the centre. Being on-site, he 
was able to maintain close contact with the trainees and their super-
visors, and could co-ordinate his contribution with what was taking 
place on the various courses. Previously, this instructor had had 
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no experience of social and life skills provision. To start with he 
had tried to work from the MSC's Instructional Guide, but he had not 
found this particularly useful. The standard subjects covered by 
the Guide had not interested the trainees and the formal talks that 
he had attempted to arrange had been a failure. He had then gone to 
a course organised by the National Association for the Care and 
Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO), which he had found far more helpful 
and which had led him to adopt a less formal approach. The basic set-up 
was weekly discussions with groups of approximately eight trainees. 
The length of these discussions was variable, depending on how interested 
the trainees were in prolonging them. The range of subjects covered 
was wide. The only set topic was that of job seeking skills. Other-
wise, it depended on what the trainees wanted to bring up on the basis 
of their own personal experiences. Subjects included the differences 
between work and school, conflicts of loyalty, and the consequences of 
sex. An example of a subject not included was that of drugs, which 
did not appear to be an issue that impinged upon the daily lives of 
the trainees. Similarly, the instructor did not attempt to 'gen up' 
information in order to be able to lead discussions on subjects that 
were outside his own personal experience. What he tried to do was to 
draw on his own experience as an adult to fill in some of the gaps 
around what they were learning from their more formal vocational training. 
This was not so much a matter of telling them what to do, as helping 
them to develop and make decisions for themselves by showing them what 
the consequences of their actions might be. The educational function 
and the counselling function were thus closely inter-related. 
In broad and abstract terms, this trainee-centred developmental approach 
was one that was shared by college providers. However, the kind of 
knowledge and experience that the Skillcentre instructor was trying 
to convey was not that which could be taught out of a manual by a 
tutor in a college who lacked any direct experience of industry. It 
was more akin to the kind of worldly wisdom that traditionally a new 
apprentice might acquire from the experience of being asked to collect 
a left-handed screw-driver or a glass hammer. A particular example 
which had actually arisen was that of a trainee who it was discovered 
always clocked in at the Skillcentre exactly at 8.00 a.m. When the 
education instructor asked him about this, he found that the trainee 
had been told to clock in promptly at 8 and had thought that this 
meant that he had to stand outside waiting until the exact minute. 
This might seem a comparatively trivial point, but it illustrates 
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the advantage of a social and life skills instructor having direct 
experience of the industrial environment into which the trainees were 
being introduced. It should also be noted that the training course 
attended by the Skillcentre instructor had played an important role 
in the development of his approach to social and life skills 
instruction. However, this training could not have substituted for 
his own experience and close involvement with the industrial environ-
ment in which the trainees were working. It merely taught him to 
make use of his own experience and relate it to what he could see 
was happening to the trainees. 
Apart from certain such exceptions, the majority of off-the-job social 
and life skills training available within the local area appears to 
have done more to highlight than to bridge the gap between education 
and industry. Blame could be put upon individuals and institutions 
on both sides of this divide, but it was the existence of the divide 
as a long-standing historical fact that was really responsible for 
the failure. Nevertheless, the exceptions did illustrate what could 
be done with the right combination of individuals and institutions. 
What appeared to be needed was an individual who combined a sound 
industrial experience with the capacity and training to be able to 
convey what they had learnt from this experience to a group of young 
trainees. Such a person was best located directly alongside the 
trainees in a realistic industrial setting which nevertheless provided 
scope and priority for the educational goals of personal development. 
This appears to have been a rare conjuncture under Yap, though certain 
of the larger schemes had recently begun to provide their own off-
the-job training using instructors who were located on-site. But 
still the systematic and close co-ordination of on and off-the-job 
training was a major challenge that would have to be faced by YTS. 
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SUB-APPENDIX 1 
1. Background 
a) Employer 
Name of firm 
Type of business 
Name and position of 
interviewee 
Number of employees 
Composition of workforce 
(m/f, p-time/f-time, 
apprentices and YOQths) 
Changes in number and 
composition, recently 
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WEEP QUESTIONNAIRE 
Local employment prospects 
in type of business ----------------------------------------------
Unionised? 
b) Scheme 
When did you first become a work experience sponsor? 
How did you hear of the scheme? 
What information were you given about the scheme? 
Why did you decide to become a sponsor? 
How many trainees have you sponsored? 
How many places have you offered at one time? 
If unionised, what has been the attitude of the unions to the scheme? 
2. Selection 
Have you been prepared to accept anyone sent by the Careers Service? 
Have you been prepared to accept trainees of either sex? 
Have you required certain minimum qualifications? 
What else have you taken account of in making your selection? 
Have you applied different criteria than for the recruitment of normal 
employees? 
J. Induction 
What form of induction have you given your trainees? 
Were there any particular Health and Safety aspects of the job that 
needed pointing out? 
4. Planned Work Experience 
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Can you describe the range of work experience undertaken by your trainees? 
Has any on-the-job training been included? 
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How closely have the trainees been supervised? 
How much responsibility have the trainees been given? 
How realistic has the work experience been? 
In what ways have the trainees worked differently from normal employees? 
5. Off-the-';ob Training 
Have any of your trainees received any form of off-the-job training? 
Have you ever encouraged your trainees to take up such opportunities? 
6. Counselling 
Who has been responsible for supervision and counselling of the trainee? 
Have they had any specific training for this role? 
How have they gone about this role? 
7. Monitoring 
How regularly have the MSC visited your premises? 
What have they asked you about? 
How regularly has the Careers Service been in contact with you and your 
trainees? 
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What have the Careers Service been concerned about? 
If unionised, what role have the unions played in overseeing the scheme? 
8. End of Scheme 
How long have your trainees stayed with you? 
Have any proved unsatisfactory ? 
Have you taken on any at the end of their scheme? 
Do you know what has happened to those you have not taken on? If so, 
how many have got jobs and what kind of jobs? 
What other benefits have trainees received from their experience? 
9. Costs and Benefits for Sponsor 
How has involvement in YOP affected your normal pattern of recruitment? 
How much extra work and expense has involvement in the scheme cost you? 
How much have the trainees contributed in terms of productive work? 
Are you intending to contribute to YTS? 
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SUB-APPENDIX 2 
MONITORING REPORT 
WORK EXPERIENCE ON EMPLOYERS PREMISES 
In YES/NO questions where the answer to the questions is NO explain or give details of action taken 
or proposed. 
RECRUITMENT 
How many trainees are now on the scheme? 
2 Have all the trainees been recruited from ESO/CO? 
3 Is the sponsor finding it reasonably easy to fill places? 
THE SCHEME 
4 
5 
Are all the trainees being given a planned induction period on first joining the scheme 
eg was holiday entitlement explained? 
Have newly recruited trainees received their copies of the "Where do I start" 
booklet, and the Health and Safety leaflet? (Health and Safety leaflet not yet to hand). 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
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In YES/NO questions where the answer to the questions is NO explain or give details of action taken 
or proposed. 
6 Are trainees undertaking the range of work experience as described on the proposal forms? YES/NO 
7 Are sponsor's normal recruitment and training arrangements continuing? YES/NO 
8 a) Have arrangements been made for the CS or ESD to provide trainees with advice 
about possibilities of permanent employment or a further YOP opportunity? 
b) Has the sponsor considered retaining the trainee(s) as a permanent employee(s)? 
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 
9 Is the Responsible Officer effectively controlling the overall operation of the scheme? 
(In all cases, give brief details of the degree of involvement) 
10 Are trainees being adequately supervised on tasks? (In all cases, give brief details of 
arrangements for supervision) 
11 a) Are assessment and progress records properly maintained? 
b) Is all attendance, timekeeping and progress recorded as satisfactory? 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
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In YES/NO questions where the answer to the questions is NO explain or give details of action taken 
or proposed. 
12 Outline the arrangements for participation of trainees in appropriate forms of associated training 
and further education, including social and life skills, on-the-job, day release, etc. 
13 a) Has the sponsor received an adequate supply of the YOP certificates? 
b) Has the importance of the certificate been explained to the trainee as an 
employment reference and/or for the purpose of claiming benefit? 
c) Is the sponsor satisfied that YOP certificates have been issued to young persons 
who have terminated? 
FINANCE PROCEDURES 
14 Does the sample check of pay sheets (SP26) against the sponsor's attendance 
records give cause for concern? 
15 Is there any evidence of additional payments to young people? 
16 a) Is the payments procedure satisfactory? 
b) Are allowances receipted correctly? 
17 Are the arrangements for dealing with unpaid items in accordance with 
the instructions? 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
In YES/NO questions where the answer to the questions is NO explain or give details of action 
taken or proposed. 
CONDITIONS AND WELFARE 
18 Are operating conditions satisfactory? 
19 a) Is protective clothing necessary? 
b) Does the sponsor provide it? 
20 Briefly outline any obvious health or safety hazards (eg is machinery guarded, 
are warning notices posted, etc?) and if there are, state what action has been suggested 
21 Are fire instructions clearly displayed and fire exits free from obstruction? 
22 Are first aid facilities readily available? 
23 Is there an Accident Book? 
24 a) Is Employers' Liability (Compulsory) I nsurance cover provided and a 
certificate displayed? 
24 b) Is there any additional insurance cover? (detail is YES) 
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YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
In YES/NO questions where the answer to the questions is NO explain or give details of action 
taken or proposed. 
25 a) Were there any disabled young people on the project/scheme at the time of the visit? 
b) I f so, briefly detail what arrangements have been made for them and state 
whether they are satisfactory 
TRAINEES' COMMENTS 
26 Do the trainees consider that their induction to the scheme covered satisfactorily all the 
necessary subjects eg hours of work, holidays, allowances paid, sickness, accidents, time 
off for interview etc? 
27 a) What are the trainees' opinions of the scheme programme? 
b) Have they any suggestions for improvement? 
28 Do the trainees consider the provisions made for personal advice and support adequate? 
29 Any other general observations. (This should include any suggestion for revision of the 
scheme programme which can be discussed with the sponsor(s). A brief report should be 
made here on any schemes awarded status" A".) 
Dd 8246674 SOOM S&K 8/80 
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YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
!'-
rl 
to 
>< H q 
~ ~ 
1 § 
U) 
AO STAJ7F 
EEO 
TRAINER 
REO OR ?ULL 
TIME Ql EO 
HEO/EO 
HEO/EO 
TRAIll'ER 
lIEO + EO 
REO + EO 
PROGRAMME OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PROFILING AND TCR BY:-
OR 
PBl.SENTATION TO fw'..ANAGER/SPONSOR ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
PR.E!JENTATIOU TO SUPERVISOR OF BASIC SKILLS PROFILE •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
OOCUMENTATIOlJ ON I~TIAL ASSESSMENT ('CAN DO' PROFILE, 
SELF !sSES~r TECHNIQUES ETC) (LOG BOOKS) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
OOCID-lElll'ATION ON BASIC SKILLS PROFILES AND MATRIX •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• til •• 
FINALISE DE"I'AILS ••• ,-•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
PIm5ENTATION TO SUPERVISORS ON SKILLS SAMPLING 
ASSESSMEm' TEX:HNIQUES + TCR 
CHECK PRQG.RESS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Cmx;K FINAL 'VER!?ION ............................................................... . 
DAY 
DAY. 
DAY. 
DAY 
DAY. 
nAY 
DAY. 
nAY • 
HEolEo ~ FOL1O'J UP AFTER A..~ ;:! ~~~ ~ ................................................................. . 6th }iONTH ~ 
AO STAFF 
TOTAL TIME PER SCHEME - MIN 
REO TEAM LEADER .. ~ DAYS 
AO QI EO '" 3 + 2 DAYS' 
TRAIh'ER .. 2 DATS 
RO STAFF 
QlO. 
TRAINER. 
EO. (Ql). 
EO.(Ql). 
EO. (CU). 
TRliNEB • 
QlO.+ EO (Ql). 
QlO. + EO (Ql)' 
cuO.+ EO (Ql). 
RO STAFF 
TOrAL. (KIN). 
RQlO .• ~ DAYS. 
, . 
QIEO.. ~ + 2 DA YI. 
TRAINER. 2 DAYS. 
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